ON THE GOODNESS OF CREATED THINGS

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by
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ON THE GOODNESS OF CREATED THINGS

Saint Thomas Aquinas:
Commentary on the De Hebdomadibus of Boethius
Quaestiones Disputatae: De Veritate, Question XXI

John of Saint Thomas:
Cursus Theologicus, Tome I, Disputation 6, Article 3

Marginal Notes
to the
Commentary on the De Hebdomadibus
Propositions

1. The common good is in any given order to be preferred.

2. The human intellect needs both an active and a passive principle.

3. The notion of locus is analogical.

4. "Poetica est infima doctrina."

5. The virtue of prudence is the only acquired virtue that makes man good.
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Part I

Translations of
Principal Thomistic Texts
on the
Goodness of Created Things

Saint Thomas Aquinas:

Commentary on the De Hebdomadibus of Boethius

Questiones Quodlibetales: De Veritate, Question XXI

John of Saint Thomas

Cursus Theologicus, Tome I, Disputation 6, article 3
Translator's Note

We have prepared these translations for two reasons: one, to make a convenient edition of the most important thomistic texts on the goodness of substances; the other, to provide a translation so that those who do not know Latin sufficiently well to read the original alone, may be induced to do so by what they gather from the translations, however inadequate.

The title of Boethius' work: De Hebdomadibus, has given rise to considerable conjecture among scholars. We have kept the title of the opusculum as given in the Parma edition, while adding the one under which Saint Thomas referred to the work of which he wrote an exposition. The latter seems to be the title it should actually have, according to the context.

An article published in the Bulletin Thomiste sustains this opinion; it provides the best answer we have found to the question as to the significance of "de hebdomadibus", and explains the confusion that has arisen. The writer offers the following explanation:

The opusculum of Boethius which bore the title De Hebdomadibus is not the one that bore this name in the Middle Ages and was commented on, notably by Saint Thomas. This latter work is a letter destined to shed light on certain difficulties raised in the mind of a deacon, John, by the reading of the De Hebdomadibus, a lost work. The mention of this lost work which figures at the beginning of the letter, was without doubt the occasion for giving — by mistake — to the letter itself, the title of the work
that it was to explain. It would be more exact to call it: On the goodness of substances. As to the name De Hebdomadibus, we need not see in it either the meaning of conceptiones with Gilbert de la Porrée, nor of editiones with Saint Thomas, but no doubt an allusion to the division of the work: the chapters or questions were probably grouped in it by series of seven, according to a method of which Boethius was not the originator.1

This explanation gives a satisfactory answer to questions that come with the reading of the first part of the text.

We wish to thank in a special way Doctor Charles De Koninck for his help and encouragement in preparing the translations and the notes to the De Hebdomadibus: Whether every thing that is, is good.

1. Cf. Bulletin Thomiste VI, 1940-1942, p. 116: Degl Innocenti, O.P., Nota al "De hebdomadibus" di Boezio. - Divus Thomas (Biacenza) XLII (1939), pp. 397-399. We are in debt to the Reverend J.M. Parent, O.P., for calling attention to this article.
WHETHER EVERY THING THAT IS

IS GOOD

COMMENTARY OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

on the

DE HERAMDIDIBUS of BOETHIUS
The pursuit of wisdom has this privilege, that as one advances in it, the more does wisdom suffice. Whereas in exterior works a man needs the help of many others, in the contemplation of wisdom he works more effectively, the more he abides with himself. For that reason the Sage, in the passage quoted, calls man back to himself, saying, "Be first to run home to thy house"; that is, be eager to withdraw from outside affairs lest you find your house occupied by another and you be distraught by care of him. Hence, it is said in the book of Wisdom, 8:16: "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her," that is, with Wisdom. Just as it is required for

1. This is the title under which Saint Thomas refers to the present work of Boethius in the De Veritate, q. 21, a. 1, Sed contra. Q. p. 28.

2. This and other quotations from the Bible are from the Douay Version.
the contemplation of wisdom, that a man should so have possession of his mind that he may fill his whole house with this contemplation, so too is it required that his full attention be given within, lest it be drawn to diverse things; and for this reason the author adds: "and there withdraw thyself," that is, there converge all your attention. Thus, the whole interior of the house being cleared, and man living in it with all his mind, he sets forth what is to be done, by adding: "and there take thy pastime." In this we must note that the contemplation of wisdom may be fittingly compared to play because of two things that are to be found in play. First, play is delightful, and the contemplation of wisdom holds the greatest delight; hence, in Ecclesiasticus, 24: 27, these words are spoken by wisdom: "My spirit is sweet above honey." Second, the activities of play are not ordered to something else but are sought for themselves; this also is true of the delights of wisdom. For it sometimes happens that a person takes delight in the thought of those things which he desires, but still has before him to accomplish. This delight, however, is dependent on something external which he tries to reach; so that if there be default or delay, a sadness no less than delight attends it, according to Proverbs, 14: 13: "Laughter shall be mingled with sorrow." But delight from the contemplation of wisdom has in itself the cause of delight; therefore, it suffers no anxiety as if expecting something to fail. For this reason it is said in Wisdom, 8: 16: "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company

1. cf. \( p.3: \) motu.
any tediousness." Likewise, divine Wisdom compares her delight with play, Proverbs, 8: 30: "I was delighted every day, playing before him," as by different days are to be understood the consideration of diverse truths. Hence, there is added: "and do what thou hast in mind," for through its conceptions man acquires a knowledge of the truth.

\[p^2\] 1. It would perhaps be better to translate ludus here, as it is translated in Proverbs, 8:30,31, by the word "play". "Pastime", as given in the Douay Version of the Bible, and divertissement in the French Edition of Crampon, do not properly express that formality of play as Saint Thomas understands it, when he uses it as an apt metaphor for the activity of wisdom: an enjoyable activity which is free in that it is not ordered to something else. Both "pastime" and divertissement are too generic, and might be had with little personal activity.
CHAPTER I

Text of Boethius:

1 You ask me to clear up the obscurity of that question in my hebdomads which treats of the manner in which substances in so far as they are, are good, although they are not substantial goods, and to show this with just a little more evidence. You say that it should be done in this way because the method of this kind of writing is not known to all. I can bear witness, with what eagerness you have already grasped the problem. Indeed I expound the hebdomads for my own sake, and I prefer to keep my speculations in my own memory rather than share them with any who by reason of their frivolity and petulance will brook no argument unless it be allied to what is entertaining and humorous.

2 Therefore do not object to the obscurities that come from brevity; these are the faithful guardian of secret doctrine and have this advantage, that they speak a meaning only to those who are worthy.

3 Hence as is customary in mathematics and other disciplines, I have put down bounds and rules from which I shall develop all that follows.

4 A common principle is a proposition which any one accepts upon hearing it. There are two kinds of these. One is so common that it is proper to all men; for instance: "If from two equals you subtract equals, the remainders are equal." No one understanding this denies it. The other kind is common to the wise only, yet it flows
from the first common principles, as: "Incorporeal beings are not contained in a place," and others like this, which are obvious not to the majority but to the learned.

Commentary of Saint Thomas:

Following upon this encouragement, Boethius produced a book on his conceptions, which is called De Hebdomadibus - that is, from the writings, because in Greek ἔβδομα is the same as "to edit."

In this book Boethius does two things. First, he presents a preface. Secondly, he proceeds to the treatise: "To-be is different from that which is." The consideration of the first is threefold.

1. First, he shows what the intention is. Secondly, how it is to be treated: "And you say it should be done in this way because the method of this kind of writing is not known to all." Thirdly, he gives the order to be followed: "As is customary in mathematics."

He writes this book to John, a deacon of the Roman Church, who had asked him to discuss and to expound a certain difficult question in his hebdomads, that is, writings, by which an apparent contradiction is solved. For it is said that created substances, in

1. We give here a literal translation without being able to explain why Saint Thomas equates the Greek ἔβδομα with the Latin edere.
as much as they are, are good; yet, on the other hand, it is said that creatures are not substantial goods, but that to be a substantial good is proper to God alone. Now whatever belongs to any thing in as much as it is, seems to belong to it substantially; and so if created substances, in as much as they are, are good, it seems that they are, in consequence, substantial goods.

When he says: "And you say that it should be done in this way because the method of this kind of writing is not known to all," he shows the way he wishes to communicate his teaching, that is, not plainly but obscurely; and concerning this he does three things. First, he shows that he intends to speak obscurely. Secondly, he shows that he is accustomed to this manner: "Indeed I expound the hebdomads for my own sake." Thirdly, he shows that this manner ought to be acceptable to him (John): "Wherefore do not object to the obscurities that come from brevity."

In the first place, therefore, he says that he to whom he is writing these things requested that they be so written, that the method of the truths that were here set down would not be known to all who were not affected by the same desire for them as he to whom Boethius bore witness that he had already eagerly grasped the problem, either by understanding it sharply or by earnestly desiring more insight.
Then when he says: "I expound the hebdomads for my own sake," he reveals that this manner is habitual with him. He says that he was accustomed to expound for himself, that is, to compose, to meditate upon certain hebdomads, that is, writings or conceptions, and, after considering them, he preferred to keep his speculations in his own memory rather than share them with any others who, because of their frivolity and petulance, their wantonness and levity, "will brook no argument unless it be allied to what is entertaining and humorous."; that is, unless it be ordered to or constructed in view of this. For they abominate having any one enter upon or direct any discourse which pertains not to sport but to serious matters.

Then when he says: "Wherefore do not object to the obscurities that come from brevity," he concludes from the foregoing that he (John) ought willingly to endure obscure speech seeing that he himself had asked for it. This is what he says: "Wherefore," namely, since you did this so that the method of our teaching might not be open to all, "do not object to" or be adverse to "the obscurities that come from brevity," that is, to the obscurity of the present book, which is proportioned to its brevity. For from the fact that some things are said briefly, they are more apt to be obscure. Since obscurity, however, faithfully keeps a secret, it brings this utility: that one may communicate "only with those who are worthy," namely, with the intelligent and eager who are worthy to be admitted into the
Then when he says: "As is customary in mathematics and other disciplines, I have set down bounds and rules from which I shall develop all that follows," he shows in what order he will proceed, namely, from those principles which are self-evident. Concerning this he does two things. First, he sets down the order of procedure. Secondly, he makes known the principles from which he intends to proceed: "A common principle is a proposition which any one accepts upon hearing it."

He says first, therefore, that he intends to set down some self-evident principles which he calls "bounds" and "rules"; "bounds", because the resolution of every demonstration comes to a stand in principles of this kind; "rules", because through them any one is directed to the knowledge of conclusions that follow. From principles of this kind he intends to draw conclusions and make evident all the matters which afterwards are to be treated, just as is done in geometry and other demonstrative sciences. These likewise are called disciplines because through them science is acquired by the disciples from the demonstration which the master proposes.

Then when he says: "A common principle is a proposition which any one accepts upon hearing it," he explains self-evident
principles: first, by giving a definition; secondly, by making a
division: "There are two kinds of these."

Concerning the first it must be noted that such principles,
which are "bounds" since they are the rules of demonstration, are
called common principles. He then defines common principle, saying:
"A common principle is a proposition which anyone accepts upon
hearing it;" in other words, which any one at all accepts as soon
as he hears it. For there are other propositions which are demonstrat-
ed by means of these and are not immediately accepted on hearing, but
need to be made evident through other principles. This process, how­
ever, cannot go on indefinitely. Hence, there is the necessity of
coming to some principles which are immediately known of themselves;
for this reason they are called common principles and universally come
within the grasp of any intellect whatsoever. The reason for this is
that the predicate is of the nature of the subject; so as soon as the
subject has been named and what it is has been understood, it is im­
mmediately evident that the predicate belongs to it.

Then when he says: "There are two kinds of these," he
divides the aforesaid principles, saying that the mode of the common
principle is twofold. Certain principles are common to all men, such
as, "If from equals you subtract equals, the remainders are equal."
On the other hand, there is a principle common only to the learned,
which is derived from the first principles which are common to all.
Of such a kind is "Incorporeal beings are not contained in a place."

Principles of this kind are accepted not by the majority but only by the wise. Now the reason for this distinction is that a common principle - or self-evident principle - is such a proposition from the fact that the predicate is of the nature of the subject. If that which is signified by the subject and the predicate falls within the knowledge of all, the consequence is that a proposition of this kind is self-evident to all. For instance, what "equal" means is known to all, and likewise what it means "to take away"; and therefore the aforesaid proposition is self-evident to all. Similarly, "Every whole is greater than its part," and others of this sort. But only the intellect of the wise rises to the apprehension of an incorporeal being, for the intellect of most men does not transcend the imagination which is only of corporeal things. Therefore, those things which are proper to bodies, for example, to be circumscriptively in place, the intellect of the wise man immediately removes from incorporeal beings; this the majority cannot do.
CHAPTER II

Text of Boethius:

13 To-be \(^1\) is different from that which is. For to-be is not
14 as yet anything, but that which is, having received the form of to-be,
15 is and has consistence. That which is can participate in something,
16 but to-be participates in no way in anything. For participation comes
17 about when something already is; but it is something after it has re-
18 ceived to-be. That which is can have something more than what it it-
19 self is; but the very to-be has no admixture of ought besides itself.
20 For to be something absolutely is not the same as to be relatively\(^2\);
21 the latter is called accident, the former substance. Every thing that
22 is participates in that which is to-be in order to be; in order to be
23 relatively, it participates in something else. For this reason, that
24 which is participates in that which is to-be in order to be; and it is,
25 so that it may participate in anything else whatever.

23 In every composite, to-be is one thing and that which is is another.
24 Any thing simple has its to-be and that which is as one.

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1. For greater precision and clarity, we shall translate the esse
directly, and not by the present participle being, since the latter
is here used as distinct from the former, i.e.: ens and esse. When
we use an expression such as "that which is to be", it might be
understood in English as "that which is about to be"; therefore,
we shall hyphenate to-be. The hyphen will help to reduce the
complexity of the English infinitive to the simplicity of the latin
esse.
2. Literally: For to be something in that it is, is not the same as to
be something. The text makes it clear that Boethius means "to be
absolutely" and "to be relatively" as these terms are commonly used.
Every unlikeness is discordant; likeness, however, is desirable. That which desires another shows itself to be naturally like to that which it desires.

The propositions that we have set forth are sufficient: each point can now be adapted to its proper arguments by one who carefully interprets its reason.

Commentary of Saint Thomas:

Boethius had already said that the order he was to follow would be such that he would first set down bounds and rules from which he would proceed to further things. Accordingly, he now sets forth certain rules or principles of the wise; then from these he begins to bring forward a proof: "The question is this."

As was said before, those propositions are most known which use terms that all understand. Now those terms which come within the grasp of every intellect are most universal; these are: being, one, and good. Boethius, therefore, first posits a few principles pertaining to being; secondly, a few pertaining to one, from which is taken the notion of simple and of composite; thirdly, a few principles pertaining to good: "Every unlikeness is discordant."

With regard to being, the very to-be is considered as something universal and indeterminate which, however, can be determined in
two ways; one, on the part of the subject which has to-be; the other, on the part of the predicate as, for instance, when we say of a man—or of any other thing—not indeed that he is absolutely, but that he is relatively; as for instance, white or black. Hence, he first posits principles that are taken from a comparison of to-be with what is; secondly, he posits principles which are taken from a comparison of what it is to be absolutely with what it is to be relatively:

"To be something absolutely is not the same as to be relatively." He has a twofold consideration of the first point. First he posits the difference between to-be and that which is. Secondly, he makes clear this sort of difference: "For to-be is not as yet anything." Thus, he says first that to-be is other than that which is, which diversity, however, is not to be referred here to things—concerning which nothing has up to this point been said—but rather to the notions or intentions themselves. For we signify one thing when we say to run and something else when we say running. For to run and to-be are signified in the abstract, like whiteness; but what is, for example: being and running, is signified in the concrete, just as white.

Then when he says: "For to-be is not as yet anything," he makes clear the aforesaid diversity in three ways. Of these, the first is that the very to-be is not signified as the subject of to be, just as neither is to run signified as the subject of the race. Hence, just as we cannot say that to run itself runs, so we cannot say that to-be
itself is; but just as that which is is signified as the subject of to-be, so also that which runs is signified as the subject of running. Therefore, just as we can say of that which runs or of one running that it runs in so far as it is subjected to the act of running and participates in it; so we can say that being, or that which is, is in as much as it participates in the act of to-be. This is what he says: "To-be is not as yet anything," since to-be is not attributed to itself as to the subject of to-be; "but that which is, having received the form of to-be," namely, by receiving the very act of to-be, "is and has consistence," that is, subsists in itself. For being is not predicated properly and per se except of substance to which it belongs to subsist. For accidents are not called beings as if they themselves were, but only in as much as they are in some subject, as will be said later.

The second difference he puts thus: "That which is can participate in something else," which distinction is taken according to the notion of participation. To participate is, as it were, to take a part; and therefore when any thing receives in a particular way that which pertains to another universally, the former is said to participate in the latter; as man is said to participate in animal because he does not have the nature of animal according to its total universality. For the same reason, Socrates participates in man. Likewise, subject participates in accident and matter in form, because
either substantial or accidental form which is universal by its nature, is determined to this or that subject. Similarly, an effect is said to participate in its cause and especially when it does not equal the power of its cause; for instance, if we say that air participates in the light of the sun, since it does not receive it in that clarity which it has in the sun. Leaving aside this third mode of participation, it is impossible that the very to-be should participate in anything according to the first two modes. For it can not participate in anything in the way in which matter or subject participates in form or in accident, because, as was said, to-be is itself signified as something abstract. Similarly, it can not participate in anything in the way in which the particular participates in the universal, for, while those things which are said in the abstract can participate in something, as whiteness in color, yet, to-be is itself the most universal; hence, to-be is participated in by others, but itself participates in nothing else. But that which is or being, although it is most universal, nevertheless is said in the concrete, and therefore it participates in to-be, not in the way in which the more universal is participated in by the less universal, but in the way in which the concrete participates in the abstract. This, then, is what he says, that "that which is," namely being, "can participate in something else; but to-be participates in no way in anything." In this way he proves what was said above, namely, that "to-be is not as yet anything." For it is manifest that that which is not, can not
participate in anything; hence it follows that participation belongs
to something when it already is. But any thing is from the fact that
it receives to-be, as was said. Hence it remains that that which is
can participate in something; but to-be itself can not participate in
anything.

