What About Canada? The Changing Dynamics of the Indexation Theory: A Content Analysis of The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star

Mémoire

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Résumé

Notre projet de recherche, *What about Canada? The Changing Dynamics of the Indexing Theory: A Content Analysis of The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star*, traite de la théorie de l'indexation dans un contexte canadien. Par conséquent, le principal problème illustré par Bennett et Pfetsch (2018) est que la théorie de l'indexation supprime les « voix alternatives » au lieu d'inclure ces « nouvelles » voix afin d'équilibrer les sources journalistiques. Dans ce nouvel environnement fracturé, il est plus complexe qu'auparavant d'équilibrer des perspectives et des opinions différentes en raison de la participation d'acteurs différents dans l'arène politique. L'argument principal de cette thèse est qu'il est impératif de tester la théorie de l'indexation et d'adapter ses éléments centraux au nouvel environnement politique. Cela signifie une inclusion de ce nouvel environnement dans les hypothèses de base qui incluront les récits alternatifs. C'est dans ce contexte que nous avons décidé d'analyser la question des politiques d'immigration au Canada et son indexation par les médias. Par conséquent, cette thèse est consacrée à une analyse des relations entre les médias et les autorités politiques officielles au Canada, notamment en abordant la question de la place des récits alternatifs dans le discours journalistique canadien.
Abstract

Our research project, “What about Canada? The Changing Dynamics of the Indexing Theory: A Content Analysis of The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star,” is dealing with the theory of indexing in a Canadian context. Therefore, the main problem illustrated by Bennett and Pfetsch (2018) is that indexing theory removes “alternative voices,” instead of including these “new” voices in order to balance the sources. In this new fractured environment, it is more complex than before to balance different perspectives and opinions because of the involvement of different actors in the political arena. The main argument of this thesis is that it is imperative to test the theory of indexation and to adapt its central elements to the new political environment. This means an inclusion of this new environment to the basic assumptions that will include alternative narratives. It is in this context that we decided to analyze the issue of immigration policies in Canada and its indexing by the media. Consequently, this thesis is devoted to an analysis of the relationship between the media and official political authorities in Canada, in particular, by addressing the question of the place of alternative narratives in Canadian journalistic discourse.
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‘A’ohe hana nui ke alu ‘ia.
No task is too big when done together by all.
Introduction

We are particularly interested on how Canada, in recent years\(^1\), had to deal with a more than ever fractured political environment; this fractured environment has been fuelled by a fear of the “othering” of Canadian politics (Dauvergne 2016). As Dauvergne (2016) mentions in *The Politics of Immigration and the End of Settler Societies*, managing migratory movements is one of the most pressing issues for advanced liberal democracies like Canada; by managing migratory movements, it is suggested the ability of the government to secure its frontiers, and its ability to welcome and aid these newcomers to Canada. Considered as a traditional settler country, Canada is now adopting “a mean-spirited politics of immigration”\(^2\)—a hard-line immigration remodeling—in response to global issues such as the three shifts highlighted by Dauvergne (2016): (1) the asylum’s crisis; (2) the fear of Islamic fundamentalism, and (3) the end of the ideological multiculturalism\(^3\). These three shifts inherently and significantly changed the already fragile line between asylum and illegal migration (Dauvergne 2016); undoubtedly, this combination of past and present events accentuated advanced liberal government’s desire to securitize immigration by enforcing security measures at our borders\(^4\), and enact laws and policies to prevent further damage to this already fragile political environment (Dauvergne 2016; Castello 2018; Bourbeau 2008).

In Canada as in other advanced liberal democracies, different migrant groups such as asylum seekers, migrants and refugees are depicted, in newspaper reports, as an anonymous and poorly qualified group of professionals, as criminals or as “fake” claimants (Lawlor and Tolley 2017). For the reader, they are “the others” and it is this limited characterization that shapes the discourse citizens have on migrants and thus, shapes public opinion on the matter. Indeed, the media’s treatment of immigration has a direct influence on the image and opinion

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\(^1\) Within this year (2015), Canada had a federal election campaign – where the Liberals took power with Justin Trudeau –, a campaign that promised to resettle 25,000 Syrian and Iraqi refugees by the end of the year, a plan deemed ambitious by the opposition and ambiguously applauded by resettlement groups within Canada. This election promise sparked public debate and a broad media coverage. On the matter and beyond, see Hynie (2018).

\(^2\) The term “mean-spirited politics” is portrayed by Dauvergne as: “The newness of this politics is found in its intensity, its urgency, and its legality. Never before have immigration issues been at the center of the political stage in so many places at the same time. Never before has the political attention to immigration drawn such a highly legalized response. Never before as hostility towards immigrants been quite so widespread, and quite so nasty. The politics of immigration has taken a sharp turn in the early years of the twenty-first century.” (Dauvergne 2016, 1) This term is used to counter the changing environment in which governments are facing regarding the greater influx of immigrants in their respective country.

\(^3\) These three shifts are associated to the anti-immigrant sentiment, the fear of “invasion” (here read crimmigration, this link between immigrants and a higher risk of criminality), and the political disenchantment from traditional ways of doing politics. Cf. Will Kymlicka, (2012) *Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

\(^4\) E.g. biometric screening, PNR, and other technologies to prevent malevolent passengers on entering the continent.
a particular society has on this phenomenon. The way information is processed, the systematic use of stereotypes and the repetition of certain informative elements guide and eventually create a unique thought on the issue (Helbling 2014; Innes 2010; Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007).

A) Media, Immigration and Framing

Framing, or framing theory, is understood as a theory that “help interpret and reconstruct reality” (Volkmer 2009, 408). The central aspect of framing is how individuals, in a certain cultural context, can identify, interpret and perceive the reality surrounding their everyday routine. This disentangle view of an everyday routine simplifies the individual’s vision of the received information (Goffman 1986). Today’s framing theory has “allow[ed] us to detect journalistic bias. The use of stereotypical framing, frames along gender lines, or imbalances of the representation of relevant societal communities, such as ethnic minorities within a national or transnational public, are examples of different frames that might be used.” (Volkmer 2009, 409). In the 1970s, with the rise of mass media, the agenda-setting theory posed that the media drawn the attention of the public toward certain issues copiously treated in their contents. However, nowadays, the research regarding framing in the news has been re-oriented toward the study of elite discourses (but also at reporting both sides of a single story), and at a more micro-level (Lippmann 1992; Entman 2007, 1993; Reese 2001; Scheufele 1999).

Highlighted by scholars (Benson 2017; Lawlor 2015a) over the last decades is how framing the “immigration question” influences the political outcomes. In fact, framing migration in a certain way tends—negatively or positively—to influence the public opinion on the matter. On the “immigration question,” previous studies have highlighted various macro-frames such as “threat frame” (Benson 2013), “heroic frame” (Benson 2013), and “managerialist frame” (d’Hænens and Lange 2001). Further, meso-frames have also drawn attention to include the following categories: “victimization” (Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007), “immigrant-as-threat” (Figenschou and Thorbjørnsrud 2015), or even as a question of “diversity” (Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007; Igartua and Cheng 2009). These meso-frames have exposed migrants as illegal, as a direct attack on the state sovereignty and
thus fragilized the State’s image on its ability to decide who can enter or not its territory (Bagaric and Morss 2005; Dauvergne 2004; Bosniak 1991). Moreover, Wallace (2018) mentions that “Newly emerging research [such as Lawlor and Tolley (2017)] also demonstrates the importance of disaggregating immigration as a category to focus more specifically on how various classes of immigrants are framed differently in news media, and a key difference is between immigrants and refugees.” (2018, 210)

The way in which migrants are portrayed by the mainstream media can harmfully impact the newcomers. Research regarding the framing of migrants in the news has pointed that a lack of understanding of certain key laws such as the international law, the national law regarding immigration and refugee laws, and the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P) have a negative impact when journalists report on a story, which alters the public’s opinion on the matter (Doherty 2015; Dreher 2010; Lawlor 2015a). This poor fact checking transforms the news storyline and can lead to imbalances, which directly affect the audience, the public’s perception of newcomers and can eventually shift the rhetoric on migrants, all caused by unchecked/unreliable information (Benson 2017; Buonfino 2004). Moreover, this prejudice in connection to asylum seekers, refugees and migrants have greatly fuelled this international anti-immigration sentiment (Dijk 1987; Doherty 2015).

Public opinion on the immigration issue in Canada is also influenced by internal populist rhetoric. On populism in the West, Mudde defines populism as “a discursive strategy employed by political entrepreneurs who claim to embody a virtuous people against morally corrupt elites. Whether left or right, in opposition or in office, populists challenge pluralism and seek to undermine the liberal-democratic institutions that protect both minorities and educated elites.” (Mudde, Mérand, and Momani 2017, 5)5 Four elements are often defined as the practical definition of the contemporary far-right and seem to make “consensus” as a starting point. According to Cas Mudde, nationalism, xenophobia, law and order, as well as chauvinism, allow the justification of the so-called groups of the populist radical right6. This

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5 For a more elaborated discussion on this debated terminology, see Cas Mudde, (2016). The Populist Radical Right: A Reader. London: Routledge.
6 The risk of populism is not solely restricted to Francophones, but also to Anglophones. Cultural sensitivities are accentuated by a problem of democratic representation and elites-citizens discourse mismatch. Furthermore, such a social and political gap can “fester and become even more ripe for exploitation by calculating political actors, leading to the overt bigotry seen in many countries today. It is not
concept allows a basic ideological classification within a unified family, despite the heterogeneity of extreme right parties (Mudde 2016).7

The public opinion is also influenced by the so-called “fake news” or commonly known as disinformation; even if disinformation is not a new phenomenon, social networks and new media platforms such as Twitter or Facebook as lead to a sudden bloom of these specifics “news” (L. Bennett and Livingston 2018; L. Bennett and Pfetsch 2018). In short, it is understood that disinformation is a phenomenon in which the “issuer” has the firm purpose of exercising some kind of influence and control over its “recipients” so that they act according to the issuer’s wishes. It is, therefore, a clearly intentional phenomenon, in which the issuer seeks its own benefit and in which, therefore, and as van Dijk (2006) explains, an abuse of power occurs. The new informational ecosystem has new actors, new economic and political logic, new business models and also new cultural practices, while the intensive privatization of the public sphere and media polarization have eroded the legitimacy of the media as institutions of democracy and even dislocating the social role of journalism (Norris 2010; L. Bennett and Livingston 2018). The new informational ecosystem is a scenario of power battles that is now being fought in cyberspace both through attacks between machines and disinformation strategies, and the very nature of the network makes it an especially complicated and more complex fight (Chadwick 2013).

Thus, it is important to analyze Canada’s profile with regard to its relationship with such political actors. In essence, elections do not define democracy, but they remain a critical component of the democratic process because they provide the opportunity and the basis for solidifying confidence in the institutions that support it. The electoral system plays a vital role in establishing this trust, by translating the popular will into elected representatives, parties and governments (Przeworski 1995). For this, it is necessary that the rules of the electoral game be perceived as equitable.

unimaginable that a more charismatic politician than Conservative MP Kellie Leitch, with more sophisticated tactics, could use English Canadians’ discomfort with social diversity to garner political support” (Medeiros 2018).

7 The most important common denominator to be retained is their ethnonationalist and exclusive conception of citizenship, mainly reflected in their electoral slogans where the focus is on the common people first and foremost (Rydgren 2007; Carter 2011). This “nativist” position means that states should exclusively include members of the early installed community, and that non-primary group threaten or end up threatening the so-called homogeneous nation state (Mudde 2004; 2007). As some groups are heavily involved in immigration issues, some researchers simply refer to “anti-immigration parties” (Minkenberg 2002; Davies et al. 2002). Again, for a more elaborated discussion on this debated terminology, see Cas Mudde, (2016). The Populist Radical Right: A Reader. London: Routledge.
This fear of “othering” combined with this disenchantment also influences the way media organization has reported the news in the last years; classically, media organization had well-defined audiences, communication processes, and the effect of these processes were known. Nowadays, while the classic sphere was imposing stability and sustainability for government support, scholars have pointed out toward a legitimacy crisis fuelled or fasten by outside groups pressuring the government, and thus, delegitimizing its establishment. This crisis forces and engages news organizations and political institutions to rethink their engagement toward citizens (Bartels 2017; Aelst et al. 2017).

B) Alternative narratives within the news
The main argument of this thesis is that it is imperative to test the indexation theory and to adapt its core elements to the new political environment. This means an inclusion of the basis hypotheses that includes the alternative narratives and moves away from the pre-2000 context. In order to test the hypotheses and includes the alternative narratives, I argue that we have to (a) reconsider the environment in which marginalized voices have evolved; and (b) re-evaluate the temporal boundaries the media organizations refer to.

The environment, or spatial barriers, is understood as the political and social conditions in which marginalized voices have evolved in. Even if media, in advanced liberal democracies, monitor events for the welfare of citizens, identify key societal problems, provide a platform for debate, and analyze/control the information given by political institutions; these organizations do not capture the context in which a marginalized voice has been mobilized or even evolved (Norris 2010; Benson 2013). The issue of multiculturalism in Canada has been an economic and political cornerstone of policies for at least the last forty years, a product, initially, of Franco and Anglo-Canadian relations, in a context in which the international community began to give importance to the inclusion of principles related to the recognition of minorities within international law (Kymlicka 2001). For Kymlicka, it is possible to construct a liberal political theory permitting differentiation of citizenship on the basis of cultural belonging. To do this, he proposes an analytical tool that presents itself from
three angles: “social cultures”, “national minorities v. ethnic groups,” and “minority claims” (Kymlicka 2001; 2007). It is in that context that marginalized voices were mobilized, until today, in an environment inclined to inclusion and diversity, but how was it reflected in the news?

The temporal boundaries evaluation is understood as the ability of the media to act autonomously in the different spheres of power through time and how media is affected by the changing environment as to consider marginalized voices (Hallin 1986; L. Bennett 1990; Livingston and Eachus 1996). As marginalized voices are event-driven, it has pushed media organizations to include marginalized voices in order to balance news’ power. In fact, pseudo-experts and new political actors challenged the political consensus agenda among elites mainly due to new technological advances such as the Internet where marginalized voices are more likely to be heard by a greater public (Benson 2017; Chadwick 2013). The temporality of the marginalized voices is reflected with our two hypotheses. Finally, it is believed, by moving away from the pre-Cold war era mindset at the epicentre of the indexation theory, that the segmentation of audiences and disinterest in politics limits the effectiveness of media organizations (Hallin 1986; L. Bennett 2012; Livingston and Eachus 1996).

It is important to define what we mean by “dissident,” “marginalized,” or “alternative” voices within the news. In 1986, Hallin defined dissident voices within his “sphere of deviance” as “the realm of those political actors and views which journalists and the political mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being heard.” (Hallin 1986, 117) The author pursues his definition of “marginalized voices” by adding that journalists have the role of “exposing, condemning, or excluding from the public agenda those who violate or challenge

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8 The first describes a system of differentiation of cultures based on the existence of “societal cultures”, the basic elements of its method of differentiation. The second angle is based on a grid of analysis used to differentiate between “national minorities” and “ethnic groups”. Finally, the third presents the important distinctions to be considered between the different types of requests claimed by these groups (Kymlicka 2001).

9 During the Cold War era, dissident voices are labelled as Communists; in this perspective, every voice, for the Americans, is perceived as a threat to their concept of “foreign policies.” In that way, we can clearly mention that there has been an evolution, temporal evolution, of the concept. However, today, dissident voices are still perceived as destabilizing the status quo by influencing the journalists’ report of what constitute a newsworthy story. In that sense, we have to widen the definition given to dissident voices, or at least, move away from its Cold War definition. It means the inclusion of another hypothesis to the theory, which would take into account the dissident voices as directly influencing the possible outcome of the news’ report (Hallin 1986; L. Bennett 1990; Livingston and Eachus 1996).
the political consensus.” (Hallin 1986, 117) However, what is understood by “unworthy of being heard”? Who is included and who is excluded from that definition?

In 1990, Bennett, in his article *Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations*, gave a greater understanding of when these voices are mobilized and who these dissident voices are. According to Bennett, dissident voices are to only be mobilized in a particular context:

Culturally speaking, it is generally reasonable for journalists to grant government officials a privileged voice in the news, unless the range of official debate on a given topic excludes or “marginalizes” stable majority opinion in society, and unless official actions raise doubts about political propriety. In these “exceptional” circumstances, it is reasonable for the press to foreground other social voices (polls, opposition groups, academics, political analysts) in news stories and editorials as checks against unrepresentative or otherwise irresponsible governments. (L. Bennett 1990, 104)

Here, “other social voices” are understood as polls, opposition groups, academics, and political analysts. However, this definition has proved to be flexible over the years as the definition left us to interpret what is considered as deviant. Regardless of this flexibility, we have defined dissident voices in a domestic context as an individual or a group outside the political sphere of influence – here understood as an individual or a group not withholding power – seeking to contribute to the debate regarding a specific topic. We believe that dissident voices, “seek to define and occupy an in-between space, resistant to prevailing orthodoxy [...] the dissenter affirms [his] continuing allegiance to the community [it] criticizes.” (Sarat 2012, 3)

As previously mentioned by Bennett in the 1990s, “other social voices” have already been including academics and opposition groups. However, we believe that it also includes, as Benson (2017) highlighted, religious leaders/communities, trade unionists, community associations, youth, community leaders, judiciary professionals, and far-
left or far-right organizations\textsuperscript{16} (Benson 2017). We also believe that dissident voices are not equally heard as journalists proceed to a certain sorting. For example, marginalized voices such as academics and lawyers are more likely to be deemed acceptable to be presented to the news than a far-right figure or pseudo-experts\textsuperscript{17}. These new inclusions are to balance the sources as a way to be considered as semi-independent from the elite’s discourses (L. Bennett and Livingston 2003).

Lastly, Bennett's theory prevailed over those of Entman, Robinson, or other theoreticians for two reasons. First, this choice was made upon this idea that the indexation theory took into account the changing environment in which media organizations are embedded in. As early as 2003, Bennett is already thinking about the inclusion of dissident voices and the importance of social media and the Internet have on the way journalists report news; on the contrary, Entman’s theory prioritize a top-down approach to journalism and how these professionals are more likely to be use as “middlemen” rather than unique actors in framing various issues. In fact, “In times when the media landscape undergoes rapid change and ‘social media’ seem to make the so-called legacy media less relevant than before, it is important to stress that [it is this so-called “conflicted” or “dual” role media organization is taking in order to overcome the changing journalistic environment and to still satisfy the political elites, that interested us].” (Bruun Andersen 2017, 165) The first and the second reasons are thus intertwined. The indexation theory seemed more appropriate to our study as we are mostly intrigued by the relation between media organizations and the political elites and how these two spheres react to the changing dynamics of their surrounding environment that is at large decentered and influenced by “new” political actors (Cecen 2015). We were intrigued by how journalists are not solely acting as “mirrors” and reflecting elites’ opinions, but how journalists have also taken into account the public opinion and play on this dual aspect of journalism.

\textsuperscript{16} We also include spokespersons of these particular groups.
\textsuperscript{17} This last point might also depend on the political stance of the news organization as well as its level of journalistic standards. News organizations that are usually more incline to sensationalism might be willing to emphasize the ‘emotion’ side of a story rather than educating the general population of a specific topic. In the context of pseudo-experts, they are deemed as “credible” by journalists as they believe in their authority, but which can ultimately cause disinformation (Benson 2017).
C) Mediated Politics

One of the core media theories is re-evaluating this fractured political environment. In its simplest formulation, the indexing theory expresses that the media coverage coincides with the interests of the political elites, broadly defining them as members of the executive, legislative or any other political group withholding power. Further, Lance Bennett suggests, with his indexing theory, that the news services of the mainstream media are indexed to the dynamics of the governmental debate (L. Bennett 1990; 2012). The author, in News: the politics of illusion, emphasizes the role of the new communication system and its impacts on the democratic government of the United States, answering the following question: How well do the news produced by this new system serve the needs of democracy? Exploring this question, the book analyzes, on the one hand, what is the relationship of political actors with news and, on the other, how journalists and news centres report the stories. In both relations, Lance Bennett takes into account that technological advances and the transformation of information consumption habits have forced various and important changes.

These important changes18 are illustrated by Bennett and Pfetsch (2018). Their main observation is that the indexation theory is suppressing the so-called alternative voices, instead of including these new voices in order to balance the sources. In this fractured environment, it is more complex than before to balance views and opinions due to the implication of various actors in the political sphere, or at least groups or individuals trying to step into the political sphere and influence the audience’s opinion on certain sensitive topics such as immigration (Bennett and Livingston 2018; Bennett and Pfetsch 2018).

However, by suppressing the so-called alternative voices, researchers have constrained, for the last thirty years or so, the indexing theory to boundaries established in a context of international crisis. Thus, in this perspective, studies regarding the integration of alternative narratives have been conducted in a Cold war mindset. Within this period, researchers have concluded to a uniformity in debates mainly due to allies protecting the Americans’ interests.

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18 According to Bennett and Pfetsch, “The resulting weakening of traditional bases for validating information has further opened societies to bots, trolls, hacking, and disinformation from outside sources.”, which ultimately led to a “contemporary political communication increasingly taking place in contexts defined by diminished citizen attention, hybrid media systems, the rise of undemocratic movements and parties, and networked, often polarized, political information flows.” On hybrid media systems see (Chadwick 2013).
Throughout their analyses, researchers have concluded to similar results about the role of the press regarding foreign policy-related issues in the United States (Zaller and Chiu 1996; Livingston and Eachus 1996; Entman and Rojecki 1993; Althaus et al. 1996; Hayes and Guardino 2010). However, these studies have led Livingston and Bennett (2003; 2018) to identify two main ways to modernize the theory: a new alternative to the indexing theory (a) that include the addition of new voices, and (b) indexing the government’s debate dynamics to the media rather than the government’s elite discourses.

D) Thesis’s Objectives

To illustrate my argument, I focus on the case of immigration policies issue to Canada and how this issue is indexed by the media. The literature on immigration issues highlights four possibilities, or four frames\(^{19}\) (outcomes) to illustrate the case (Lawlor 2015a; Lawlor and Tolley 2017; Benson 2017; Wallace 2018). Depending on who is mobilized in the news story, the outcome frame will vary to reflect or move away from the elite’s official rhetoric. The following frames have been selected as scholars such as Lawlor (2015a) have pointed during their analysis of various newspapers and media mediums, that government has a greater tendency to frame the immigration question in words: “generally related to five thematic issues in Canadian coverage: refugees and asylum, illegality and security, economic and labour considerations, social services, and diversity.” (Wallace 2018, 210) Additionally, Lawlor and Tolley (2017) found that different immigration category also resulted in different outcomes; refugees are often framed as a security threat as immigrants are framed in terms of economy.

Thus, each elitist’s frame is analyzed through a content analysis based on Bennett’s hypotheses and the literature on migration portrayal in news. First, the economic frame looks at immigration from the angle of its impact – positive or negative – on the national economy; second, the identity frame refers to the rhetoric used by various actors to emphasize the identity changes undergoing by the host country and its repercussions for the “nation” identity (i.e. far-right rallies throughout Canada). The humanitarian frame assesses the humanitarian imperatives associated with migratory movements and the responsibility of the

\(^{19}\) Public security, economic, humanitarian and identity.
government to protect (i.e. R2P principle) its future citizens, and finally, the public security frame is highly influenced by events happening abroad and at home concerning terrorism and suspicious activities related to migrants and their relationship with kinship (i.e. 9/11 attacks, Charlie Hebdo, Bataclan) (Browning 2017). These four outcomes are perceived through the analysis and predicted how media organization framed the marginalized voices in regard to immigration policies. This different usage of the theory is anchored in the proposed testing of the core aspects of the theory in order to be coherent with the modern age of political institutions and its constant evolving environment (Chadwick 2013; L. Bennett and Pfetsch 2018). The case of immigration policies reflects how dissident voices, or alternative narratives, have been included in the news by journalists (Benson 2017; Sarat 2012).

