Structural homophily

Authors: Boucher, Vincent
Abstract: Homophily, or the fact that similar individuals tend to interact with each other, is a prominent feature of economic and social networks. I show that the equilibrium structure of homophily has empirical power. I build a strategic model of network formation, which produces a unique equilibrium network. Individuals have homophilic preferences and face capacity constraints on the number of links. I develop a novel empirical method, based on the shape of the equilibrium network, which allows for the identi cation and estimation of the underlying homophilic preferences. I apply this new methodology to the formation of friendship networks.
Document Type: Article de recherche
Issue Date: 23 January 2015
Open Access Date: 6 April 2018
Document version: AM
Permalink: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/17545
This document was published in: International Economic Review, Vol. 56 (1), 235–264 (2015)
https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12101
Philadelphia Economics Dept. of the University of Pennsylvania
Alternative version: 10.1111/iere.12101
Collection:Articles publiés dans des revues avec comité de lecture

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