The third difference he puts thus: "That which is can have
something more than what it itself is." This difference is taken from
the admixture of something extraneous. Concerning this it is to be
noted that, of any thing that is considered in the abstract, it holds
true that it does not include anything extraneous, namely, anything
besides its own essence, such as humanity and whiteness, and whatever
else is said in this way. The reason for this is that humanity is
signified as that by which some thing is a man, and whiteness, that
by which some thing is white. Now no thing is a man, formally speak-
ing, except by that which belongs to the nature of man; and likewise,
no thing is white formally, except by that which belongs to the nature
of white; therefore, whatever is abstract in this way can have nothing
extraneous in it. The same is not true, however, of those things
which are signified in the concrete; for a man is signified as one who
has humanity, and white as that which has whiteness. But the fact
that a man has humanity or whiteness does not prevent him from having
something else which does not belong to the nature of these - with the
exception of that which is opposed to these; and hence, a man and white
can have something other than humanity and whiteness. This is why
whiteness and humanity are signified in the manner of a part and are
not predicated of concrete things, just as no part is predicated of
its whole. Since, therefore, as was said, the very to-be is signified
as abstract and that which is as concrete, it follows that what is said
is true, that that which is can have something more than what it itself
is," namely, beyond its essence, but "to-be has no admixture of ought
besides its essence."

Then when he says: "To be something absolutely is not the
same as to be relatively," he sets down principles taken from a
comparison of what it is to be absolutely and what it is to be
relatively. First he posits the distinguishing character of each,
then he assigns the differences: "For the latter is called accident;
the former, substance."

Concerning the first point, it must be noted that from the
fact that that which is can have something besides its own essence,
it is necessary to consider in it a twofold to-be. For since form is
the principle of to-be, it must be that according to whatever form is
had, the thing having it be denominated. If, therefore, that form is
not in addition to the essence of the thing having it, but constitutes
its essence, then from the fact that it has such a form, the thing
having it will be said to be absolutely; for instance, a man from the
fact that he has a rational soul. But if it be a form extraneous to
the essence of the thing having it, according to that form a thing
will be said not to be absolutely, but to be relatively; as for
instance, by whiteness a man is said to be white. And this is what
he says: "it is not the same to be relatively"—which is not to be
absolutely—as to be something "absolutely", which is the proper to-be
of a subject.

Then when he says: "For the latter is called accident;
the former, substance," he posits three differences between them.
Of these the first is that "the latter"—where it is said of a thing
that it is relatively and not that it is absolutely—is called "ac­
cident," since the form which makes a to-be of this kind is in ad­
dition to the essence of the thing; "the former", however—when some­
thing is said to be absolutely—"is called substance," because the
form which makes this to-be constitutes the essence of the thing. The
second difference he posits thus: "Every thing that is participates
in that which is to-be in order to be," where he says that in order
for a thing to be absolutely, a subject participates in the very to-be;
but in order for a thing to be relatively, it must participate in
something else. For example, for a man to be white, he must participate
not only in substantial to-be, but also in whiteness. The third dif­
ference he posits thus: "For this reason, that which is participates
in to-be itself, in order to be; and it is, so that it may participate
in any thing else whatever"; this is taken from the order of both
kinds of forms and is concluded from what precedes. Now there is this
difference, that first it must be understood that something is absolutely and afterwards that it is relatively. This is clear from the foregoing. For any thing is absolutely in that it participates in to-be itself, but when it already is, namely, through participation in to-be, there remains that it may participate in something else, for this purpose namely, that it may be relatively.

Then when he says: "In every composite, to-be is one thing and what is is another," he posits principles concerning the composite and the simple which pertain to the notion of one. Now it must be noted that what was said above concerning the difference between to-be and that which is is according to the intentions themselves; but here he shows how it is applied to things. First he shows this in composites; secondly, in simple things: "Every thing simple has its to-be and that which is as one."

There is first to be noted, therefore, that just as to-be and what is differ in simple things according to intentions, so in composites they differ really. This is indeed manifest from the foregoing. For it is said above, that the very to-be neither participates in any thing, so that its nature would be constituted of many things; nor does it have any thing extra added, so that some composition of accident would be in it. Therefore, the very to-be is not composite. Hence, the composite thing is not its to-be; therefore he says that "in every composite the to-be is one thing and the composite itself is
another, which is a participation of the very to-be."

Then when he says: "Every thing simple has its to-be and that which is as one," he shows how it is with simple things, in which it is necessary that to-be and that which is be one and the same really. For if that which is and the to-be were really distinct, there would be by that very fact not a simple thing but a composite.

It must nevertheless be noted that when any thing is called simple from the fact that it lacks composition, nothing prevents a thing from being relatively simple in so far as it lacks a certain composition and yet not be entirely simple. For instance, fire and water are called simple bodies in so far as they lack the composition that is of contraries and which is found in mixtures; yet, each of them is composed of the parts of quantity as well as of matter and form. If, therefore, there are some forms that are not in matter, each of these is, to be sure, simple in that it lacks matter and consequently quantity which is the disposition of matter; yet because each form is determinative of its to-be, no one of them is the very to-be but it is a thing having to-be. For example, according to the opinion of Plato, let us suppose that an immaterial form subsists which is the idea and nature of material men, and another form which is the idea and nature of horses; it will be obvious that the immaterial subsisting form itself, since it is something determined to a species, is not the universal to-be itself but participates in it;
and it does not make any difference if we posit those immaterial forms of a higher order than the nature of these sensible things, as Aristotle thought. For each of them, in that it is distinguished from another, is a certain special form participating in the very to-be; and thus no one of them will be truly simple. Now that alone will be truly simple which does not participate in to-be; something not inhering, but rather subsisting. This, however, can be only one; because if the very to-be has no admixture of ought besides that which is to-be, as was said, it is impossible for that which is to-be itself, to be multiplied by any thing diversifying; moreover, since it has nothing added besides itself, it follows that it can receive no accident. Now this simple being, unique and sublime, is God Himself.

Then when he says: "Every unlikeness is discordant; likeness, however, is desirable," he sets forth two principles pertaining to appetite by which good is defined; for that is called good which all things desire. Hence the first principle is that "Every unlikeness is discordant; likeness, however, is desirable." Concerning this it is to be noted that discordance expresses contrariety to appetite; hence, that is said to be discordant which is repugnant to appetite. Now, all that is unlike, is as such repugnant to appetite; and the reason for this is that like is increased and perfected by its like. Any thing desires its own development and perfection; and therefore
the like as such is appetible to any thing; and for the same reason the unlike repels the appetite in so far as it lessens and impedes perfection. Hence he says that "every unlikeness is discordant," that is, disagrees with appetite; "likeness, however, is desirable."

It happens, nevertheless, by accident, that an appetite shrinks from the like, and desires the unlike or contrary. For, as was said, any thing first and essentially desires its own perfection which is the good of each thing, and this good is always proportionate to that which is perfectible by it; and in this respect it has a likeness to it. But those things which are exterior to this, are desired or repelled in so far as they contribute to the proper perfection from which a thing may fail sometimes by defect, sometimes by excess. For the proper perfection of any thing consists in a certain commensuration. Thus, the perfection of the human body consists in a commensurate warmth, and if it falls short of this, it desires something warm by which to increase the heat. But if the heat exceeds what is commensurate, the body desires the contrary, namely, something cold by which it is reduced to the temperament in which consists perfection in conformity with nature. And in this manner, one potter disdains another in so far as the latter diverts from him the good he desires, namely, profit.

He posits the second principle thus: "That which desires
another shows itself to be naturally like to that which it desires," and this follows from the foregoing. For if likeness is per se to be desired, consequently that which desires another shows that it is naturally like that which it desires, because, namely, it has a natural inclination for that which it desires. This natural inclination sometimes follows from the very essence of the thing, as the heavy tends downwards according to its essential nature; but sometimes it follows from the nature of some supervening form as when anyone has an acquired disposition, he desires that which is agreeable to him according to this disposition.

Finally, he concludes, saying that these preliminaries will do for the present purpose, and that he who carefully interprets the reasons of the things that have been said will be able to adapt each one of them to congruent arguments, namely, by applying these premises to fitting conclusions, as will appear in what follows.
CHAPTER III

Text of Boethius:

The question is this. Those things that are, are good; for the common judgment of the learned is that every thing that is, tends to the good. But every thing tends to its like. Therefore those things that tend to the good, are good. But inquiry must be made as to the way in which they are good, whether by participation or by substance. If by participation, then in themselves they are in no way good, for that which is white by participation is not white in itself, that is, in that which itself is. The same is true of the other qualities. If, therefore, things are good by participation, they are in no way good in themselves. Then they do not tend to the good. But it has been granted that they do. Therefore, they are good not by participation but by substance. Now, the things whose substance is good, are good in that they are. But that they are, they have from that which is to-be; the to-be of these things, then, is good. Therefore, the to-be of all things is good. But if their to-be is good, those things that are, are good in that they are; and, in them, to be is identically the same thing as to be good. Therefore they are substantial goods, since they do not participate in goodness. But if the to-be itself in them is good, there is no doubt but that substantial beings, since they are good, are like the
First Good. And therefore, they will be that Good itself; for nothing
is like to it except itself. From this it follows that all things
that are, are God; and to say this, is blasphemous. Therefore, they
are not substantial goods, and so in them their to-be is not good.
They are not good, therefore, in that they are. But neither do they
participate in goodness, for in no way would they tend to the good.
Therefore, in no way are they good.

Commentary of Saint Thomas:

After a few preliminary principles which are necessary for
the discussion of the proposed question, he (Boethius) approaches the
question. Concerning this he does two things. First, he proposes the
question. Secondly, he gives the solution: "To this question, the
following solution can be given." Thirdly, he excludes certain objections against the solution: "But will it not have to be that white
things are white in that they are," Concerning the first point, he
does two things. First, he presents what the question presupposes.
Secondly, he considers that in the question which raises a doubt:
"But inquiry must be made as to the way in which they are good."

He says then, that the proposed question must be approached
by presupposing that all things that are, are good; and for proving
this he brings in a reason taken from what precedes, which is: every
thing tends to its like. For this reason it was said: Whatever desires
another, shows itself to be naturally like to that which it desires. But every thing that is, tends to the good; and he maintains this according to the common judgment of the wise. Hence in the beginning of the Ethics, the Philosopher says that wise men judge that to be good which all things desire. For the proper object of the appetite is the good just as sound is the proper object of hearing. Hence, just as sound is that which is perceived by every act of hearing, so good must be that to which every appetite tends. And so, since every thing has an appetite - either intellectual or sense or natural - it follows that every thing desires the good. And so is concluded that every thing is good, and this is what the question under consideration presupposes.

Then when he says: "But inquiry must be made as to the way in which they are good," he shows that the question raises a doubt. Concerning this he does three things. First, he puts the question. Secondly, he objects to each alternative of the question: "If by participation, then in themselves they are in no way good." Thirdly, he proceeds further to excluding the first supposition: "They are not good, therefore, in that they are."

First, therefore, he says: supposing all beings are good, it must be asked in what way they are good. Something is said of another in two ways: in one way, substantially; in another, by participation. The question, therefore, is whether beings are good by their essence
or by participation.

In order to understand this question, it must be kept in mind that here it is presupposed that to be something by essence and something by participation are opposites. In one of the modes of participation above mentioned, this is obviously true; namely, according to that mode by which subject is said to participate in accident - or matter, form (for accident is outside the nature of the subject, and form is outside the substance of matter). But in another mode of participation by which species participates genus, this is true that species participates genus. This is true also according to the opinion of Plato who posits that the idea of animal is one thing and of the biped man, another. But according to the opinion of Aristotle who held that man is truly that which is animal, as the essence of animal does not exist beyond the difference of man, nothing prevents that which is said by participation from being predicated substantially.

But Boethius is here speaking according to that mode of participation by which subject participates accident; and, therefore, that which is predicated substantially is placed in opposition with that which is predicated by participation, as is obvious in the examples that he subsequently gives.

Then when he says: "If by participation, then in themselves they are in no way good," he objects to each alternative of the question. First, against the position that things are good by participation.
Secondly, against the position that they are good by reason of their substance: "The things whose substance is good, are good in that they are." First, therefore, he says that if all things are good by participation, it follows that in no way are they good in themselves. And this indeed is true if in themselves is posited as being whatever is said in the very definition of that about which it is said, just as man is in himself animal. For whatever is put in the definition of any thing pertains to its essence, and so it is not said of it by that participation of which we are now speaking. But if in itself is understood in another way, namely, as the subject is posited in the definition of the predicate, then what is here said would be false; for a proper accident according to this mode is essentially in the subject, and yet it is predicated of it participatively. Boethius, therefore, takes participation here as a subject participates an accident; but he takes in itself for what is posited in the definition of the subject. Thus it follows of necessity that if things are good by participation, they are not good in themselves. And Boethius illustrates this by an example: "for that which is white by participation is not white in itself," that is, in that which itself is, which pertains to the first mode of saying per se. And it is the same with the other qualities. It follows, therefore, that if all things are good by participation, they are not good in themselves, that is, by their substance. From this then it would follow that the substances of beings do not tend to the good, whereas the contrary of this was
granted above, namely, that all things do tend to the good. It seems, therefore, that beings are good not by participation, but by their substance.

Then when he says: "The things whose substance is good, are good in that they are," he objects to the contrary position in the following way. Those things whose substance is good are necessarily good in this: that they are; for it pertains to the substance of any thing whatever, that it concurs with its to-be; for it was said above that any thing is when it has received to-be. It follows, therefore, that, of those things which are good according to their subject, the very to-be is good. If, then, all things are good according to their substance, it follows that the to-be itself of all things is good. And since the premises from which he argues are convertible, he proceeds conversely; for it follows conversely that if the to-be of all things is good, then those things that are, in as much as they are, would be good; so that it would be the same thing for any thing whatever to be and to be good. It follows therefore, that they would be substantial goods from the very fact that they are good; and yet, not by participation of goodness.

Now what unfitting conclusions would follow from this he shows, and says that if the very to-be of all things were good, then since from this it would follow that they would be substantial goods, the consequence is also that they would be like the First Good which is substantial goodness and in which to-be is the same as to be good. And from this it follows further that all would be the First Good itself,
since nothing other than itself is like to it, namely, as to the mode of goodness. Now nothing else except the First Good is good in the same way that it is good, since it alone is the First Good. Yet some things are predicated like to it in that they are good secondarily, derived from the First and Principal Good. If, then, all are the First Good itself, then since the First Good is no other than God, it follows, that all things are God. And to say this, is blasphemous. It follows, therefore, that the premises are false. Therefore, not all beings are substantial goods, nor is the very to-be in them good, since from these premises the conclusion is drawn that all things are God. It follows further that not all things are good in as much as they are.

Then when he says: "But neither do they participate in goodness," he proceeds to remove the first supposition and says that if to this conclusion which is that beings are not substantially good, there be added the other conclusion which was drawn above, that beings are not good by participation, since from this it would follow that in no way would they tend to good, as was held above, it seems it could be further concluded that in no way are beings good - which is contrary to what was said above.
CHAPTER IV

Text of Boethius:

To this question the following solution can be given. There are many things which cannot be separated actually, and yet they are separated by an operation of the mind; as no one actually separates a triangle or other such things from the material subject, yet, by separating it mentally, a person can think on a triangle and its properties apart from matter. Let us, therefore, put the presence of the First Good from our mind for the time being, although certain that it is; and this fact can be known from the judgment of all the learned and unlearned and also from the religions of uncivilized peoples. The First God having been set aside for the time being then, let us posit that all things that are, are good. And let us consider in what way they could be good if they did not at all flow from the First Good. I perceive in these that it is one thing that they are good, and another that they are. For it is posited that one and the same substance is good, heavy, white, round; then one thing would be its substance, another its roundness, another its color, another its goodness. For if each of these were the same as the substance, the weight would be the same as the color, good would be the same as white, and as round; which nature does not endure. In these things, therefore, to-be would be one thing, and to be relatively would be another. Then indeed they might be good, yet they would not have their to-be itself, good. Therefore,
if in any way they might be apart from the First Good, they might
indeed be good, and they would not be identical with good, but in
them to-be would be one thing and to be good would be another. If
they were nothing else at all except good, neither heavy nor colored
nor distinct by spatial dimension, nor would any quality be in them,
except only that they were good, then they would seem to be not things,
but the principle of things; rather, not they would seem but it would
seem. For there is one alone of such a nature that it is only good,
and is nothing else. Since they are not simple beings, they could
not have been at all unless that which alone is good had willed them
to be. For the reason that their being flows from the will of the
Good, they are said to be good. For the First Good, in that it is, is
good; the secondary good, since it flows from that whose to-be itself
is good, is also itself, good; but the very to-be of all things is
derived from that which is the First Good, and which is such a good
that it is rightly said of it: In that it is, it is good. Hence,
the to-be of these things is good. Then, they would not be good in
that they were, if they had not come from the First Good.

Commentary of Saint Thomas:

The question having been presented and arguments set forth,
here Boethius gives the solution. Concerning this he does three things.
First, he determines the truth of the question. Secondly, he answers
the objection: "In this way the question is solved." Thirdly, he raises certain objections against the solution and solves them: "But will it not have to be that white things are white in that they are."

Concerning the first he does three things. First, he makes a preliminary supposition. Secondly, he shows what would follow as to the goodness of things, from that supposition: "The First Good having been set aside for the time being, let us posit that all things that are, are good." Thirdly, he shows how goodness is in things in very truth, apart from any supposition: "Since they are not simple things, they could not have been at all unless that which alone is good had willed them to be."

Concerning the first he does two things. First, he presents something that is necessary to show that such a supposition can be made. Secondly, he sets forth the supposition: "Let us, therefore, put the presence of the First Good from our mind for the time being."

