Providing global public goods under uncertainty
Authors: | Boucher, Vincent; Bramoullé, Yann |
Abstract: | We study how uncertainty and risk aversion affect international agreements to supply global public goods. We consider a benchmark model with homogeneous countries and linear payoffs. When countries directly contribute to a public good, uncertainty tends to lower signatories' efforts but may increase participation. Despite risk aversion, uncertainty may improve welfare. In contrast, when countries try to reduce a global public bad, uncertainty tends to increase signatories' efforts and decrease participation. In that case, an ex-ante reduction of uncertainty may have a large positive multiplier effect on welfare. |
Document Type: | Article de recherche |
Issue Date: | 15 June 2010 |
Open Access Date: | 3 April 2018 |
Document version: | AM |
Permalink: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/17501 |
This document was published in: | Journal of public economics, Vol. 94 (9-10), 591-603 (2010) https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.008 North Holland Pub. Co. |
Alternative version: | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.06.008 |
Collection: | Articles publiés dans des revues avec comité de lecture |
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