Therefore, this thesis is devoted to analyzing the relationship that exists in Canada between the media and the official political authorities; in particular, whether the indexation and dissident voices hypotheses can predict the behaviour of Canadian media, more specifically in major national and local newspapers, here represented by The Globe and Mail, and The Toronto Star. Based on the predictions of the indexation hypotheses and the conclusions of the literature on dissident voices (a) the media coverage is oriented toward a single narrative identical to that of the official political discourse notably constituted by the Prime Minister, the government, and the parliamentary opposition20, and that (b) dissident voices have a greater chance of inclusion once the speech outcome is not related to the official discourse, but to a public concern such as health, detention conditions or citizenship (Benson 2017; Sarat 2012; Jørgensen and Agustín 2015; Meyer and Laschever 2014).

Drawing on the theory and the term “indexation,” first introduced by Lance Bennett (2012), it allows to establish a relationship between the centres of power and the media organizations. When speaking of “indexation,” it refers to the tendency of the media to adjust the points of view of the stories that are going to be published very close to the dominant ideologies of the political institutions, who have the power to change those situations (L. Bennett 1990; 2012). According to Bennett, to achieve these adjustments, journalists resort

20 See (Benson 2017; Sarat 2012; Given 2008; van Dijk 2006).
to framing the news in four categories: personalization, fragmentation, authority-disorder and dramatization (L. Bennett 2012). This journalistic style is thus a frame that contributes to the analysis of the strategic political game that shows a propensity of journalism in drama, conflict and negativity, with respect to individuals or political groups of the elite and that also entails a tendency to personalize the news. This study will compare the relative importance of four officials frames the public security frame (Castelli Gattinara and Morales 2017), the economic frame (d’Appollonia 2017), the identity frame (Browning 2017), and the humanitarian frame (Dijk 1987; d’Appollonia 2017).

E) Research question, hypotheses and methodology
This thesis seeks to test the literature on the indexation theory within Canada with a qualitative and longitudinal study that examines temporal evolution of the press coverage process between January 2013 to December 2016. It tackles the following question: How does the changing dynamics of the indexation theory influence the Canadian journalistic discourse? Therefore, the two hypotheses for our research are:

(H1) The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star have produced a coverage of the immigration policy issue oriented toward a single narrative\(^2\) identical to that of the official Canadian political discourse when in favour of the policy.

And

(H2) The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star have more often included dissident voices, both at the national and local levels\(^2\), in their news stories when opposing the official Canadian political discourse on the immigration policy issue.

The two hypotheses are based on our thesis question relating to the indexation theory and the literature on immigration and dissident voices. Indeed, the literature on immigration issues highlights four possibilities, or four frames (outcomes) to illustrate the case. Depending on who is mobilized in the news story, the outcome frame varies to reflect or move away from the elite’s official rhetoric (Benson 2017). This different usage of the theory is anchored in

\(^{21}\) Here we are referring to the four possible outcomes that are public security, identity, humanitarian or economic.

\(^{22}\) On the matter see Ono and Sloop (1995). If one of the previously mentioned frames is exposed as an elite’s preferred rhetoric specific to migration policies, then there is a lesser chance for dissent voices to be included. Indeed, if media reports news specific to a frame related to economic, identity, public security or humanitarian aid then the organization is acting in a ‘semi-independent’ way (Hallin 1986; L. Bennett 1990; L. Bennett and Livingston 2003). On the contrary, if there is a ‘dissent voice’ included in the news’ story, the previous four frames are less likely to be mobilized (Benson 2017; Lawlor 2015a; Lawlor and Tolley 2017; Igartua and Cheng 2009). In that case, media organizations have a greater flexibility in reporting the story and be considered as ‘independent’ from the official discourse.
the proposed testing of the core aspects of the theory in order to be coherent with the modern age of political institutions and its constant evolving environment.

The two journals are ideologically divergent. On the one hand, The Globe and Mail is considered, economically, as liberal but politically conservative (or right on the political ‘spectrum’); on the other hand, The Toronto Star is being labelled as a liberal and centre-left (Greenburg 2000)\textsuperscript{23}. The LIWC2015 software is used to facilitate and systematize the content analysis of our newspapers’ articles. The body of articles for analysis is compiled from the Lexis Nexis Academic database, which allowed us to gather all articles published in The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star within our timeframe, and responding to keywords: “immigration,” “refugee*,” “asylum seeker*” and “Canada”. For the years covered, the search returns 2,005 articles, but a total of 1,391 articles have been selected due to our inclusion factors\textsuperscript{24}. Given the volume of material to be analyzed, we chose to restrict the content analysis to a random sample of 10\% of the corpus, which represents 141 articles (i.e. this random sample is simplified thanks to \textit{Stata}). The initial analysis focused on the title of the article, and the language used to qualify these immigration policies through the economic, identity, humanitarian and public security discourses. These four discourses provide information regarding the indexation, or exclusion, of alternative voices within news stories. We have included opinions, chronicles, comments, letter to editors and editorials in our analysis, but duplicates have been excluded\textsuperscript{25}.

We first present, in Chapter 1, the indexation theory applied to the field of communication, a theory that explores the treatment of public affairs by the media. From the beginning, different approaches from different disciplines, lines of research and definitions have influenced the theory. This chapter will enable us to expose the competing theories from

\textsuperscript{23} Additionally, theses newspapers are targeting a more diverse readership than The National Post or Le Devoir.

\textsuperscript{24} We have excluded all articles relating to foreign policies, international immigration policies or international accords. Additionally, we have excluded articles that simply mentioned one of our keywords (i.e. “Canada,” “immigration,” “refugee,” or “asylum”) in their main body.

\textsuperscript{25} To examine the relative indexation discourse on immigration policies in Canada, we will cover a four-year period, where both the Conservative and the Liberal parties have governed the country. This period was chosen as the basis for our analysis mainly due to the fact that a regime change happened during the 2015 elections. During this period, the Canadian political sphere moved away from the Conservatives and toward the Liberals; this transition will serve as a guideline to see if we have a continuity or discontinuity in the media organizations’ rhetoric regarding immigration policies. This selection will enable us to observe, if this is the case, a divergence of speech or even of a subject of concern to the populations concerned.
Tuchman and Entman to Hallin and Bennett. Furthermore, this literature review highlighted a new way to index with recent research.

Chapters 2 and 3 are measuring and explaining our methodological element for this thesis by focusing on the thesis’s question, hypotheses, case selection, the keywords search, and finally, our categorization of media’s frames. As of Chapter 4, it rapidly summarizes the case of immigration in Canada while emphasizing the multicultural aspect of immigration policies from Harper to Trudeau. Chapter 5 examines the changing dynamics of the indexation theory in Canada by showcasing the obtained results, and conclusively, we will recapitulate our findings concerning the inclusion of dissident voices in Canada, discusses the main limits of our research and highlights potential avenues for future research. This thesis has accentuated at its beginning on how the public sphere is disrupted by the arrival of “new” actors. Thus, the following chapter is tasked to define and described the origin of the indexation theory, and how this fragmented environment has pressured the theory to re-evaluate its position.
Chapter 1 – A Press-Power Relation: Beyond the Dynamics of the Indexation Theory

we have turned into a public relations society. Much of the news Americans get each day was created to serve just that purpose—to be the news of the day. Many of our headlines come from events created by public relations—press conferences, speeches, press releases, canned reports, and worst of all, snappy comments by “spokesmen” or “experts.” (Pincus cited in Bennett 2012c, 111)

According to one of the indexation hypotheses put forward by Bennett (1990a), journalists in the leading media tend to ponder or “index” the ideas and points of view on a topic according to the points of view presented in the discussions of the political elites. The other voices appear in the news only when they pick up some point of view within the range of the dominant governmental debate or if they are associated with acts that “establish negative interpretative contexts for these voices” (L. Bennett 1990, 107), as is usually done with protests, strikes or civil disobedience.

The indexation theory applied to the field of communication explores the treatment of public affairs by the media, including the process of construction of the journalistic message, and how the media produce effects on individuals and society. Thus, from the beginning, different approaches from different disciplines, lines of research and definitions are established around this theory, which leads soon to speak of the theory of indexation as a “fractured paradigm” (Entman 1993).

1.1 Competing theories and the indexation theory elaborated by Lance Bennett

Tuchman (1978) describes news as a window whose frames limit the perception of reality, ignoring one part while focusing attention on another. This allows to build a series of textual or visual frames that revolve around an idea making it emerge indirectly. The creation and reproduction of these frames are what we call “framing.” As pointed out by one of the authors who has worked on the concept, the frame is a scattered or ambiguous concept, which has hindered its development on solid pillars and well-defined research lines (Entman 1993). Additionally, Tuchman (1978) suggests other elements that account for the approach: the
organization of the sections, the decision of what to publish and what not, the place where
the news is covered and the moment in which events happen. Finally, Hallin’s theory of
spheres of influence—consensus, legitimate controversy and deviance—highlighted that
framing is defined as a specialty of media studies and there is a willingness coming from
scholars to develop it as an instrument of empirical measurement (Hallin 1986).

1.1.1 Tuchman and Gramsci

The theory of framing comes to describe the interactive process by which subjects
interpret reality. The representations transmitted in the communicative products constitute a
key factor for the understanding of the social world, since they suppose a cognitive shortcut
so that the individuals can know realities of access or what surpasses their spatial and
temporal limits. Tuchman compares the news with a window to which we lean out to see
reality: “But the view from a window varies depending on whether it is large or small, if its
glass is clear or opaque, if it faces the street or a patio. The scene also depends on where one
is located, far or near, forcing the neck or looking effortlessly forward.” (Tuchman 1978, 1)
In this way, communication, representation and cognition are related in the concept of
symbolic mediation. Under this notion, the framing theory is based among other perspectives
that, together with other theoretical perspectives such as agenda-setting or gatekeeping,
recognize the power of the media to influence the cognitive processes of audiences and, so
much, potentially also in their attitudes and decisions²⁶ (Tuchman 1978).

In particular, the framing theory supposes a negation of the informative objectivism
when considering that the reference schemas provided in the journalistic information are not
a faithful reflection of the facts, but a symbolic representation of these realized through a
series of filters for its interpretation, as they are, for example, formats, professional routines,
personal characteristics of the journalist or those of the media organization (Goffman 1986).

²⁶ Tuchman’s studies have focused on the news’ effects on both the journalists and the media organizations. The means with which a
newspaper has when covering an information vary the final product that is offered to its readers. The roles and ways of working of the
informant also influence the final product or the abundance/scarcity of news that occurs on a given day. Other factors mentioned are the
sources with which the journalist counts, his style, his language and his ideology. Also the place where the news is covered, the organization
of the sections, or how it is cataloged in the newsroom produce one type of treatment or another: if the news is considered of great interest
it will have a different coverage that if it is considered of minor importance (Tuchman 1978).
Indeed, the need to incorporate the political, social and cultural contexts where frames originate in the study of framing is due, as several researchers such as Goffman (1986) and Tuchman (1978) have pointed out, to the fact that media frames do not arise and develop in a vacuum, but rather is the consequence of the social interaction of different actors, so that research on the framing process cannot be reduced only to the experimentation on cognitive effects of information in individuals (Goffman 1986; Tuchman 1978). Thus, the critical perspective demands the consideration of the power relations that are reflected in the frames that the media project and their social consequences.

This view was already collected by the first scholars of framing in the field of media, and is based on the premise that the frames transferred by journalists serve the interests of the elites, who use them from their dominant position in the coverage of the media, which allows them, at the same time, to maintain their ideological hegemony in society (Hallin 1986; Gramsci 1971). This is due to the fact that frames not only organize reality for the media, but also to a larger extent for the public who trust in their information.

The investigations within the critical paradigm, therefore, connect the theory of framing with the concept of hegemony expressed by Gramsci. The concept of hegemony referred to the belief system or ideological structure by which the established political order is maintained and legitimized. According to Gramsci (1971), the press and other cultural institutions disseminate and reinforce the dominant perspectives; “The functions in question are precisely organizational and connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group’s ‘deputies’ exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government.” (Gramsci 1971, 12) Therefore, some researchers have highlighted, through research and data collection, the ideological role of media organizations. Since then, the researchers consider that the media, in their coverage, give less credibility—when they do

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27 The concept of hegemony comprises the political/ideological direction of a wide range of alliances achieved through consensus. This consensus implies that the articulator of this alliance, the political party/political elites for Gramsci, manages to represent a set of heterogeneous demands, which are not the sum of the demands of different classes, but their amalgamation into an ideological political project that gives them consistency (Gramsci 1978).

28 Gramsci understands that the seizure of power, by the State, is necessary as well as constituting a new one. Therefore, he considers that a group must be a leader before achieving it, that is, it must build its hegemony meaning the articulation of a consensus within the group. Once the State is conquered, the class that achieves it has the direction and the coercion; consequently, it is the new leader and the new dominant class (Gramsci 1978). Now, when the social class that holds power can no longer lead, when their ideology is rejected, when the consensus is released, they are replaced by another dominant group. In short, when it does not lead society forward because it cannot respond to its demands, then it leads the society to a new crisis of hegemony.
not exclude—to social narratives that do not fit with the definitions of situation inserted in the frames that they transmit to their audience. In this way, media accounts reflect the interests of the sources to which they give priority and limit alternative visions (Gramsci 1971; Curran 2005; Allen and Blinder 2018; Charon 2013).

But the inclination of the media for certain versions of reality is not necessarily a conscious process. In this sense, Tuchman (1978) points out that journalistic practices and informative routines, presented as “objective procedures,” make the news legitimize the status quo; since journalists carry out their work on structures, mechanisms and institutional processes, as they, at the same time, reproduce them. More specifically, it has been underlined that the frames promoted by official sources and powerful groups have a greater presence in the contents of the media. These links the investigations of the critical paradigm with the theory of indexation, arguing that the media tend to prioritize the issues and points of view pointed out by the political elites and the institutions with greater power (Tuchman 1978; L. Bennett 1990; Benson 2013; Lawlor 2015a; Dekker and Scholten 2017).

1.1.2 Entman and the Cascading Activation Model

Robert Entman has proposed the cascade activation model in 2004 in his book Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy. As a restatement, Entman’s starting point has been the recognition of the inability of the previous models to explain the relations between the media and the political elites at present. Therefore, the author states that,

Although they offer elements for understanding, the models of hegemony [propaganda] and indexing—based fundamentally on events that occurred during the cold war—do not fit with some of the findings of this book. It is not surprising that models cannot fully account for changes in international politics and media behaviour since the Soviet Union withered. It seems the time, then, of a new model (Entman 2004, 4).

The model tries to explain the multilevel process of framing the media in foreign policy matters in the United States (See Figure 1.1). This process begins with a negotiation

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29 For Robert Entman, as for Dietram Scheufele (1999) (see “Framing as a theory of media effects” Journal of Communication 49, nº1 (1999): 103-122), the frames are specific to the media, and are found specifically in the news (in a broad sense). Framing in other types of discourse would be called schema (idea schemes). This scheme would be the one that would travel through the waterfall, and only in the...
between the political actors and key interest groups about the messages around a specific event or policy. Media filter the process of establishing an agenda and framing, who, following a hierarchy of influence, provide the public with frames based on the messages received from the political elites. But the public is also able to influence the media by reacting to the proposed frameworks. Its power to establish a counter-frame strong enough to challenge those induced by the elite depends, among other variables, on the number of messages it is capable of generating and communicating. This capacity has been multiplied in the last decade by the alternative communication networks that provide, for the first time in history, a free space for the production of messages and the connection between people. In this sense, the new communication networks are the source of the new power acquired by the masses for the construction of meanings, being also the origin, therefore, of the decomposition of the hierarchical structures of power with the political and financial elite at the top (Entman 2004; Cecen 2015).

Although the model supposes a further step in the interaction between the actors of political communication (here understood as political groups, media and citizenship), it is the foreign policy that establishes a hierarchical model with its object of study. As one descends into the levels of the cascade, the flow of information is less and less thorough, and incrementally limited to the important ideas selected, processed through schemas and then transmitted. The further the idea travels in the waterfall, the lower its connection with the “real” situation is (Entman 2004). For Entman, the cascading activation model is at the intersections of Hallin and Bennett’s work on the indexation.

Although indexing convincingly emphasizes elite opposition as a vital determinant of whether the news will deviate from the White House line, it does not explain fully why leaders sometimes contest the president’s frame and other times keep quiet, or just how much elite dissent will arise, or what it will focus on. Nor do previous models delineate comprehensively the public’s role in the larger system of communication linking presidents, elites outside the administration (including foreign leaders), journalists, news texts, and citizens (Entman 2004, 5).
In essence, the *cascading activation model* is interlinked between four categories, which influences each other’s framing outcomes: the administration, other elites, news organizations, and the public. For the model to formally pass on an idea/issue from the “top” of the cascade to the last level, it must assume that some actors of communications have more power to impose an idea and thus forces the issue to transcend all levels of the model. The “Administration” is, as a result, located at the “top” of the cascade as it is an actor withholding the greatest power to frame issues it wants to be highlighted by the “lower” levels of the model and can, additionally, take initiatives due to their inside knowledge of particular concerns, or undisclosed information. It is, then, followed by other political elites, such as opposition parties, parliamentarians, experts and foreign governments. In the “Administration” and “Other Elites” sections, the frame is negotiated, being accepted or rejected, and can be translated in a competitive situation between frames. This situation of consensus or dissent will give rise to one or more frames, which will make its way into the “Media” section. The “Media’s” role, seen as organizational entities and propagators of information, is to reflect the issue in the news and inform, in various formats, the “Public”. Here the second negotiation between frames takes place, since the “Administration” perceives the treatment of the media toward its narrative line, and a new framing process can be initiated. Lastly, the “Public” will react to the information at its disposal with a third negotiation between the frames of public opinion—that is, its reactions to present framing—, and the media. At this point it is important to mention that Robert Entman links the opinion of the public with the media, because he considers that the political elites use the media as barometers of public opinion (Entman 2004; Cecen 2015).
What is transmitted through the waterfall are not ideas or concise information but framing or schemes of thought. This means that it is the perception and the point of view on how a certain topic should be approached that reaches the lower levels of the cascade and not the exact words or ideas. In this way, the vertical process—from top to bottom—does not imply an exact reproduction of the discourse, as the theory of consensus-making or, in part, the theory of indexing, affirms, but rather of framing. Naturally, the feedback process would imply that there might be induced framing changes from the lower levels.

Entman (2004) also analyzes the variables on which the negotiation process depends on each level of the cascade. There are basically four, although each of them has a different meaning or dimension for each actor: motivations, cultural congruence, power, and strategy. The first two variables are internal, typically representing the thought processes of each actor, while power and strategy are considered external, since they depend on the contextual context.
The motivations of the actors to accept or reject a framing or scheme of thought are, according to the author, the following: (a) minimize the cognitive cost; (b) avoid emotional dissonance; (c) react to threats against values; (d) participate in public life; (e) maintain interpersonal relationships through discussion; and (f) professional interests, such as promoting a political career or journalistic. Each of these motivations will weigh differently for each actor or individual, the latter being especially relevant for political elites and journalists (Entman 2004).

1.1.3 Hallin and the Vietnam War

Journalists’ role, according to the indexation theory, is to solely report the decisions taken by official state representatives or government officials; it is conceivable to think that it is the elites who determine the terms and the limits of the debate regarding foreign policy in the news. The theory of indexation predicts that if there is a consensus among U.S. political elites on a certain type of policy decision, journalists will present little or no critical reporting (L. Bennett 1990; 2012). On the other hand, if there is a disagreement between the elites, journalists will be able to easily broadcast negative reports on the validity of the decisions taken. Lance Bennett goes as far as to assert “only the presence of a debate among the elites legitimizes the coverage of diverging points of view and makes this gesture safer in times of crisis” (L. Bennett 2012, 22).

The indexation theory takes its foundation in the work of Hallin. His book, *Uncensored War: The Media and the Vietnam, the Vietnam War (1963–1975)*, has been at the epicentre of studies on the influence of political power in the media. Considered the first television war, Vietnam is an academic point of reference for two reasons: first, because it was a war where journalists did “something more” than tune in with the powers of the state, and second, because it was in the belief that the excessive overexposure of dead bodies and images of suffering on television screens and on the front pages of the newspapers undermined the American public’s support for the war (Hallin 1986). In his intention to revisit Vietnam, Daniel Hallin proposes an analytical framework to examine the role played by the media in that war. The author divides his analysis into three spheres (See Figure 2.2): (1) the sphere of consensus, in which the media operates within the consent of elites; (2) the
sphere of legitimate controversy, where the media reflect the dissent of the elites, and (3) the sphere of deviation, in which the media offer coverage from outside the hegemonic point of view (Hallin 1986). According to Hallin, while elite consensus prevailed around the reasons why Vietnam had to be fought, media coverage was tuned to the dominant political perspective—the sphere of consensus. Thus, for this author, the critical coverage of the media on Vietnam was a consequence of elite dissent rather than its cause.

**Figure 2.1 Sphere of consensus, controversy, and deviance (Hallin 1986, 117)**

The indexing model is considered, due to its proposals, as a reformulation of the propaganda model in terms much more in line with the requirements of the scientific community in political science and communication, for which it has received widespread support within academia. Even some authors, such as Piers Robinson, consider it a split or a modality of the “paradigm of making consensus” (Robinson 1999).

1.1.4 Bennett and the Indexation Theory

This is because the simplest formulation of the model has very important similarities with consensus building. In it, this model, formulated by Lance Bennett on the basis of Hallin’s proposal, states that media coverage coincides with the interests of political elites, broadly defining them as members of the executive, legislative or any other political group withholding power. This point of view has been clarified mainly through the work of Lance
Bennett, who has suggested the theory of indexing, which proposes that the news services of the media of the masses are indexed to the dynamics of the government debate. Thus, even when media coverage is critical of the executive’s policy, it simply reflects the responsibility of journalists to point out the struggles within the centre of power. The implication is that political criticism within the media is only possible when there is a conflict among the elites over the policy that is carried out (L. Bennett 1990; 2012).

The theory of indexation’s hypotheses arose from asking, “what it means” and “how to explain” the fact that media organizations are based mainly on what government representatives say. The author, Lance Bennett, of this theory clarifies that his purpose was to synthesize three groups of different theories about the press-power relationship: (1) the idea that property is a way of restricting or limiting the flow of ideas (2) the symbiosis or trans-sectionalism between journalists and public officials, and (3) the other that values the function of giving the voice to the government for being the legitimate representative of the people for the sake of governance (L. Bennett 2012).

Following the basic line of the model, Bennett (1990) argues that the media’s confidence in senior officials is rooted in three types of journalistic norms: the professional virtues of objectivity and balance, democratic responsibility, and the economic realities of the information business. The “objectivity norm” requires journalists to present “both sides” of a story. But this phenomenon has meant that the routine use of these norms has turned the press into a political institution. Bennett supports the notion that obtaining the official reaction has been institutionalized among the American press. Thus, Bennett says that this institutionalization links journalists with officials who occupy important positions of responsibility that include decision-making. In this way, Bennett creates the theory of indexing where:

Media professionals, from the meeting room to the street, tend to ‘index’ the range of voices and points of view, in the news and editorials, according to the range of dominant points of view expressed in the governmental debate on a given topic.

This working hypothesis implies that “other” (i.e., non-official) voices filling out the potential universe of news sources are included in news stories and editorials when those voices express opinions already emerging in official
circles. Such a finding would imply that the media have embraced the first element of our aforementioned cultural ideal (i.e. emphasis on institutions, de-emphasis of direct popular expression) while abandoning the important companion principle calling for publicizing popular opposition in the face of unrepresentative or irresponsible institutions. Evidence supporting the indexing hypothesis would suggest that the news industry has ceded to government the tasks of policing itself and striking the democratic balance (L. Bennett 1990, 106).

In other words, if there is political consensus, the media should show their agreement with the narrative line (usually expressed through a frame) and, in situations of political dissent, reflect the different frames, sometimes taking sides with one or the other in particular. These differences in media coverage provoke open or closed public debates (L. Bennett 2012). In this way, the author affirms that the existence of rich debates in the media is perfectly possible, including the participation of diverse voices in time of crisis (e.g. the European refugee crisis), and the public debate can have measurable effects on the position of political elites, who could lose control in political decisions. However, in the second case, closed debates, there are fewer points of view in the media coverage, as well as arguments to evaluate foreign policy as per se. Furthermore, Lance Bennett states that the coverage of each determined conflict usually falls somewhere in between the existence of a fully open debate and a close one but that, in any case, the independent variable is at the level of debate among the elites that make the foreign policy (L. Bennett 2012).