Then first he says that there are many things which cannot actually be separated, which nevertheless are separated by an operation of the mind. The reason for this is that things are in the mind in one way and are in matter in another. It can be, therefore, that something, according to the way in which it is in matter, might have an inseparable union with something else; yet, according to the way it is in the mind, not have an inseparable union with it, because the notion
of one is distinct from the notion of the other. He gives the example of a triangle and other mathematical objects which cannot in reality be separated from sensible matter; nevertheless, the mathematician, by an abstraction of the mind, can consider a triangle and its properties apart from sensible matter, because the notion of triangle does not depend on sensible matter.

Then when he says: "Let us put the presence of the First Good from our mind for the time being," he posits the supposition that he had in mind, namely, that by a mental abstraction we should remove from other things for the moment the presence of the First Good. This indeed is possible according to the order of that which is knowable for us; for although according to the knowability of things considered in themselves, God is the first known, nevertheless for us His sensible effects are first known. Therefore, nothing prevents the effects of the Highest Good from falling under our consideration without our considering the First Good itself. So let us remove the First Good from the consideration of our mind, although we are very certain that it is.

For this "can be known from the common judgment of all the learned as well as the unlearned" and further, even "from the religions of uncivilized peoples" none of which would be if God were not.

Then when he says: "The First Good, then, having been removed for the time being, let us posit that all things that are, are good," he shows what would follow concerning the goodness of things,
this supposition having been made. First, he makes clear what he intends. Secondly, he proves something which had been taken as a supposition: "If they were nothing else at all except good ... then they would seem to be not things but the principle of things."

First, then, he says that the First Good having been prescinded from by the intellect, let us posit that other things are good; because from the goodness of the effects we come to a knowledge of the First Good. Then let us consider in what way they could be good if they had not proceeded from the First Good. Now this supposition having been made, it is clear that in them their goodness is other than their very to-be; for if "it be posited that one and the same substance is good, white, heavy, round," it follows that in that thing its "substance would be one thing, its roundness another, its color another, its goodness still another." For the goodness of any thing at all is understood to be its virtue by which it effects a good operation. For it is virtue that makes the thing having it good and its work good, as is made clear by the Philosopher in the book of Ethics. Now that this is something distinct from the substance of the thing, he proves by this, that if each of the foregoing were the same as the substance of the thing, it would follow also that they all would be identical, one with the other, namely, that weight would be one and the same as color; one and the same as good, and as white, and as round; for things that are the same as one and the same thing, are identical
with each other. But nature does not allow all those to be identical.

Therefore, it remains that, the previous supposition having been made, the very to-be in things would be something other than to be relatively, for instance, good or white or whatever is said in such a way. And thus, the aforesaid position having been taken, things might indeed be good, yet their very to-be would not be good. Thus, therefore, if is some way they were, not from the First Good, and yet were good in themselves, it would follow that it would not be the same thing that they are such as they are, and that they are good; but their to-be would be one thing, and to be good would be another.

Then when he says: "If they were nothing else at all except good, then they would seem to be not things, but the very principle of things," he proves what he had supposed, namely, that the aforesaid supposition having been made, in these things to be good would be something other that to be absolutely, or to be any other thing. Because if there were nothing else in them other than that they were good, so that "they would be neither heavy nor colored nor distinct by spatial dimension," as are all bodies, "nor would any quality be in them" except this alone that they would be good; then it would not seem that they were created things, but rather they would be the first principle of things itself: because that which is the very essence of goodness is the first principle of things. It would follow that one would not have to say of all of these things taken in their plurality, that they
seemed to be the principle of things, but rather that taken in the singular, it seemed to be the first principle of things. This would be as if all good things were absolutely one thing; because there is only one that is of such a nature that it is just good and nothing else. But this is clearly false. Therefore, so is the first premise, namely, that created things - prescinding from the First Good - would be nothing else than this: to be good.

Then when he says: "Which things, since they are not simple, could not have been at all unless that which alone is good had willed them to be," he shows what is to be judged in truth concerning the goodness of things. And he says, since created things do not have simplicity in every way, namely, so that there be nothing in them other than the essence of goodness; nor could they exist at all in the real order unless God had willed them to be - God who is that which alone is, in that, namely, He is the very essence of goodness; it follows that since the to-be of created things is derived from the will of Him who is essentially good, therefore created things are said to be good. For the First Good, namely, God, "in that He is, is good," since He is essentially goodness itself. But the secondary good, which is created, is good from the fact that it is derived from the First Good which is good by its very essence. Since, therefore, the to-be of all things has flowed from the First Good, it follows that the very to-be of created things is good and that any created thing in so far
as it is, is good. But thus created things alone would not be good
in that they are if their to-be had not come from the Highest Good.
Therefore, his solution comes to this: the to-be of the First Good
is according to its proper nature good, since the nature and essence
of the First Good is nothing else than goodness. But the to-be of
the secondary good is indeed good, not according to the nature of its
own essence, because its essence is not its goodness, but is either
humanity or something else of this sort; but its to-be owes what good­
ness it has to its relation to the First Good which is its cause. And
to this cause it is compared as to its first principle and last end,
in the way in which some thing is said to be healthy from the fact
that it is ordered to the end of health, as a thing is called medicinal
in that it is from an effective principle of the medical art.

It is to be noted according to what has previously been said,
that in created goods there is a twofold goodness. One is that good­
ness according to which they are called good because of their relation
to the First Good; and according to this, their to-be and whatever is
in them from the First Good, is good. But another goodness is consider­
ed in them absolutely, namely, in that any one thing is called good in
so far as it is perfect in its to-be and its operation. And in truth,
this perfection does not belong to created good according to the very
to-be of their essence, but belongs according to something superadded
which is called their virtue, as was said above; and according to this,
the to-be itself is not good. But the First Good has perfection in every respect in its very to-be, and therefore its to-be is good of itself, absolutely.
CHAPTER V

Text of Boethius:

In this way the question is answered. For although things are good in that they are, yet they are not like the First Good since their very to-be is not good in whatsoever way they are things. But since the to-be of things cannot be unless it has flowed from the First to-Be, that is, from the Good - on that account their to-be is good, but is not like to that from which it comes. For the latter, in every way that it is, is good in that it is; for it is nothing other than good. But if the derived good did not come from it, the former might perhaps be good but could not be good in that it is. For in that case it might perhaps participate in good, but that to-be which it did not have from the Good, could not have goodness. Therefore, the First Good having been set aside from them by a mental abstraction, these things, although they might be good yet could not be in that way in which they were good. And since they could not actually exist unless that which is truly Good had produced them, for that reason their to-be is good; but that which is derived from the substantial Good is not like to it. And unless they had flowed from it, although they might be good, nevertheless they could not be good in that they are. This is because they would be outside the Good and not from the Good, since that is the First Good itself, and the very to-Be, and the Good,
the very to **Be Good**. But will it not have to be that white things

are white in that they are, since it has flowed from the will of God

that they be white? Not at all; for it is one thing to be and another

to be white; moreover, He who made them to be is indeed good, but is

not, in truth, white. Therefore, it is communicated from the will of

the good that they be good, in that they are, but it is not communicat-
ed to a thing from the will of the white that the property be such

that it be white in that it is; for they did not flow from the will of

the white. And so because He who was not white willed these things to

be white, they are white merely; but because He who is Good willed

them to be good, they are good in that they are. But then according

to this reason, all things have to be just since He is just who willed

them to be. That is not so either; for to be good, regards essence,

but to be just, regards act. In God **to-Be** is identical with **to act**;

therefore in Him **to-be** is the same as to be just. But in us, **to-be** is

not identical with **to act**, for we are not simple. Therefore in us, to

be good is not the same as to be just. But **to-be** is the same in all

of us from the fact that we are; therefore, all things are good but are

not also just. Besides: whereas good is general, just is special; the

species is not realized in all. For this reason some things are indeed

just, some are otherwise; but all are good.

Commentary of Saint Thomas:

After he has determined the truth of the foregoing question,
he now answers the objection from which it was concluded that created goods are good in that they are like the First Good; and concerning this he does two things. First he answers the objection. Secondly, he summarizes what has been said: "Therefore, the First Good having been set aside from them by a mental abstraction, these things, although they might be good, yet could not be in that way in which they were good . . . for that reason their to-be is good, and at the same time that which flows from the substantial Good is not like to it."

First, therefore, he says that it is clear from what precedes that this question has been answered, for they are not like the First Good from the fact that they are good in that they are, because the to-be itself of created things is not good absolutely in whatever way it is, but is good only according to a relatedness to the First Good.

But since the to-be of created things can not be unless they are derived from the First Good, for that reason their to-be is good; yet it is not like the First Good in goodness. For the latter absolutely is good in every way that He is, since nothing is in Him except the very essence of goodness; and this is because there is in Him no perfection by way of addition, but in His simple to-Be He has perfection of every kind, as was said. But a created good might perhaps be good even considered in itself, even if - per impossibile - it were conceded that it did not proceed from the First Good; namely, by a goodness which belonged to it absolutely. But in this way it would not be good in that it is,
because it would be good by participation of a superadded goodness. But its to-be, itself, would not be good if it were not derived from the Good, from which relatedness the to-be of created things is good.

Then when he says: "Therefore, the First Good having been set aside from them by a mental abstraction, these things, although they might be good yet could not be in that way in which they were good ... for that reason their being is good but that which flows from the substantial Good is not like it," he summarizes what has been said, and he says that if by the intellect the First Good be set aside from things, all the rest - granted that they might be good - could nevertheless not be good in that they are. But because they could not be actually, except in as much as they have been produced by the First Good which is truly good, for this reason their to-be also is good.

Yet to-be which flows from the First Good is not like the First Good which is substantially Good; and unless they had flowed from this, although they might be good, nevertheless they could not be good in that they are, in as much as they would not be from the First Good; whereas the First Good Itself is the very to-Be because its to-Be is its substance; and is goodness itself since it is the very essence of goodness; and existing Good because in it to-Be does not differ from what is.

Then when he says: "But will it not have to be that white things are white in that they are," he moves two objections against
the aforesaid, the second of which he posits thus: "Then according to this reason, all things have to be just, since He is just who willed them to be." Concerning the first he posits the following objection: It is said that all things, in that they are, are good because it has come from the will of the First Good that they be good. Hence, why should not all white things, in that they are, be white, since it has come from the will of God that they be white? But he answers that this is not at all necessary, since in those things that are white, their to-be, considered absolutely, is one thing which belongs to them according to essential principles, and that by which they are white is another. And the reason for this difference between white and good is that God who made created things good and white, is indeed good but is not white. Therefore, it follows from the will of the First Good that created things be good, in as much as He willed them to be good, and that they be good in that they are, in as much as they have been produced by the Good, since the to-be of created things - from the fact that it is from the Good - has the nature of good, as was said. But such a property does not follow from the Divine Will, that that which is created be white in that it is, for the reason that it did not flow from the will of the white as good things flowed from the will of the Good, so that it could be said that their to-be is white in as much as they are from the first white. Therefore, it is obvious that since God who is not white willed some things to be white, this alone in truth can be said of them: that they are white, but not
in that they are. But since God who is good willed all things to be good, therefore they are good in that they are, in so far namely, as their to-be has the nature of good because it is from the Good.

Then when he says: "According to this reason, all things have to be just, since He is just who willed them to be," he posits the second objection. For any one could say: All things are good in that they are, since He who is good willed them to be good. With like reason, all things ought to be just since He who is just willed them to be. But Boethius replies that this does not follow, for a twofold reason. In the first place, because that which is good signifies a certain nature or essence, for it has been said that God is the very essence of goodness, and each and every thing is called good according to the perfection of its proper nature; but a person is called just with respect to act, and the same is true of any virtue. In God, however, to be and to act are identical; hence in Him to be good is the same as to be just. But in us, to be and to act are not identical because we fail from the simplicity of God. Hence, to be good and to be just are not identical in us, but to-be belongs to us all in so far as we are, and therefore also goodness belongs to us all. But the act which justice regards does not belong to all, nor is it identical with their to-be in those to whom it does belong. Hence it remains that not all things are just in that they are.
The second reason he puts thus: "Besides, while the good is general, the just is special." Now the good is something general of which one species is justice, and the same with the other virtues. In God, however, there is found the whole nature of goodness, and therefore He is not only good, but is just. But not all kinds of goodness are to be found in all things, but different kinds in different things. On that account it is not necessary that that species which is justice come to all beings as goodness comes to them. Hence, of beings some are just and some have another kind of goodness; yet, all are good in so far as they are derived from the First Good. And with this is ended the exposition of this book. May God be praised by all. Amen.
ON THE GOOD

SAINT THOMAS AQVINAS

QUESTIONES QUODLIBETALES

DE VERITATE

Question XXI
ON THE GOOD

QUESTIONES QUODLIBETALES

DE VERITATE

Question XXI

In six articles:

1. Whether good adds anything to being.
2. Whether good and being are convertible according to supposita.
3. Whether the good is prior in nature to the true.
4. Whether all things are good by the first goodness.
5. Whether created good is good by its essence.
6. Whether the good of the creature consists in mode, species, and order, as Augustine says.

Article I

Whether good adds anything to being
(I, q. 5, a. 1)

Objections

1. The question concerns the good. First it is asked whether good adds anything to being, and it seems that it does. For any thing is a being by reason of its essence. A creature is good by participation, however; not by its essence. Therefore, good adds some-
thing real to being.

2. Moreover, since the good in its nature includes being, and since good is formally distinguished from being, it must be that the nature of good adds something to the nature of being. But it cannot be said to add something negative to being as does unity which adds lack of division, since the whole nature of good consists in something positive. Therefore, it adds something positive to being; and so it seems that it really adds something.

3. It must be said that the good adds reference to an end. — But on the contrary: according to this view, the good would be nothing other than being as related. But being as related is committed to a determinate category of being which is relation. Then, good is in some one determinate predicament, and this is contrary to the Philosopher in the first book of Ethicus where he places good in all the categories.

4. Besides, as can be accepted from what Dionysius has said in IV De Divinis Nominibus, the good is diffusive of itself. Therefore, a thing is good through that by which it is diffusive of self. But to diffuse expresses a certain action; and action proceeds from the essence by the medium of virtue. Therefore a thing is said to be good by reason of virtue superadded to essence, and so good adds something to being.

5. Besides, the more things recede from the one principle that is first and simple, the greater the difference that is found in
them. Now being and good are really one in God and are distinguished by a distinction of reason. Therefore, in creatures they are distinguished more than by a distinction of reason, and so they are really distinguished, since there is nothing beyond a distinction of reason except a real distinction.

6. Besides, accidents really add something to essence. But goodness is accidental to a created thing, otherwise it would not be possible to lose goodness. Therefore, good really adds something to being.

7. Besides, all that is predicated by reason of its informing anything, adds something real to it, because nothing is informed by itself. But the good is predicated by reason of its informing, as is said in the commentary on the book De Causis. Therefore, good adds something to being.

8. But it must be said that good determines being according to reason. On the contrary: either something in the thing answers to that reason or nothing does. If nothing, then it would follow that that reason was hollow and vain; but if something answers in the thing, the proposition holds that good really adds something to being.

9. Besides, relation is specified according to that to which it is named. But the good is named to a determinate genus, namely the end. Therefore, the good names a specific relation. But every
specific being really adds something to universal being. Therefore, good really adds something to being.

10. Besides, just as being and good are convertible, so are man and risible. But although risible can be converted with man, yet it adds something real to man, namely, a property of man which is in the category of accidents. Therefore, good also adds something to being.

1. On the contrary, there is what Augustine says (I De Doctrina Christiana, Chapter 32), that in as much as God is good, we are; and in as much as we are, we are good. It seems, therefore, that good does not add anything to being.

2. Moreover, whenever things are such that one adds to another either in reality or in the mind, one of them can be understood without the other. But being cannot be understood without good. Therefore, good adds to being neither in reality nor in the mind. Proof of the middle. God can make more than man can understand. But God cannot make any being that is not good, since from the very fact that a thing is from the Good, it is good, as is made clear by Boethius in his De Hebdomadibus (in the book, Whether every thing that is, is good, about the middle). Therefore, neither can the intellect understand.

I answer that it must be said that something can add to an-
other in three ways. In one way, because it adds a certain reality which is outside the essence of that thing to which it is said to be added; as white adds to body, since the essence of whiteness is extraneous to the essence of body.

In another way something is said to be added to another, by way of contracting and determining it, as man adds something to animal; not indeed in such a way that there is in man some reality which is wholly extraneous to the essence of animal, otherwise we should have to say that not all that is man is animal, but that animal is a part of man. Animal is contracted by man, however, since that which determinately and actually is contained in the nature of man is contained implicitly and as it were potentially in the nature of animal; just as it is of the nature of man that he should have a rational soul, and it is of the nature of animal that it have a soul, without determining it to rational or non-rational. Yet that determination by reason of which man is said to add something to animal is founded in some reality.

In a third way something is said to add to another according to reason only; namely, when something is of the notion of one which is not of the notion of the other, which nevertheless is nothing in the order of nature but is in the mind only, whether that to which it is said to be added is contracted by it or not. For blind adds something to man, namely, blindness which is not any being in nature but is of the mind only, from the fact that being includes privations. And
by this blindness man is contracted, for not every man is blind; but when we say that a mole is blind, no contraction is made by adding this.

Nothing can add to universal being in the first way, although in that way some addition can be made to a particular being; for there is no thing in nature which is outside the essence of universal being, although some thing may be outside the essence of this particular being. In the second way, however, there are some additions to being, since being is contracted by ten categories, each one of which adds something to being - not any accident or any differentia which is outside the essence of being, but a determined mode of being which is founded in the very essence of the thing. But in this way, good does not add anything to being: since the good is, like being, divided into ten categories, as is clear in the first book of Ethics, Chapter VI. Hence it must be either that it adds nothing to being, or that if it does add, the addition be one of reason only. For if it added anything real, it would have to be that by the formality of good, being would be contracted to some special genus. Since, however, as Avicenna says, being is that which first falls under the apprehension of the mind, it must be that every such name either is a synonym of being, which cannot be said of good, since being is not called good in just a nugatory way; or it adds something at least conceptually, and thus it must be that good, from the fact that it does not contract being, adds something
to being which is of the mind only. But a merely conceptual addition can not be except in two ways; for every absolute positing signifies something existing in the order of nature.

