“Buy-it-now” or “sell-it-now” auctions : effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanisms

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorGrebe, Tim-
dc.contributor.authorIvanova-Stenzel, Radosveta-
dc.contributor.authorKröger, Sabine-
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-09T17:11:42Z-
dc.date.available2019-02-23-
dc.date.issued2016-02-23-
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765fr_CA
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/63-
dc.description.abstractWe study experimentally the effect of bargaining power in two sequential mechanisms that offer the possibility to trade at a fixed price before an auction. In the “Buy-It-Now” format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price prior to the auction; whereas in the “Sell-It-Now” format, it is the buyer. Both formats are extensively used in online and offline markets. Despite very different strategic implications for buyers and sellers, results from our experiment suggest no effects of bargaining power on aggregate outcomes. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity within sellers. Sellers who ask for high prices not only benefit from having the bargaining power but also earn revenue above those expected in the auction.fr_CA
dc.description.abstractKeywords: Buy-It-Now price; Sell-It-Now price; private value auction; single item auction; sequential selling mechanism; fixed price; auction.fr_CA
dc.languageENGfr_CA
dc.publisherElsevierfr_CA
dc.title“Buy-it-now” or “sell-it-now” auctions : effects of changing bargaining power in sequential trading mechanismsfr_CA
dc.typeCOAR1_1::Texte::Périodique::Revue::Contribution à un journal::Article::Article de recherche-
dcterms.bibliographicCitationEconomics lettersfr_CA
dc.audienceProfesseurs (Enseignement supérieur)fr_CA
dc.audienceÉtudiantsfr_CA
dc.audienceDoctorantsfr_CA
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.025fr_CA
dc.subject.rvmPrix--Fixationfr_CA
dc.subject.rvmVente aux enchèresfr_CA
dc.subject.rvmVente aux enchères sur Internetfr_CA
dc.subject.rvmNégociations (Affaires)--Modèles mathématiquesfr_CA
dcterms.date.accepted2015-12-22-
rioxxterms.versionAccepted Manuscriptfr_CA
rioxxterms.version_of_recordhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.025fr_CA
rioxxterms.project.funder_nameSocial Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canadafr_CA
bul.rights.periodeEmbargo36 moisfr_CA
Collection:Articles publiés dans des revues avec comité de lecture

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