Thus, he argues that “other unofficial voices fill the potential population of news sources included in coverage and editorials when those voices express opinions that are emerging in official circles” (L. Bennett 1990, 106). In essence, what the model affirms is that government elite, not the press, establish the range of arguments, with fewer actors offering points of view within the accepted range. Further, Bennett says that this institutionalization links journalists with officials who occupy important positions of responsibility that include decision-making. The indexation proposes that there is a propensity of the main news organizations to adjust the views of the stories that are going to be published, as close as possible to the dominant views of the political institutions, which they have proven to have enough power to affect the outcome of these situations. The indexation is a reporting system considered as the closest to balance, equity and objectivity
by these news organizations and has generated, in journalists, the dilemma of deciding on the publication of news including versions of the history coming from the elites, which are not totally consistent with the available evidence (trustworthiness of the news) (L. Bennett 1990; 2012).

Lance Bennett argues that the framework of four biases of the news, explained below, correspond to the different structures in which each journalist, according to his background, frames the story. The first bias identified is personalization, where the news only focuses on one person, their challenges, tragedies and triumphs, and the social, economic and political contexts in which the character unfolds is underestimated. What is worrisome about this aspect is that once it manages to attract public attention to the character, the attention is not finally transferred to the problematic context of which it speaks, but the news only translates into benefits for its image (L. Bennett 2012).

The second bias is the dramatization, in which the news no longer reports facts but becomes narrative. These dramatic stories emphasize the crisis over the options, and the scandals over the achievements and instill fear in the public. For example, in recent years, we have seen an increase in the amount of reported news on and about violence (i.e., crime, accidents, threats to health, protests), more criticism of the government and opinion columns with a cynical and negative tone. This generates an impression of general discontent and dissatisfaction among citizens (L. Bennett 2012).

Fragmentation is the third bias and where the news is published, but isolated from other organizations that could give a better context and a better perspective of the situation. They are encapsulated in small dramatic news that makes it difficult to see the connections, causes and consequences of a single situation (L. Bennett 2012). Finally, there is the bias of authority-disorder in which authoritarian voices are at the centre of attention and used to cause intimidation or threaten the order of social life, underlining who is in charge to restore order and championing a theme to their favour (L. Bennett 2012).
In other words, if there is political consensus, the media should show their agreement with the narrative line (usually expressed through a frame) and, in situations of political dissent, reflect the different frames, sometimes taking sides with one or the other in particular. These differences in media coverage will provoke open or closed public debates (L. Bennett 2012).

1.2. A new way to index? Revisiting the indexation theory

Regarding the indexing theory, researchers have concluded, throughout their analyses, to similar results about the role of the press regarding foreign policy-related issues in the United States (Zaller and Chiu 1996; Livingston and Eachus 1996; Entman and Rojecki 1993; Althaus et al. 1996; Hayes and Guardino 2010). However, these studies have led Livingston and Bennett (2003) to identify a new alternative to the indexing theory. These authors concluded that the media coverage of foreign-policy issues in the United States and the journalistic practices/autonomy in setting the political agenda, which modify the press-government relations, have changed since the foundation of the indexing theory in the 1990s. In their content analysis of stories related to the implication of journalists on scenes of war or other disasters, they concluded

that live coverage has indeed shifted from officially controlled institutional settings often far removed from the action to the scenes of the events themselves. At the same time, the frequencies of these event-driven stories that contain no official source has not risen over this period of greater press liberation from official institutional settings due to new technologies. (Livingston and Bennett 2003, 361)

Finally, Livingston and Bennett (2003) introduced this aspect of the “semi-independent press” idea where journalistic practices are relatively more autonomous in setting their own agenda than before.

In certain cases, journalists may hold greater power in communicating and transmitting opinions opposed to the official government. Indeed, Scott Althaus mentions that “Some studies of news indexing in foreign policy reporting find abundant criticism of the U.S. government even in situations where domestic officials are unified in support of a policy, but most research in this tradition concludes that news coverage is unlikely to criticize administration policies unless prompted to do so by domestic officials.” (Althaus 2003, 385–
Therefore, Althaus continues his argument by saying that if the indexation theory is applicable to a wider range of news discourses than the domestic voices are reduced to being represented in a smaller set (Althaus 2003).

Livingston and Eachus (1996) support the idea or notion of “indexing” by the news and editorials of the official foreign policy lines. However, they delve into the concept with comparative case studies, arguing that after the Cold War, the press now includes marginalized voices. In addition, their studies show that dissident voices, when they are recognized in the news, are contextualized with symbolic clues that diminish or increase their presence or credibility for the audience (Livingston and Eachus 1996; Entman and Rojecki 1993). Bennett suggests that “eccentric” views and the introduction of clues to their credibility or importance suggest the existence of underlying rules for making symbolic decisions. The marginalization of dissident voices has been found in the study of Althaus, Edy, Entman and Phalen on the Libyan crisis in 1985-86. These authors showed that the voices of some sources were marginalized, and others overemphasized according to the amount of space on the first page. Althaus et.al. and Bennett noted that, under certain conditions, journalists appear to seek foreign sources to expose opinions contrary to the dominant governmental position. The authors called this coverage “the power of indexing” (or indexed power), and call the monitoring of the views of those who are able to control a situation, regardless of nationality (Althaus et al. 1996b).

Recently, Hayes and Guardino (2010) mentioned through an analysis of three national media (CBS, ABC and NBC) that their research had for goals to examine existing theories surrounding the framing theory, and to accurately draw the contours of pre-war media content and how every voice—supporting or opposing—the Iraqi invasion manages to be heard in the mainstream media. Conclusively, Hayes and Guardino highlighted the importance of external foreign sources when a foreign-related issue such as the Iraq war is being discussed by the journalists. In sum, the indexation theory expresses that the media coverage coincides with the interests of the political elites, broadly defining them as members of the executive, legislative or any other political group with power. Bennett has clarified this point of view
which suggests that the news services of the media of the masses are indexed to the dynamics of the government debate.

Thus, even when media coverage is critical of the executive’s policy, it simply reflects the responsibility of journalists to point out the struggles within the centres of power. The implication is that political criticism within the media is only possible when there is a conflict among the elites over the policy that is carried out. As the indexation theory is a media-government relationship theory explaining relationship rather than issues, new studies (Bennett and Pfetsch 2018; Masini et al. 2018) have tried to fulfill the limits highlighted by Livingston and Bennett in the early 2000. Indeed, these studies have identified two main ways to modernize the theory; a new alternative to the indexing theory (a) that include the addition of new voices, and (b) indexing the government’s debate dynamics to the media rather than the government’s elite discourses.

In this fractured environment, it is more complex than before to balance views and opinions due to the implication of various actors in the political sphere, or at least groups or individuals trying to step into the political sphere and influence the audience’s opinion on certain sensitive topics such as immigration (Bennett and Livingston 2018). Fostering diverse content is a priority concern in such an environment. Thus,

the analysis of voices in the news is a central concern for journalism studies, in those actors’ ability to speak in the news is key to shaping the debate on a certain issue. [It’s] their ability to express viewpoints on the issue under discussion is what really allows them to contribute to the framing of a topic. [And] it is the diversity of viewpoints that can provide readers with a wide range of perspectives on a given issue. (Masini et al. 2018, 2325)

However, by suppressing the so-called alternative voices, researchers have constrained, for the last thirty years or so, the indexing theory to boundaries established in a context of an international crisis. Thus, in this perspective, studies regarding the integration of alternative narratives have been conducted in a Cold war mindset. Within this period, researchers have concluded to a uniformity in debates mainly due to allies protecting the Americans’ interests. Livingston and Eachus (1996) have concluded that once we saw the collapse of the Soviets,
dissident voices were to be included in this now more diverse environment where a larger array of opinion could exist and openly critic the elite’s decisions on foreign-related issues. Indeed, research has shown how the Cold War mindset has dominated the international section of the American press since the end of the Second World War until the collapse of the Soviet Union. During this period of time, the American press basically framed international news in terms of the struggle between the ‘Free world’ and the ‘Communist bloc’. The end of the Cold War coincided with changes in the social norms governing American society and journalists’ practices. As a result, the Cold War framework became obsolete (Livingston and Eachus 1996).

1.3 Democracy and Media – A Game Play?
Whether media are playing an active or passive role, deliberately or not, when it talks about immigration, the media actor acts as a political agent as Figure 3.3 shows (Norris 2010; McNair 2017). Thus, we see that there is no mass democracy without communication. Subsequently, as a non-exclusive condition of the existence of a public sphere within democracy, the media ideally fulfill three traditional functions, which constitute standard ideals: “watchdogs,” “agenda-setting” and “gatekeepers.”

As highlighted by Norris (2010), the term “watchdog” “advocates that as watchdogs, the news media have a responsibility to help guard the public interest, ensuring the accountability of powerful decision makers by highlighting cases of malfeasance, misadministration, and corruption, thereby strengthening the transparency and effectiveness of governance.” (2010, 15) The notion of “watchdog” is integrated within this concept of information counterbalancing as it is its role to maximize the government’s transparency and accountability to its citizens. Encompassed within the journalist’s work, media organizations need to give greater space to whistleblowers and other citizens willing to denounce and expose the misconduct, corruption and other issues to the public’s light (Norris 2010).

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30 Thus, dissident voices are to be described as the voices of Communists.
31 I.e. as expressing their own opinions
32 I.e. as relaying the words of another agent, or as “middlemen”.

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The concept of “agenda-setting” tells us that mass media have the “responsibility to raise awareness of pervasive social problems, helping to turn public attention to matters of common interest, to inform governing officials about social needs, and to inform the international community about development challenge.” (Norris 2010, 15; McCombs and Shaw 1972) The central idea of the theory of agenda-setting is the ability of mass media to modify the understanding that people have of social realities. As a consequence of the action of newspapers, television and other media, the public is aware or ignores, pays attention or neglect, emphasizes or overlooks, specific elements of public scenarios. People tend to include or exclude from their own knowledge what the media includes or excludes from their own content. This scenario results in a growing cognitive dependence on the mass media, which is configured on two levels: the “agenda” of the issues, arguments and problems present in the media agenda and second, the hierarchy of importance and priority with which these elements are arranged in the “order of the day” (McCombs and Shaw 1972; Norris 2010).

Lastly, the “gatekeeping” theory states that “the news media have a responsibility to reflect and incorporate the plurality of viewpoints and political persuasions in reporting, to maximize the diversity of perspectives and arguments heard in rational public deliberations, and to enrich the public sphere.” (Norris 2010, 15; Lewin 1947a; White 1950). Lewin (1947b) makes a special emphasis on ideologies when he states that the gatekeeper’s decisions “[…] depend partly on their ideology, that is their system of values and beliefs which determine what they consider to be “good” or “bad,” and partly on the way they perceive the particular situation” (Lewin 1947b, 146). For Lewin (1947a; 1947b), group decisions depend, in part, on how the group sees the situation, and therefore, can be influenced if the perception is changed. For White (1950), “a story is transmitted from one “gate keeper” after another in the chain of communications. From reporter to rewrite man, through bureau chief to “state” file editors at various press association offices, the process of choosing and discarding is continuously taking place.” (1950, 384)
Figure 3.3 Model of Political Communication (McNair 2017, 5)

Media are designed as determinants of the agenda and have the function of prioritizing the importance of societal issues by choosing whether or not to attract the attention of public opinion and political leaders on certain news. The media thus determines news that is of interest to public opinion and political power, and sounds the alarm when issues of major importance arise (Soroka 2012; Pingree et al. 2013). However, many debates remain as to the exact direction of this relationship of influence. If the agenda-setting theory initially predicts the media as exerting an independent influence on political elites and public opinion, alternative versions of the theory rather advance the idea of a bidirectional and mutual interactions where the media would serve to link the priorities of elected officials with those of citizens. Finally, interestingly for our study, some theories suggest a more passive role of the media, according to which the media would simply follow and reflect the priorities of the elites, the pre-existing debates within the public opinion and the course naturalness of international events (Norris 2010; Haselmayer, Wagner, and Meyer 2017).

Bennett and Pfetsch (2018) clearly indicated in their article that “The resulting weakening of traditional bases for validating information has further opened societies to bots, trolls, hacking, and disinformation from outside sources.” (2018, 245), which ultimately led to a “contemporary political communication increasingly tak[ing] place in contexts defined by diminished citizen attention, hybrid media systems, the rise of undemocratic movements and parties, and networked, often polarized, political information flows.” (2018, 250)
On this hybrid media systems question, Chadwick (2013) believes that:

Today, we might ask whether the average citizen interested in influencing politics but without ambitions for high political office join a party or create a Twitter account and start interacting with others in the diverse assemblage that now increasingly make political news and set the agenda. Then again, perhaps this, too, is missing an important part of the hybrid picture. For, […] the hybrid media system creates new opportunities for such citizens' groups to combine older and newer media logic in compelling and effective news ways. It is not a case of “either/or” but of “not only, but also.” (2013, 209)

Under this quickly changing environment, media organizations have to adapt to the now rising importance of social media and their usefulness in presenting political content. This hybridity has left advanced liberal democracies like Canada, the United States and others to re-evaluate who now is a powerful voice in this era of digital communication. Journalists and political elites are currently facing an added layer of complexity as interactions and interdependence among them have grown into a combination between the “old” and the “new” ways of doing political communication.

For Chadwick, the sphere of political communication and the sphere of politics should not be perceived as two separated entities, but rather as intertwined. It is due to underlying media logic that “points us toward a different approach, one focused on studying how discrete interactions between media elites, political elites, and publics create a shared understanding and expectations about what constitutes publicly valued information and communication. […] the daily practice of political and media actors evolve over time to create a shared media culture based upon underlying media logic.” (Chadwick 2013, 19)

Finally, media are supposed to act as a traditional agora to the public interest in which the whole range of interests, political parties and opinions, and views are expressed and confronted within society. Thus, the media are guardians, but especially the event breeders giving access to an enlightened and plural public debate necessary for the good exercise of

33 “Hybridity is inevitably associated with flu, in-betweenness, the interstitial, and the liminal. It is about being out of sync with a familiar past and a half-grasped future.” (Chadwick 2013, 8)
34 “Logics are defined as technologies, genres, norms, behaviors, and organizational forms.” (Chadwick 2013, 4)
democracy. Additionally, the media and public opinion never evolves independently of each other but intertwined in a specific reciprocity gameplay.

Political communication and political elites are also influenced by internal and external political instabilities such as the rise of populism. “Among some of the often-cited drivers for the rise of populism, factors such as globalization, economic dislocation/insecurity, influx of new immigrants, nativists’ cultural anxieties or fears, rising inequality, workplace automation, and the rising mistrust of governments, media, academics, experts, and political elites have all been noted.” (Mudde, Mérand, and Momani 2017, 10) These push factors are reflected within the Canadian public opinion on immigration as polls have suggested. Additionally, Momani points out that: “While Canada often celebrates the notion that differences amongst us is a healthy contribution to our multicultural mosaic, there is no ignoring the threat of divisive populism that is sweeping across Western democratic countries and no benefit to be found in being complacent about Canada’s prospects for escaping this phenomenon.” (Momani 2018, 4)

Moreover, Momani mentions that pull factors such as our aging population and our growing need for semi-skilled and skilled workers influence Canadians, but not at the same level as in Europe or in the United States. Even if Canada has not avoided hate crimes or terror attacks perpetrated by right-wing extremists or populists, “the increase of macroaggressions and racism on our streets is also notable in daily life. […] The rise of Rebel media in Canada, clearly funded by Russian interests, to bring a populist narrative into Canada is already making its mark.” (Momani 2018, 20) What is concerning for Momani and other scholars is how few studies have been done on how to predict/notice signs of populism crawling into the political system and how Canada has yet seen the first sign of online populism and anti-immigration sentiment without conceiving appropriate tools to equip its citizens toward this quickly rising phenomenon (Momani 2018).

35 63% of polled Canadian citizens have shown concerns about immigration that is showing a belief that the federal government should limit the number of migrants accepted into the country (Wright 2019).
36 Such as resiliency and digital literacy.
In recent years, the study of the impact of the media on the political agenda has brought together a growing number of researchers. Recently, many of these empirical studies pointed out that media coverage effects, to varying degrees, the political agenda, be it the Parliament or the Congress, the government, the president, the political parties, or public expenditure (Buonfino 2004). In addition, studies have also found that the mass media affect more the symbolic content of political agendas than for their substantive content, those dailies weigh more than television news, and certain issues are more likely to be included in the political agenda than others. Moreover, the impact of the media agenda on the political agenda is immediate and does not require a long incubation period to materialize, and that media coverage affects the political agenda more. Some scholars have relied on case studies with a qualitative framework oriented toward interviews, while others have relied on a quantitative analysis of time series assessing the temporal sequence between media attention (Norris 2010; Aelst and Walgrave 2017).

Moreover, immigration policy is often read through the prism of security by some politicians, by the police and some social services, by many journalists and a fraction of the public opinion. Despite the frequent and argumentative criticisms of such perception, despite the existence of alternative discourses, this reading continues, very largely, to be dominant. Why? What drives all these actors to make a connection between crime, unemployment, terrorism, and immigration? Our framework is particularly useful for a study that investigates whether and, if so, how similar are the media and political frames, since it focuses precisely on the degree of variety of media discourses compared to that of the politics. It also leaves room for the possibility of a varied media discourse that reflects the full range of views expressed within the official political authorities. This is all included in the model as it conceives the media more as actors with a power of initiative than as mere performers in the political sphere.

In this chapter, I presented the origin and the evolution of the indexation theory since its establishment in the 1980s by Hallin and then, Bennett. As Entman characterized the theory as a “fractured paradigm,” this literature review helped us to rethink the theory’s predictions and how the changing political and media environments have largely influenced
Bennett and other theorists in the last decade. Given this literature review, the following chapter is redirecting, briefly, the focus on our thesis’s questions and the hypotheses underlying our research on the changing dynamics of the indexation theory in a Canadian context.
Chapter 2 – Research question and Hypotheses

2.1 Question and Hypotheses

This thesis seeks to examine the indexation theory proposed by Bennett in a non-American context and on a theme relating to immigration policies with a longitudinal study that examines temporal evolution of the indexation theory from January 2013 to December 2016. In order to answer my research question and fulfill my objectives, we have chosen The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star for the content analysis.

2.1.1 Theory’s predictions

According to the predictions of the indexation, the “indexation power” is expected to be in alignment with the official political rhetoric put forward by the government’s elites. These predictions are: (1) if a homogenous discourse exists between the official states’ speeches and newspaper articles, then we are located, in Hallin’s term, in the consensus zone; (2) if a heterogeneous discourse exists between the official states’ speeches and newspaper articles, then we are situated in the dissonance zone (or in Hallin’s term, in the sphere of legitimate controversy, or the sphere of deviance) (L. Bennett 1990; 2012; Hallin 1986).

Moreover, these predictions link the investigations of the critical paradigm with the theory of indexation, arguing that the media tend to prioritize the issues and points of view pointed out by the political elites and the institutions with greater power rather than its citizens or other social voices (L. Bennett 1990).

In order to test whether the relationship between the media discourse and Canadian official political discourse can be predicted by the indexation hypotheses and the literature on dissident voices, we propose to choose the case of media coverage of the immigration policies. As some authors (L. Bennett 1990; 2012; Hallin 1986; L. Bennett and Livingston 2003) have pointed out, the indexation hypotheses are subject to several interpretations that will defer the results.

Thus, what we call the “media coverage,” a process that meet two conditions constituting the “indexing power,” which correspond, according to the predictions of the indexation theory, to: (a) the media coverage is biased and oriented in favour of a unique
position vis-à-vis the official political discourse, and that (b) sources from the official rhetoric should be used more often than others external sources by the media (L. Bennett 2012). Both of these conditions are necessary to verify the “indexing” of news. Indeed, the first condition tells us that the media adopt the same discourse as of the official political authorities, while the second condition allows us to say that it is on the official discourse that the media index, and not the other way around.

2.2 Definitions and Thesis Question
In order to test whether or not the media included dissident voices in their news stories, we propose the case of the media coverage of the Canadian immigration policies. Thus, we answered the following question: How does the changing dynamics of the indexation theory influence the Canadian journalistic discourse? Based on the two conditions, we formulated the two following hypotheses:

(H1) The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star have produced a coverage of the immigration policy issue oriented toward a single narrative identical to that of the official Canadian political discourse.

And

(H2) The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star have more often included dissident voices, both at the national and local levels, in their news stories when opposing the official Canadian political discourse on the immigration policy issue.

Finally, if the first hypothesis is validated, thus, the media have covered the immigration question with a single vision identical to that of the official Canadian political debates. However, it does not mean that it is, indeed, on this issue or debate in particular, and not on another, that the media would have indexed. To this extent the second hypothesis, by indicating to us on which frames (i.e. a greater voice given to officials rather than dissident voices) the journalists base more often their words or information would come to validate or, on the contrary, to invalidate, the indexation of the media on the dissident voices.

37 The two hypotheses are based on this thesis general question, the indexation theory, and the literature on immigration and dissident voices.
2.2.1 Definitions

The term “official political discourse” is defined as follows by Dijk van A. Teun in 1995:

The easiest, and not altogether misguided, answer is that political discourse is identified by its actors or authors, viz., politicians. Indeed, the vast bulk of studies of political discourse is about the text and talk of professional politicians or political institutions, such as presidents and prime ministers and other members of government, parliament or political parties, both at the local, national and international levels. (Dijk 1995, 12)

With the general definition given by Dijk van A. Teun in 1995, we defined, in our study, the concept of “official political discourse,” within Canada as political authorities (including the official opposition38) withholding political power such as the Prime Minister, and its Cabinet members.

According to this definition of the “official political discourse,” the political stance of the political majority is not supposed to impact the media’s treatment of information as predicted by the indexation hypotheses: the media reflect all the opinions formulated on both sides39 (Hallin 1986; L. Bennett 1990; 2012). In other words, indexing predicts the existence of homogeneity in the media treatment of information, a homogeneity that would smooth and transcend the specific political identities of the media. This would mean, on the one hand, that the information produced by the media is objective, but only to the extent of the boundaries of official discourse, and secondly that this discourse has more influence on the media treatment of information than the identity of the newspaper itself. (L. Bennett 2012)

Given the institutional functioning of Canada, we added two additional categories to this definition of “official political discourse”. The first is constituted by the non-executive political members and the non-legislative political opposition. Indeed, this category includes representatives of the governing authority since it designates any source from the political

38 “Politicians in this sense are the group of people who are being paid for their (political) activities, and who are being elected or appointed (or self-designated) as the central players in the polity.” (Dijk 1995, 13) Due to a multiparty system (Canada has three dominant parties which are the Liberal Party of Canada, the Conservative Party and the New Democratic Party (NDP)) that exists in Canada, the term “leader of the official opposition” mainly refers to the dominant party on the Canadian political spectrum currently constituted by the Conservative Party, as of June 2019. Thus, the Conservatives constitute the official opposition when the Prime Minister comes from the Liberal Party, and vice versa.
39 Cf. The spheres of consensus, legitimate controversy and deviance exposed by Hallin (1986). As the theory of indexation is based upon the first findings of Hallin, the indexation’s predictions are closely related to Hallin’s spheres.
majority except members of the government, or any source from the political opposition. We can include in this definition Members of the Provincial Parliament (MPP), Members of Parliament (MP), mayors, and City councillors. The second category includes the other official representatives of the political power in place, such as, but not limited to, official spokespersons, police commissioners, or certain judicial authorities such as judges40.