Thus it is that "one" adds that which is of the mind only, namely negation, to being which is the first concept of the intellect, for "one" is predicated as a being, undivided. But "true" and "good" are predicated positively, and for this reason they cannot add anything unless a relation which is of the mind only. Now, according to the Philosopher in the fifth book of Metaphysics (text 20) that relation is said to be a merely mental relation by which that which does not depend is said to be related to that to which it is referred; but the converse is true, since the relation itself is a sort of dependence as can be plainly seen in knowledge and knowable, sense and sensible. For knowledge depends on the knowable but not conversely: hence, the relation by which knowledge is related to the knowable is real; but the relation by which the knowable is related to knowledge is purely mental. For the knowable is said to be related, according to the Philosopher (Metaphysics, Book VI, text 7), not because it itself is related but because another is related to it. The same holds true in all other instances where there is measure and measured, perfective and perfectible.

It must be, therefore, that true and good add to the concept of being the relation of perfective. In any being whatever, two things
are to be considered, namely, the specific nature itself, and the very to-be by which something exists in that species or form. Thus any being can be perfect in two ways. In one way, according to the specific nature alone. Thus intellect is perfected by being for it is perfected by the formality of being; yet being is not in the intellect according to its natural mode of existence. And it is this manner of perfecting that true adds to being. For the true is in the mind, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics, Book VI; and any being is said to be true in so far as it is conformed or conformable to the intellect. Hence, all who define "true" correctly, put "intellect" in the definition. In another way one being is perfective of another not only according to its specific nature, but also according to the to-be which it has in the real order of things, and in this way good is perfective; for the good is in things, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics, Book VI (com. 8). In so far as one being is, according to its to-be, perfective and conservative of another, it has the nature of end with respect to that which is perfected by it; and hence, all who correctly define "good," put in its definition something which pertains to the relation of end. That is the reason the Philosopher says in the first book of Ethics (in the beginning), that they best define the good who say that the good is that which all things desire.

Thus, first and primarily the good is said to be being as perfective of another by the way of an end; but secondarily something
is said to be good which leads to the end, as the useful is said to be good; or which follows upon the end, as not only that which has health is said to be healthy, but also that which perfects, and conserves, and signifies health.

In reply to the objections, then, it should be said:

To the first: Since being is predicated absolutely, but good adds the relation of final cause, the essence itself of a thing absolutely considered suffices for the thing to be called a being because of it, but does not suffice for the thing to be called good. Just as in the other genera of causes, the relation of the second cause depends on the relation of the first cause, but the relation of the first cause does not depend on any other, so it is with final causes, since secondary ends participate in the relation of final cause from their order to the ultimate end, but the ultimate end has this relation from itself. Thus it is that the essence of God, which is the ultimate end of things, suffices for God to be called good by reason of it; but given the essence of a creature, the thing is not called good except from its relation to God, by reason of which relation it has the nature of final cause. And thus it is said that the creature is not good by essence but rather, by participation. This is from one point of view, namely, in as much as the essence itself, as an object of intellect, is considered as something other than that relation to God, from which relation it has the nature of final cause and to Whom
it is ordered as to its end. But from another point of view the creature can be called good by reason of its essence, namely, in as much as the essence of the creature is not found without relation to the goodness of God; and this is what Boethius means in the De Hebdomadibus.

To the second: Negation is said to be not only of the mind merely, but also a certain relation, as was said in the body of the article.

To the third: Every real relation is in a definite category; but relations which are not real can go the round of all being.

To the fourth: To diffuse—although according to the proper connotation of the word it would seem to express the operation of the efficient cause—can nevertheless, in a wide sense, express the relation of any cause; just as: to flow into, to make, and the like. When, however, it is said that the good is diffusive according to its nature, diffusion is not to be understood according as it expresses operation of an efficient cause, but rather according as it expresses relation of the final cause; and such diffusion is not through the medium of any superadded virtue. The good bespeaks a diffusion of the final cause and not of the efficient cause: both because the efficient cause, as such, is not the measure and perfection of the thing, but rather the beginning; and also because the effect particip-
ates in the efficient cause according to an assimilation of the form only; whereas a thing pursues the end according to its whole being, and in this consists the nature of good.

To the fifth: Some things can be really one in God in a twofold way. In one way, only on the part of that in which they are and not from their own nature, as knowledge and power; for knowledge is the same thing as power in reality not from the fact that it is knowledge but from the fact that it is divine. Things that are really one in this way in God are found to differ in their reality in creatures. In another way, from their own nature they are said to be one really; and thus, good and being are really one in God, since it is of the nature of good that it does not differ in reality from being. Therefore, wherever good and being are found, they are the same really.

To the sixth: Just as being is in a certain way essential, and in a certain way accidental, so also is the good in some way essential and in some way accidental; and in the same way any thing loses goodness, just as substantial or accidental being.

To the seventh: From the aforesaid relation it happens that the good is said, in the order of reason, to determine or inform being.

To the eighth: Something in the thing corresponds with that reason, namely, the real dependence of that which is for the end
itself, just as in other mental relations.

To the ninth: Although good expresses a special relation, namely, that of an end, yet that relation belongs to any being whatever and does not add anything real to a being. Hence, the reasoning does not follow.

To the tenth: Although risible is convertible with man, yet it adds a nature extraneous to man, which is outside the essence of man; but nothing can thus be added to being, as has been said.

The second objection he proves, that neither does it add anything according to reason; and so to the second objection it must be said that in a twofold way something can be understood without another. In one way, according to the mode of enunciating namely, in so far as one is understood to be without another; and, in this way, God can make whatever the intellect can understand without another. Being cannot be understood in this way without good, so that the intellect would understand anything existing not to be good. In another way something can be understood without another according to the mode of defining, so that one may be understood but the other, not understood, as animal is understood without man and all the other species; and in this way being can be understood without good. Yet it does not follow that God can make being without good, since to make is to produce something in its to-be.
Article II

Whether being and good are convertible according to suppositis
(I,q. 5, art. 3)

1. In the second place it is asked whether being and good are convertible according to suppositis, and it seems that they are not. For contraries are in the same genus. Good and evil are contraries. Therefore, since evil is not found in all beings, because as Avicenna says (Metaphysics, Book IX, Chapter VI), beyond the orbit of the moon there is no evil, it seems that neither is good found in all beings; and so good is not converted with being.

2. Moreover, whatever things are such that one has a wider extension than another, are not convertible with one another. But, as the Commentator Maximus says in IV De Divinis Nominibus, good extends to more things than being does; for it extends to non-beings which are called into existence by the good. Therefore, good and being are not convertible.

3. Moreover, as Algazel says, the good is perfection, the apprehension of which is delightful. But not every being has perfection; for prime matter does not have any perfection. Therefore, not every being is good.

4. Moreover, there is being in mathematical objects but there is not good in them, as is made clear by the Philosopher in Metaphysics,
Book III (text 4). Therefore, good and being are not convertible.

5. Moreover, in the book De Causis it is said (proposition 4), that the first of created things is to-be. According to the Philosopher in the Categories (in the chapter concerning the notion of "prior"), that is prior whose sequence can not be reversed. Therefore, the sequence from being to good can not be reversed; and so good and being are not convertible.

6. Moreover, that which is divided is not convertible with any of the things that divide it; as for instance, animal with rational. But being is divided by good and evil, since many beings are called evil. Therefore, good and being are not convertible.

7. Moreover, privation, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics, Book IV, is called being in some way. But in no way can it be called good; otherwise, evil, whose nature consists in privation, would be good. Therefore, good and being are not convertible.

8. Moreover, according to Boethius in the De Hebdomadibus, all things are said to be good, because they are from the Good which is God. But the goodness of God is His wisdom and His justice. Therefore, for the same reason, all things that are from God would be wise and just; but this is false. Therefore, so is the first statement, namely, that all things are good.

On the contrary, everything tends to its own like. But every
being tends to the good, as Boethius says in the De Hebdomadibus. Therefore, every being is good; nor can any thing be good unless it exist in some way. Therefore, being and good are convertible.

Moreover, from the good nothing can come to be except the good. But every being proceeds from divine goodness. Therefore, every being is good; and so the conclusion is the same as the previous one.

I answer that it must be said that since the nature of good consists in this, that a thing is perfective of another by way of an end, every thing that is found to have the nature of end has also the nature of good. Two things are of the nature of end; namely, that it be sought or desired by those things which have not yet attained the end; or that it be loved, as something delectable, by those that participate in the end, since it belongs to the same nature to tend to an end, and in some way to rest in the end, just as by the same nature a stone is moved to an intermediate place and rests there. Now these two characteristics belong to the very to-be. For those things which do not yet participate in to-be tend toward to-be by a certain natural appetite; hence matter seeks form, according to the Philosopher, Physics, Book I (text 81). All those things which already have to-be, on the other hand, naturally love that to-be of theirs and conserve it with all their strength. That is why Boethius says in the third book On Consolation (prosa 11, near the end) : Divine Providence gave to His creatures this as the greatest cause of continuing, that they naturally
desire to continue as long as they can. Therefore, there is no reason for you to doubt in any way that all things that are, naturally desire the constancy of remaining and avoid corruption. Therefore, to-be itself has the nature of good. Hence, just as it is impossible that there be any entity which does not have to-be, so it is necessary that every entity be good from the fact that it has to-be; although in some beings many formalities of goodness are superadded to their to-be by which they subsist. Since, however, the good includes the nature of being, as is clear from what was said in the preceding article, it is impossible for any thing to be good which is not a being; and so it remains that good and being are convertible.

In reply to the objections, then, it should be said:

To the first: Good and evil are opposed in the manner of privation and habit; yet it need not be that in whatever being there is habit, there is privation. Likewise it need not be that in whatever beings there is good, there is also evil. In contraries, when one is by nature in a certain thing, the other is not naturally in the same thing, according to the Philosopher in the Categories (in the chapter on opposites, about the middle). But good is naturally in any being whatever, since it is called good from its very own, natural to-be.

To the second: Good extends to non-beings not by way of predication but by causality in as much as non-beings seek the good; as we call non-beings those that are in potency and not in act. But
being does not have this causality unless perhaps according to the nature of exemplary cause; and this cause extends only to those things which actually participate in \textit{to-be}.

To the third: Just as prime matter is being in potency and not in act, so it is perfect in potency and not in act, and good in potency and not in act.

To the fourth: Those objects which come under the consideration of a mathematician are good according to the \textit{to-be} that they have in things. For the \textit{to-be} of a line or of a number is good; but these are considered by the mathematician not according to their \textit{to-be} but only according to their specific nature, for he considers them in a state of abstraction. For they are not abstract according to their \textit{to-be} but only according to reason. It was said above, in the preceding article, that good does not follow upon the specific nature except according to the \textit{to-be} it has in some thing; and likewise the nature of good does not attach to a line or a number according as these fall under mathematical consideration, although a line and a number are good.

To the fifth: Being is not said to be prior to good in that way of speaking which the objection touches, but in another way; as the absolute to the relative.

To the sixth: Any thing is said to be good from its own \textit{to-be}, and from its own qualities, or from a superadded mode of being;
just as any one is called a good man in as much as he is just and
caste, or as he is ordered to beatitude. Therefore, by reason of
the first goodness, being is converted with good, and vice versa; but
by reason of the second, good divides being.

To the seventh: Privation is not termed a real being, but
rather, only a being of the mind, and so it is a good of the mind. For
to know privation and any such thing, is good; and the knowledge of
evil, according to Boethius (loc. cit.), can not be lacking in good.

To the eighth: According to Boethius, any thing is said
to be good from its own to-be; but any one is called just, by reason
of some of his action. Now to-be is diffused into all things which pro-
ceed from God; not all, however, participate in that action to which
justice is ordered. For although in God to act is the same as to be,
and therefore His justice is His goodness, nevertheless in creatures
to act is one thing and to be is another. Hence, to-be can be com-
municated to something to which to act is not communicated; and in those
things to which both are communicated, to act is not the same as to be.
Thus, men who are good and just are indeed good in as much as they are;
but they are not just in as much as they are, but rather, in that they
have a certain habit ordered to acting; and the same can be said of
wisdom and others of this kind. It must be said concerning the same
point, that just, and wise, and others such, are special goods, since
they are special perfections; but good designates something perfect
absolutely. Therefore, from the perfect God Himself, proceed things that are perfect, not by the same mode of perfection by which God is perfect, since what is made is not according to the mode of the agent but according to the mode of that which is made; nor do all things which receive perfection from God receive it in the same measure. Likewise, as it is common to God and to all creatures to be perfect absolutely, but not to be perfect in this or that way; so it belongs to God to be good, and to all creatures; but it need not be common to all to have the particular goodness which is wisdom or which is justice. Certain perfections belong to God alone, as eternity and omnipotence; and certain perfections belong to some creatures and to God, as wisdom and justice and others like these.

Article III

Whether the good is prior in nature
to the true
(I, q. 14, a. 4)

1. In the third place it is asked whether the good is prior in nature to the true; and it seems that it is. For that which is in things is prior to that which is in apprehension only, in that our apprehension is caused and measured by things. But according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics, Book VI, the good is in things, but the true is in the mind. Therefore, the good is prior in nature to the true.
2. Moreover, anything that is perfect in itself according to its nature, is prior to that which is perfective of another. But a thing is called good in so far as it is perfect in itself; true, however, in so far as it is perfective of another. Therefore, the good is prior to the true.

3. Moreover, the good is named by reference to the final cause; the true, in reference to the formal cause. But the final cause is prior to the formal cause, since the end is the cause of causes. Therefore, the good, according to its nature, is prior to the true.

4. Moreover, a particular good is posterior to a universal good. But the true is a certain particular good, for it is the good of the intellect, as the Philosopher says in Ethics, Book VI. Therefore, the good is naturally prior to the true according to its nature.

5. Moreover, the good has the nature of end. But the end is prior in intention. Therefore, the intention of the good is prior to the intention of the true.

1. On the contrary, the good is perfective of appetite; the true, of intellect. But the intellect naturally precedes the appetite; therefore, so does the true, the good.

2. Besides, the more a thing is immaterial, so much the more is it prior. But the true is more immaterial than the good, since
the good is in the real order, but the true only in the immaterial mind. Therefore, the true is naturally prior to the good.

I answer that both the true and the good, as has been said (in the sed contra), have the nature of perfective, or of perfection. Now the order among some perfections can be taken in a twofold way: in one way, on the part of the perfections themselves; in the other way, on the part of the perfectibles.

If, then, the true and the good are to be considered as they are in themselves, in this way the true is prior to the good according to its nature, since it is perfective of something else by reason of its specific nature; the good, however, not only according to the specific nature but also by reason of the to-be which it has in reality. And so the nature of the good includes more than the nature of the true and is, in a certain way, constituted by an addition to it. Thus, "good" presupposes "true," but "true" presupposes "one," since the nature of the true is perfected by the apprehension of the intellect; but anything is intelligible in so far as it is one, for he who does not understand "one", understands nothing, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics, Book IV. Hence, the following is the order of the transcendental names if they are considered as they are in themselves: after "being" comes "one", then "true", then after "true","good".

If, however, the order between the true and the good is taken from the perfectibles, then the good is naturally prior to the true for
two reasons.

The first reason is: the perfection of good extends to more things than does the perfection of true; for things are not perfected by the true, except such as can perceive some being within themselves according to their own nature and not according to that mode of existence which the entity has in itself. Those only are of this kind that receive something immaterially and are cognoscitive; for the specific form of a stone is in the mind, but not according to the to-be which it has in the stone. But those things that receive something according to its material to-be are perfected by the good, since the nature of good consists in this, that something is perfective both according to its specific form and according to its to-be, as has previously been said. And so, all things desire the good, but not all things know the true. In both is manifest the relation of the perfectible to perfection which is the good and the true, namely, in the desire of the good, and in the knowledge of the true.

The second reason is, that those things which are perfected by the good and the true are perfected by the good previous to the true, for from the fact that they participate in to-be, they are perfected by the good, as has been said; but from the fact that they know something, they are perfected by the true. But cognition is posterior to to-be; hence, also in this consideration from the point of view of the perfectibles, the good precedes the true.
In reply to the objections, then, it should be said:

To the first: That argument proceeds from the order of the true and the good on the part of the perfectibles, but not on the part of the true itself and the good; for the mind alone is perfectible by the true, but every thing is perfectible by the good.

To the second: The good has the nature not only of perfect but also of perfective, as was said in the body of the article; and so the reasoning does not follow.

To the third: The end is prior to any of the other causes in causing; but the caused is perfected by its own cause. Hence, this argument proceeds according to the order of the perfectible to perfection, and in this order the good is prior. But if we consider absolutely form and end, then, although form itself is the end, the form considered in itself is prior to form considered as the end of another. But the nature of the true arises from that very form in as much as it is understood just as it is.

To the fourth: The true is said to be a certain particular good in as much as it has to-be in some special perfectible, and thus also the objection pertains to the order of the perfectible to perfection.

To the fifth: The end is said to be prior in intention to those things which are for the end, but not with respect to the other
causes, except in so far as these are for the end; and thus this objection is solved like the third. And yet it ought to be known, that when it is said that the end is prior in intention, intention is taken for the act of the mind which is to tend to. When, however, we compare the intention of good and true, intention is taken for the meaning which definition signifies; hence both are taken equivocally.

With regard to the first point that is made to the contrary, it must be said that anything is perfected by the good not only through the medium of appetite, but also in so far as it has to-be; hence, although intellect is prior to appetite, it does not follow that anything is perfected by the true previous to its perfection by the good.

With regard to the second point, this argument proceeds from the true and the good according as they are considered in themselves; hence it is granted.

Article IV

Whether all things are good by the first goodness
(I, q. 6, a. 4)

1. In the fourth place it must be asked whether all things are good by the first goodness; and it seems that they are. Because according to Boethius in the De Hebdomadibus (about the middle), if we understand, per impossibile, that God is, having intellectually
abstracted from His goodness, it follows that all other things are beings, but not good. But goodness being understood in God, it follows that all other things are good, just as they are beings. Therefore, all things are called good by the first goodness.

