Enchère k-double tronquée : test sur la collusion
|Advisor:||Doyon, Maurice; Tamini, Lota Dabio|
|Abstract:||The adoption of a centralized system of quota acquisition in the Québec egg production sector improved the availability of market information and raised the market efficiency. However the use of the T-kDA raises some questions regarding the possibilities of collusive and strategic behaviors, because of the limited number of participants to the auction’s sessions. In this study, we use the experimental economics approach to test the T-kDA in optimal collusion conditions. Our results suggest that collusion works when all the sellers and all the auction’s participants do communicate, but also when we have three sellers. Our results also show that with only one seller (monopolistic situation); his bid is smaller than the ones with three sellers communicating in contrast to the teaching of the economic theory. That is explained by the fact that in monopolistic situation, the seller does not know if he is the only seller. With three sellers in communication, the coordination between them produces a higher clearing price. The results also confirm that the T-kDA lower significantly the market price with or without collusive conditions. In other words, the truncated rule does not have a significant effect regarding the collusion when compare to the kDA.|
|Document Type:||Mémoire de maîtrise|
|Open Access Date:||18 April 2018|
|Collection:||Thèses et mémoires|
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