Lastly, as stated earlier, in order to meet the minimum journalistic standards, journalists are more likely to balance and complete their stories with outside sources (here read, sources outside the sphere of influence). Dissent voices have been described by researchers as foreign officials which may include, but not limited to, United Nations (UN) officials, diplomats, and foreign government’s elite (Hayes and Guardino 2010). But for Hallin (1986) and his sphere of deviance, this dissent voice meant an individual who is in “the realm of those political actors and views which journalists and the political mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being heard.” (Hallin 1986, 117)

However, this definition has proved to be flexible over the years as the definition left us to interpret what is considered as deviant41. Regardless of this flexibility, we have defined dissent voice in a domestic context as an individual or a group outside the political sphere of influence seeking to contribute to the debate regarding a specific topic. These dissident voices are, but not limited to, academics, religious leaders, youth, community leaders, lawyers, far-left or far-right members. We also believe that dissident voices are not equally heard as journalists proceed to a certain sorting. For example, marginalized voices such as academics and lawyers are more likely to be deemed acceptable to be presented to the news than a far-right figure or pseudo-experts42. These new inclusions are to balance the sources as a way to

40 Especially Judges from the Supreme Court of Canada.
41 “While some studies seem to reveal indexed news, others do not. In its initial formulation, the hypothesis is difficult to falsify. It is not entirely clear what constitutes “mainstream government debate.” For example, if the news includes the views of foreign government official who disagree with American officials’ consensus view on foreign policy, is it indexed or not? Moreover, the original formulation of the indexing hypothesis may refer to the range of official debate or to the distribution of official perspectives. Is news that confines itself to the perspectives offered by public officials but misrepresents the distribution of official support and opposition to various views indexed or not?” (Edy 2008)
42 This last point might also depend on the political stance of the news organization as well as its level of journalistic standards. News organizations that are usually more inclined to sensationalism might be willing to emphasize the ‘emotion’ side of a story rather than educating the general population of a specific topic. In the context of pseudo-experts, they are deemed as “credible” by journalists as they believe in their authority, but which can ultimately cause disinformation.
be considered as “semi-independent” from the elite’s discourses (Entman 1993; Benson 2017).

2.2.2 Hypotheses

The two hypotheses are based on the literature on dissent voices and our thesis question relating to the indexation theory and the literature on immigration. Indeed, the literature on immigration issues highlights four possibilities, or four frames (outcomes) to illustrate the case. Thus, our first hypothesis is (H1) *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star* have produced a coverage of the immigration policy issue oriented toward a single narrative identical to that of the official Canadian political discourse. Depending on who is mobilized in the news story, the outcome frame varies to reflect or move away from the elite’s official rhetoric. Each frame is analyzed through a content analysis based on Bennett’s theory: the economic frame, which looks at immigration from the angle of its impact on the national economy. As of the identity frame, the rhetoric used emphasizes its repercussions for the identity of the host country (i.e. far-right rallies throughout Canada); and the humanitarian frame, which assesses the humanitarian imperatives associated with migratory movements and the responsibility of the government to protect (i.e. R2P principle) its future citizens. Finally, the public security frame is highly influenced by events happening abroad and at home concerning terrorism and suspicious activities related to migrants and their relationship with kinship (i.e. 9/11 attacks, Charlie Hebdo, Bataclan) (Browning 2017). These four outcomes are perceived through the analysis and predict how media organization frame the marginalized voices in regard to immigration policies.

This different usage of the theory is anchored in the proposed testing of core aspects of the theory in order to be coherent with the modern age of political institutions and its constant evolving environment. The case of immigration policies reflects how dissident voices, or alternative narratives, have been included in the news by journalists. If the two daily newspapers, *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star*, are not following the single narrative forwarded by the Canadian government, then we can formulate our second hypothesis as follows: (H2) *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star* have more often included dissident voices, both at the national and local levels, in their news stories when
opposing the official Canadian political discourse on the immigration policy issue. In that case, the second hypothesis highlights the media’s inclusion of dissident voices. If one of the previously mentioned frames is exposed as an elite’s preferred rhetoric specific to immigration policies, then there is a lesser chance for dissent voices to be included. Indeed, if media reports news specific to a frame related to economic, identity, public security or humanitarian aid then the organization is acting in a “dependent” way. On the contrary, if there is a dissident voice included in the news’ story, the previous four frames are less likely to be mobilized (Benson 2017). In that case, media organizations have a greater flexibility in reporting the story and be considered as “semi-independent” from the official rhetoric (L. Bennett and Livingston 2003).
Chapter 3 – Measuring and Explaining the Dissent Voices regarding Migration Policies: A Comparative Study

3.1. Qualitative analysis

Our hypotheses are tested thanks to newspaper articles from *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star*. According to Riff et al. (2014), content analysis—qualitative or quantitative—is a way of processing information. This methodology can be applied to all forms of communication, speech and image. Therefore, it is used to describe and apprehend any passage of meaning from a transmitter to a receiver. More precisely, “Content analysis is a set of methods for systematically coding and analyzing qualitative data and for testing hypotheses about texts, usually statistically.” (Bernard 2013, 536–37) Additionally, this methodology refers to a set of descriptive, objective, systematic and qualitative techniques for “document exploitation,” which is therefore very useful and relevant when it comes to describing journalistic content. These techniques are intended to establish the meaning and enable an informed understanding of the documents analyzed.

Undoubtedly, the first fundamental aspect of content analysis is the understanding of the explicit meaning of communication. The second is the unveiling of an implicit meaning of the message. This second aspect concerns the revelation of another message glimpsed through or beside the first. Content analysis therefore operates from a first level of reading, and extends to a second level of reading: the underlying of meanings (Riff et al. 2014; Krippendorff 2004).

Hence, content analysis has a heuristic function, that is to say, it helps to support intentions of discoveries, but it can also have a function of the administration of the proof that it can appear like a mode of verification of hypotheses, questionings or provisional affirmations. It is used for documentary purposes. Its purpose is to support impressions, intuitive judgments with respect to certain communications in order to obtain, by structured operations, reliable results as to their signifying content (Riff et al. 2014).

Qualitative content analysis, in particular, has many advantages. First, it allows the researcher to access the messages he wants to study without having recourse directly to the
people who formulate them, which are often not very accessible to the public. Moreover, it provides the searcher with archived content, and it, therefore, allows short-term or even long-term longitudinal studies. Finally, since communication is an omnipresent process within society, this method is applicable to a very wide variety of fields, issues and research interests (Riff et al. 2014; Krippendorff 2004).

3.1.1 Case selection from January 2013 to December 2016

To examine the relative indexation of dissident voices on the immigration question in Canada, we have covered a four-year period, where both the Conservative and the Liberal parties have governed during this period. We have restricted our analysis to this specific period for three reasons. First, Bill C-16 was proposed to ease the election process by introducing fixed-term elections in Canada. “Various rationales have been offered for fixed-date elections, including: [...] providing governments with sufficient time to develop and implement a legislative agenda” (Barnes, Bédard, and Spano 2012, 33) Thus, under this amendment, a four-year interval was fixed, which left the Conservatives, overseen by Harper, to lead the government (166 seats obtained) between May 2011 and October 2015. Following the federal elections of October 2015, a majority government (184 seats) was acquired by Justin Trudeau and the Liberal Party of Canada, which have left Trudeau to lead Canada between October 2015 to October 2019.

Secondly, the growing importance Canada is taking on the international stage as a key leader in global questions such as the refugee crisis, and as a central figure to fulfill a gap left by other administrations over the years (Mudde, Mérand, and Momani 2017). More importantly, with his new role within well-established leaders such as European Union countries and the United States, Canada has rethought its international place and that by

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43 Own emphasis.
44 However, Bill C-16, ch.10, art. 56.1(1) “Nothing in this section affects the powers of the Governor General, including the power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General’s discretion.” (Nicholson 2007) This dissolution can occur prior to the four-year interval fixed by the Election Act. However, under certain conditions such as a loss of confidence from the House of Commons, can the Parliament be dissolved (Barnes, Bédard, and Spano 2012).
45 The elections would have been held in October 2012 if the then-Prime Minister Stephen Harper, after the motion of non-confidence from the House of Commons, would have not led to a dissolution of the parliament.
welcoming refugees, the Canadian government has viewed, “Immigrants [as] necessary for the country’s continued economic prosperity, innovation, and the fulfillment of needs for global talent and semiskilled labour.” (Mudde, Mérand, and Momani 2017, 11)

Thirdly, by collecting articles from two media agencies—either labelled centre right or left media agencies—we are able to better understand and grasp the various nuances implied by the initial assumptions. Thus, this political transition served as a guideline to see if we have a continuity or discontinuity in the media organizations’ rhetoric regarding immigration policies and their inclusion or exclusion of dissident voices on the issue over two different administrations. This selection enabled us to observe, if this is the case, a divergence of speech between official rhetoric and social voice rhetoric related to the immigration question. By analyzing a period from January 2013 to December 2016, we are able to assess the impact this political change had on the media institutions and their ways of reporting government views relating to immigration policies.

Moreover, there is a growing association between immigration, terrorism and national security since the September 2001 attacks (Salter 2008). In the same vein, one year prior to our year of analysis, Canada adopted measures, in 2012, to facilitate the asylum seeker’s demand and avoid fraudsters to access the Canadian system46. The act introduced, with this new policy, the term “designated countries of origin,” a list enumerating the countries considered safe and thus not threatening the livelihood of the applicants (Government of Canada 2012a, 15–16; 2012b). With this Bill C-31, the Canadian government is distancing itself from its historical traditions of welcoming asylum seekers and refugees under the humanitarian banner. With this bill, the government now divides newcomers into two categories: as “fraudsters” and/or as “fake refugees.” The former depicts the applicant as taking advantage of our system, and the latter as threatening its national security. Therefore, these two perceptions actively participate in this negative framing of migrants and also enforce the logic of security/crimmigration. These recent legislative changes are, additionally, contributing to the criminalization of migrants; the bill makes it possible to increase the use of detention of asylum seekers, many of whom are regularly

46 Also known as Bill C-31.
imprisoned with criminals without having been criminally tried (Atak, Hudson, and Nakache 2018).

Since the federal election of 2015, these measures are still in action, and no legislative changes have occurred, even under the Liberal Party. Atak et al. mentioned that: “the political discourse has considerably influenced mental representations and social opinions in Canada, which may have contributed to the ease with which Parliament implemented unjust measures.” (2018, 8) These unjust measures highlighted by these scholars is, for example, the term “designated countries of origin,” to speak about Mexico. Scholars also criticize the Liberal Party in perpetuating this terminology, and how the government, since 2015, has limited his actions to short-termed solutions rather than reviewing specific categories elaborated within the Bill C-31 (i.e. demand delays, modification of the terms “irregulars” or “designated foreign nationals” to classify asylum seekers that have crossed U.S.-Canada’s borders illegally, and the possibility for asylum seekers to repeal the decision) (Atak, Hudson, and Nakache 2018; Government of Canada 2012a, 7). Therefore, their concern relating immigration and security together was redirected to this idea of whom really deserved to be considered as a refugee and not simply an immigrant trying to circumvent the immigration process.

3.1.2 From article’s selection to software usage

These two journals, The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star, are ideologically divergent. On the one hand, The Globe and Mail is considered, economically, as liberal but politically conservative (or right on the political “spectrum”); on the other hand, The Toronto Star is being labelled as a liberal and centre-left (Greenburg 2000). Additionally, theses newspapers are targeting a more diverse readership than The National Post or Le Devoir47.

47 The National Post was not selected for our study for two reasons. First, The Globe and Mail and The National Post are both national level newspapers. To obtain a more diverse selection between the local/provincial and the national level, we have decided to exclude The National Post and maintain The Globe and Mail in our selection. Additionally, The Globe and Mail has a larger readership than The National Post nationwide. Secondly, this inclusion of The Globe and Mail rather than The National Post was also based on this idea of ideological spectrum on which it revolves around. The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star are, respectively, center-right and left, as for The National Post, the newspaper is considered as a hard-right-wing publication such as The Toronto Sun and The Vancouver Sun (Greenburg 2000). A certain uniformity is, thus, found in the sample articles as both The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star are largely oriented toward a more liberal editorial stance and are socially and economically attracting a rather diverse readership than The National Post (political and corporate elites) (Greenburg 2000). This selection of The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star have enabled us to, even if both are considered liberal and attracting a similar audience, perceive a divergence in framing the immigration question from an elite’s perspective and the inclusion of dissident voice. A future research could include The National Post, The Toronto Sun, The Vancouver Sun and other newspapers’ organization viewed as right-wing/populist distributions.
In fact, as of January 2018, “The country’s largest newspapers all saw growth in digital readership: The Globe and Mail’s weekly readership was up 3.9 per cent to 4.1-million compared to the previous quarter; the National Post reached 2.7-million, an increase of 2.2 per cent (...).” (“Globe Readership Grows, Most Read in Canada” 2018) As of The Toronto Star, their digital view exceeds 6.7 million unique visitors per month as their weekly print is around 3.1 million readers; of these readers, 2.3 million are between 24 and 54 which “comprises nearly half the Canadian population” (“Star Media Kit” 2018, 3). The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star represent a total of 11.4 million unique visitors (digital and print combined).

First, The Globe and Mail is founded in 1844 by George Brown in Toronto (“Company Overview of the Globe and Mail” 2018). The Globe and Mail is an English-language daily newspaper based in Toronto that is distributed across Canada. Numbering 2 million copies a week, it is the national newspaper with the highest circulation in Canada and is the second-largest newspaper after The Toronto Star. The Globe and Mail is considered by many to be the number one newspaper in Canada, though this honour is also attributed to The Toronto Star. According to the website, “The Globe and Mail print and digital formats reach over 6 million readers every week, with Report on Business magazine reaching over 1.5 million readers every issue in print and digital.” (“About Us” 2018) As of The Toronto Star, founded in 1892 by Horatio Clarence Hocken, the daily newspaper is also based in Toronto and is a multi-platform news organization distributed across Canada. First known as the Evening Star, it was under the influence of Joseph E. Atkinson that The Toronto Star has established its national renown. Today, the news company still relies on his philosophy to run the daily newspaper; furthermore, the Canadian firm can rely on more than 10.7 million readership (“About The Star | The Star” 2018; “Star Media Kit” 2018).

The body of articles for our analysis was compiled from the Lexis Nexis Academic database, which allowed us to gather all articles published in The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star between January 2013 and December 2016, and responding to keywords:

48 As of The Globe and Mail, the under 35 readers are at 34%, 35-45 at 20% and the 50-64 at 25% (“Globe and Mail Media Kit” 2018, 2).
“immigration” OR “refugee*” OR “asylum seeker*” AND “Canada”. For the years covered, the search returns 2,005 articles, but a total of 1,391 articles have been selected due to our inclusion factors. The initial analysis focused on the title of the article, the combination of keywords, its pertinence to these keywords, and the language used to qualify these immigration policies through the economic, identity, humanitarian and public security frames.

As the examples show, we have eliminated articles that were including our keywords such as “immigration” or “refugee*”; however, we eliminated articles that were not related to our subject which was immigration policies in Canada. Here, for our study, we are concerned with immigration in Canada and to Canada and the influence the policies – federally or provincially – have on these different frames to characterize the immigration question (such as the arrival of immigrants to Canada, the life of immigrants in Canada, and so on). Here are examples to illustrate what we considered as inclusive or exclusive news. The first two are not included in our research as the articles are interested in refugees and immigration in Europe or to Europe. As of the last two, these articles are related to immigration in Canada and to Canada, and were, thus, included in our sample.

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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| December | “[…] The count is based on police and coast guard data and estimates stemming from refugee registration in Greece; data and estimates from government, police and UNHCR in Italy; and police and government data from Spain and Malta. Of those who arrived, 49 per cent came from Syria and 21 per cent from Afghanistan. […]”  
| 2015     |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
| December | “[…] Europe’s leaders are not expecting a smooth ride in 2017 following a year marked by political upheaval extremist attacks, unchecked immigration and a rising military threat from Russia […]”                                                                                     |
| 2016     |                                                                                                                                                                                                           |

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49 We added asterisks as to gather a larger number of articles relating to immigration to Canada.
50 See the “Limits” section regarding the data collection.
51 “UN says migrant arrivals by sea to Europe topped one million this year” (Anonymous 2015)
52 “Europe braces for a challenging 2017” (Katz 2016)
January 2015  “[…][Canada is opening its doors wider for refugees fleeing a Middle East civil war and the Islamic State’s reign of terror, announcing it will accept another 10,000 Syrians over three years and 3,000 more Iraqis in 2015. […]”

April 2016  “[…] Private sponsorship hit its stride in the late 1970s, when Canada successfully brought in 60,000 refugees from Southeast Asia through the matching of government and groups. […].”

Given the volume of material to be analyzed, we chose to restrict the content analysis to a random sample of 10% of the corpus, which represents 141 articles (i.e. this random sample is simplified thanks to Stata). These different frames provided information regarding the indexation of alternative voices, as these are sourcing differently; we analyzed the sourcing of the information within the media. We have included opinions, news, comments, columns, chronicles and editorials in our analysis, but duplicates have been excluded. The database, Lexis Nexis Academic, automatically eliminate duplicates from being displayed in the results, which reduce our search time as only one coder is available for this research. Moreover, this reduces search time permitted the coder to focus on key aspects of this research rather than looking for duplicates.

A coding grid has been developed based on the hypotheses put forward in this thesis and the predictions advanced by the indexation theory formulated by Lance Bennett. The coding grid, which is annexed to this study, is also built upon the literature on how media are framing the immigration question. In order to clarify and assure a reality correspondence to these two elements combined, a sample of 10% (14 articles) has been pre-coded and then adjusted, if needed, to add these new elements to our coding grid. Our coding grid is composed of nine variables. The variables I100 to I400 are factual information regarding our article as of the date of publication, the name of the newspaper, the article’s ID and the section/type of the article.

53 “Canada to welcome more Syrians, Iraqis; Ottawa announces it will accept an additional 13,000, hoping private organizations can take on much of the resettlement burden” (Chase 2015)
54 “Let’s get all the Syrian refugees into the homes awaiting them” (Goodwin 2016)
The variables S100 to S400 are concerned with the official’s frame in relation to the Canadian debate on the immigration question. These variables encompass the economic, the public security, the humanitarian and the identity frames usually mobilized/forwarded by the political elites withholding power within the Canadian government. As an example, the variable S100, or the economic frame, is divided in five subcategories – “positive,” “mainly positive,” “neutral,” “mainly negative,” and “negative” – and are identifiable through a keyword combination. For the “positive” and “mainly positive” subcategories, keywords such as “prosperity,” “growth,” “productivity,” and “well-being”, are related to these two subcategories of S100. On the contrary, the “mainly negative” and “negative” subcategories are linked to keywords such as “unemployment,” “deficit,” “welfare,” and “burden.” As of the “neutral” subcategory, the keywords are neutral as they are not combined to adjectives modifiers.

Here is an example of a positive economic frame:

*The Globe and Mail*, ID. 297  
*The Globe and Mail*, March 19, 2016, F8

In Canada, immigration is **smooth, legal, economically beneficial** and designed to welcome newcomers **as future citizens**.

[...]

It’s all about people – **economic immigrants**, reunited family members and refugees – joining the **Canadian family** as **full members**.

[...]

By the end of 2014, there were more than 353,000 people in Canada under the **Temporary Foreign Worker** and **International Mobility programs** – a **seven-fold increase** since the mid-1990s.

[...]

55 “Most often, modifiers are adjectives describing a noun. They can also intensify a noun in comparative (such as the words higher, greater) or superlative (highest, greatest) ways. A single use of a target word might have more than one modifier, each of which will count toward the total. This finding includes all words in the top fifty overall modifiers of either immigration or migration relating to scale or pace: mass, net, uncontrolled, large-scale, high, more, unlimited, unrestricted, excessive, unfettered, much, further, open-door, unchecked, massive, low, less, balanced, large, vast, and big. Four modifiers relating to illegality appeared in the top fifty overall modifiers of immigration or migration: illegal, legal, unlawful, and irregular” (Allen and Blinder 2018, 222).
Thanks to lobbying from businesses in Atlantic Canada, seasonal industries [...] will now have something approaching carte blanche to hire temporary foreign workers [...] follow the principles that have made Canadian immigration a positive force for the economy and society.

The variables S500 to S900 are attributed to the dissident voices’ frames in relation to the immigration issue in Canada. These variables encompass the health frame, the detention frame, the citizenship frame, the family reunification frame and lastly, a variable call “other” for frames that might emerge from the analysis such as education. As an example, the variable S500, or the health frame, is also divided in 5 subcategories – “positive,” “mainly positive,” “neutral,” “mainly negative,” and “negative” – and are identifiable through a keyword combination. For the “positive” and “mainly positive” subcategories, keywords such as “human right,” “health,” “well-being,” and “caring,” are related to these subcategories of S500. On the contrary, the “mainly negative” and “negative” subcategories are linked to keywords such as “burden,” “taxpayers,” “welfare,” and “money.” As of the “neutral” subcategory, the keywords are neutral as they are not combined to adjectives modifiers.

Here is an example of a positive health frame,

The Toronto Star, ID. 582
The Toronto Star, December 10, 2013, A6

Since the federal health cuts a year and a half ago, we have seen pregnant women turned away from prenatal care and sick children denied treatment.

[...]

This government has been the most hostile and vicious to refugees since the Second World War. We are grateful for the new provincial health program.

[...]

The federal government said the cuts could save taxpayers $100 million over five years and genuine refugees continue to receive comprehensive health-care coverage on par with what Canadian receive.

[...]

56 This positive health frame is regarding the renewal of the health access to refugee claimants, which is in disagreement with the official rhetoric on the matter. Here, we have the inclusion of doctors such as Philip Berger from the Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care.
According to health officials, almost one third of refugee claimants are without health coverage as a result of the cuts.

In order to analyze our selected articles, the LIWC2015 (pronounced “Luke”) software is used to facilitate and systematize the content analysis of our newspapers’ articles. The LIWC2015 has a build-in dictionary including more than 6,400 words; moreover, the “LIWC reads written or transcribed verbal texts which have been stored in a digital, computer-readable form (such as text files). The text analysis module then compares each word in the text against a user-defined dictionary.” (“LIWC 2015: How It Works | LIWC” 2019) Because LIWC2015 was developed by researchers in social and cognitive psychology, the categories included in the build-in dictionaries reflect this reality. First develop in the 1990s, the LIWC2015 software has evolved and adapted to the changing environment; because we want to know if media organizations include dissident voices, we also want to measure and explain what kind of words are likely to be associated with the dissident voices. Indeed, our second hypothesis (H2) postulates that dissident voices are more likely to be reported once they are included in a frame outside the economic, humanitarian, public security and identity spheres. This software enabled us to measure the percentage of words attributed to different frames associated with dissident voices (Cf. Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010).

Our coding process is tinted as it was done by a single coder which can generate certain bias related, for example, to a lack of internal consistency or human-related errors of coding. Although, we did not have, for our study, chronologically analyzed our articles, but rather decided to analyze the content of the selected articles related to our hypotheses and the literature on the immigration question’s framing in the news. The unit of analysis retained is the complete corpus, since we start from the premise that the media coverage of the immigration question produced by The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star is somewhat homogenous as of its economic liberal stance. As a result, we chose to consider the 141 articles in the corpus as a separate unit of analysis.

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57 To diminish this single-coder bias, we have demanded to a first group of colleagues to code articles from the 10% random sample which served as a basis to our adjusted version of the coding grid, and a second group of colleagues have coded all the same articles (034, 429, 818, 999, and 1207) to see consistency with the single coder.
As we gathered all articles published in *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star* between January 2013 and December 2016, and responding to keywords: “immigration,” OR “refugee*,” OR “asylum seeker*” AND “Canada”. These keywords have then been matched with our built-in dictionary for *LIWC2015* (Cf. Annex B). This built-in dictionary gives us the ability to analyze the proportion of the four possible outcomes related to the immigration issue (i.e. public security, economic, humanitarian and identity) and the inclusion of dissident voices’ frames within the selected article.

Each category of our dictionary was divided into groups (or clusters), where: “Clustering divides data into meaningful or useful groups (clusters) without any prior knowledge. Text clustering is a fundamental and important work in information processing, […]” (Ma 2014, 530) In that context, text clustering is an effective solution when it comes to content analysis. In order to efficiently categorize our various frames, we have used Antidote semantic field dictionary.