2. But it must be said that this happens, that without goodness being understood in God there is no goodness in the creature, because the goodness of the creature is caused by the goodness of God, and not because the thing is denominated good by the goodness of God formally. But on the contrary, whenever anything is denominated in any way solely from its relation to another, it is denominated such not by reason of anything inhering in it formally, but by reason of that which is outside itself, to which it is referred; as urine is called healthy from the fact that it signifies the health of the animal; it is not called healthy from any health inhering in it, but rather from the health of the animal, which it signifies. But the creature is said to be good by reason of its relation to the first goodness, since according to this anything at all is called good, namely, that it is derived from the First Good, as Boethius says in the De Hebdomadibus (loc. cit.). Therefore, the creature is denominated good not from any formal goodness existing in it, but from the divine goodness itself.

3. Moreover, Augustine says in the De Trinitate, Book VIII, (Chapter III, a little after the beginning): This is good and that is good; take away this and that and see the good itself if you can;
thus you will see God, not the good by another good, but the good of every good. But all things are called good by that which is the good of every good. Therefore, by the divine goodness, of which he is speaking, all things are called good.

4. Moreover, since every creature is good, it is good either by some goodness inhering in itself or by the first goodness alone. Suppose it be by some goodness inhering in itself. Since that goodness would be a certain creature, it too will be good; therefore, either by its own goodness or by another. If by its own goodness, then it will be the first goodness, for this is the nature of the First Good, as is clear from the authority of Augustine, that in and by itself, it is good. Thus the proposition will hold, that the creature is good by the first goodness. But if that goodness is good by another goodness, the same question remains concerning this. Therefore, we shall either have to proceed indefinitely, and this is impossible, or come to some goodness denominating the created, which is of itself, good; and this is the first goodness. Therefore, it must be that by all ways, the creature is good by the first goodness.

5. Moreover, according to Avicenna, everything true is true by the first truth. But just as the first truth is related to true things, so the first goodness is related to good things. Therefore, all things are good by the first goodness.

6. Moreover, what is not possible in the less is not possible
in the greater. But it is less to be than to be good. Now a creature has no power to be, since every to-be is from God. Therefore neither has it power to be good. Therefore, the goodness by which anything is said to be good is not a created goodness.

7. Moreover, according to Hilarion (De Trinitate, Book III, not far from the beginning) to-be is proper to God. But that is proper which belongs to one alone. Therefore, no other thing is, except God Himself. But all things are good in so far as they have to-be. Therefore, all things are good by the divine to-be itself, which is its goodness.

8. Moreover, first goodness adds nothing to goodness, otherwise the first goodness would be composite. But it is true that all things are good by goodness. Therefore, it is true that all things are good by the first goodness.

9. But it must be said that first goodness adds absolute goodness, according to reason and not according to reality. - But on the contrary: the notion to which nothing in the thing corresponds is hollow and vain. But such is not the notion by which we understand the prime goodness. Therefore, if it adds anything according to reason, it adds according to reality; but this is impossible, and so neither does it add according to reason. Thus, all things are said to be good by the first goodness as also by the absolute goodness.
On the contrary: all things are good in as much as they are beings, since according to Augustine, in as much as we are, we are good. But all things are called beings formally not by reason of the prime essence, but by reason of a created essence. Therefore things are not good formally by the first goodness either, but rather by created goodness.

Moreover, the commutable is not informed by the incommutable, since they are opposites. But every creature is commutable; the prime goodness is incommutable. Therefore, the creature is not called good formally by the first goodness.

Moreover, every form is proportionate to its perfectible. But the first goodness, since it is infinite, can not be proportionate to the creature, since it is finite. Therefore, the creature is not called good formally by the first goodness.

Moreover, according to Augustine, De Trinitate, Book VIII, Chapter III, all created things are good by participation of the Good. But a participation of the Good is not the first goodness itself, since this latter is total and perfect goodness. Therefore, not all things are good formally by the first goodness.

Moreover, the creature is said to bear the vestige of the Trinity, according as it is one, true, and good, and so good pertains to vestige. But the vestige and its parts are something created. There-
fore, the creature is good by a created goodness.

Moreover, the first goodness is the most simple. Therefore, it is neither composite in itself nor componible with another; and so it cannot be the form of anything, since the form enters into composition with that of which it is the form. But the goodness by which things are said to be good is a certain form, since every to-be is form. Therefore, creatures are not good formally by the first goodness.

I answer that it must be said that concerning this question some have held different positions.

For a few, led by light arguments, have maintained that God is of the substance of any thing whatever. Some of these men claimed that God is the same as prime matter, as did David of Dinant. Some even claimed that He is the form of any thing at all. The falsity of this error appears at once. For all who say this of God, understand that He is productive of all principles since it must be that all beings flow from one first being. But the efficient cause, according to the teaching of the Philosopher in *Physics*, Book II, (text 10), does not coincide in one and the same thing with the material cause, since they have contrary natures. For any thing is an agent according as it is in act, but the nature of matter is to be in potency. In truth, the agent and the form of the effect are specifically the same, in as much as every agent acts like itself; but they are not the same numerically,
since the maker can not be the same as the thing made. From this it is clear, that the divine essence is neither the matter of any thing at all nor the form, so that by it a creature could be called formally good as by a conjoined form. Any thing is, however, a certain likeness to it; and so the Platonists said that all things are good formally by the first goodness not as by a form conjoined, but by a separated form.

In order to understand this we must know that Plato (according to Aristotle, Metaphysics I, text 6) claimed that those things which can be separated by the intellect were also separated in reality; and so just as man can be understood apart from Socrates and Plato, so he claimed that man exists apart from Socrates and Plato, which he called \textit{per se} man, and the idea of man, by a participation of which Socrates and Plato were called man. Now just as he found that man is common to Socrates and Plato and to other men, so he found that good is common to all good things, and that good could be understood without understanding this or that good. Hence he claimed that it exists separate from all particular goods; and this he claimed \textit{per se} good, or the idea by a participation of which, all things are called good, as is made clear by the Philosopher in \textit{Ethics}, Book I. There was, however, this difference between the idea of man and the idea of good; that the idea of man does not extend to all things, whereas the idea of good extends to all. For the very idea of good is something good,
and so it had to be said that this _per se_ good was the universal principle of all things, which is God. Hence it follows according to this opinion, that things are denominated good by the first goodness itself which is God, just as Socrates and Plato (are men); but according to Plato they are called men by their participation of a separated man, not by the humanity inherent in them. The Porretani, too, followed this opinion in some way; for they said that we predicate good absolutely of the creature as when we say: man is good; and good by something added, as when we say: Socrates is a good man. Therefore, they held that a creature is called good absolutely not by any inherent goodness, but by the first goodness as if goodness absolutely and universally were the divine goodness; but when we say that a creature is a good this or that, it is so denominated by created goodness, since particular created goods are like the particular ideas according to Plato. But this opinion was rejected by the Philosopher for many reasons. For one, from the fact that the quiddities and forms of things are in the particular things themselves and are not separated from them, as is proved in many ways in _Metaphysics_, Book VII, (text 46). Also, because of the supposition of ideas, especially because this reason has no place in the case of good, since good is not predicated univocally of good things, and in such cases just one idea is not ascribed according to Plato; and the Philosopher proceeds against him in this way in _Ethics_ I, Chapter VI. But especially, as to what was proposed, the falsity of the aforesaid position appears from this fact,
that every agent acts like to itself; hence if the first goodness is productive of all goods, it must be that it impresses its likeness in the things produced; and thus each thing is said to be good as by an inherent form by reason of a likeness to the Highest Good sealed in it; and besides, by reason of the first goodness as by the exemplar and producer of every created good. In this respect the opinion of Plato can be sustained.

We say, therefore, that according to common opinion all things are good formally by a created goodness as by an inherent form, but by an uncreated goodness as by an exemplary form.

In reply to the objections, then, it should be said:

To the first: As was previously touched upon, inasmuch as creatures would not be good unless goodness were understood to be in God, since the goodness of the creature is drawn from the divine goodness, it does not follow that the creature is called good by an uncreated goodness, except as by an exemplary form.

To the second: Anything is denominated with respect to another in two ways. In one way, when that relation is the reason for the denomination, as urine is called healthy with reference to the health of the animal; for the notion of health according as it is predicated of urine, is: to be the sign of health in the animal. In
such cases, that which is denominated with reference to another, is not denominated from some form inhering in the thing, but rather from something extrinsic to which it is referred. In the other way, anything is denominated with reference to another when not the relation but the cause is the reason for the denomination; as, if the air is said to be light from the sun, this is not because the air’s being referred to the sun is the shining of the air, but because the direct opposition of the air to the sun is the cause that it is light. It is in this way that the creature is called good in relation to the good; hence the reasoning does not follow.

To the third: Augustine follows the opinion of Plato in many things in so far as this can be done in accordance with the truth of faith; and so his words are to be understood thus, that the divine goodness is said to be the good of every good in as much as it is the first efficient and exemplary cause of every good, without excluding the created good by which creatures are denominated good as by an inherent form.

To the fourth objection: The case is not the same for general and for particular forms. In the case of particular forms, to predicate the concrete of the abstract is not allowed as, for instance, to say whiteness is white, or heat is warm, as is made clear by Dionysius in II De divinis nominibus. But in general forms, predication of this
kind is allowed, for we say that essence is being; goodness is good; unity, one; and so on. The reason for this is that being is that which first falls under the apprehension of the intellect; hence it must be that the intellect attributes being to whatever is apprehended by it. Thus, since it apprehends the essence of any being, it says that that essence is being; and the same is true for any general or particular form, so that goodness is being, whiteness is being, and so on. Since there are certain things which communicate inseparably in the nature of being, such as one, good, and the like, it must be that these are predicated by the same reason as being, of anything at all that is apprehended. Hence we say that essence is one and good; similarly, unity is one and good; and the same holds for goodness and whiteness and any universal or particular form. But white, since it is particular, does not communicate inseparably in the nature of being; hence the form of whiteness can be apprehended without attributing to it the being white; we do not think of saying: whiteness is white. For white is predicated in one way; but being, and one, and good, and the like, which are necessarily predicated of anything at all that is apprehended, are predicated multifariously. For anything is denominated being because it subsists in itself; or, because it is the principle of subsisting, as form; or, because it is a disposition of the thing as quality; or, because it is the function of a disposition of the thing subsisting, subsisting, as blindness. And so when we say; essence is being, if we were to proceed thus: therefore it is being through something, either by itself or by another, the process of reasoning would not follow,
since it was not said to be being in this way, as something subsisting in its to-be is being, but as that by which something is. Hence we do not need to ask how essence itself is, by something else, but rather how something else is by essence. Similarly, when goodness is said to be good, "good" is not said as if subsisting in goodness, but in that way by which we call good that by which something is good. And so it is not necessary to ask whether goodness is good by its own goodness, or by another; but whether by goodness itself something is good which is other than goodness itself, as in creatures; or which is the same as goodness itself, as in God.

To the fifth: The same distinction must be made concerning truth; namely, that all things are true by the first truth as by the first exemplar, although they are nevertheless true by a created truth as by an inherent form. Yet, there is a different reason for truth and for goodness. For the nature of truth consists in a certain adequation or commensuration; but anything is denominated measured or commasured by something extrinsic, as a piece of cloth by an ell; and in this way Avicenna understands all things to be true by the first truth, in as much namely, as anything is measured by the divine intellect filling it to the measure that divine providence has ordained or prescribed for it. The nature of good, however, does not consist in commensuration; hence it is not the same.

To the sixth: A creature has no power to be in such a way
that it has its to-be of itself; yet something can have power to be in such a way that it is the formal principle of being, for thus any form has power to be; and in this way created goodness can be in the good as a formal principle.

To the seventh: When it is said that to be is proper to God, it is not to be understood that there is no other to-be except the uncreated, but that that to-be alone is properly said to be, in as much as by reason of its immutability it has not known "to have been" nor "about to be." But the to-be of the creature is said to be by a certain similitude with the first to-be since it has an admixture of coming to be or of having been, by reason of the mutability of the creature. Or, it can be said that to-be is proper to God since God alone is His to-be; although other things have to-be, that to-be is not divine.

To the eighth: First goodness adds nothing in reality over and above absolute goodness, but it adds something according to reason.

To the ninth: As the Commentator says in the book, De Causis, the first goodness is individuated and divided from all others by the fact that it does not receive any addition. It is not of the nature of goodness absolutely, however, either to receive or not to receive addition; then every goodness would receive addition and there would be no pure goodness. Likewise, if it were of its nature not to
receive addition, no goodness would receive any, and every goodness would be pure goodness; just as neither rational nor non-rational is of the nature of animal. And so this fact, that it cannot receive any addition, communicates absolute goodness and distinguishes first goodness, which is pure goodness, from other goodness. Now this fact of not receiving addition, since it is a negation, is a mental being, and yet it is founded on the simplicity of the first goodness. Hence, it does not follow that the reason is hollow and vain.

Article V

Whether the created good is good by its own essence
(I, q. 6, a. 3)

1. In the fifth place it is asked whether the created good is good by its own essence; and it seems that it is. For that without which a thing cannot be, seems to be essential to it. But a creature cannot be without goodness since nothing can be created by God which is not good. Therefore, the creature is good by its essence.

2. Moreover, a creature has its to-be and its good from the same principle, since from the fact that it has to-be, it is good, as was shown in article two. But a creature has to-be through its essence; therefore, it is good by its own essence.

3. Moreover, whatever belongs to a thing in as much as it
is such or such, is essential to it. But good belongs to the creature in as much as it is, since, as Augustine says (De doctrina christiana, Book I, Chapter XXXII), in as much as we are, we are good. Therefore, a creature is good by its essence.

4. Moreover, since goodness is a certain created form inher­ning in creatures, as was shown, it will be either a substantial or an accidental form. If accidental, sometimes a creature could be without it; and this cannot be said of the creature. Therefore, it remains that it is a substantial form. But every such form is either the es­sence of a thing, or part of the essence. Therefore, a creature is good by its essence.

5. Moreover, according to Boethius in the De Hebdomadibus (about the middle) creatures are good in as much as they are derived from the First Good. But they are derived from the First Good by their essence. Therefore, they are good by their essence.

6. Moreover, the denoting is always more simple than the denominated, or equally simple. But no form added to the essence is more simple than the essence itself, nor equally simple. Therefore, no form superadded to the essence denominates the essence itself; for we can not say that an essence is white. But the essence of a thing is denominated by goodness, for any essence at all is good. Therefore, goodness is not a form superadded to the essence, and so any creature
is good by its essence.

7. Moreover, just as one is converted with being, so is good. But the unity by which a thing is said to be one and which is convertible with being, is not some form superadded to the essence of the thing, as the Commentator says in *Metaphysics* IV (X, comm. 5); but any thing is one by its essence. Therefore, any being is good by its essence.

8. Moreover, if the creature is good by some goodness superadded to its essence; then since every thing that is, is good, that goodness, since it something, will be good; not, however, by another goodness but by its essence, since otherwise there would be indefinite regression. Therefore, by the same reasoning it could be that the creature itself would be good by its essence.

On the contrary, nothing which is predicated of a thing by participation belongs to it by its essence. But a creature is called good by participation, as is made clear by Augustine, *De Trinitate*, VIII, Chapter III. Therefore, a creature is not good by its essence.

Moreover, every thing that is good by its essence is a substantial good. But creatures are not substantial goods, as is made clear by Boethius in the book, *De Hebdomadibus*. Therefore, creatures are not good by essence.

Moreover, the opposite of that which is predicated essential-
ly of anything, cannot be predicated of it. But the opposite of good, namely evil, is predicated of some creatures. Therefore, the creature is not good by its essence.

I answer that according to three authors it must be said that creatures are not good by essence, but rather by participation; namely, Augustine (De Trinitate, VIII, Chapter II), Boethius (De Nobdomadibus), and the author of the book, De Causis (propositions 20 and 22), who says that God alone is pure goodness. Yet, they are moved to the same position by diverse reasonings.

To make this clear, we must know that just as being is multiplied by the substantial and the accidental, as is clear from what has been said, so also is the good; yet, there is a difference between them. Anything is said to be absolutely on account of its substantial to-be, but not so on account of its accidental to-be; hence since generation is motion toward to-be, when any thing receives substantial to-be, it is said to be generated absolutely, but when it receives accidental to-be, it is said to be generated relatively; and the same is true of corruption by which to-be is lost. But the reverse is true of the good. For according to its substantial goodness a thing is said to be good relatively, but is called good absolutely according to its accidental goodness. Hence, we do not call an unjust man absolutely good, but only relatively good, in as much as he is a man; but a just man we call absolutely good. The reason for this difference this is that any thing
is said to be a being in as much as it is considered absolutely, but
to be good, as is clear from what was said in article 1, ad 6, accord­
ing to a relation to others. In itself a thing is perfected so that
it may subsist by essential principles; but in order that it may be
in due measure to all things that are outside itself, it is not per­
fected except by the medium of accidents superadded to the essence;
because operations by which one thing is joined to another proceed
from the essence by the medium of virtues superadded to the essence.
Hence, it does not attain goodness absolutely, except as it is complete
according to both substantial and accidental principles. Whatever
perfection a creature has from its essential and accidental principles
conjoined, God has as a whole by reason of His one simple to-be; for
His simple essence is His wisdom, and His justice, and His fortitude,
and all such perfections which in us are superadded to essence. Thus,
absolute goodness itself in God is the same as His essence; but in us
it is considered according to those perfections which are superadded
to essence. For this reason complete or absolute goodness in us is
increased and diminished and totally lost, but not so in God; although
substantial goodness always remains in us. In this way Augustine seems
to say (De Trinitate VIII, Chapter III) that God is good by essence,
but we by participation.

Between the goodness of God and our goodness, there is an­
other difference. For essential goodness is not understood according
to an absolute consideration of a nature, but according to the to-be
of this individual; for humanity does not have the nature of good or
of goodness except in as much as it has to-be. Now the divine nature
or essence is its to-be; but the nature or essence of any created
thing is not its own to-be; it participates to-be from another. Thus
in God there is pure to-be since God Himself is His subsisting to-be;
but in a creature to-be is received or participated. For this reason
I say that if absolute goodness were predicated of a created thing ac­
cording to its substantial to-be, it would none the less still remain
true that it has its goodness by participation just as it has a par­
ticipated to-be. God, however, is goodness by essence in as much as
His essence is His to-be. And this seems to be the meaning of the
Philosopher in the book De Causis (loc. cit.), who says that only the
divine goodness is pure goodness.

