Comprendre les (non) interventions militaires de la France en Afrique subsaharienne à l'aide de la théorie cohabitationniste

Authors: Zoungni, Fiacre
Advisor: Kimball, AnessaPaquin, Jonathan
Abstract: Despite the end of colonization in the 1960s in Africa, France remained present on the continent through several agreements and conventions signed with its former colonies in order to establish cooperation in several fields (economic, monetary, political, cultural, defense). Thanks to a particular military policy, France intervenes militarily in several civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, it sometimes refuses to intervene in others. The problematic of this research is to explain the reasons why France intervenes militarily in certain civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and why it refuses to intervene in others. To solve this enigma, this thesis develops the theory of cohabitation or cohabitationist theory based on the transactional principle of the delegation of power developed by the neoinstitutionalist rational choice that aims to assess the democratic performance of political regimes. This theory, composed of two models, states that because of the institutional and political constraints that arise during periods of cohabitation, it is difficult for a French government to initiate a military intervention in sub-Saharan Africa. This situation, peculiar to the semi-presidential regimes, explains France's refusal to intervene militarily in certain civil conflicts. On the other hand, in times of unified government, it is easier to trigger a military intervention since there is a coherence and a concordance of government and presidential policies. Empirically, we have shown that the refusal of France to intervene in Côte d'Ivoire in 1999 after the military coup and in the Central African Republic after the mutinies of 1998 and 2001, was in essence linked to the institutional conflict engendered by the third cohabitation (1997 - 2002). During this period, we noted that despite the fact that several written questions were sent to the government by French parliamentarians to know the attitude of France with regard to these political instabilities, the option of a military intervention was not selected. On the other hand, after the presidential elections of 21 April and 5 May 2002 and the legislative elections of 9 and 16 June 2002, France has entered a new era of unified government. It was during this period that the French government was able to initiate Operation Licorne by sending armed troops to Côte d'Ivoire in 2002 and Operation Boali in 2003 to the Central African Republic.
Document Type: Thèse de doctorat
Issue Date: 2019
Open Access Date: 9 January 2020
Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/37735
Grantor: Université Laval
Collection:Thèses et mémoires

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