Semantic content analysis (SCA) is an automated form of text analysis that allows a researcher to automatically and objectively compare the content of any text along given parameters. It is similar to traditional text analysis studies, which are well-established in applied linguistics research, in that it uses computer programs to analyze texts and the words that are contained in those texts (Polat 2014, 42)

The semantic field dictionary of Antidote is grouped by meaning and ranked by relative strength, meaning the stronger the word is, closer it is related to the main semantic section. Thus, we have used the noun, adjective and verb’s categories in the semantic field dictionary to create our own, and it to be included to our software *LIWC2015*.

### 3.2 Categorization of elite’s speech

Lately, different migrant groups such as asylum seekers, migrants and refugees are depicted, in journal articles, as an anonymous and poorly qualified group of professionals, as criminals

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58 “The large-scale text clustering was an effective way to solve data understanding and information mining massive text[s].” (Ma 2014, 530)
59 The “humanitarian” frame yielded 71 related nouns, 16 adjectives and 4 verbs; the “security” frame yielded 239 related nouns, 51 adjectives and 56 verbs; the “identity” frame yielded 79 related nouns, 30 adjectives and 21 verbs; and the “economy” frame yielded 280 related nouns, 120 adjectives and 108 verbs. As of the dissident voices’ frames, “health” yielded 346 nouns, 117 adjectives and 49 verbs; “detention” yielded 78 nouns, 24 adjectives, and 21 verbs; “citizenship” yielded 75 nouns, 28 adjectives and 21 verbs, and “family” yielded 221 nouns, 71 adjectives and 68 verbs. Each category, from Antidote semantic field dictionary (nouns, adjectives and verbs), has been scanned to include the relevant words to each frame. Noting that some nouns, adjectives and verbs are crossing over frames categories.
or as “fake” claimants. For the reader, they are “the others” and it is this limited characterization that shapes the discourse citizens have on migrants and thus, shape the public opinion on the matter. Indeed, the media’s treatment of immigration has a direct influence on the image and opinion a particular society has on this phenomenon. The way information is processed, the systematic use of stereotypes and the repetition of certain informative elements guide and eventually create a unique thought on the issue. Information, reports, and editorials are numerous and recurrent in all media, so this topic is a main concern for researchers in discourse analysis (Helbling 2014; Innes 2010; Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007).

Highlighted by scholars over the last decades is how framing the immigration question influences the political outcomes. In fact, in framing immigration in a certain way will—negatively or positively—influence the public opinion on the matter. These frames such as “victimization” (Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007), “immigrant-as-threat” (Figenschou and Thorbjørnsrud 2015), or even as a question of “diversity” (Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007; Igartua and Cheng 2009) exposes migrants as illegal, as a direct attack on the state sovereignty and thus fragilized the State’s image on its ability to decide who can enter or not its territory (Bagaric and Morss 2005; Dauvergne 2004; Bosniak 1991). Wallace (2018) mentions that “Newly emerging research [such as Lawlor and Tolley (2018)] also demonstrates the importance of disaggregating immigration as a category to focus more specifically on how various classes of immigrants are framed differently in news media, and a key difference is between immigrants and refugees.” (2018, 210)

Framing, or framing theory, is understood as a theory that “help interpret and reconstruct reality” (Volkmer 2009, 408). The central aspect of framing is how individuals, in a certain cultural context, can identify, interpret and perceive the reality surrounding their everyday routine. This disentangle view of our routine simplifies the individual’s vision of the received information (Goffman 1986). Today’s framing theory has “allow[ed] us to detect journalistic bias. The use of stereotypical framing, frames along gender lines, or imbalances of the representation of relevant societal communities, such as ethnic minorities within a national or transnational public, are examples of different frames that might be
used.” (Volkmer 2009, 409). In the 1970s, with the rise of mass media, these frames dictated the Americans, but not only, how and what they should be thinking (agenda-setting) about a specific topic being related in the news. However, nowadays, the research regarding framing in the news has been re-oriented toward the study of elite discourses (but also at reporting both sides of a single story), and at a more micro-level (Lippmann 1992; Entman 2007, 1993; Reese 2001; Scheufele 1999)

Portrayal and framing of migrants by the mainstream media can harmfully impact the newcomers. Research regarding the framing of migrants in the news has pointed that a lack of understanding of international law, national law regarding immigration and refugee laws, and the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P) may have a negative impact when journalists report the stories, which ultimately alter the public’s opinion on the matter (Doherty 2015; Dreher 2010; Lawlor 2015a). Moreover, in order to report a story, journalists reinforce, unintentionally or intentionally, stereotypes when relying on unchecked and unreliable historical and social information on certain key events to describe and support their evidence put forward in their story (S. Bennett et al. 2013; George 2015). This poor fact checking, undoubtedly, transforms the news storyline and thus can lead to imbalances, which directly affect the audience, the public’s perception of newcomers and can eventually shift the rhetoric on migrants, all caused by unchecked/unreliable information (L. Bennett 1990; S. Bennett et al. 2013; George 2015; Bradimore and Bauder 2011; Doherty 2015).

Finally, this inadequately reported coverage of migrants can harmfully cause damage to the already established migrants and may dissuade newcomers to choose Canada as their final destination. Moreover, this prejudice in connection to asylum seekers, refugees and migrants have greatly fuelled this international anti-immigration sentiment (Dijk 1987; Doherty 2015).

3.2.1 Economic

It is not easy to delimit the borderlines between politics and the economy. These two spheres of the social field maintain a relationship of interdependence that is complementary on many occasions, but which is controversial in other cases. Various scholars pointed out
that economics requires adopting decisions from politics, which means choosing between some options and others, which are related, although conditioned, by the ideology of the parties that govern. Economic policy, which has acquired greater importance as modern societies developed, is not neutral and, although it requires technical knowledge, it responds to ideological factors. In turn, political decision-making is intertwined with economic factors that limit political action on many occasions (Knowles 2016).

However, within these established relations between the economy and politics, it is worth pointing out which of the two plays a predominant role, since political discussions in the House of Representatives are oriented toward the examination and debates related to economic, political and social issues. In recent times, as a result of globalization, there are analyzes that claim that the economy takes on a greater role than politics, so that it has been subordinated to economic interests and, above all, to the growing importance from the market (Knowles 2016). The justification for this assertion is that the predominance of the market limits the action of nation states, with these having to replicate their functions to adapt to the economy marked by the interests of globalization (Knowles 2016).

Much of the political, economic, social and even media debate in many cases with regard to immigration revolves around the concern that immigrants “take away” employment from native workers, mainly because they are willing to accept the same job at home at a lower price. However, after more than two decades of empirical research carried out in many countries, with different technical approaches, the evidence indicates that the impact of immigration on the employment of natives, and even on their wages, is practically nil. This discursive rhetoric explains the reason, which is mainly based on the fact that the labour market should not be seen as a static market, but rather a dynamic one, where certain supply shocks, such as an increase in immigration, the labour market and as a result, companies and workers react to the new situation, and even in most cases their welfare improves with respect to the previous situation (Igartua and Cheng 2009; Dekker and Scholten 2017).

In fact, migrants can thus fill specific needs of the labour market and contribute to the improvement of the standard of living of the society. In that case, immigrants are
perceived by the public as positively contributing to the economic development of the economic dynamics of the country; this positive frame particularly targets specific temporary working programs such as the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) or programs mainly targeting skilled workers. However, some groups argue that immigrants are also consumers and users of services offered by the state (i.e. health, and education), which incurs additional expenses for the latter. Within this frame, the public opinion, and certain populist groups (such as Fédérations des Québécois de souche (FQS), La Meute, Soldiers of Odin or ID Canada), perceive the migrant as “abusers” of the social system already in place to help the “nativist.” In their sense, these right-wing groups believe that these newcomers have a negative effect on their economic livelihood (Mudde, Mérand, and Momani 2017). In order to counter this negative narrative on immigrants, it is important to try to take in consideration their contribution, so as to improve policies that relate to immigration (Igartua and Cheng 2009; Dekker and Scholten 2017; Lawlor 2015b; Gravelle 2018).

3.2.2 Humanitarian

Undoubtedly, when confronting measures to welcome refugees, humanitarian reasons are often prevailing in political debates. Even if the costs of reception were greater than the benefits, countries assume that challenge, and the host countries are responsible for assuming the corresponding share of the burden. The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate the sufferings, and maintain human dignity during and after man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as preventing and reinforcing preparedness for the occurrence of such situations. Secondly, humanitarian action is governed by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Lastly, humanitarian action includes the protection of civilians and people who are no longer part of hostilities, as well as the provision of water, food and sanitation, shelter, health and other services, all in favour of the people affected, which will facilitate their return to a normal life and livelihoods (Purvis 2016; Gravelle 2018; Berry, Garcia-Blanco, and Moore 2016).

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60 Implies the importance of saving human lives and alleviating suffering anywhere.
61 Means undertaking humanitarian actions based exclusively on needs, without discriminating between or within affected populations.
62 Implies that, in places where humanitarian action is being carried out, it should not favour any of the parties to an armed conflict or a dispute.
63 Means that the humanitarian objectives are autonomous with respect to the political, economic, military or other objectives of any of the participants in the areas where the humanitarian action is being carried out.
Therefore, the humanitarian frame is mainly concerned with the moral duty to welcome migrants and must be embodied in policies that have to reconcile hospitality and sovereignty; additionally, legal responsibility to offer its assistance to the most vulnerable is protected by this international principle called “Responsibility to Protect,” or R2P.

3.2.3 Identity

The identity frame on immigration can largely be qualified as societal security. The societal security is what allows us to speak of “us.” The intensity of this “we” can vary in a broad spectrum with respect to the size of the group to which it is applied, to the intensity of perception and to the reasons that create the sense of belonging. Societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible threats. The societal security pertains to sustainability, within the scope of acceptable conditions of evolution, of the traditional schemes of language, culture, association, religion, national identity and customs. It can be better understood by studying the processes by which a group comes to perceive its identity as threatened, when it begins to act with respect to security and what behaviour causes this disturbance. Societal security refers to situations in which societies perceive threats in terms of identity (Gravelle 2018; Knowles 2016).

The most common issues considered as threats to societal security are: (a) larger influx of immigrants (64); (b) the identity of a particular society/community is evolving due to a change in the composition of the population (65); (c) horizontal competition arises (66); and lastly (d) vertical competition is causing the society to find a new identity (67) (Knowles 2016).

The identity frame, or societal identity, on immigration comes in two opposing arguments: the positive identity frame (i.e. related to multiculturalism and a celebration of integration) and the negative identity frame (i.e. migrants as representing a threat to the

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64 I.e. a population A is being “invaded or diluted” by the influence of population B.
65 E.g. Chinese migrants into Tibet.
66 Although the population A continues to live in its territory, its way of life is changing due to the preponderant cultural and linguistic influence of the nearby culture (e.g., the fear of Canadians and French against the Americanization of their culture).
67 The population A will no longer be seen as a homogenous community because there is an integrative project (e.g., the European Union project) or a regionalist project (i.e. Quebec from 1960s to 1990s) that is leading it toward a new identity.
survival of the Canadian identity and a risk to social fragmentation) (Pérez-Paredes, Aguado Jiménez, and Sánchez Hernández 2017; Khosravinik 2009).

3.2.4 Public Security

The security frame presents immigration as a public safety issue for Canada. It is expressed by an association between immigrant status and crime (e.g. stealing and murder) or between the religion and ethnicity of an individual (i.e. terrorism being associated with Islam and Muslims), as well as the description of security measures taken against certain individuals (e.g. arrest, and detention) or in general terms of flow management (i.e. security screening). The security frame does not follow a trajectory of linear intensification and seems strongly linked to external and internal factors rather than solely being influenced by the 9/11 attacks, which did not have a lasting impact on the relative importance of security discussions about immigration in Canada (Browning 2017; Rudolph 2006; Allen and Blinder 2018).

3.3 Limits

Due to the interpretive nature of the thematic categorization approach of the significant content of the newspaper articles studied, the internal validity of this research—understood as the match between the research results and the observed reality—is highly dependent on the stability and the reliability of the coding operation.

First, the small size of the sample⁶⁸, which consists of only two dailies and omits others such as the National Post, and Le Journal de Montréal/Québec, makes it difficult to generalize our results to all Canadian newspapers. For this reason, it is important to remember that our findings will testify to the relative status of the official governmental frames in The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star articles inclusively. Although these two newspapers are important players in the Canadian journalistic space, they cannot be considered as true representative of the Canadian press in its totality.

While immigration is by definition a transnational phenomenon and is regularly reported and managed at the supranational level⁶⁹, our research proposal—including

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⁶⁸ Moreover, the LIWC2015 software is easily applicable to an English lexicon as it is an additional reason why French newspapers such as Le Devoir or Le Journal de Montréal/Québec were excluded from our study.
⁶⁹ As proof, regional regimes such as the Schengen area and its common visa policy; and border controls, as well as bilateral agreements.
international news articles—intentionally ignores the interconnectedness of internal and external spheres. The concept of immigration operates along a transnational continuum that our study will be unable to grasp as a whole.

The period chosen for selecting the articles is also a limitation, since it does not include other high-profile stories\(^70\) that may have an impact on the media. However, the period chosen allows us to better understand the media coverage of the most important aspects of Canada’s immigration policies and its variety between the Conservatives and the Liberals. Lastly, the database chosen for the research, here *Lexis Nexis Academic*, represents a limit to the methodology. While combining keywords in the search bar, the database selected the first 1,000 articles that are relevant to our research while eliminating the proportion considered irrelevant; by limiting the search to 1,000 articles, the database, thus, limits the searcher to the first 1,000 articles and have no access to the other articles that might have been useful for the analysis. Therefore, a different tactic could have been used to look in the database, a search combining different keywords such as “immigration” AND “Canada”; “asylum seeker*” AND “Canada”; “refugee*” AND “Canada”. We could also have combined our research with another database such as *Eurekka*\(^71\).

In this chapter, I presented our methodological approach on how we measured the presence or the absence of dissident voices within the Canadian journalistic sphere. Elements that were discussed principally relating to the case selection, our keywords search and finally, how elite frame the migration issues in the news. This next chapter rapidly summarizes the case of immigration in Canada while emphasizing the multicultural aspect of immigration policies from Harper to Trudeau.

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\(^{70}\) E.g. Cargoes of Sikh and Tamil refugee claimants in the 1980s, and the arrival of Chinese refugee claimants in the summer of 1999.

\(^{71}\) It is due to a lack of financial resources.
Chapter 4 – The Case of Immigration in Canada

Key strands of this imagination [that Western states have a political and an economic power to craft international laws] include the idea that immigration is permanent, that some countries are “senders” and others are “receivers,” that migration and national identity are intertwined that migration informs individual identity, but does not completely remake it. (Dauvergne 2016, 24)

Migration, as a result of the neoliberal model and a globalized economy, has run between restrictive rules that have limited borders and countries with the greatest economic power in what was commonly called the First World, which takes advantage of the conditions of need, poverty and marginalization of large sectors of the population of economically and socially disadvantaged countries to cover their unskilled activities. Thus, managing migratory movements is one of the most pressing issues for advanced liberal democracies like Canada; by managing migratory movements, it is suggested the ability of the government to secure its frontiers, and its ability to welcome and aid these newcomers to Canada. Considered as a traditional settler country, Canada is now adopting “a mean-spirited politics of immigration”—a hard-line immigration remodeling—in response to global issues such as the three shifts highlighted by Dauvergne (2016): (1) the asylum’s crisis; (2) the fear of Islamic fundamentalism, and (3) the end of the ideological multiculturalism. These three shifts inherently and significantly changed the already fragile line between asylum and illegal migration; undoubtedly, this combination of past and present events accentuated this desire to securitize immigration by enforcing security measures at our borders (e.g. biometric screening, PNR, and other technologies to prevent malevolent passengers on entering the continent). This anti-immigrant sentiment, the fear of “invasion” (here read crimmigration, this link between immigrants and a higher risk of criminality), and the militarization of borders in advanced liberal democracies accelerates the process behind the securitization of immigration (Dauvergne 2016; Castello 2018; Bourbeau 2008).

As is well known, global migration has not only not been able to slow down but has been on the rise; the circumstances are diverse—wars, disasters—but there is no doubt that poverty and unemployment in some regions are the “push” factors triggering the immigration
process. The global phenomenon has been the reason for the implementation of numerous programs (i.e. economic programs such as the Temporary Foreign Workers Program in Canada), but according to the regions, the conditions\textsuperscript{72} of migrants, and public policies of each country, the rules and the treatment differ (Gogia and Slade 2011b).

Now, in the face of such a conception of American reality, where does Canada fit in? As a binational, bicultural and bilingual entity, self-defined as multicultural and dedicated to the promotion of immigration, Canada could even propose itself as a model for migration and ethnic pluralism in the Americas of the 21st century.

4.1 Are we really exceptional?
This portrait leads us to address the so-called Canadian “exceptionalism thesis” on immigration. A report drafted by Irene Bloemraad referring to the “exceptionalism” of Canada, noting that Canada is by far, more open and more optimistic about immigration when compared to the United States and Europe, even when the proportion of foreign-born residents is much higher in Canada than in almost all other recipient countries. The author describes a sort of “national ethics” that is reflected in the policies of multiculturalism and anti-discrimination, as well as in the government measures to assist the integration of immigrants. According to Bloemraad, the Canadian government, regardless of the political inclination of the party in power, is frankly enthusiastic about immigration. Although it is natural that many Canadians choose to explain the “exceptionalism” of their country by citing qualities such as generosity or solidarity, the Canadian values are not the only factors at stake in this “exceptionalism thesis.” Government officials also cite economic growth and diversity (Bloemraad 2012; 2006; Enriquez 2018).

First, Canada is, historically, the only territory on the continent that did not go through an independence phase in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century, nor did it suffer events or decisive wars for his nationality. In other words, there is not, in the Canadian past, as in other countries, an “emancipatory deed” of rupture with their “Motherland,” as well as a revolutionary process (or civil war) leading to national consolidation, generally associated

\textsuperscript{72} Here understood as the applicant’s status category such as “refugee,” “asylum,” “political refugee,” etc.
with foundational myths. This factor, together with the highly decentralized federal structure, is a tributary of the binational character of the Canadian colonies (i.e. with the presence of the old New France, then Quebec) (Gogia and Slade 2011c). Canada did not have its own Citizenship Act until 1947, nor a completely autonomous Constitution with respect to the United Kingdom Parliament until 1982⁷³. This reality created the conditions for Canada to embrace the cause of multiculturalism as the organizing principle of its society, because the premise of forming a community of communities did not clash with the idea of a unifying and unquestionable “national being,” as we do, even today, in almost all other advanced liberal countries. Thus, the question is to see it as a factor that allows us to understand the demonstrated benevolence of Canadians toward the pluralism that it is nourished by the migratory contribution (Andras 2016; Dauvergne 2016).

The second structural element is that of geography, an obvious aspect and, nevertheless, generally disregarded. Canada constitutes a territorial mass with a relatively small population and located in a position of marked isolation. Note, in this sense, that the migration dynamic in the United States is marked, above all, by the influx of Latin Americans and, especially, Mexicans, while the presence of immigrants from Latin America in Canada is 12.6 % (Government of Canada 2017)⁷⁴. Faced with this situation, it is reasonable to assume that Canada is also differentiated from the rest of the continent by a lesser attachment to the territorial and inclusive conception of citizenship.

It should be noted that much of the advance of multicultural policies in Canada was due to the continued struggle of the province of Quebec to achieve that status of a “different society,” which reflected its efforts to preserve its French-speaking identity in the face of federal government attempts to promote a common Canadian identity—based on the cultural characteristics of the English-speaking majority—from the end of the Second World War. In 1971, during the government of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, began to legislate in the field of multiculturalism, which led to the nomination of a Minister of State for Multiculturalism and

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⁷³ See Liew and Galloway (2015).
⁷⁴ More than 1 Canadian out of 5, in 2017, is either from Asia (61,8%) or from Africa (13,4%) (Gouvernement du Canada 2017).
the Department of Multiculturalism was created within the secretariat of State in 1972 (today, it is called the Department of Citizenship and Immigration) (Cardinal and Couture 1998).

4.2. Canadian Multiculturalism and Quebec
Canada and Quebec participated in the extended modern ideal that has long been characterized by a series of policies—linguistic, cultural, and educational—that have favoured uniformity, symmetry and homogeneity. However, in the last decades, these two nations and other Western world countries have begun to accept that a large part of their states are both pluri-national and pluricultural (Kymlicka 2012). This condition has led to notable academic and political efforts in recent decades, in order to overcome this monistic condition and to design political arrangements capable of making understanding viable and, beyond mere tolerance, mutual coexistence.

The first issue that should be highlighted is that both interculturalism and multiculturalism are polysemic notions that require different levels of analysis. On the one hand, they configure political theories that seek to respond to the postulates derived from the extended vision of the uniforming and assimilationist nation state, which considers that the public sphere must be culturally homogeneous. On the other, they include a set of measures and institutional public policies aimed at managing ethnocultural diversity. And, finally, they can be configured as a state model, which would imply their constitutional regulation (Taylor 2012; Rocher and Labelle 2010).

In the Canadian scenario, interculturalism and multiculturalism have their roots in cultural pluralism; but these are two different models both in the normative plane and in the political dimension, whose distance is also explained by the particular history of Quebec and Canada, as well as by the historical relationship between both nations (Taylor 2012). Now, about the differences between the two there are different perceptions that vary in intensity, from those who argue that the discrepancies are nuanced to those who believe that their ultimate goal makes them cover different principles (Bouchard 2014; Rocher and Labelle 2010).

In the Québec scenario, interculturalism as a policy had to wait until March 2016 to be officially incorporated into a government document ( Ministère de l’Immigration, de la
diversité et de l’Inclusion 2016). However, the question of interculturalism in Quebec is the defence of the model of integrative pluralism whose constitutive elements are the protection of rights, the support of the Francophones, participation and reciprocity. This interculturalism vision and its link to the Bouchard-Taylor Commission is that the objective is to approximate the concerns of a majority of French Canadians regarding culture and religion (Laforest 2010). Thus, interculturalism in the case of Quebec is characterized by a collection of elements—not just on concerns of French Canadians—observed individually or all together. These elements range from dialogue, coexistence, tolerance, respect and recognition among groups to integration policies, moral contract, and a common civic culture (Karmis 2014).

According to authors present throughout the laws and policies, it is possible to state that Quebec has been configuring “an informal constitution” that determines the relations between the majority and the minority. It is true that Quebec has not recognized the constitutional reform of 1982, but that has not prevented it from providing itself with laws and public policies that allow the citizens of this nation to give a meaning to their collective experience within the Canadian political group (A.-G. Gagnon 2010).

In recent years, Quebec has adopted a series of institutional measures and responsibilities associated with policies on tolerance and respect for difference within a Francophone social environment, despite the fluctuations between those who bet on multiculturalism, advocates of interculturalism and those who emphasize models with assimilationist dyes (A.-G. Gagnon et al. 2014).

This diversity management model has been configured with a series of values, principles and policies, among which the following can be highlighted:

1. Promotion of the French language and an emphasis on rights and diversity
2. The place given to the Francophone majority culture;
3. The recognition of ethnocultural minorities in a pluralistic framework;
4. Protection of fundamental values such as democracy, male-female equality, non-discrimination and secularism based on respect for the moral equality of individuals and on the protection of freedom of conscience and worship and

65
The imperative of integration; (A.-G. Gagnon et al. 2014) However, according to various academics, such as Gagnon, Milot, Seidle and Boucher (2014), these advances are incomplete if they are not accompanied by public policies conveniently articulated with interculturalism, and inter-community bonds of trust that can provide strength to interculturalism, which will only be possible through the promotion of a common culture that integrates diversity (Bouchard 2013). That is to say, of an active citizenship that can lead to a legal statute, to the access to the exercise of rights, to the participation of all within the political community and to the feeling of belonging to a territory, that of Quebec (Rocher and Labelle 2010). Some specialists such as Gagnon (2014) also insists on the importance of habilitation as a way to favour dialogue and lay the foundations for a political convergence. That said, there is still a way to go to see the results of the political and legal configuration of interculturalism, as well as the scope of its social acceptance.