There is still another difference between the divine goodness
and that of the creature, for goodness has the nature of final cause.
Now God has the nature of final cause since He is the ultimate end of
all things, just as He is the first principle; from this it must be
that every other end does not have the relation or nature of end except
according to its order to the first cause; for the secondary cause does
not flow into its own caused unless the influx of the First Cause be
presupposed, as is clear in the book De Causis (proposition 1). There­
fore, the good which has the nature of end cannot be predicated of the
creature, unless there be presupposed an order from the Creator to
the creature.

Therefore, granted that a creature were its own to-be just
as God is; even yet, the existence of the creature would still not
have the nature of good, without presupposing an order to the Creator;
and thus, it still would be called good by participation and not
absolutely in that it is. The divine to-be, however, which has the
nature of good without anything being presupposed, has of itself the
nature of good. And this seems to be the meaning of Boethius in the
De Hebdomadibus (loc. cit.).

In reply to the objections, then, it should be said:

To the first: It is not possible for a creature not to be
good with an essential goodness which is goodness relative, yet it is
possible for it not to be good with accidental goodness which is good-
ness absolutely. Moreover, that goodness which is understood accord-
ing to substantial to-be is not the essence itself of the thing, but
a participated to-be, and in this there is presupposed an order to
the first to-be, self-subsisting.

To the second: From that principle by which a thing has
to-be, it is relatively good, namely, according to its substantial to-
be; but it does not formally have from this, to-be absolutely and to-
be good absolutely, as is plain from what has been said. Therefore,
the reasoning does not follow.

The same reply may be made to the third and the fourth objections.

To the fifth: A creature is from God not only according to its essence, but also according to its to-be in which the nature of substantial goodness especially consists; and also according to superadded perfections in which consists absolute goodness; and these are not the essence of the thing. Moreover, that relation by which the essence of a thing is referred to God as to its principle, is other than its essence.

To the sixth: In this way essence is denominated good just as it is being. Hence, just as it has its to-be by participation, so it is good by participation, for to-be and good are commonly taken to be more simple than essence, because more common. For they are predicated not only of essence but also of that which subsists through essence and also of accidents.

To the seventh: The "one" which is converted with being is named from the nature of negation which adds to being; but good does not add negation to being. Its nature consists in something positive. So it is not a similar case.

To the eighth: The goodness of a thing is called good in the way in which the essence of a thing is called good and as the to-be
of a thing is called being; not because its to-be is any other to-be, but because by this to-be a thing is said to be, and because by this goodness a thing is said to be good. Hence, just as it does not follow that the substance itself of a thing is denominated by reason of its to-be something which it itself is not, since its to-be is not called being by any to-be other than itself, so the aforesaid reasoning does not follow as regards goodness. It does, however, follow for unity, concerning which the Commentator introduces it in Metaphysics IV: because "one" is indifferent as to whether it looks to essence or to to-be; hence the essence of a thing is one of itself and not on account of its to-be, and so it is not one by any participation, as happens with being and good.

Article VI

Whether the good of the creature is in mode, species and order (I, q. 5, a. 5)

1. In the sixth place it is asked whether the good of the creature is in mode or measure, species, and order, as Augustine says (De Natura Boni, Chapter III); and it seems that it is not. For good has the nature of end, according to the Philosopher. But the whole nature of end consists in order; therefore, the whole nature of good, and so the other two are superfluous.

2. Moreover, being, good, and one differ in meaning. The
notion of being consists in species; of one, in measure. Therefore, the notion of good does not consist in species and measure.

3. Moreover, species names the formal cause. But in this the true and the good are distinguished, according to some, since the true bespeaks the nature of formal cause, but the good the nature of final cause. Therefore, species does not pertain to the nature of good.

4. Moreover, since evil and good are contraries they are in the same genus. But Augustine says in LXXXIII Questionum (Quaestio 6), evil is found in the privation of species. But the whole nature of good consists in the positing of species, and so mode and order seem to be superfluous.

5. Moreover, mode is consequent upon a thing. But a certain goodness pertains to the essence of the thing. Therefore, mode is not of the nature of good.

6. Moreover, what God can do through one thing, He does not do through many. But God could make a creature with one of these, since any one of them has a certain nature of goodness. Therefore, it is not necessary that each of the three be required for the nature of good.

7. Moreover, if these three are of the nature of goodness,
then in any good at all these three ought to be. But each of the
three is good. Therefore, in each one of them there are these three;
and so one ought not to be divided against another.

8. Moreover, if these three are good, it must be that they
have mode, species, and order. Then there will be mode of mode, and
species of species, and so on indefinitely.

9. Moreover, measure, species, and order are diminished by
sin according to Augustine (De Natura Boni, Chapter XXVI and XXVII).
But the goodness of a thing is not diminished by sin. Therefore the
nature of good does not universally consist in the three mentioned.

10. Moreover, that which is of the nature of good does not
receive the predication of evil. But these three receive the pre­
dication of evil, according to Augustine in the book De Natura Boni
(Chapter III et seq.) : for an evil measure is spoken of, an evil
species, and so on. Therefore, the nature of good does not consist
in these three.

11. Moreover, Ambrose says in Hexameron (Chapter IX, about
the middle), that the nature of light is not in number, weight and
measure, like other creatures. But of these three, the three aforesaid
are constituted as Augustine says (De Natura Boni, Chapter III). There­
fore, since light is good, the nature of good does not include the three
aforesaid.
12. Moreover, according to Bernard (De Diligendo Deo, in the beginning) the measure of charity is to be without measure; yet charity is good. Therefore, the three mentioned are not required.

On the contrary, is what Augustine says in the book, De Natura Boni (Chapter III, about the middle), that where these three are great, there is great good; where slight, the good is slight; where they are not at all, there is no good. Therefore, the nature of good consists in these three.

Moreover, Augustine in the same book (Chapter III, a little after the beginning) says that for this reason certain things are called good, that they are measured, ordered, and specified.

Moreover, a creature is called good according to its relation to God, as Boethius maintains in the book, De Hebdomadibus. But God stands in the relation of three-fold cause to the creature: efficient, final and formal exemplary. Therefore, a creature is said to be good according to its relation to God in the nature of a three-fold cause. According as it is compared to God as to the efficient cause, it has the mode fixed for it by God; compared to Him as to the exemplary cause, it has species; compared to Him as to the end, it has order. Therefore, the good of the creature consists in mode, species, and order.

Moreover, all creatures are ordered to God by the medium of
the rational creature which alone is capable of beatitude, for this is, in as much as it is known by the rational creature. Therefore, since a creature is good from the fact that it is ordered to God, these three are required for it to be good, namely, that it be existing, that it be knowable, and that it be ordered. It is existing by some mode; knowable by species; ordered by order. Therefore, the good of the creature consists in these three.

Moreover, it is said in the book of Wisdom 11:21, Thou hast made all things in number, weight and measure. According to Augustine in Book III, Super Genesim ad Litteram (IV, Chapter III, about the middle), measure fixes the mode of a thing, number brings about the species, weight gives the order. Therefore, in these three, mode, species and order, the goodness of the creature consists, since the creature is good according as it is disposed by God.

I answer that the nature of good consists in the three mentioned, as Augustine says (De Natura Boni, Chapter III).

In evidence of this it should be known that any name may express a relation in two ways. In one way, when the name is imposed for signifying that relation itself, as the name father, or son, or paternity. Certain names, on the other hand, are said to express relation because they signify a thing in some genus, which relation accompanies, although the name is not imposed for signifying that
relation itself, as for instance, science is imposed for signifying a certain quality which a certain relation follows, but not for signifying the relation itself. It is in this way that the notion of good implies relation, not because the very name of good signifies the relation alone, but because it signifies that which relation follows, together with the relation itself. The relation which is implied by the name of good is the relation of perfective, according to which something is constituted so as to be perfective not only according to its specific nature, but also according to the to-be which it has in things; for in this way the end perfects those things which are ordered to the end. Since creatures are not their own to-be, it must be that they have a received to-be; and for this reason their to-be is finite and terminated by the measure of that in which it is received.

Thus, of these three which Augustine posits (ibid., Chapter III) the last, namely order, is the relation which the name of good implies; the other two, species and mode, cause that relation. For species belongs to the specific nature itself, and this nature, in that it has to-be in anything, is received according to a certain determined mode or measure, since every thing that is in a thing, is in it according to the mode of the recipient. Thus, then, each and every good, in as much as it is perfective by virtue of both its specific nature and its to-be, has mode, species and order; species, as to its very nature; mode, as to its to-be; order, as to its relation of perfective.
In reply to the objections, then, it should be said:

To the first: That reason would go well, if the name of good were imposed for signifying the relation itself, but that it is false, is clear from what has been said in the body of the article. Therefore, the reasoning does not follow.

To the second: Good does not differ in nature from being and one as if they had opposite meanings, but in that the nature of good includes the nature of being and of one and adds something besides.

To the third: According to the Philosopher in Metaphysics VIII (text 10), just as in numbers, any unity either added or taken away changes the species of number, so in definitions any thing added or taken away makes a different species. Thus from the species alone, the nature of the true is constituted, in that the true is perfective according to the specific nature only, as is clear from what has been said in article three of this question; but the nature of good is constituted from both the specific nature and number, and it is perfective not only according to specific nature, but also according to its to-be.

To the fourth: When Augustine says (LXXXIII Quaestiones, Q. 6), that all evil is found in privation of species, he does not exclude the other two; because, as he himself says in the same book, where there is a species, there is necessarily some measure. Order also follows upon species and measure or mode; but he mentions species
only, because the other two follow upon species.

To the fifth: Whenever anything is received, there must be mode or measure, since the received is limited according to the recipient; therefore, since both the essential and the accidental to-be of a creature are received, so mode or measure is found not only in accidental realities but also in substantial.

To the sixth: Since the nature of good is constituted by these three, God could not bring it to pass that any thing would be good without having mode, species, and order; just as He could not make anything be a man, which was not a rational animal.

To the seventh: Each of these three—mode, species and order—is good, not in that way in which that which subsists in goodness is good, but by which a principle of goodness is good. Hence, it is not necessary that each of them have mode, species and order, just as it need not be that form have form, although it is being, and every being is by reason of its form. And this is what some say: that when it is said that all things have mode, species, and order, this is understood of created things, not of concreated.

The solution to the eighth objection is made clear through the seventh.

To the ninth: Some say that measure, species, and order,
according as they constitute the good of nature, and according as they are diminished by sin, in that they pertain to the moral good, are both the same in reality but differ by a mental distinction; as is manifest in the will which can be considered one and the same in as much as it is a certain nature - and thus there are in it measure, species, and order constituting the good of nature; and in as much as it is the will according as it has an order to grace - and thus there are attributed to it measure, species, and order, which can be diminished by sin, and which constitute the moral good. Or, it can be said that since it follows upon to-be, the good also is constituted by species, measure, and order: and just as substantial to-be is not the same as accidental, so it is certain that substantial form is not the same as accidental; and each has its proper measure and proper order.

To the tenth: According to Augustine in the book, De Natura Boni, (Chapter XXXIII, in the beginning), measure, species, and order are not called evil because they are evil in themselves, but because they are less than they ought to be, or are not fitted to those things to which they are applied. Thus, by reason of some privation with respect to measure, species, and order, things are called evil, and not because of these themselves.

To the eleventh: The word of Ambrose is not to be understood as meaning that light entirely lacks measure since it has a limited specific nature and virtue; but because it is not limited by a
relation to just some corporeal things, in that it extends to all
corporeal things, for all are such as to be illumined or to receive
other effects through the light, as is clear in the work of Dionysius
De Divinis Nominibus, Chapter IV.

To the twelfth: Charity has measure according to the to-be
that it has in a subject, and thus is a certain creature; but as com­
pared to an infinite object which is God, there is no measure beyond
which our charity ought not to pass.
Whether it is proper to God
To be good by essence

John of Saint Thomas

Cursus Theologicus
Tome 1

Disputation 6
Article 3
WHETHER IT IS PROPER TO GOD

TO BE GOOD BY ESSENCE

1. Saint Thomas\(^1\) affirms that it is proper to God to be good by essence, and in general his disciples follow him in this: Cajetan, Banez, Gonzalez\(^2\), Navarrete\(^3\), Biescas (on the same text). Father Vasquez\(^4\), Molina\(^5\), Valentia\(^6\) and others whose position we shall give later, deny that it is. For they think either that existence is not distinguished from essence in created things, so that these are good by reason of their existence; or that their essence has in itself sufficient actuality by which it is good, namely, the very to-be of the essence.

2. We presuppose that "to be such by essence" is said in two ways. In one way, so that by essence is opposed to that which is by participation. In the second way, so that it is opposed to that which is such accidentally: and thus, to be such by essence is the same as to be such essentially. In the first way, to be by essence - that

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1. I, q. 6, a. 3.
3. Controv. 22.
4. I, disp. 24, ch. 2, 3.
5. Disp. 2, q. 6, a. 3.
6. Disp. 1, q. 6, n. 2.
is, not by participation - eliminates an efficient cause and is the same as to be such of itself and not by participation of another cause. In the second way, the by expresses a formal cause, namely, to be such by essential form and not by accidental form.

3. The position, therefore, of Saint Thomas consists in the three things that have been said. The first is, that in creatures there is good only by participation; and in God, not by participation but of itself. Such is the mind of the Holy Doctor¹. - The second is, that if we take by essence for that which is essentially such or such and not accidentally, in this sense also only God is good essentially. This is taken from the same article² where he says that "according to Augustine, Boethius and the Author of the book De Causis, it must be said that God alone is good essentially; creatures are good by participation"; and he immediately shows that complete and absolute goodness in creatures depends on accidents. - The third is, that as to goodness relatively and not absolutely, even creatures are perfect and good substantially in as much as they have in their essence some perfection, although they have not all that is due and suitable to them. This third point is taken from Saint Thomas³, where he says that "by

1. I, q. 6, a. 3, Sed contra; De Veritate, q. 21, a. 5. cf. above p.
2. I, q. 6, a. 5, c. and ad 2; De Veritate, idem.
3. I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1.
its substantial to-be, anything is not perfect absolutely although it is being absolutely"; because anything is called perfect when it is in its ultimate, not in its first to-be which is the foundation of the other perfections.

4. As to the first point, there is no difficulty; for it is certain that every created being is a being by participation and from another, not by essence and of itself. This is verified of the created being not only as regards its accidents and existence but also as to the very to-be of its essence. For although a thing in a state of possibility, bespeaks only predicates which are essential and objectively possible, yet when they are produced in reality, not only is there produced the existence and accidents, but also the essence itself is rendered a participant of God - in such way, however, as the subject of existence from which it is distinguished; because that essence truly is produced in the real order. And thus, a man has his very substance, life, and other essential predicates participated from God and not of himself; for this does not do away with the fact that some thing may be essentially such or such and yet have that essence as something derived from the first essence which is its idea and exemplar.

5. As to the second point, almost the whole difficulty and present controversy is about this: because it is not apparent why the very essence itself has not goodness by its own formal nature, since
by its own formal nature it does not lack essential perfection and integrity. Nevertheless, we say that if we speak of goodness absolutely, as Saint Thomas spoke — and Cajetan¹ agreed, and the above named disciples of Saint Thomas have commonly followed him in this — it is impossible that a created being have goodness essentially and in virtue of its essence alone, formally speaking. Yet it is true, that radically there is contained in its substance the total goodness that can come from its operations or accidents, since accidents and operations are rooted in the substance itself. As to existence, although it is not radically in the substance as to its connection, yet it is reduced to it as to the limitation and specification which it has from substance. But in truth, formally speaking, essence can not be termed good in virtue of essence alone or of substance: but rather, from some accidents or predicates accidentally supervening. — The reason is: because the goodness of a thing results from the fact that it has the perfection which is due and suitable to it, since good expresses the nature of perfect which is appetible; and if it is good absolutely, it must be perfect absolutely. Therefore, it must have not only its first actuality, but also the consummative and ultimate actuality from those things which are due to it. But a created substance can not in its own self have all the perfection which is consummately and ultimately due

¹. I, q. 6, a. 3, Ad hoc dicitur.
it, except by something superadded to it accidentally. Therefore, it can not in virtue of essential predicates be termed good absolutely. The consequence is clear: because it is not called consummately perfect previous to those accidental predicates, but is said to be lacking in something due it, to which it is in itself ordered, and without which it is in potency. But goodness absolutely considered belongs to any thing from fullness of being, as Saint Thomas says; and fullness of being is the same as having all that is due to a thing, and that pertains to such or such an essence. - The minor is proved: because the perfection suitable to a thing is threefold, namely, its to-be, its operation, and the end to which it is ordered. All these perfections are accidental and not essential to a thing, and without these a thing is not said to be something perfect absolutely. That these are not essential is quite certain: for existence is an accidental predicate of a created thing. So, too, is operation, since it flows from the very nature already constituted and proceeds from it: therefore it did not constitute it. And similarly, the end is something to which the very nature of a thing tends, as a stone to the center: therefore, the end does not belong to the constitution of the essence. It is likewise certain that the essence of a thing without existence is a being only in potency and is not actually appetible and good. Furthermore, without operation and end, it is lacking in something to

1. I-II, q. 18, a. 1.
which it is per se ordered; hence, it does not have the consummate perfection to come from those things which are due it. Therefore, it is not good absolutely, since the good is from the integral cause belonging to the due consummation of such or such thing.

6. You might say: without these accidental perfections a substance is not perfect with regard to accidents, yet it remains perfect essentially, since the very constitution of the essence is perfection. And the essence is established by some predicate that is more or less perfect (so that different essences are gradated according to different essential degrees, and any one degree is more perfect than another). Therefore, previous to to-be and to operation there is essential perfection and, in the line of essential perfection, a thing is consummated: because it is constituted in integrity although it is not perfect in the line of accidents. And this is confirmed: because the accidents themselves, as existence and operation, are perfect by their essential nature and do not need another existence or operation. Likewise, therefore, the substance which is more perfect than its existence and operation, is said to have in itself consummate essential perfection.

