Providing global public goods under uncertainty
|Authors:||Boucher, Vincent; Bramoullé, Yann|
|Abstract:||We study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods. We consider a benchmark model with homogeneous countries and linear payoffs. When countries directly contribute to a public good, uncertainty tends to lower signatories' efforts but may increase participation. Despite risk aversion, uncertainty may improve welfare. In contrast, when countries try to reduce a global public bad, uncertainty tends to increase signatories' efforts and decrease participation. In that case, an ex-ante reduction of uncertainty may have a large positive multiplier effect on welfare.|
|Document Type:||Article de recherche|
|Issue Date:||15 June 2010|
|Open Access Date:||3 April 2018|
|This document was published in:||Journal of public economics, Vol. 94 (9-10), 591-603 (2010)|
North Holland Pub. Co.
|Collection:||Articles publiés dans des revues avec comité de lecture|
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