Finally, it is pertinent to continue insisting that in democratic and plural contexts the normative and political debate on the recognition of difference as well as on pluralistic models and policies of cultural diversity management is extremely complex and should not be simplified with reductionist labels, which often misrepresent the contents, extend prejudices, impede efforts for coexistence and social cohesion, and can encourage fragmentation. As Laforest (2010) states, we would go a long way if it were recognized that coexistence in difference can be done by combining elements of convergence and disagreement.

4.3. Canadian immigration policies
For more than three decades, Canada is virtually the only country in the world that actively pursues a policy of openness and encouragement of immigration. Obviously, this does not mean that all those who want to immigrate can do so freely. But, unlike almost all others—even those characterized as “immigration countries” or “settler countries”—Canada offers

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75 Other values, principles and policies highlighted by this intercultural approach: the search for a voice that mediates between assimilation and fragmentation; the need for a dynamic interaction and inter-community exchanges; the development of a common public culture and Québec membership; the participation of all inhabitants in civic and political life; the principle of reciprocity in the process of integration of immigrants, especially in relation to accommodations; and harmonization practices through citizenship education to act responsibly (A.-G. Gagnon et al. 2014; Karmis 2014; Rocher and Labelle 2010).
every individual, regardless of their origin or status, the ability to request that their candidacy be evaluated objectively on the basis of pre-established criteria. Most Western countries, even those that integrate millions of foreigners, aim above all to manage a problem or, rather, two problems: (a) prevent the entry of “illegals” and deal with undocumented people who are in their territory, or (b) either to regularize them (temporarily or permanently, conditionally or permanently), or to expel them. This is the case of the United States, where two thirds of the “legal” immigrant population are admitted because they have resident family members, while deportations increase dramatically. Australia and New Zealand have visa programs for skilled workers in areas of high professional demand, but the famous Canadian “points system” is the only one in the world that does not consider the demand of the labour market as a dominant aspect in its selection process (although, of course, assigns an important weight). This means that even with a “marginal” specialty, a candidate has the possibility of being approved if the other factors compensate for this relative failure (CIPE 2018; Dauvergne 2016; Liew and Galloway 2015).

**Figure 4.3 Canada’s Skilled-Worker Immigration System (The Economist 2015)**

![Bar chart showing selection factors for Canada's Skilled-Worker Immigration System](image)

In Canada, every application submitted under the heading of self-employed workers is evaluated according to six selection factors: levels of education, proficiency in official languages, experience, age, job offer and adaptability (as shown in Figure 4.2 and Table 1).
The candidate fills out a form and is awarded points for each rubric. For example, if a candidate only possesses a high school diploma, he earns fewer points in education. But if another applicant finishes with a postgraduate degree, the claimant receives more points (or the maximum which is 25). The level of handling of English and French is expressed on a scale of 0 to 28. Points are lost if you are less than 18 years old or more than 47 (2 points per year). Adaptability is the least objective criterion, but some factual indicators (e.g. having studied or worked in Canada) facilitate, however, a certain uniformity in the evaluation (Castello 2018).

**Table 1 The Points System (Liew and Galloway 2015)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selection Factor</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Regulations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Regulations, Sect. 78(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language Proficiency in English and French</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Regulations, Sect. 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Experience</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Regulations, Sect. 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Regulations, Sect. 81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arranged Employment</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Regulations, Sect. 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptability</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Regulations, Sect. 83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this way, no criterion of national or ethnic provenance during the process, no questions about religion or political opinions arise (Immigration 2018; Liew and Galloway 2015). At least in its formulation, the Canadian point system is an example of rationality and equity, and several countries (such as Great Britain, New Zealand and Sweden, among others) have considered the possibility of imitating it (Dauvergne 2016; CIPE 2018; Castello 2018).

**4.4. From Harper to Trudeau**

Migration policy can be defined as being a set of decisions and actions of a state that aims to deal with the entry and exit of individuals in its national territory. In this context, such rules reflect the will of the State and may be more open or more restrictive. Canada can be considered as one of the countries that attract the most immigrants in the world. This attraction is made, to a large extent, by the belief shared by most Canadians that immigrants represent a growth opportunity for the economy (Enriquez 2018; CIPE 2018). This is because, from the 1980s, one of the items in the immigrant selection process for Canada became the professional skills of potential immigrants. In this context, they would help

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76 A minimum of 67 points out 100 need to be scored by the applicants.
leverage the country’s economy. In this sense, the immigration policies adopted by the
government are considered as an example to be followed, being considered open and often
coming to be called the “Canadian model.” Thus, it is possible to perceive that this North
American country, unlike the Europeans, did not resist the fact that it was the destiny of many
immigrants but, on the contrary, it acted in ways to improve this process (Enriquez 2018).

This great success is based on three pillars defended by the government itself: the
selection of qualified immigrants; a major effort to integrate immigrants into society and the
labour market; and the autonomy of administration of the provinces. The former is commonly
known as points system. This was installed in 1967. Its purpose is to assign points to
immigration candidates through considerations such as education, age, knowledge of one of
the official languages of Canada among other aspects considered relevant to a possible entry
into the labour market. Over time, the weight given to each of the items evaluated has
changed. In some eras, previous professional experience was considered as more important
than language, for example (Liew and Galloway 2015; Gogia and Slade 2011a).

The second pillar refers to the integration policy adopted by the Canadian state. It is
based on the idea of multiculturalism and was first mentioned in 1971 by then-Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau. Its purpose is to recognize cultural minorities and also to promote a certain
degree of cultural relativism. The third concerns the ability of provinces to make their own
decisions about immigration in order to meet their local needs. An example is the province
of Quebec77, which seeks to prioritize applicants who speak French.

4.4.1 Stephen Harper’s Government

The Canadian government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Stephen Harper,
in power between 2006 and 2015, initiated a significant process of reorientation of
immigration and naturalization policy. A fundamental aspect of this process was the
emphasis on adapting to labour market trends. The federal government clearly expanded the
scope of the “provincial nomination” list program, by which provincial governments

77 See “The Canada-Québec Accord relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens,” enacted on 1 April 1991.
preselected groups of immigrants based on precise requirements of the companies\textsuperscript{78}. Also, the number of temporary workers permits doubled, to such an extent that their number in 2012 exceeded that of permanent immigrants admitted annually to the country, something never before occurred in Canada (Knowles 2016).

On the other hand, the scoring system was altered in order to give net priority to workers under 47 years of age who possess strong language skills, and also to foreigners graduated from Canadian universities. Finally, the approach to political asylum was reformulated, drastically limiting access to material and legal resources for refugees and creating a list of “designated safe countries” (e.g. in which Mexico is included) to restrict the requests of its citizens (i.e. alleging that they run lower risks than those from other countries). These types of changes in migration policy converge with the implementation of highly repressive measures in the matter of fraud against the citizenship law—which led to the naturalization of thousands of people, for the first time in modern Canadian history—and the possibility of withdrawing citizenship from those who, Canadians by birth, incurred in activities considered as “terrorists” by the government. Also, in what was argued would be a strategy of valorization of the Canadian citizenship, the demands were increased with respect to the naturalization process and the citizenship examination (with higher approval grades) (Newton 2018; Liew and Galloway 2015).

Thus, Canada has a history of immigration incentives—however, in 2006 the Canadian federal election marked the return of conservatism to power, with Stephen Harper being elected Prime Minister. During his nearly 10 years in office, Harper has associated immigration with security. In this context, there was a great decrease in the percentage of immigrants accepted as well as an increase in the number of deportations (Knowles 2016; CIPE 2018). Decisions on the issue of immigration, which were once decentralized with each province having a high degree of autonomy, were centralized in the hand of the Immigration Minister, who was able to establish immigration quotas.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{i.e.} an agreement very different from the one signed with Quebec, since this consists to rely on the provinces to refine the recruitment of highly qualified workers in great demand.
4.4.2 Justin Trudeau’s Government

In opposition to the Harper administration, Justin Trudeau was elected the new Canadian Prime Minister in 2015, which represented a return of the Liberals to power. Trudeau’s immigration policy is marked by a return to the stimulus of immigrant attraction, emphasizing multiculturalism as an essential feature of Canada. This feature can be seen in his policy agenda, which contains a section dedicated to expand and welcome more Syrian refugees as well as the desire to double the number of applications for entry to the country (“A New Plan for a Strong Middle Class” 2015).

For the first time, in many years, the Liberal Party of Canada, under Trudeau’s leadership, has achieved a majority in the House of Commons. In a few months, it was already possible to identify projects that seek to help improve the living conditions of immigrants in Canada. Among these, we can mention the attempt to make Ottawa, the country’s capital, a sanctuary city (Khan Salter 2017). In this context, we can see that the rise of Justin Trudeau, as Prime Minister, can be seen as a return to “open-door” policies to encourage immigration and assistance to immigrants who inhabit the country (Liew and Galloway 2015).

At the same time, as we have seen, after a brief period of a certain restriction on the entry of foreigners under Harper, Canada has again had more open migration policies. This recent Canadian trend has been spearheaded by new Prime Minister Justin Trudeau; the leader of the Liberal Party of Canada has been strongly in favour of opening the country to foreigners, especially refugees.

Meanwhile, in response to immigration policies adopted by his neighbour to the south, the Canadian Prime Minister has shown on social networks his support for immigrant entry into Canada. In addition, Trudeau also said that Canadians will receive refugees regardless of their religious beliefs (Austen 2018). At another time, already in response to a direct criticism of Trump regarding economic policies, Trudeau said that he will always stand in favour of the Canadians and defend them, regardless of what the American leader thinks about them (Trudeau 2018).
As has been shown, the arrival of Justin Trudeau as the Canadian Prime Minister represented a return of ideas to encourage immigration in the country, with Canadian policies now adopting an open feature. In other words, the logic of immigration as a factor of national development, which in other times it was justified by the openness to diversity and the ideology of multiculturalism, today becomes more intense, more crudely expressed: the immigrant is an economic variable that it must be effectively managed based on the needs of the market (CIPE 2018; Knowles 2016).

While it rapidly summarized the case of immigration in Canada while emphasizing the multicultural aspect of migration policies from Harper to Trudeau, Chapter 4 also highlighted the origin and the evolution of the migration policies over the last years, and the so-called “exceptionalism thesis” forwarded by Bloemraad and others. As of Chapter 5, it examines the changing dynamics of the indexation theory in Canada by showcasing the obtained results of whether or not dissident voices are included in the news, and briefly discussing the key findings.
Chapter 5 – The Changing Dynamics of the Indexation Theory in Canada

Canada’s once path-breaking immigration policies are being transformed into a system that mainly serves employers, treating immigrants not as future citizens or members of Canadian communities and families but merely as convenient or cheap labour. (Beiser and Bauder 2014)

Ontario should not continue to be a place where its immigrant children and youth new to Canada are denied health care when ill; where pregnant immigrant women cannot afford basic maternity and delivery care; and where families are bankrupted by massive medical bills for emergency care, and sometimes forced to return home. (Caulford 2014)

In order to test whether or not the media include dissident voices in their news stories, we propose the case of the media coverage of the Canadian immigration policies. Thus, we answer the following question: **How does the changing dynamics of the indexation theory influence the Canadian journalistic discourse?** Before the analysis itself, we shall present the articles’ distribution with Table 2. On a total of 141 articles (n), the majority is composed of *The Toronto Star* (82 articles or 58.16%) and followed by *The Globe and Mail* (59 articles or 41.84%).

**Table 2 Distribution of Articles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspapers</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Proportion in N</th>
<th>Proportion in n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>The Globe and Mail</em></td>
<td>59</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>41.01</td>
<td>41.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The Toronto Star</em></td>
<td>82</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>58.99</td>
<td>58.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>141</td>
<td>1390</td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can observe, with Table 2, that the random selection is representative of the selected N. In sum, both *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star* 0.83 points of difference between the population and the sample, meaning we have an equal distribution of the sample in balance with their proportion.
5.1 Official Discourse on Immigration

Prior to our results regarding the validation or invalidation of our two hypotheses, we looked at the official discourse regarding the immigration issue to Canada. According to the 2013 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration, the Canadian government perceived immigration as a way to support the national interests in a competitive global market and as a way to meet their present and future labour force. For the Citizenship and Immigration Minister, Chris Alexander, “Reforms to our economic immigration program will accelerate the arrival of highly skilled immigrants who can fill acute labour market shortages, integrate more quickly into our workforce and immediately begin making contributions to our economy” adding that “The reforms to the immigration system will foster economic growth and ensure long-term prosperity. They will also ensure we can reunite families within a reasonable amount of time. Finally, changes made to the asylum system will ensure Canada remains a world leader in offering protection to vulnerable persons.” (Government of Canada 2013, 1–2) Thus, a larger accent was given to the economic frame in comparison to the humanitarian or identity frames. As of the 2014 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Chris Alexander focused on the economic debate79, but an emphasis is also placed upon the identity frame especially regarding the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) and this “Canadians First” speech. The Report clearly mentions that:

the newly created International Mobility Program (IMP) incorporates those streams in which foreign nationals are not subject to a Labour Market Impact Assessment and whose primary objective is to advance Canada’s broad economic and cultural national interests. Within the new TFW Program, reforms are intended to ensure the program is only used to fill acute labour shortages on a temporary basis when qualified Canadians and permanent residents are not available. Among other measures, employers are now required to more clearly demonstrate their efforts to hire Canadians and ensure that Canadians and permanent residents are not displaced by foreign workers.

[adding that] The reforms are accompanied by more vigorous compliance monitoring and enforcement, for both the TFW and IMP, including significant increases in inspections of businesses employing foreign workers and tougher penalties for violations. (Government of Canada 2014, 8–9)

79 I.e. launch of the new Express Entry, the termination of the Immigration Investor and Entrepreneur’s program, Temporary Foreign Workers Program (TFWP) and the International Mobility program (IMP)
The long-standing humanitarian tradition is still mentioned, but less accentuated compared to the 2013 Annual Report.

Following, the 2015 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration, under Trudeau, underlines the Canadian’s role on reviewing the refugee resettlement program in order to focus on the Syrian crisis, and thus maintaining the humanitarian aid’s tradition and heritage. Additionally, a minor change in the title of the department from “Minister of Citizenship and Immigration” to “Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship” has proved to reflect the Liberals’ general rhetoric, one oriented toward the humanitarian frame and family reunification rather than the previous economic, social and security frames. Thus, the then-Minister, John McCallum, reasserts that: “it is vitally important that immigration continues to be representative of Canada’s compassion and humanitarianism. It is by finding a balance between compassion, efficiency and economic opportunity for all, and through diversity and humanitarianism, that immigration will continue to bring both economic and social rewards.” (Government of Canada 2015, 1)

Lastly, the 2016 Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration still orient the Government’s rhetoric toward one of compassion, well-being and efficiency: humanitarian and economic frames are at forefront. The Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship John McCallum reasserts that: “Canada admitted over 271,000 new permanent residents, the highest number since 2010. […] Reuniting spouses and families quickly and efficiently will continue to be a priority going forward.” (Government of Canada 2016, 1) The minister accentuates the nation’s role in resettling 25,000 Syrian refugees and believe the government, “will continue to welcome displace and persecuted people in need of protection, security and an opportunity to rebuild their lives in our country.” (Government of Canada 2016, 1)

This evolution of priorities will enable us to validate or invalidate our two hypotheses regarding the two daily newspapers, The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star. The second hypothesis allows us to measure the bias, or not, of the media coverage of the immigration.

80 Security measures are also mentioned, but rather in the context of the implementation of the Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA) and the CAN+ program.
issue in order to determine whether or not the media have presented alternative narratives to that expressed in the official Canadian political debate. Here, alternative narratives can be associated to when Bennett and Pfetsch (2018) mention a redefinition of the core concepts of a theory in order for these to be coherent with the modern age of technologies and political institutions. In that case, it is the desire of media to balance sources by including diverse actors trying to step into the political sphere and influence the audience’s opinion without producing a single narrative identical to the official Canadian political speech. Additionally, these so-called alternative narratives can also be associated with what Hallin labelled, in his theory, the “sphere of deviance,” and how these “deviant” voices managed to be heard by the mainstream media (Hallin 1986).

5.2 Hypothesis 1
We will expose whether or not, we can validate our first hypothesis in regards with The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star. The first hypothesis stipulated that (H1) The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star have produced a coverage of the immigration policy issue oriented toward a single narrative identical to that of the official Canadian political discourse.

If we look at our results, we can validate the first hypothesis that is the two daily newspapers covered the immigration issue to Canada according to the official debate. The Globe and Mail is more inclined to follow the official discourse then The Toronto Star 81.

Table 3 Consensus, Legitimate Controversy and Neutral speeches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official discourse</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensus with the official discourse</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against the official discourse</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 3 demonstrates, 41.8% of the 141 articles composing the sample is opposing the official discourse; only 23.4% of the total articles are in consensus with the official discourse.

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81 It is partially explained by the journal’s political orientation. Here, The Globe and Mail is center right and The Toronto Star is considered on the left.
A non-negligible portion of those articles are neutral, or factual news (49 articles). Those articles are basically news reporting factual information regarding key events in various provinces: ranging from trial for convicted fraud of the system to suspected terrorism-linked claimants \(^{82}\).

Beginning with the analysis of our results for hypothesis 1, we concluded that, indeed, when one of the four frames is predominant in the official rhetoric, the daily newspaper is less incline to include dissident voices. We have defined dissent voice in a domestic context as an individual or a group outside the political sphere of influence seeking to contribute to the debate regarding a specific topic. These dissident voices are, but not limited to, academics, religious leaders, youth, community leaders, far-left or far-right members, and lawyers. We also believe that dissident voices are not equally heard as journalists proceed to a certain sorting. For example, marginalized voices such as academics and lawyers are more likely to be deemed acceptable to be presented to the news than a far-right figure or pseudo-experts\(^ {83}\). These new inclusions are to balance the sources as a way to be considered as “semi-independent” from the elite’s discourses\(^ {84}\).

\(^{82}\) These articles are simply written to inform the general population of what is happening at the national and regional levels; The Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star are agenda-setting according to their political inclination.

\(^{83}\) This last point might also depend on the political stance of the news organization as well as its level of journalistic standards. News organizations that are usually more incline to sensationalism might be willing to emphasize the ‘emotion’ side of a story rather than educating the general population of a specific topic. In the context of pseudo-experts, they are deemed as “credible” by journalists as they believe in their authority, but which can ultimately cause disinformation (Benson 2017; Meyer and Laschever 2014; Sarat 2012).

\(^{84}\) The medias are still considered as “semi-independent” even with the addition of the marginalized voices because the medias are deemed agenda-setter, thus their selected stories are following the government’s agenda but also taking into account public opinion (L. Bennett and Livingston 2003).
Additionally, as we know, media agenda-setting and public opinion cannot be dissociated. Thus, we maintained that with the concept “opinion,” in general, there is already an intrinsic feature of heteronomy. The weakness found within the concept is sustained for two reasons: first, it is a mere doxa, meaning that it does not have the true and firm character of the epitome, or the knowledge. Second, the opinion would be irremediably linked to the image given that it shares its variable and probabilistic nature; in that sense, opinions are fragile and variable convictions, thus easily manipulated. If they become deeper or rooted convictions, then they should be called beliefs (and thus, the problem changes) (Bourdieu 1977; 1991).

As we can see, opinions are related with conviction and belief rather than with knowledge. In this sense, public opinion is defined as a “feeling” of the public thing supported by the images through which citizens misinform. For this reason, it is only a product of sensitivity or emotion and in no way reaches the level of a reflective and critical judgment—which is required to guarantee its autonomy (Bourdieu 1977). As Figure 5.2 demonstrates, around 80% of Canadians consider immigration has a favourable influence on the national economy. Moreover, during the period of alignment with the official discourses,
there is a lesser proportion of open letters to editors; when disagreement arises, the proportions go up by around 14.8%.

It is not a surprise that the Canadians believed, at around 80%, that immigration is favourable for the economic development of Canada. This belief is also reflected in the news by *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star*. Because hypothesis 1 is validated regarding *The Globe and Mail* and partially for *The Toronto Star*, we can mention, as a first example, that *The Globe and Mail* in December 2015 highlights

“[the] unprecedented enthusiasm and leadership from Canada’s private sector to support the Syrian newcomers. Private companies are front and centre in the Canadian response to this crisis. Many see it as a business and moral imperative.” (Omidvar 2015)

“For the thousands of Syrian newcomers willing and able to work, a job will be top of mind on arrival. It’s up to Canadians to help leverage their talent quickly and fully. We should bear in mind that 25,000 is just the start—a lot more talent will be on the way.” (Omidvar 2015)

These two quotes from *The Globe and Mail* clearly highlights the preferred frame during this period, an economic frame directly aligned with the Canadian official discourse. This positive economic perception of immigrants by *The Globe and Mail* is aligned with this global perspectives on immigration in economic terms; indeed, Canadian journals are not different from other regions as observed, for example, in the coverage of the immigration question in the Spanish media of the Latin American migrants (Igartua, Cheng, and Muñiz 2004; Dekker and Scholten 2017). As in Europe, the question of immigration is treated, by both *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star*, in terms of “skilled labour,” “capital gain,” “taxpayers,” “skilled workers,” “business,” and “contributors” (Igartua and Cheng 2009; Dekker and Scholten 2017; Lawlor 2015b; Gravelle 2018). Therefore, *The Globe and Mail* reasserts John McCallum’s idea of immigrants as contributors to the Canadian economic life; immigrants as spurring productivity and increasing productivity activities.85

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85 Moreover, the economic discourse, in positive terms, is associated to various governmental programs such as the Temporary Seasonal Workers Programs. There is also the inclusion, in both *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star*, of economic voices such as the Canadian Chamber of Commerce.
The second example reflects, in this context, the proliferation of intrastate and identity conflicts since the end of the Cold War that have provided advanced liberal countries to correlate migration, security and criminality together. Undoubtedly, the criminalization of immigration “has created parallel systems in which immigration law and the criminal justice system are merely nominally separate. […] [,and where] aliens become synonymous with criminals.” (Stumpf 2006, 376, 419; Bourbeau 2018) Indeed, the intensification of migratory flows poses several problems with respect to the territorial integrity of states—and respect for human rights—in addition to reconfiguring identities circumscribed by nation states (Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Huysmans 2006). These multifaceted consequences were then the subject of a lot of concerns, especially on the challenges they pose to internal security. In fact, in September 2016, Tony Clement86, a Conservative MP and former cabinet minister, has proposed to increase the security measures surrounding individuals suspected of association to terrorist organizations. For Clement, “If they are so dangerous to the Canadian population that they deserve a peace bond slapped on them, I would put it to you that unless we can surveil them 24/7, they should be incarcerated.” (Smith 2016) Clement pursues by reasserting that “If that is not possible [peace bond and 24/7 surveillance], then I think the community interest and the national interest is there would be incarceration until they were no longer a threat.” (Smith 2016)

Under this negative perception of immigrations, The Globe and Mail describes immigrants in terms of law offenses, a lexicon attributed to illegality, and by the description of security measures taken against certain individuals – e.g. arrest, and detention – or in general terms, the security management of the various flows – e.g. security screening, and CBSA-related screening. While the articles of The Globe and Mail opt for a strengthening of the Canadian immigration system, the articles of The Toronto Star are quite cautious in framing the immigration question in negative terms and recall the importance of preserving the humanitarian tradition of Canada87 and respect for civil liberties. As Figure 5.2 has

86 The article’s length is 625 words. Government, or elite’s security frame, is given a 67.8% (or 424 words) proportion, while dissident voices are given a proportion representing 3.2% of the article’s length (or 20 words). The rest of the article is factual with 181 words (or 29%)

87 As mentioned earlier, the humanitarian tradition is embedded in the government’s political agenda, see section 5.1. However, The Globe and Mail and, to a lesser extent The Toronto Star, evokes systematically the reception of Middle Eastern refugees in terms relating to “terrorism,” “screening,” and “false claim”. The Toronto Star opt for a discourse based less on dehumanizing terms regarding immigrants, but rather on a positive humanitarian discourse. The Toronto Star frames the immigration question in terms of “victim,” “seeker,” “civilians,” and “citizens”.