7. To the contrary: because the very essence and nature, although constituted by essential predicates, yet has to be ordered from the essential predicates themselves to those that are extrinsic and has to depend on the latter in order that it may actually be per-
fect, consummately and absolutely, and not remain in potency only.
And the reason is: in virtue of essential predicates there is con-
stituted only the nature in its formality as the first principle or
root of those things which are due it, and which are superadded. There­
fore, in virtue of essential predicates it has being only radically
and fundamentally good, or inchoatibly — but not formally and absolute-
ly. And so we admit that in the line of essential constitution and
root, the essence is perfect and good — a perfect and good root: but
this is to be good and perfect not absolutely and formally, but
inchoatively and radically. We admit this goodness; indeed, goodness,
as we said above¹, is not distinguished from being: goodness radically
and inchoatibly, that is, from essential being; but consummate and per-
fect goodness, from accidental being. And by reason of this radical
perfection and goodness, one essence is said to be more perfect than
another in its degree. For just as it is the root of more perfect
operation and accidents, so in itself it is essentially more perfect:
although each one is its own order is not perfected absolutely except
by something superadded to the essence. And Saint Thomas² expressly
admits that he is speaking of absolute good when he says that things
are not good essentially. Now God has all these as essential predicates:
to-be and operation and all; and so by His essence He is called good

¹ Infra, a. 1, n. 12 sqq.
² De Veritate, idem.
and perfect; and this, without any order to or dependence on any thing outside Himself.

8. To the confirmation we reply: existence itself and operation are good not as quod but as quo. Hence, they do not need another existence and operation that they may be good; but substance does need these that it may be rendered good.

9. As to the third point, some raise the question whether there is, in truth, any essential goodness at all in things; or whether all goodness is accidental, so that neither relatively nor absolutely would there be any essential good in creatures. And this, because if existence be taken away, all that is essential no longer remains except in potency. But being in so far as it is in potency is not good absolutely nor actually but only in potency: and this is not to be good. Therefore, goodness in act is always accidental. Therefore, since things are called good by participation from God, and the first thing that is thus participated is the to-be which is the most universal effect of the first agent; then, every goodness is participated by the medium of to-be and consequently by the medium of something accidental which to-be is.

10. None the less, the opposite must be said, and it is taken from Saint Thomas where he teaches that substantial goodness does not

1. Idem.
vary in creatures, but absolute and complete goodness which depends
on accidents, does; yet this substantial goodness is had by participa-
tion according to its to-be and dependently on the first to-Be. Saint
Thomas admits, therefore, that some substantial and invariable good-
ness is given, and this goodness he distinguishes from absolute and
complete goodness which is goodness absolutely. And the reason is
this: when substance is produced, although it depends on existence
in order to be in the real order, yet it is not constituted by that
very existence. Nor is the entity of existence alone given to it, but
also the entity of the essence which is the subject of existence: and
this essence has some perfection and actuality by reason of which it
is the root of operations and accidents and not by reason of existence:
although without existence it is not in act but only in a state of
potency. But having been placed in existence, it has that perfection
which is the root of accidents, by reason not only of existence but
also of its own nature. And this is a certain goodness. Thus it has
substantial goodness just as it has perfection, but not full and
absolute of its own nature alone, but depending on existence that it
may be in act; and ordered to operation and end, that it may be per-
fect and consummate. Hence, if we speak of goodness absolutely, it
does not belong to a thing essentially; it belongs by reason of some-
thing superadded accidentally by which the thing is consummated. But
if we speak of goodness relatively, or of goodness which is the root
and foundation, or the beginning and not the consummation of perfection,
then that does belong to substance which is being absolutely, as Saint Thomas¹ teaches, where he concludes that "according to the first to-be which is substantial, something is predicated as being absolutely but is good only relatively, that is, in as much as it is being; but according to the ultimate actuality something is called being relatively" (that is, accident) "and good absolutely." But it is certain that something is called being absolutely by reason of its substantial act, not by reason of existence: although it depends on existence as to its state of being outside its causes and outside possibility. Thus, the good absolutely, that is, complete and full as to its state, belongs to things not essentially but accidentally.

Solution of the Arguments

11. To the first point, you might object: for the nature of being is imbibed intrinsically and essentially in any differentia whatever and essential predicate of a created thing, for example, of man. Therefore, it is being by its essence, that is, essentially, although by participation in, and dependence on God as its efficient cause. Therefore, it is also good by its essential nature or form. - The antecedent is certain: because the essential concept howsoever intimate,

¹ I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1.
necessarily includes being, otherwise it would be nothing. Therefore, by its essential form and concept it is being. - The consequence is proved in that the good is an attribute of being as perfect. But essence includes in its essential concepts some perfection or act. Therefore, in virtue of such essential form it is good in that way in which it is in act and perfect. And this is especially compelling, since, as we said above\(^1\), the good is an attribute of being in such way that it is not distinguished from it, nor does it add any reality to being, but only a relation of reason. Therefore, by the same essential form by which any thing is a being, it is good: at least by way of identity.

12. This is confirmed: because when an attribute is predicated of a subject by the verb is, the is prescinds from existence and from time; and all the more so when the attribute itself is not an other entity differing really from the entity of the essence. Therefore, when a being is called good, it prescinds from existence; and so a thing is called good previous to existence. Therefore, it is essentially good, independently of existence and of other accidents. - This is (further) confirmed: a thing that is as yet possible and not existing is perfect and appetible; therefore, good. - The consequence is obvious: because the good is identical with the appetible. - The

\(^1\) Infra, a. 1, nn. 6-7.
antecedent is proved: it is perfect, because according to different essential natures, essence is said to be diversely perfect, as the Angel is said to be essentially more perfect than man by reason of its essential difference. It is appetible, for the sick person desires health which is not yet but can be, and which in some cases will never be; moreover, we can love impossible things by mere complacence. Therefore, independently of existence a thing may be actually desired. Therefore it is actually appetible and therefore, good.

13. The reply is that in the essential concept there is included being and actuality or essential perfection, as Saint Thomas says¹. But the goodness of this is relative, not perfect and complete and absolute. For absolute goodness depends upon existence and upon other accidental perfections. Moreover, the good is an attribute of being: not absolutely and for any state of being, but for that state in which being is perfect, and ordered to existence and to accidents. But the relative and inchoate good pertains to the essence by itself and in itself, and this is the teaching of Saint Thomas², that the good follows upon being qua perfected; indeed, it is not enough that it be perfected in just any way, but it must be in the state of appetibility: that is, there must be perfection not only as informing and constituting

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1. De Veritate, q. 21, a. 5, ad 1. cf. above, p.
2. I, q. 5, a. 5, ad 1; De Veritate, q. 21, a. 1, cf. above, p.
but also as finalizing. But no perfection finalizes except by ordi-
nation to existence because in no other way is it appetible, as
Saint Thomas teaches¹. For information comes about by means of the
conjunction and union of the form; finalization, however, by means of
apprehension directing to the attainment of a thing. Hence, final-
ization moves according to the order to existence, because it moves
to execution or is the principle of execution. But execution has to
do with existence; and likewise the end, in finalizing, bespeaks order
to existence. But the information and constitution of a thing comes
about not by means of existence as the formal reason, but by the very
conjunction of the form with the matter, from which results the composite
which is the subject of existence. Hence, for the informing and con-
s tituting of a composite, existence is not in the nature of a cause but
rather of an effect, that is, as what is attained; but for finalizing,
it is a cause in the order of intention. Hence, although many of the
essential predicates are essential perfections, nevertheless, taken as
such, they are not considered in a state of appetibility and final-
ization, but rather in their state of constituting and informing; and
this is not enough for the nature of the good, as we have already suf-
ficiently pondered². And in this way some perfection belongs to any
thing by its essence, for example, to be animal, or rational (although

1. I, q. 5, a. 2, ad 4.
2. Infra, a. 1, n. 15
by participation from God, as from the efficient cause: yet, it does not finalize by its essence without order to existence. - Nor is this contrary to the fact that the good is not really distinguished from being: for the good is understood of being as perfected to its consummate fullness, or of being in its universality, as Saint Thomas says¹. Yet, complete and perfect good can well be distinguished from being which is not as yet perfect and consummated but is only inchoate and taken as to its essential predicates; because the good is from the integral cause, and this integrity can be constituted of diverse entities: hence, since goodness comes from integrity only, it may be distinguished from one entity because of another.

14. To the first confirmation, the reply is that in the predication of a proper attribute, the is prescinds from existence precisely as to that in which it is an attribute, and as to the manner in which it is an attribute. Hence, the good, complete and absolutely such, since it is not an attribute of being in just any way at all, but is of being as perfect and consummated, will be predicated necessarily of this consummated being. But then existence is supposed, as well as the other accidents by which the thing is completed and consummated; and when existence is predicated - or the perfection of existence - of existence itself, the predication is of eternal truth and prescinds

¹. De Veritate, idem.
². cf. p. 114. vol. 1.
from existence as to its exercise, but not in actu signato and as the extreme of predication. But of a being not perfect and consummated, complete and absolute good is not predicated as an attribute: but only a good that is relative and radical or inchoate, as has been explained. And such goodness prescinds from the exercise of existence, although not from an order and a tendency to it, without which it can not finalize.

15. To the second confirmation, the reply is that apart from existence, possible things are said to have diverse essential perfection and a gradation of it. Nevertheless, they do not have the nature of what is good absolutely, nor are they in a state of being appetible and of finalizing; although by way of constituting, the perfections of essential predicates are found in them in a state of possibility. Nor does goodness which is absolutely such follow from such perfection, when the latter is taken precisely as essential; but only a goodness which is radically and inchoately such, and in the manner of a state of potency.

16. In reply to the other argument which asserts that what

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1. If we understand this correctly, John of Saint Thomas means that integrity may be made up of diverse entities, so that if one of them necessary to integrity is absent, integrity itself will be absent from the others; e.g., if Socrates is lacking in a moral virtue, he is no longer a good man simply, and whatever his other qualifications, they can not make this man good simply. In other words, because of the absence of one due entity, integrity is withdrawn from the others in that they are not enough to make Socrates good.

2. Cf. n. 12, "It is appetible."
does not exist is yet appetible, I distinguish: that it does not exist in execution, I deny. For anything must be apprehended either as having existence or as ordered to existence. And indeed if its attainment be intended, it must be considered as possible or as something that is going to be. If it is not intended but is pleasing only by way of velleity, it must at least be considered as suitable, or united to me at least in a hypothetical way and in semblance. And under that condition it pleases, and that is an existence at least imagined: for if anyone imagines himself to be an angel, he takes pleasure in this, because he considers himself to be an angel: where the apprehension of his own existence is brought in. - And when it is urged: It is actually appetible, since it is actually desired; therefore, it is actually good, I distinguish: that it is actually appetible in execution, I deny; in intention, let it pass; and in this case, it has existence in intention, not in execution. Thus, unless it is ordered to existence, without which no actual good is given, it is not actually appetible either in intention or in execution.

17. If you pursue the objection: Of itself essence it radically good, therefore it has radical appetibility; and goodness consists not in actual appetibility but in radical, as we said above. Therefore, essence has goodness actually from the very fact that it

1. Infra, a. 1, nn. 12-23.
has radical appetibility, since it consists in that radical appetibility even though it may not have the exercise of it. - The reply is that goodness does not consist in radical appetibility, but in the radical relation of actual appetibility: for actual appetibility is that which is the foundation and the root of the relation which appetibility founds. For goodness consists not in an actual relation but in the actual nature of appetibility which is the foundation of this relation: and this foundation or nature of appetibility, essence does not have except by reason of its order to existence, as has been said.

18. In the second point, Father Vasquez objects: since essence is not really distinguished from existence, as is proved, therefore it is the same thing for goodness to belong according to essence and according to existence. The sole difference is that before existence things are said to be only possible and likewise the goodness suited to them is possible: but after existence it is in act. And just as on account of dependence on an efficient cause, a thing can be deprived of existence and cease to be: so it can be deprived of some good and an opposite evil can come to it. - In the second place, since possible creatures are loved by God with a certain love of com-

1. I disp. 24, c. 2.
2. III P. q. 17.
placeence which in God is necessary, so, there is supposed in creatures themselves a goodness which He loves. The antecedent will be proved by itself\(^1\). But the consequence is sufficiently manifest. - In the third place: because Vasquez thinks that the goodness of a thing is the same as its integrity; but every essence has integrity previous to existence since it is constituted by its predicates, whether it be simple or composite.

19. The reply is: all three of these arguments which Vasquez maintains as fully certain, we deny. For that existence is distinguished from essence, we have proved above\(^2\). - That possible creatures are not, in truth, necessarily loved by God, will be shown later\(^3\), speaking of love terminated directly in them; for that God, in loving His omnipotence wills all those things to be possible, this is not to love them in themselves and by reason of their own goodness, but to love them by reason of omnipotence from which follows the denomination of possibility in objects. - Finally, goodness does not consist in the sole integrity of a thing in that this bespeaks the constitution itself of the thing and its perfection by way of formal cause, but rather as it is finalizing and appetible. And hence, it does not bespeak the integrity of a thing only by way of constituting

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1. Infra, disp. 79.
2. Disp. 4, a. 3.
3. Q. 19.
its essence, but rather by way of perfecting appetite; and thus it adds appetibility.

20. To the third point, objection is made by Molina: because although created essences are not good by reason of their essence, since they participate actual goodness from the efficient cause and from existence, yet it must not be denied that when they do exist they are good not only with the goodness of existence, but much more so with the goodness of essence; because in his opinion essence is more perfect than existence, or, if it is not more perfect, it is distinct from existence. Therefore, it has its own distinct goodness just as it has its own perfection, from essence. - This is confirmed by Father Valentia: because every creature, in as much as it is such or such, is good, as it is said in Genesis: God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good, and in other places which we set forth above. But the essence of a thing even apart from existence is a creature. Therefore it is good. Indeed by the same reality by which anything is a being, it is formally good and appetible. Therefore, essence previous

1. I, disp. 2, Hoc praehabito.
2. Molina, in q. 4, a. 1; disp. 2.
3. In q. 3, a. 4; disp. 2.
4. I, disp. 1, q. 6, n. 2.
5. Genesis 1: 31.
to existence is formally good, since it is formally being; otherwise, we would desire only existences, not things themselves—for example, health or riches, and so on. — Finally, Augustine teaches that every nature, in as much as it is a nature, is good; and frequently he proves, against the Manicheans, that each thing is good in its kind.

21. The reply is: to solve the argument of Molina, what we have already said: that to the essence itself or substance, there corresponds its own goodness; yet the substance is not perfect absolutely, but is radically and inchoately perfect. This is to have a relative goodness; that is, not yet perfect but as yet perfectible and dependent on existence and other accidents that it may be in the state of appetible absolutely.

22. To the confirmation the reply is: every creature is good actually and consummately in the order of existence; but radically and inchoately by reason of its essence which is the root of the accidents by which it is made fully and consummately perfect. And in this way all things that God made are very good; for He made them together with existence and due accidents, and not without these in the pure nature of their essence. — And in this way Augustine and other Fathers say that all creatures are good; yet, they do not say

that by reason of their essence alone, apart from existence and accidents, they are good absolutely. And likewise, by the same reality by which any thing is a being, it is good: namely, by the same reality by which a being is perfect, it is good perfectly and absolutely; but by that reality by which it is a being as to its essence only, it will be good radically and inchoately. And thus a thing itself is desired, for example, health, not indeed apart from existence, but ordained to it. Nor is existence desired apart, but the existence of health; but without existence, health itself is not actually appetible, but only radically in the way in which it has been explained.

23. From what has been said we have also solved the argument of Father Suarez, which may be reduced to the foregoing: because if essence is distinct from existence, it argues for a distinct goodness and perfection; just as the humanity of Christ also in itself is good, although it does not have its own to-be, but is assumed by the divine to-be. For from what has been said, this difficulty is solved by distinguishing between goodness that is radical and relative and that which is actual and absolute, as has been said.
Principal References
to the
Translations

Abbreviations:

DH - De Hebdomadibus; Roman numerals refer to the chapters; Arabic, to the passages in the text of Boethius and Saint Thomas.

DV - De Veritate; since all references here are to Question XXI, only the numbers of articles will be given.

GT - Cursus Theologicus; since all references here are to Tome I, disp. 6, art. 3, only paragraph numbers will be given.

Absolutely, to be
DH, II, nn. 19, 20, 21, 22.
DV, a. 1, ad 6; a. 5, c.; ad 2.
is to be good relatively in creatures : CT, nn. 10, 13; DV, a. 5, c.; ad 2; cf. essence.

Absolutely, to be good
DH, IV, n. 67.
DV, a. 1, ad c; a. 2, ad 6; a. 5, c.; ad 2.

is from accidents in creatures : CT, nn. 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 22;

DV, a. 5, c., ad 5; DH, n. 67.
is not the same as to-be in creatures : DH, V, nn. 69, 73, 76;

DV, a. 5, ad 2.
thing must be perfect : CT, nn. 3, 5, 13, 14.

Abstraction
nature of, DH, IV, nn. 48, 49.

Appetite
two principles pertaining to, DH, II, nn. 25, 26.
possible things are not actually appetible : CT, nn. 15, 16, 19, 22.

Accident
DH, II, nn. 19, 20
gives perfection : cf. absolutely, to be good.
Being
addition made in three ways to, DV, a. 1, c.
to-be: DH, II, nn. 13-22.
how determined, n. 13.
cannot be subject of to-be, n. 14.
properly belongs to substance, n. 15.
cannot participate in anything, nn. 14, 16, 24 fi.
has nothing added besides itself, nn. 18, 24 fi.

What is: DH, II, nn. 13-22
 can participate in something else, nn. 14, 16.
can have something besides itself, n. 18.
can have a twofold to-be, n. 18.

Brevity
advantages of, DH, I, nn. 5, 6, 7.

Cause
efficient, DV, a. 4, c; a. 6, c.
final, cf: good.
formal, CT, n. 2; goodness is not by, CT, n. 19; DV, a. 6, c.
material, DV, a. 4, c.

Composite
distinction of to-be and what is: DH, II, n. 23.
relation to existence, CT, n. 13.

Discipline
nature of, DH, I, n. 8.