80
demonstrated, around 25% of the Canadian population surveyed believed that the arrival of refugees would increase the level of crime in Canada, and it clearly follows the belief put forward by Clement and this terrorist assumption. Similarly, the security frame, held by The Toronto Star in 2013 when reporting on the ruling of a ‘career criminal’ convicted of more than 75 criminal charges, faces an alike association between immigrants and crime. In this article, most of it is reporting on the gravity of his actions; however, the then-Minister of Immigration, Jason Kenney\textsuperscript{88}, associated his name to the “danger opinion” label, and affiliating it to a “threat to Canadians [that] outweighs the need to protect him from harm should he be deported.”(Edwards and Keug 2013)

As a third example, a similar rhetoric and alignment are sizeable with The Toronto Star \textsuperscript{89}. Here, in September 2015, the Liberal Party combined with the NDP demanded to Conservatives to boost humanitarian aid sent to Syrians. In order to support the Liberals and New Democrats’ plan, Les Whittington quote the International Development Minister Christian Paradis:

“The Syrian conflict is a tragedy of huge magnitude,” [adding that]

“None of us can stand idle when we know the horrors that affect so many civilians caught in the Syrian conflict. The question that we’ve been hearing, loud and clear, from Canadians is: ‘What can I do to help?’” (Whittington 2015)

Additionally, of these two quotes from The Toronto Star that clearly highlights the preferred humanitarian frame\textsuperscript{90} during this period, Les Whittington adds Paul Dewar, an NDP candidate in Ottawa Centre, saying, “We welcome the Conservatives’ decision to finally listen to Canadians who have been calling for government action to help Syrian refugees and set up a donation-matching fund as we requested […]”(Whittington 2015)

As of the articles from 2015 onwards, the question of immigration within an humanitarian frame is described in a positive form and structured around the notions of vulnerability and moral duty; these narratives are manifested through terms such as

\textsuperscript{88} The article’s length is 601 words. Government, or elite’s security frame, is given a 42,3\% (or 254 words) proportion, while dissident voices are given a proportion representing 18,6\% of the article’s length (or 112 words). The rest of the article is factual with 235 words (or 39,1\%).

\textsuperscript{89} 11 articles are still aligning with the official discourse.

\textsuperscript{90} The article’s length is 1175 words. Government, or elite’s humanitarian frame, is given a 51,1\% (or 600 words) proportion, while dissident voices are given a proportion representing 20\% of the article’s length (or 235 words). The rest of the article is factual with 340 words (or 28,9\%).
“vulnerability,” “sanctuaries,” “altruism,” “duty,” and “aid.” From this humanitarian standpoint, Canada does not differ—in the face of the stories of threat, division and dehumanization—from other studies that have showed an explicitly humanitarian framework used by medias and in which immigrants are presented as victims of an unfair system. There are numerous examples of this type of immigration coverage in the Western European media, such as those in France and the Netherlands (Benson 2013; Bos, Mewafi, and Vliegenthart 2016; Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007; Figenschou and Thorbjørnsrud 2015). These results echo those obtained in other studies, where regional newspapers tended to emphasize frames of humanitarian interest, regardless of the opinion of local residents about asylum. This pattern coincides with the existence of divergent perceptions: citizens can perceive immigration as an important problem at the national level but consider that diversity has positive or neutral effects in their area.

As a fourth example, the identity frame, or societal identity, on immigration comes in two opposing arguments: the positive identity frame (i.e. related to multiculturalism and a celebration of integration) and the negative identity frame (i.e. migrants as representing a threat to the survival of the Canadian identity and a risk to social fragmentation)91. The negativeness of the identity frame is illustrated with Figure 5.2. Indeed, 37% of the surveyed population believed there is too much immigration, and 54% believed that newcomers are not adopting or not compatible with Canadian values. In this context, The Globe and Mail is aligned with the Canadian officials as they are in favoured of the Canadian authorities “prioritizing some refugees based on characteristics that include their religion, the age of their children and whether they have a business background” and that “While the Conservatives have said they are targeting ethnic and religious minorities for resettlement […] some areas of focus seem to value qualities considered desirable for economic and cultural integration […]”92 (Friesen 2015) Similarly, almost a year later, Conservative

91 The mass media have a special role in the communication between two different elite groups and institutions, and they are crucial for the communication of racial or ethnic ideologies to and among the majority of the public. Similarly, discourse about and against ethnic or racial minority groups also sustains and defines much of the social interaction and communication of many institutions. From top to bottom in the hierarchy of institutional power of the nation, that is, from governmental and parliamentary debates, deliberations and decision-making to legislative actions at the lowest levels of states, regions or cities, we find many types of discourse that are currently very subtle. They express negative attitudes towards members of minority groups or provoke discriminatory actions against them. In addition to the spoken forms of institutional discourse, such as those already mentioned, in the meetings of legislative or judicial bodies, we find those discursive expressions or prejudiced and racist actions in laws, regulations, statutes, instructions, forms, documents, reports and other official texts (Dijk 1987).
92 Own emphasis.
In 2016, Canadian politician Kelly Leitch proposed screening immigrants for their “Canadian values.” Leitch proposed this screening to “be strong, safe and secure. And that’s what Canadians are telling me across the country.” (Stone 2016)

On the contrary, The Toronto Star has reported positively, in July 2016, about the celebration of integration and its positive effect on Canadians (around 50% of the surveyed population strongly believe that new immigrants are adapting to the Canadian values93). The Toronto Star goes on, in its editorial, about: “Canadians hav[ing a] good reason to feel proud about providing a safe haven for thousands of desperate Syrian refugees. But an equally important job remains to be done: ensuring that these newcomers put down roots and successfully integrate into their adopted homeland94 and moreover, “Providing special programs for refugee youth, a group that faces extra challenges attempting to integrate into Canadian society.”94 (Toronto Star 2016)

These reported quotes clearly validate that if the four frames (i.e. public security, identity, humanitarian, and economic) are more prominent in the news then there is a lower chance of finding dissident voices. The predominance of the legislative and executive members of the government—here represented in the newspapers by the MPs, MPPs, the Prime Minister and the Immigration ministers—can be explained in twofold. First, as the first hypothesis has highlighted the single narrative orientation of both daily newspapers, an understanding has emerged regarding the political inclination of The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star whether to include or to exclude dissident voices. In the context of The Globe and Mail, no significant change95 has occurred when the Canadian government moved away from Stephen Harper and the Conservatives toward the Liberal Party of Canada and Justin Trudeau. This ambivalence is also reflected in the way dissident voices are reported, which is almost null.

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93 See Figure 5.2. Here, Canadian values may include, amongst other, equality, respect for different cultures, safety and peace, and tolerance.
94 Own emphasis.
95 See Table 4.
Table 4 Newspapers’ political transition between January 2013 and December 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Globe and Mail</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toronto Star</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>For</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Additionally, when reporting a news story, *The Globe and Mail* has a greater tendency to index sources from the Immigration Department in order to support their arguments posing for or against the official discourse. Illustrating this point is Debra Black when she is reporting on Canada’s expected level of newcomers for 2016. The journalists state John McCallum’s *propos* that “Our plan will improve processing times and our backlogs will go down in our different immigration categories, including those for spouses, partners and children and parents and grandparents because we will be able to welcome more people to Canada.” (Black 2016a) The political stance of *The Globe and Mail* is closer to centre right, which can explain its ambivalence in reporting the news under the Conservatives and the Liberals. Presumably, a different result would have emerged if the daily chosen would have been *The National Post* considered a rightist newspaper. Thus, the political stance greatly influences their news reporting, which is exposed with *The Toronto Star* in Table 4.

However, *The Toronto Star* has majorly shifted its distribution between January 2013 and December 2016. As Table 4 demonstrates, during the Conservatives mandate—which is represented in our sample between January 2013 to November 4, 2015—, only 2 articles were considered in favour of the Canadian government as compared to 36 articles against the officials’ speech. As the second hypothesis will highlight, *The Toronto Star* had a greater inclusion of dissident voices during the Conservative mandate than under the Liberals. In this way, *The Toronto Star* has a greater tendency to include dissident voices when the

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96 Article’s reference 674, March2016. Moreover, the article is also located in the consensus sphere where Debra Black, or *The Toronto Star*, is in accordance with the government’s objectives on welcoming more refugees during 2016.

97 To facilitate family reunification, build the Canadian economy, and maintain Canada’s humanitarian tradition and heritage.

98 As between November 5, 2015 and December 2016, 9 articles were in favor of the official rhetoric, while 6 articles were going against this official position.
government in place is opposing their political stance, which is on the left of the political spectrum whereas the government was of the right.

**Table 5 Consensus, Legitimate Controversy and Neutral speeches for *The Globe and Mail***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official debate</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensus with the official discourse</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against the official discourse</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>59</td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Generally speaking, *The Globe and Mail* is more inclined to align its rhetoric according to the official discourse (i.e. 37.3% or 22 articles)\(^9\). A similar discourse is held when the story reported is mentioning concerns regarding security, economy and humanitarian support. In those cases, the journalists are reporting sources that are also aligned with the official debate.

Here is a “but.”\(^10\) Considering the first hypothesis applied to *The Toronto Star*, which highlights that the daily newspaper produce a partial coverage of the immigration issue, oriented toward a single narrative identical to that of the Canadian political speech.

**Table 6 Consensus, Legitimate Controversy and Neutral speeches for *The Toronto Star***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official debate</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensus with the official discourse</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against the official discourse</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>51.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>82</td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 6 highlights it, *The Toronto Star* is mostly non-aligning with the official discourse at 51.2% or 42 articles. In this case, the journalists at *The Toronto Star* are reporting a different frame that is not necessarily concerning the ‘favoured’ frames by officials to report immigration-related issue that is public security, economy, identity or humanitarian-oriented.

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9 See Table 4 and Table 5.

10 We need to note that this ‘but’ is temporally restricted as we are analyzing a news coverage between January 2013 to December 2016. Indeed, a larger temporal selection could help us validate, permanently, this hypothesis. Cf. (Bruun Andersen 2017).
In those cases, the journalists are reporting sources that also are not aligned with the official discourse\textsuperscript{101}.

Indeed, the analysis of the two daily newspapers have validated our first hypothesis stipulating that \textit{The Globe and Mail} and \textit{The Toronto Star} have excluded dissident voices when it is following the four frames understood as the public security, identity, economic or humanitarian.

5.3 Hypothesis 2

We are now at our second hypothesis which states that (H2) \textit{The Globe and Mail} and \textit{The Toronto Star} have more often included dissident voices, both at the national and local levels, in their news stories when opposing the official Canadian political discourse on the immigration policy issue. The second hypothesis is validated, and here are a few examples to illustrate our findings.

When we are talking about dissident voices, we have defined dissent voice in a domestic context as an individual or a group outside the political sphere of influence seeking to contribute to the debate regarding a specific topic. These dissident voices are, but not limited to, academics, religious leaders, youth, community leaders, far-left or far-right members, and lawyers. We also believe that dissident voices are not equally heard as journalists proceed to a certain sorting. For example, marginalized voices such as academics and lawyers are more likely to be deemed acceptable to be presented to the news than a far-right figure or pseudo-experts\textsuperscript{102}.

In May 2013, in \textit{The Toronto Star}, Dr. Paul Caulford\textsuperscript{103} wrote about the social injustice faced by newly installed migrants. For this doctor, the health-care system for new claimants “involves Canada’s disgraceful denial of health-care equity and eligibility to our

\textsuperscript{101} They do cite John McCallum, Chris Alexander or Jason Kenney, but do not solely based their report on these specific officials compare to \textit{The Globe and Mail}.

\textsuperscript{102} Journalists are balancing sources with outside information from the executive and legislative branches, but they are selecting dissident voices portrayed as acceptable and presentable to a larger audience. We shall not forget that journalists still considered as agenda-setter and public opinion’s influencers.

\textsuperscript{103} A Medical Director at The Volunteer Clinic for Medically Uninsured Immigrants and Refugees.
landed immigrants and some citizens caught in Ontario’s three-month wait for OHIP, adding that “A host of evidence-based studies in the scientific literature clearly confirm it is much more expensive to a health system to deny care than to provide it up front.” (Caulford 2013) In this letter to the editor, *The Toronto Star* clearly gives Dr. Paul Caulford, or his dissident voice, a place to be heard and express his discontent vis-à-vis the federal government; as the hypothesis underlines, there is a higher chance of dissident voices’ emergence when the daily newspaper is against the elite/official speech. Dr. Philip Berger, in his open letter to the editor in September 2015, clearly follows the idea left by Dr. Caulford in 2013. For Dr. Berger, under the Conservatives:

cuts to refugee health care, refugee claimants from Designated Countries of Origin or so-called safe countries (for example the Roma in Hungary) were denied all usual health coverage before they even had their refugee determination hearing. All refugee claimants lost coverage for medication, vision and dental care, and for prostheses necessary for amputated limbs. No refugee claimant ever received more health care coverage than Canadians receiving social assistance. This was all confirmed in the July 2014, ruling of the Federal Court, which found the cuts unconstitutional and “cruel and unusual” treatment. (Berger 2015)

Thus, this medical director at St. Michael’s Hospital in Toronto, strongly disagree, like most of his colleagues, about the government decision to exclude refugees from the health-care program especially refugees coming from a designated country.

Following these doctors’ dissatisfaction, in December 2013, Ontario and five other provinces challenged the federal government regarding the refugee’s health-care coverage. During this period, the federal government, under Harper, had decided to cut their spending of this specific program; however, the now-six provinces resumed the temporary coverage of these claimants. In that context, *The Toronto Star* is against the official discourse as Chris Alexander, the then-Minister of Immigration, mentioned in an email:

Canadians have been clear that they do not want failed asylum claimants and asylum claimants from safe countries receiving better health-care benefits than Canadian taxpayers. […] our government listened and acted with regard to Canadian taxpayers’ concerns on this issue, and we remain committed in our effort to preserve the integrity of our immigration system. (Keug 2013)

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104 Ontario Health Insurance Plan.
105 Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia and Quebec.
106 The article in question is 582_Dec2013.
In fact, the length of the article is 499 words. Out of these words, only 54 words are attributed to the Minister of Immigration Chris Alexander, which only represents 10.82% of the reported voice in the story. Comparatively, the opposition, here represented by Dr. Philip Berger of the Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care, is given 25.1% or 125 words to counter the federal government’s decision to halt the program. The remaining words are to support the argument in favour of reinstating the health-care program for asylum claimants. Thus, the favoured frame by *The Toronto Star*, here, is concerning health and health-care program for asylum claimants.

A similar critic, this time on social assistance, was forwarded in September 2014 by *Toronto Star*’s journalist Nicholas Keug on a bill that could manage to exclude refugees from accessing social assistance. This bill, C-585\(^\text{107}\), was largely debated among charitable groups assisting refugees\(^\text{108}\). The Chisu’s Act was strongly supported by the Conservatives and by the Immigration Minister Chris Alexander whom presented the legislative act as a bill, making changes to the system, [and where] our government is ensuring immigration is protected from those who are seeking to abuse taxpayer-funded health care, welfare and other social benefits, [adding that]

> We will continue to look at legislation in this place from the government, from private members, that goes in that direction to ensure a generous system gives value for taxpayers’ dollars. (Keug 2014)

Thus, dissident voices were largely mobilized by Nicholas Keug. Indeed, 52.2% of the article is attributed to dissident voices comparatively to a mere 16.3% allocating a space for officials’ voices\(^\text{109}\). For a former political refugee from El Salvador, Francisco Rico-Martinez and his wife, this bill would mean the end of assistance and help for newcomers. For him, “Social assistance is the lifeline for refugees when they first arrive in the country, without family, friends or any social support. How are they going to survive with no food, no clothes and money for transportation?” (Keug 2014) Similarly, to further illustrate the dissatisfaction among former refugees, Tharan Veeram, originally from Sri Lanka, spoke about his own experience and how the government assistance help him get on track once in Canada; and

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\(^{107}\) A bill formulated by Pickering-Scarborough East MP, Corneliu Chisu.

\(^{108}\) One of the dissident voices chosen is Francisco Rico-Martinez, a member of the FCJ Refugee Centre in Greater Toronto.

\(^{109}\) 31.5% of the article is factual information in order for the reader to situate the problem. The length of the article is of 766 words; 400 words for dissident voices as compared to 125 words for the officials.
finally, Linda Moorcroft, an executive director of Toronto’s Christie Refugee Welcome Centre, denounced the Conservative’s government on tarnishing Canada’s “reputation of opening our door for refugees.” (Keug 2014)

In March 2016, The Toronto Star reported on the death of a 64-year-old Burundian refugee who hanged himself in a detention centre and who awaited deportation110. Various voices were included in the news, and Samer Muscati, director of the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law’s International Human Rights Program (IHRP), is one of them. The director of the IHRP denounces the latest death as it “is a further strain on CBSA’s reputation and highlights the urgent need for reform of the way immigration detention is practised in this country”(Black 2016b). This 13th death at a CBSA’s detention centre as left Josh Paterson of the B.C. Civil Liberties Association (BCLA) to demand a renewed call for an independent oversight of the CBSA, a proposition favoured by IHRP’s director Muscati. For Paterson, “We [the BCLA] continue to see across the country deaths in CBSA custody along with many other instances where people have complaints, but there is nowhere people can take these complaints and no independent body to provide any review or oversight of CBSA’s activities.” (Black 2016b) The different dissident voices mobilized call on the federal government to clarify the CBSA’s role regarding the deaths of immigrant detainees in custody over the last years. Clearly exposing the dissident voices, Debra Black111 gave Josh Patterson112, Samer Muscati113, Alex Neve114, Mitch Goldberg115 and Loly Rico116 a greater space in her article (35% or 475 words) to expose their main concern regarding CBSA’s transparency than to the official’s speech which represents only 10.3% of the space.

Similarly, in August 2016, The Toronto Star advocates for a reform of the immigration detention system. Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale announced that “$138 million would be invested to “enhance alternatives to detention” and invest in rebuilding immigration holding facilities.” (Keug 2016b). However, for Anthony Navaneelan

110 Let us notes that it was the 13th reported death of an immigration detainee in CBSA’s custody since 2000.
111 Journalist for The Toronto Star.
112 Member of the B.C. Civil Liberties.
113 Director of the University of Toronto’s Faculty of Law’s International Human Rights Program (IHRP).
114 Secretary general of Amnesty International Canada.
115 President of the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers.
116 President of the Canadian Council for Refugees.
of the Canadian Association for Refugee Lawyers said, regarding Public Safety Minister Ralph Goodale, that: “Building more detention beds is not enough. We need to keep people out of detention” (Keug 2016b) adding that an independent oversight of the CBSA should be accomplished in order to observe in which conditions detainees are incarcerated in. Following Navaneelan’s idea, Josh Paterson is encouraging the federal government to reform the immigration detention system. Detention of immigrants needs to be absolutely the last resort and the government recognizes that, […] The thing is, we need to put an end to housing migrants in criminal population. The money dedicated to the immigration infrastructure must not become the reason to detain more migrants and for longer period of time. (Keug 2016b)

As previously underlined in Black’s article in March 2016, the dissident voices, here represented by Anthony Navaneelan, Josh Paterson, Tings Chak117 and Renu Mandhane118, are strongly opposition the announcement forwarded by Goodale. In fact, 54.5% of the article is reporting the concerns of the marginalized voices of Navaneelan, Paterson, Chak and Mandhane compared to 12.8% reporting on Goodale119. Once again, the second hypothesis is validated.

In March 2016, as another example, Immigration officials told private-sponsored groups that they will now have to fully cover the travel and health screening fees instead of the usual government-assisted program. Within this article, The Toronto Star’s journalist, Nicholas Keug, is opposing the official discourse. Once again, the non-alignment with the official discourse is regarding health care, but also travel expenses. The length of the article is 451 words. Out of these words, no direct quotations are used to expose the government’s position or support the reason of this unexpected bill for the private-sponsored agencies. On the contrary, the opposition, here represented by Scott McLeod of the Council of the Canadian Refugee Sponsorship Agreement Holders Association and Janet Dench, Executive Director of the Canadian Council for Refugees, is given 25.1% or 125 words to counter the federal government’s decision to halt the program. The remaining words are to support the

117 Member of the End Immigration Detention Network.
118 Chief commissioner of the Ontario Human Rights Commission.
119 213 words are ‘given’ to the dissident voices as only 50 words are ‘given’ to the elite’s voice. 128 words are considered factual as they only help the reader to comprehend the issue being discuss.
argument in favour of re-establishing the joint-program that covers the travel and health screening for newcomers\textsuperscript{120} (Keug 2016a).

In April 2016, \textit{The Globe and Mail} stated that sponsorship groups, who welcome refugees through private agreements, have accused the federal government over the slowed pace processing new claimants’ application. Indeed, Syrians were given 24 hours’ notice to submit their paperwork. For Scott McLeod, a member of the Canadian Refugee Sponsorship Agreement Holders Association, “We have the time and the space and the energy to temper our own senses of anger and entitlement because what really matters is the people whose lives are hanging in the balance on the other side of the world… I’m having a problem with some of our First World senses of entitlement to all of this” (Zilio 2016) Leen Al Zaibak, a board member of Lifeline Syria, discusses a similar idea. A Syrian-Canadian herself, Ms. Al Zaibak believes that “the government cannot let bureaucracy get in the way of saving lives,” adding that the sponsors “have the apartments ready. They have the money in the bank accounts and the government is saying, ‘Well, wait another year or two.’ You should not put a cap on public compassion.” (Zilio 2016) Thus, McLeod and Al Zaibak concluded that the Canadian government should communicate with sponsors in order to re-evaluate the status of cases\textsuperscript{121}.

In June 2013, Gloria Galloway quotes Stephen Lewis, a former Ontario NDP leader and Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations who is now the Co-Chairman of the Jewish Refugee Action Network (JRAN), to argue against the government’s initiative to discourage asylum seekers from certain regions to apply to become claimants. JRAN is “aimed at undoing a law that fast-tracks the applications from prospective refugees who come from a country the federal Immigration Minister has designated as safe and another law that strips refugees from those countries of the right to free health care.” (Galloway 2013) For Stephen Lewis, the deportation of Roms, for example, is considered, “a transgression of human rights, it’s almost unimaginable and it’s certainly indefensible.” (Galloway 2013) Additionally,

\textsuperscript{120}This article in question is 699_March2016.

\textsuperscript{121}The dissident voices, here composed of Al Zaibak, McLeod and Herr, represent 50,9\% of the article as compared to the government/elite speech composing only 23,2\% of the article. Article’s length is 599 words, which the dissident voices hold 305 words and the government 110 words; factual information is represented at 30,7\% with 184 words.
Lewis believes that JRAN can educate the population about the flaws of this legislation and how to publicly mobilize Canadians against this particular issue on immigration. The government voice, or the consensual sphere, is covering 23.2% (124 words) of the article as Stephen Lewis’s voice, or here considered a dissident voice, is featured at 59.6% (319 words)\(^\text{122}\). Thus, the second hypothesis is once again proven.

Lastly, these reported quotes clearly validate the second hypothesis. When *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star* reported another frame (i.e. health care, detention and citizenship laws) not aligned with the major official discourse, the dissident voices were included to balance the sources.

### 5.4 General Conclusions

Therefore, what our results have shown that we can validate our two hypotheses for both daily newspapers.

**Table 7 Summary of the Findings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(H1) <em>The Globe and Mail</em> and <em>The Toronto Star</em> have produced a coverage of the immigration policy issue oriented toward a single narrative identical to that of the official Canadian political discourse.</td>
<td>Validated for <em>The Globe and Mail</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(H2) <em>The Globe and Mail</em> and <em>The Toronto Star</em> have more often included dissident voices, both at the national and local levels(^\text{123}), in their news stories when opposing the official Canadian political discourse on the immigration policy issue.</td>
<td>Validated for <em>The Globe and Mail</em> Partially validated for <em>The Toronto Star</em> Validated for <em>The Toronto Star</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 have been validated by our results; when the four possible outcomes—here understood as public security, economic, humanitarian, and identity—are predominant, journalists are more likely to align their stories on the elite’s rhetoric. However, *The Toronto Star* is partially validated for H1 as we believe its political stance has influenced

\(^{122}\) The remaining 17.2% are attributed to factual information (or 92 words). The article’s length is 535 words.

\(^{123}\) On the matter see Ono and Sloop (1995).
their institution’s agenda-setting. In that case, the ‘left’ inclination has led *The Toronto Star* to mostly go against the political party in place between January 2013 and November 2015.\(^\text{124}\) This result can also explain why *The Toronto Star* is more inclined to include dissident voices as they positively affect their audience, the public opinion and sets the potential internal discourse among elites and within the Canadian population (Cf. Figure 5.2.).

Thus, the main observation illustrated by Bennett and Pfetsch (2018) that the indexation theory is still suppressing the so-called alternative voices, instead of including these “new” voices in order to balance the sources is temporarily validated in a Canadian context. In this new fractured environment, it is more complex than before to balance views and opinions due to the implication of various actors in the political sphere, but both *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star* have included dissident voices in their news. As marginalized voices are considered event-driven, this temporary inclusion of dissident voices might be explained by two potential causes: (a) the European refugee crisis; and (b) the rise of alt-right and far-right groups (C.f. Cabot 2016; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2011).

\(^{124}\) See Table 4 and Table 6.
Conclusion

This thesis sought to test the new environment inclusion to the literature on the indexation theory within Canada with a qualitative and longitudinal study that examines temporal evolution of the press coverage process. It tackled the following question: \textit{How does the changing dynamics of the indexation theory influence the Canadian journalistic discourse?} As the two previous hypotheses have demonstrated, the Canadian journalistic scene has been temporarily modified between January 2013 and December 2016. Indeed, the media organization has reflected all the “possible” opinions formulated on both sides, here understood as the elites and the marginalized voices. In other words, indexing predicts the existence of homogeneity in the media treatment of information, a homogeneity that smooths the specific political identities of the media. This inclusion of dissident voices by the journalists at \textit{The Globe and Mail} and \textit{The Toronto Star} over this temporal frame as proven Entman’s idea of the indexation theory as a “fractured paradigm” and Dauvergne’s concept of the “end of settler societies.”

Further, drawing on the theory and term “indexation,” first introduced by Lance Bennett (2012), it allows to establish a relationship between the centres of power and the media organizations. When speaking of “indexation,” it refers to the tendency of the main media to adjust the points of view of the stories that are going to be published, very close to the dominant ideologies of the political institutions, who have the power to change those situations. According to Bennett, to achieve these adjustments, journalists resort to framing the news in four categories: personalization, fragmentation, authority-disorder and dramatization (L. Bennett 2012). This journalistic style is thus a frame that contributes to the analysis of the strategic political game that shows a propensity of journalism in drama, conflict and negativity, with respect to individuals or political groups of the elite and that also entails a tendency to personalize the news. This study has compared the relative importance of four standard frames to include or exclude dissident voices in the news in order to balance the daily’s story: the public security frame (Castelli Gattinara and Morales 2017),

\footnote{Cf. The spheres of consensus, legitimate controversy and deviance exposed by Hallin (1986). As the theory of indexation is based upon the first findings of Hallin, the indexation’s predictions are closely related to Hallin’s spheres.}
the economic frame (d’Appollonia 2017), the identity frame (Browning 2017), and the humanitarian frame (Dijk 1987; d’Appollonia 2017).

To examine the relative elite’s rhetoric on immigration, we covered a four-year period from January 2013 to December 2016. During this period, both political parties—Conservatives and Liberals—once in power, adopted policies that created much public debate on how these policies were bundling migration with security, economy and humanitarian concerns. These debates have reflected journalists’ desire to balance their news stories and emphasized who deserved to be included or excluded from the national debate126.

Highlighted by scholars over the last decades is how framing the “immigration question” influences the political outcomes. In fact, in framing migration in a certain way, it has —negatively or positively—influenced the public opinion on the matter. These frames such as “victimization” (Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007), “immigrant-as-threat” (Figenschou and Thorbjørnsrud 2015), or even as a question of “diversity” (Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007; Igartua and Cheng 2009) exposed migrants as illegal, as a direct attack on the state sovereignty and thus weakening the State’s image on its ability to decide who can enter or not its territory (Bagaric and Morss 2005; Dauvergne 2004; Bosniak 1991). Moreover, Wallace (2018) mentions that “Newly emerging research [such as Lawlor and Tolley (2018)] also demonstrates the importance of disaggregating immigration as a category to focus more specifically on how various classes of immigrants are framed differently in news media, and a key difference is between immigrants and refugees.”(2018, 210)

Framing, or framing theory, is understood as a theory that “help interpret and reconstruct reality” (Volkmer 2009, 408). The central aspect of framing is how individuals, in a certain cultural context, can identify, interpret and perceive the reality surrounding their everyday routine. This disentangle view of our routine simplifies the individual’s vision of the received information (Goffman 1986). Today’s framing theory has “allow[ed] us to detect journalistic bias. The use of stereotypical framing, frames along gender lines, or imbalances of the representation of relevant societal communities, such as ethnic minorities

126 See 6.1 Dissident voices in Canada
within a national or transnational public, are examples of different frames that might be used.” (Volkmer 2009, 409). However, nowadays, the research regarding framing in the news has been re-oriented toward the study of elite discourses (but also at reporting both sides of a single story), and at a more micro-level (Lippmann 1992; Entman 2007, 1993; Reese 2001; Scheufele 1999)

Table 8 Summary of The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official debate</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consensus with the official discourse</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Globe and Mail</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Toronto Star</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Against the official discourse</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Globe and Mail</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Toronto Star</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neutral</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Globe and Mail</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Toronto Star</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>141</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 8 shows, we looked at the two hypotheses put forward by the indexing theory, and the literature on immigration policy, which is if a newspaper produces a partial coverage of a certain topic, it orients its argument/storytelling toward a single narrative identical to the officials debate. The second indexing hypothesis is that (H2) The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star have more often included dissident voices, both at the national and local levels, in their news stories when opposing the official Canadian political discourse on the
immigration policy issue. What our results have shown is that *The Globe and Mail* is largely following the official discourse; out of the 33 articles related to the sphere of consensus, 66.7% is originating from *The Globe and Mail* and the remaining articles, 11, are from *The Toronto Star*. The former newspaper largely mobilized sources from the government most often citing the Immigration minister holding office (Chris Alexander or John McCallum). For the latter, sources are varied from government officials to lawyers and doctors to professors and detainees\textsuperscript{127}.

A) Dissident voices in Canada

The two hypotheses were related to the inclusion of alternative voices by *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star* in their stories. These two hypotheses were related to the main argument of this thesis that it is imperative to test the indexation theory and to adapt its core elements to the new political environment. This meant a rectification of the basis hypotheses that included the alternative narratives and moved away from the pre-2000 context. Moreover, the temporal boundaries evolution was understood as the ability of the media to act autonomously in the different spheres of power through time and how media are affected by the changing environment as to consider marginalized voices. As marginalized voices are event-driven, it has pushed media organizations to include marginalized voices in order to balance news’s power. In fact, new actors such as doctors, professors, lawyers, NGO’s leaders and immigrants challenged the political consensus agenda among elites mainly due to the desire of media organization to include them in their story. Nevertheless, that is true for *The Toronto Star*, which is mainly against the sphere of consensus.

However, in the case of coverage of the immigration issue, the first source of information used by the media studied is from a variety of actors mainly consisting of direct witnesses of the immigration influx to Canada. This could lead us to believe that journalists are less likely to adjust to the official discourse because they have reason to believe that the discourse on an issue has expanded to include unofficial groups or ordinary citizens; therefore, journalists modified their routine to include outside sources considered marginalized or dissidents to illustrate specific points in relation with the immigration issue.

\textsuperscript{127} In contrast, 71.2% of the articles located in the sphere of legitimate consensus are from *The Toronto Star*. 
to Canada. This element could be a sign of a certain autonomy of the media toward the official political authorities.

i) Citizenship Act, Family Reunifications, Detention Centres, and Health Care

In fact, the two hypotheses can be validated for The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star. Indeed, 59 articles (or 41.8%) of our sample is exposing the so-called, alternative voices. The principal indignation of the alternative voices against the official discourse is that, according to them, the federal government is not doing enough when it comes to family reunification, travel expenses fees and the modification of the Citizenship Act. In fact, 26 articles (44.07%) are related to this category that we can call ‘reunification’ as it encompasses both family reunification, travel expenses and citizens born outside of Canada from a Canadian citizen but cannot have access to this citizenship due to the current Act. In this category ‘reunification,’ journalists spoke in terms of ‘rights,’ ‘livelihood,’ and ‘belongings.’ Moreover, the journalists at The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star are including dissident voices here exposing the main immigrants facing this reality through interviews.

The second speech forwarded by the alternative voices is regarding the conditions in which illegal detainees are held in (18 articles or 30.51%). This category ‘detention’ could be seen as a subcategory of the ‘public security’ frame, however, there is a distinction being made by the journalists when to include or not these alternative voices. In the case of the ‘public security’ frame, journalists, both at The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star, included key ministers such as Ralph Goodale or Steven Blaney to Harjit Sajjan or Jason Kenney, but decided to exclude, or to an extent give lesser space to the dissident voices. On the contrary, when reporting about ‘detention’ and ‘audit,’ the journalists were more inclined to mention dissident voices such as lawyer, professors and leader/members of NGOs to expose the reality faced by the detainees; additionally, the dissident voices asked for a re-evaluation of the CBSA’s security methods in their detention centre which left 15 people deaths since 2000.

The last frame is concerned with the access to health care by immigrants and newcomers. The ‘health’ frame is encompassed by 15 articles, or 25.42%, that are dedicated
to the government’s elimination and afterward the re-introduction of the health-care program for newcomers. In this context, journalists have introduced dissident voices, mainly doctors and lawyers specializing in human rights. This strong opposition to the removal of the federal support for health-care funding led the journalists to characterize the federal government as ‘disloyal,’ ‘wrongful,’ and ‘degrading.’

The last element highlighted by our study is the factual nature of the media coverage of the immigration issue produced by *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star*. Indeed, out of 141 articles analyzed, 49 (or 34.8%) are purely factual articles, that is, articles that expose facts without making any judgment, or, in other words, are neutral. This very important part of factual articles could be linked to certain journalistic routines, some of which could allow journalists to extract their information from any context of institutional interpretation.

**B) Limits**

Content analysis is defined as a series of processes to collect and organize information in a standardized manner that allows analysts to make inferences about the characteristics and meanings of written texts. By analyzing written productions that account for the perceptions of social actors and also of institutions, the researcher can interpret, qualitatively or quantitatively, the purpose for which a text has been written and how the language is used in it.

As our research used its own dictionary to search for specific words related to one of the four official frames (i.e. public security, economic, humanitarian and identity), and other potential frame such as health, reunification or detention, the analysis of the presence of certain meanings and related words in key texts might differ, as obviously, it involves a part of subjectivity and generalization not to be neglected. The dictionary was built upon a semantic field keyword search, thanks to *Antidote*. However, some words such as ‘bill’ could be included in the ‘public security’ frame as well as the ‘health’ frame; thus, the non-inclusion and the flexibility of a word might have led to porous categorization.
In our case, if the fact of quantifying messages according to an analysis grid created for the occasion, obviously involves a part of subjectivity and generalization not to be neglected, it is reasonable to consider that the messages produced by two daily newspapers resulting from similar global political culture (*The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star*) are comparable to each other in their symbolic dimension. In addition, the development of a sufficiently precise coding manual usually standardizes the differences in symbolic interpretation. The coding manual produced for this thesis also proposes a reading model applied to the immigration issue which could possibly be mobilized and adapted to other content analyzes related to the same problem in a future study. That being said, migration issues are often studied in an American context, as the framework suggested; nonetheless, our study tests the theory applied to Canada. Besides this new application of the theory in a Canadian context, we have decided to study the inclusion of dissident voices (here considered as members of the non-executive and non-legislative branches of a government) in order to see how, here, *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star* balanced their sources, and thus see if Canadian daily newspapers were to be considered as ‘semi-independent’ or ‘independent’ from the official sourcing.

Lastly, our relatively small sample consisting of 141 articles which consists of only two dailies might be a limit to our analysis. We have omitted other major English-speaking daily newspapers such as *The National Post* or *The Huffington Post*; moreover, in future researches, the inclusion of the *Journal de Montréal/Québec, Le Devoir* and *La Presse* could easily facilitate generalization of the Canadian newsworthy sphere, and give learners a larger picture of the inclusion of dissident voices in the news by the English and French media organizations. For this reason, it is important to remember that our findings will testify to the relative status of the discourses in *The Globe and Mail* and *The Toronto Star* articles exclusively. Although these two newspapers are important players in the Canadian journalistic space, they cannot be considered as true representative of the Canadian press in its totality.
C) Future research

Several avenues could be explored in future research on the role of dissident voices as a way to modernize the indexation theory as Bennett and Pfetsch have highlighted. For them, “The resulting weakening of traditional bases for validating information has further opened societies to bots, trolls, hacking, and disinformation from outside sources.” (2018, 245–46), which ultimately led to a “contemporary political communication increasingly tak[ing] place in contexts defined by diminished citizen attention, hybrid media systems, the rise of undemocratic movements and parties, and networked, often polarized, political information flows.” (2018, 250) Interestingly, conducting a study investigating the place of dissident voices in the Canadian journalistic sphere between 1990 and 2012 would be engaging and clearly benchmarking the role played over the years by dissident voices in the news; or on the contrary, how these marginalized voices have been silenced or totally excluded from the official national debate. Additionally, during this period, various events128 have punctuated the political environment notably Bill C-86129, the arrival of the Chinese boats130, and the 9/11 attacks. This closer examination could also enable us to better understand our current ways of reporting and balancing the news by our national and local news organizations.

Secondly, another project should investigate what Bennett and Pfetsch have called “hybrid media systems.” The indexation theory has been, over the years, applied to daily newspapers, but, nowadays, the proliferation of new digital technologies such as Facebook, Twitter and blogs have led to the emergence of dissident voices, but voices that are not necessarily reliable. These new technologies have allowed the growth of disinformation, or fake news. The phenomenon of fake news or disinformation can easily be explained and situated in a context of international political fragmentation fuelled, or fasten, by the rise of populism and nationalism, and lastly, the loss of prestige of the elites and the media131. If these factors can partially explain the diminished interests of citizens to turn to traditional

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128 Let us remember that dissident voices are highly influenced by the spatial environment in which they evolve, and thus, the marginalized voices are event-driven.
129 Bill C-86 “significantly change[d] Canada’s immigration law by making it more difficult for refugees to process their claims in Canada. In fact, the amendments empower the Senior Immigration Officer to expel a claimant who falls into certain categories created by the law.” (Drumbl 1994, 389)
130 In the Summer of 1999, “Four different ships arrive off the British Columbia coast carrying 600 [individuals] mostly Chinese migrants. Of 577 who ma[de a] refugee claims, only 24 are granted [a] refugee status. They had paid human smugglers for the perilous journey” (The Canadian Press 2010).
131 To learn how to spot a “fake news,” consult IFLA’s infographic on their website.
communication, dissident voices, here represented by, but not only, far-right or far-left leaders, have understood the importance of using this temporary vacuum to largely influence the public opinion on specific issues such as immigration. Thus, these new networks have indeed shaped the public opinion, but more importantly, “how these hybrid media ecologies [fed] into decision making in political institutions” and the press institutions (L. Bennett and Pfetsch 2018, 250).
Bibliography


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Annex A – Selected News Articles

Articles from *The Globe and Mail*

008 Chase, Steven. 2015. “Liberals look to expedite refugee process; Trudeau government assigns nine cabinet ministers to initiative in attempt to meet goal of resettling 25,000 people by Jan.1.” November 10, A4.


025 Dhillon, Sunny. 2015. “Sun Sea anniversary highlights migrant policy.” August 10, S1.


034 Chase, Steven. 2014. “Canada to boost efforts to help refugees; Ottawa says it will increase number of people it will accept, pledges national effort on par with response to other major crises.” July 5, A3.


057 Chase, Steven and Daniel Lelanc. 2015. “Ottawa to miss deadline on asylum seekers; Security concerns to slow process as government also backs away from funding all 25,000 refugees.” November 25, A1.

071 Waldie, Paul. 2014. “Doctor provides health care for the uninsured; Volunteer clinic addresses needs of newcomers to Canada who are sick and aren’t yet covered.” December 27, B2.

073 Friesen, Joe. 2015. “Torries apply specific criteria for refugees; Religion, business background, family ties in Canada among ‘areas of focus’ being used to prioritize acceptance of asylum-seekers.” October 9, A1.

086 Chase, Steven and Adam Radwanski. 2015. “Tories move to revive faltering campaign; Plagued by missteps, party turns to controversial Australian strategist as government scrambles to speed up intake of refugees.” September 11, A1.

Woo, Andrea. 2015. “Sikhs rally to support Syrians; Community leaders offer food, transportation and spots in private schools to asylum seekers.” November 24, S1.


Praet, Nicolas van. 2015. “Quebec to triple admissions target; Province says it is taking steps to admit 3,650 Syrian refugees in 2015, but needs help from the federal government.” September 8, A3.


Zilio, Michelle. 2016. “Group urges private sponsors to be patient.” April 5, A3.

Chase, Steven. 2015. “Canada to welcome more Syrians, Iraqis; Ottawa announces it will accept an additional 13,000, hoping private organizations can take on much of the resettlement burden.” January 8, A3.

Kane, Laura. 2015. “Canada alone in charging interest on travel loans.” September 12, S4.


Hunter, Justine. 2016. “Debt, housing and education are only some of the concerns faced by recent arrivals in Canada, Justin Hunter reports.” January 16, S1.

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Levitz, Stephen. 2016. “Victoria is ready, and waiting, to offer aid to refugees.” January 20, S3

Hunter, Justin and Laura Stone. 2016. “B.C. needs skilled workers; Premier lobbies Ottawa for increase in immigration to address shortages stifling economic growth.” February 5, S1.


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Chiose, Simona. 2015. Universities offer refugees a fresh start; The Istefan family is one of the first of many that will arrive in Canada through private sponsorship groups on campuses.” November 20, A14.

Dhillon, Sunny. 2015. “Leaders plan for refugee influx; Province to cover cost of incoming public-school students, as housing and mental-health care issues linger.” November 11, S1.


Omidvar, Ratna. 2015. “Putting refugees to work requires all hands on deck.” December 22, B4.


Goodwin, Dei. 2016. “Humanitarian aid; Let’s get all the Syrian refugees into the homes awaiting them.” April 1, A12.

Woo, Andrea, Justin Hunter and Frances Ula. 2015. “All options are open in scramble to find housing for 3,000.” November 21, S1.

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Evra, Jennifer van. 2015. “Giving shelter; Lower Mainland homeowners and developers are offering rental properties to refugees to help them get settled.” December 5, S6.
Woo, Andrea. 2013. “Alleged trafficking victim testifies; Mumtaz Ladha accused of bringing woman to Canada under false pretenses and forcing her to work long hours for no pay.” September 12, S1.


Lamey, Andy. 2014. “My daughter has second-class citizenship; Born to two Canadians, she’s a citizen herself – but under our new laws, her children probably won’t be. Andy Lamey has a solution.” February 27, A13.


Smith, Joanna. 2016. “National security; If potential terrorists can’t be monitored, jail them, Clement says.” September 14, A4.

Galloway, Gloria. 2015. “Mulcair appears to extend olive branch to Trudeau; NDP leader says ‘No. 1. Job’ is to oust Harper Conservatives from office even if it means working with Liberals to form government.” October 10, A10.


Anonymous. 2014. “Justice: Supreme Court to hear Sun Sea refugees’ appeal.” April 19, S3

**Articles from The Toronto Star**


Keug, Nicholas. 2013. “Ontario reinstates health care for refugees; Six provinces have defied Ottawa’s cuts to coverage for asylum seekers.” December 10, A6.

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Keug, Nicholas. 2013. “Cuts to leave refugees lawyerless; Plan would stop Legal Aid from representing asylum seekers who come from ‘safe’ countries.” April 5, GT1.

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Whittington, Les. 2015. “Aid pledge falls short; Tories will match up to $100M in donations for Syria, but Liberals, NDP say more needed.” September 13, A1.


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Keug, Nicholas. 2014. “Refugees bill would create chaos, critics say; Charitable groups alarmed by plan to deny social assistance to displace people.” September 22, A4.

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Siddiqui, Haroon. 2015. “How Harper has been economical with the truth.” October 15, A23.

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Annex C – Coding grid
This thesis, in an assessment of the changing dynamics of the indexation theory and its inclusion of dissident voices in Canada, will review the corpus with a systematic and extensive study of the element constituting the official discourse on migration policies, and this, for two dailies (The Globe and Mail and The Toronto Star). In order to qualitatively measure the research question, we will combine the terms “refugee*,” “asylum seeker*,” “immigrant*” with the term “Canada” as our research is specific to this country.

Moreover, a particular attention was given to modifying adjectives. As Allen William and Scott Blinder in their article “Media Independence through Routine Press-State relations: immigration and government statistics in British Press” maintained that:

Most often, modifiers are adjectives describing a noun. They can also intensify a noun in comparative (such as the words higher, greater) or superlative (highest, greatest) ways.

A single use of a target word might have more than one modifier, each of which will count toward the total.

This finding includes all words in the top fifty overall modifiers of either immigration or migration relating to scale or pace: mass, net, uncontrolled, large-scale, high, more, unlimited, unrestricted, excessive, unfettered, much, further, open-door, unchecked, massive, low, less, balanced, large, vast, and big.

Four modifiers relating to illegality appeared in the top fifty overall modifiers of immigration or migration: illegal, legal, unlawful, and irregular (Allen and Blinder 2018, 222).

Thus, for the years covered, the search returns 2,005 articles, but a total of 1,391 articles have been selected due to our inclusion factors132. Given the volume of material to be analyzed, we chose to restrict the content analysis to a random sample of 10% of the corpus, which represents 141 articles (i.e. this random sample is simplified thanks to Stata). The initial analysis focused on the title of the article, and the language used to qualify these migration policies through the economic, identity, humanitarian and public security frames.

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132 We have excluded all articles relating to foreign policies, international immigration policies or international accords. Additionally, we have excluded articles that simply mentioned one of our keywords (i.e. “Canada,” “immigration,” “refugee,” or “asylum”) in their main body.
These different frames will provide information regarding the indexation of alternative voices, as these are sourcing differently; we will analyze the sourcing of the information within the media. We have included opinions, news, columns, comments, chronicles and editorials in our analysis, but duplicates have been excluded.

1. Article’s general information

   I100 – Date of publication

   I200 – Name of the daily newspaper
   I200.001 The Globe and Mail
   I200.002 The Toronto Star

   I300 – Article’s ID

   I400 – Section of Article
   I400.001 Editorial
   I400.002 Opinion
   I400.003 News
   I400.004 Column
   I400.005 Other

2. Official’s frames in relation to the Canadian debate

   S100 – Economic
   S100.001 Positive
   S100.002 Mainly Positive
   S100.003 Neutral
   S100.004 Mainly Negative
   S100.005 Negative

   S200 – Identity
   S200.001 Positive
   S200.002 Mainly Positive
   S200.003 Neutral
   S200.004 Mainly Negative
   S200.005 Negative

   S300 – Public security
   S300.001 Positive
   S300.002 Mainly Positive
   S300.003 Neutral
   S300.004 Mainly Negative
   S300.005 Negative
S400 – Humanitarian
  S400.001 Positive
  S400.002 Mainly Positive
  S400.003 Neutral
  S400.004 Mainly Negative
  S400.005 Negative

3. Dissident voices’ frames in relation to the immigration issue in Canada
S500 – Health
  S500.001 Positive
  S500.002 Mainly Positive
  S500.003 Neutral
  S500.004 Mainly Negative
  S500.005 Negative

S600 – Detention
  S600.001 Positive
  S600.002 Mainly Positive
  S600.003 Neutral
  S600.004 Mainly Negative
  S600.005 Negative

S700 – Citizenship
  S700.001 Positive
  S700.002 Mainly Positive
  S700.003 Neutral
  S700.004 Mainly Negative
  S700.005 Negative

S800 – Family reunification
  S800.001 Positive
  S800.002 Mainly Positive
  S800.003 Neutral
  S800.004 Mainly Negative
  S800.005 Negative

S900 – Other