End
bespeaks order to to-be, CT, n. 13.
nature of, DV, a. 1, c; a. 2, c; a. 3, ad 3; ad 5.

Essence
absolutely perfect in God, DV, a. 5, c.; DH, IV, mn. 65, 67; cf: also; God.
is good inchoately and radically in creatures: CT, mn. 3, 5, 7, 13, 14, 21, 22.
one more perfect than another, CT, N. 7.
perfection of, CT, 11, 12, 13.
opinion of Molina as to goodness of, CT, n. 20.
opinion of Vasquez as to goodness of, CT, mn. 18, 19.

Form
according to Plato, DV, a. 4, c.
according to Aristotle, DV, a. 4, c.
determines the to-be, DH, II, n. 18 comm.
particular, DV, a. 4, ad 4.
universal, idem.
proportionate to perfectible, DV, a. 4, sed con.

Good

created things are, DH, IV, 63-67; III, n. 29; 69, 70, 73-77, 81, 83, 88; CT, n. 22; DV, a. 2, passim;
every thing desires the, DH, III, n. 29.
expresses order: DV, a. 6, c.
final cause: DV, a. 1, c.; ad 1; a. 2, c.; a. 5, c.; CT, n. 13.
in mathematical objects: DV, a. 2, ad 4.
in things: DV, a. 3, c.; a. 6, ad 3.
invariable - substantial: DV, a. 5, c.; ad 1; CT, n. 10.
variable - accidental: DV, a. 5, c.; ad 1; CT, n. 10.
in relation to another: DV, a. 4, ad 2.
perfective of appetite: cf. transcendentals; DV, a. 3, sed con. and c.; CT, n. 17.
presupposes measure and species: DV, a. 6, c.
principles pertaining to, DH, II, nn. 25, 26.
Primary and secondary end: DV, a. 1, c.
prior to the true, according to their perfectibles, DV, a. 3, c.
self-diffusive: DV, a. 1, ad 4.
substantial: DV, a. 5, c.; DH, III, nn. 31, 34-43; CT, n. 10.
by participation: DV, a. 5, passim; CT, n. 3; DH, IV, nn. 66, 67.
by reason of an exemplar form: DV, a. 4, c.; ad 1; ad 3; ad 4; CT, n. 4.
by reason of inherent created form: DV, a. 4, c.; ad 3.

God

absolute goodness: DV, a. 5, c.; a. 4, ad 9; DH, IV, nn. 65, 67.
final cause: DV, a. 5, c.
possible creatures not necessarily loved by, CT, n. 19.
to-be is proper to, DH, II, n. 24 fi.; DV, a. 4, ad 7.
to-be and to-be good are identical in, DH, IV, n. 67 fi; V, n. 71.
to be good by essence is proper to, CT, nn. 1, 3, 7; DV, a. 1, ad 1.

Intention
meaning of, DV, a. 3, ad 5.

Molina
opinion as to goodness of essence, CT, n. 20.

One
cf. transcendentals.
adds negation to being, DV, a. 5, ad 7.
principles pertaining to, DH, II, nn. 23 24.

Participation
creature is good by, DV, a. 1, ad 1; ad 5, c.; CT, n. 4,
distinguished from per se, DH, III, n. 31; CT, n. 2.
nature of, DH, II, n. 15.

Perfection
each thing desires its own, DH, II, n. 35.
from accidents in creatures, cf. absolutely, to be good.
formalizing, and finalizing CT, n. 15.
order of transcendental, DV, a. 3, passim:
threefold in creature: CT, n. 5.
cf. essence; God.

Principles
bounds and rules: DH, I, n. 8.
definition: DH, I, n. 9.
kinds: DH, I, nn. 10, 11, 12.

Privation
an ens rationis, DV, a. 2, ad 7.
as evil: DV, a. 2, ad 1.

Relation
DV, a. 1, c.; ad 2; ad 3.
names which express, DV, a. 6, c.
of reason; DV, a. 1, ad 6.

Relatively, to be
DH, II, nn. 19-22.
DV, a. 5, c.

Relatively, to be good
DV, a. 5, c; CT, nn. 3, 10, 13, 14, 21, 22.

Simple being
absolutely: DH, II, n. 24; DV, ad 4, sed con. a. 4, ad 9.
relatively, idem.
created things are not absolutely, DH, IV, n. 63; V, n. 87
DH, II, n. 24 comm.

Suarez
reply to, CT, n. 22.

Substance
DH, II, nn. 19, 20.
Transcendentals
how these add to being, DV, a. 1, c.
order of, DV, a. 3, c.

True
consists in a certain adequation: DV, a. 4, ad 5.
perfective of intellect: DV, a. 3, c.; a. 6, ad 3.
prior to the good, taken in themselves: DV, a. 5, c.
cf. transcendentals.

Vasquez
opinion as to goodness of essence, CT, 18, 19.

Wisdom
compared to play, DH, Prefatory note.
Part II

Marginal Notes

to the

De Hebdomadibus

Whether every thing that is, is good
Introduction

Because many of our contemporaries are guided by a stray, blinded thinking whose expression tends to exalt the contingent and minimize or deny the eternal, there is danger of deceiving, in one form or another, even the elect. Lest we whose light is better be misled, we have the greater need to clarify and defend our own fundamental notions, since a mistake in these would be the root of many errors. There is, perhaps, no better way to renew the great basic truths than to bring them to new life and light within our own minds through the doctrine of a master. At present, false conclusions as to the nature of being and of the good are current; we shall do well, then, to meditate upon the teaching given to us by Saint Thomas Aquinas on these important notions.

We are, indirectly, in debt to "John, a deacon of the Roman Church" of the sixth century for the particular work we have in mind to study. He was evidently an earnest student whose sincere desire for more insight into difficult problems had its reward, for Boethius responded to his request for a clearer explanation of how created substances are good, by writ-
ing an answer in the De Hebdomadibus which solves the difficulty in a few pages.¹ Seven centuries later, Saint Thomas added value to this book by writing a commentary on it, in which he further elucidates the solution so succinctly given by Boethius. It is this commentary with its many implications, that we hope to make as much as possible our own, drawing into its compass related clarifications from other works and seeing it in relation to a few questions of the day. Most especially it will be our concern to expose the important distinctions between ens per se and ens secundum quid on the one hand, and bonum per se and bonum secundum quid on the other.

In accomplishing this task we shall be acting upon the advice - usually accredited to the Angelic Doctor himself - written to another John, also an earnest student, in the thirteenth century: to follow the streamlets in his study before going out to the ocean.

¹. We note from Saint Thomas's introduction to the De Trinitate that this same John, because of his "desire to know", was the occasion for two other works of Boethius: one, on the distinction of Persons and unity of essence in the Trinity; the other, on the two natures and one Person in Christ.
CHAPTER I

The Problem
and
Preliminary Considerations

The problem that gave John difficulty would find few of us prompt with a solution. Saint Thomas states it more fully than does Boethius:

It is said that created substances in as much as they are, are good; yet, on the other hand, it is said that creatures are not substantial goods, but that to be a substantial good is proper to God alone. Now whatever belongs to any thing in as much as it is, seems to belong to it substantially; and so if created substances, in as much as they are, are good, it seems that they are, in consequence, substantial goods.¹

Or, we might put it this way:

Good is a transcendental attribute of being. Hence, whatever is, is good in so far as it is.

It would seem to follow, then, that substances, being ens per se should also be bonum per se.

Yet it is said that this is true of God only.

John does not understand this and, while encouraging Boethius' usual concision, begs for the further light of a little more evidence. The disciple asks his master to reply by a method that will conceal his teaching from the many - a request that might strike one at first as strange and illogical. Yet, not infrequently men who were advanced in purely natural wisdom, as well as they who were versed in sacred doctrine have agreed that in so doing they were being more faithful to wisdom and more prudent. The author of Ecclesiasticus says:

¹DH, T,n.l. The letters:DH will refer to the De Hebdomadibus B will indicate the text of Boethius; T, the commentary of Saint Thomas. Arabic numerals refer to the precise passage.
Low very unpleasant is wisdom to the unlearned, and the unwise will not continue with her... For the doctrine of wisdom is according to her name, and she is not manifest to many.  

In our time of philosophy-for-the-millions trend, it may be of interest and value for us to note briefly, the reasons that sustain the request of the Deacon.

The many whose minds have not been trained for abstract thinking are more apt to be harmed than helped by having proposed to them truths beyond their reach or readiness. They may be led astray by their incomprehension of what is said, or may fall into unwarranted doubts concerning it and other problems. Gregory, in a gloss on Exodus, 21:33, suggests a certain "scandal of mind" that may be caused by setting forth lofty and subtle truths to those who are not prepared for them. Saint Thomas says in the De Trinitate: "If any subtleties are proposed to uncultivated people, these folk may find in the imperfect comprehension of them matter for error." These are the "little ones in Christ" who need "milk to drink, not meat." (I Cor. 3:1)

Nor is Saint Augustine of the opinion that doctrine can be equally imparted to all. He therefore suggests the use of "obscuring words" to shield it when need be. Saint Thomas quotes thus from the De doctrina Christiana:

Where certain truths are, by reason of their own character, not comprehensible, or scarcely so, even when ex-

1. Ecclesiasticus, 6:21, 23. All quotations from the Bible are from the Douay version.
2. De Trinitate, q.2, a.4, c. Parma ed. vol. 17, p.365b. Translation by Sister Rose Emmanuella Brennan, S.H.N., Herder, 1946, p.64. Latin texts are given pp. 219 ff; references will be indicated thus: (LTr.1)
3. ibidem. (LTr.4)
plained with every effort on the part of the speaker to make them clear, these one rarely dwells upon with a general audience, or never mentions at all; but in writing, the same distinction cannot be adhered to, because a book, once published, can fall into the hands of any one at all, and therefore some truths should be shielded by obscuring words so that they may profit those who will understand them and be hidden from the simple who will not comprehend them.1

The passage concludes by saying that thus no harm will come to any one, because the author will have fulfilled his duty in bringing the truths to the minds of some, and those who can not understand will not read further.

The citations we have given concern the protection of a multitude of good, well-meaning men who simply lack an adequate intellectual formation. But there are others who are dull and slow through their own fault, their own perversity of will. From these Christ concealed the "secrets of the kingdom" by the use of parables, as He told His disciples:

Because to you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven; but to them it is not given... Therefore do I speak to them in parables: because seeing they see not, and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand.2

And Our Lord points out that in these men, there is fulfilled one of the prophecies of Isaias:

By hearing you shall hear, and shall not understand: and seeing you shall see, and shall not perceive. For the heart of this people is grown gross, and with their ears they have been dull of hearing, and their eyes

1. Ibid. Parma, loc. cit.; translation, p. 65. (LT m.3)
they have shut: lest at any time they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them.\(^1\)

The reasons that we have seen for this deliberate obscurity are taken from the multitude who, because of their lack either of adequate learning or of a good will, were not prepared to receive instruction in the more recondite and sacred truths.\(^2\)

There are other considerations springing from a concern for the truths themselves. There is danger that these may be lost and the doctrine itself deteriorate, or the teachings not be kept uniform if they be given out to all indiscriminately and passed from one exoteric mind to another. In this way Dionysius expressed concern for holy teachings when he said to shield them "from the unclean multitude so that you may keep

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1. Ibid., v. 14,15. It is important and interesting to note that the metaphor may serve two purposes. For by means of comparison with material things, divine truth is not only "better hidden from the unworthy" but also, it may be made more accessible to the "simple who are unable to grasp intellectual things." This is because the way of knowledge that is natural to man is through sensible things. Cf. Summa Theologica, I, q.1, a.9.

2. There is no question here of those fundamental truths, most certainly profound, pertaining to God and salvation that must be made known to every one. Saint Thomas says: "The words of a teacher ought to be so moderated that they result to the profit and not to the detriment of the one hearing them. Now, there are certain things which on being heard harm no one: and such ought not to be hidden but openly professed to all. But there are others which, if openly presented, cause harm in those hearing them." De Trinitate, Parma, loc. cit.; translation, p. 64. Cf. also: replies to the objections.
them as uniform as possible.\textsuperscript{1} This seems to have been the fear that moved certain students of wisdom among the Greeks: Orpheus, Hesiod and others, to conceal under the cover of divine myths, the truth they possessed. We know to what extent Plato bound up his doctrine with myth and, to some measure, with mathematics. They had excellent reasons for doing this. Apparently, in their zeal to keep their doctrine pure, they exercised an almost jealous guardianship over it, so that only the initiate who knew what the metaphors and fables of the myth stand for, could enter the inner sanctum of the truth it enclosed. As Saint Thomas comments:

\begin{quote}
For if the truth is covered over with myth, no one can know what truth is hidden under the myth except he who has penetrated the myth.\textsuperscript{2}
\end{quote}

But there is another reason still: wisdom herself must be protected as far as possible from the revilements of any who in their own envy or malice or indecency would despise her. Therefore, a method that unites "obscurity to brevity" will be a useful device whereby doctrine may be communicated to the worthy and at the same time be kept secret from the unworthy. In the De Trinitate Saint Thomas explains in strong terms the motive Boethius gives for restraining "my pen with brevity":

\begin{quote}
'Wherever I have directed my gaze apart from you ... I
\end{quote}

\begin{enumerate}
\item De Trinitate, loc. cit. (LT n.4)\textsuperscript{1}
\item In Metaphysicam, III, 1.11, n.468. (LT n.5)\textsuperscript{2}
\end{enumerate}
have encountered on the one side, stolid indifference; that is, lack of comprehension; 'on the other, sly envy,' that is, ill will, sly only in condemnation, so that he who treated of these things, would seem to offer insults to divine treatises, that is, by inordinately explaining them to such monsters of men. Men are called monsters who, though in human body, bear within them the heart of a beast, since vice has made them like to beasts in their affections; hence these things would be trampled under foot by them, rather than be acknowledged, because of their envy - to revile whatever is said, because they do not so much desire to know, but - because

And he uses the authority of Christ's words to the multitude gathered on the mount:

Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest perhaps they trample them under their feet. (Matt., 7:6)

We might restate to advantage the principal considerations expressed by the foregoing texts. With a view to the multitude, it is well to shield the deeper truths from a) those who have good will but not sufficient learning; b) those who have learning, but whose wills are not right. With a view to the doctrine itself, it is well a) to preserve the truths intact for the development of sound doctrine; b) to protect wisdom from the revilements of the unworthy.

These reasons evince a concern to keep the light of wisdom strong and clear, and to use it in such way that its strength may be intensified for penetrating ever farther into

1. De Trinitate, Preface; Parma, p.351b; translation, p.17
2. Loc. cit. (L7 v.7)
truth. Those who possess it should protect it. In order to do
this well, it becomes necessary to speak and write in terms
which have a clarity for the wise but are obscure and confusing
for the majority; for if wisdom aims to please the majority,
she herself will enter into darkness. We have only to consider
modern philosophy, beginning with the renaissance and continuing in our day, to see how wisdom is perverted when - even in
discussing problems which, frankly confronted, are not diffi-
cult - she seeks the favor of the multitude. Whereas in medi-
eaeval times philosophy was the business of the schoolmen, and
maintained a precision conducive to the acquisition of a rich
and deep habitus of wisdom, today it wants to trade with men
of every rank. A philosophical writer is to be judged by his
influence - a condition which can become tragic both for phi-
losophy and for philosophers. The Proverbs say:

Do not sell wisdom, and instruction, and understanding.¹

If the wise set up their stands in the market place, the house
indeed of wisdom will be idle.

Which of the arguments that we have seen prompted
John to ask for an answer that would not be open to all? There
seem to have been several. In the first place, the problem is
a metaphysical one, and hence even if Boethius expanded the
answer with illuminating detail, there would be little chance

¹. Ch. 23:23.
of his being read or understood by the uncultured multitude. But, it is the other three reasons that Boethius and Saint Thomas have in mind. The many to whom the Deacon primarily referred are a group who as a matter of fact should be capable of following a reasoned discourse, but who have no real taste for wisdom. They want entertainment. Their reading must be made enjoyable. Their interest in a philosophical argument would be not for intrinsic reasons, for the acquisition of wisdom, but for extrinsic: to be amused, or possibly to appear as quick-witted. Better, then, not to meet their minds in presenting the solution of the problem, but to set it forth in view of the "intelligent and eager who are worthy to be admitted into the secrets of wisdom."  

Boethius acquiesced to this request by saying that he would use a method that is commonly used in "mathematics and other disciplines". Why does he signalize mathematics when the question is a metaphysical one?

We remember that John wanted "evidence"; and evidence produces certitude. Now among the acquired sciences, the mathematical are the ones that most firmly fix the mind by their certainty. Saint Thomas says:

To proceed disciplinabiler is attributed to mathematics, not because it alone proceeds in the manner of

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1. Cf. DH, B, T, n.5.
2. DH, T, n.7.
discipline, but because this belongs to it particularly. For since to learn methodically is nothing else than to receive science from another, we are said to proceed in the manner of discipline when our procedure leads us to certain knowledge; and this indeed occurs in the mathematical sciences. For although mathematics holds the middle way, between natural science and divine science, it is more certain than either of these others.¹

This comes, on one hand, from the fact that the objects of the natural sciences are material things; hence they are involved in the instability and variability of motion and in the obscurity consequent upon matter. Besides, these sciences require a wider experience of singulars in order to engender certitude, and there is often the possibility that some determining fact has been missed. On the other hand, the mind must stretch up to the objects of the metaphysical sciences and seek principles and causes and conclusions in a realm of objects whose intelligibility, because of their complete remotion from matter, is difficult for the human intellect to grasp with firmness. The comparison that likens our minds in their regard, to the eyes of a bat in the sun, is apt:

Those things are most knowable by their nature which are most in act, namely, immaterial and immobile beings; yet, these are least known to us. Hence, it is manifest that the difficulty in acquiring a knowledge of truth comes especially from the weakness of our intellect. From this fact it happens that our intellect is to immaterial things, which have the greatest clarity by their nature, as are the eyes of a bat to the light of day which they can not see, although they can see in the dark.²

¹ De Trinitate, c.6, a.1, c. (sec. pars); Parma, p.391a. The translation here given is adapted from the translation already cited, p. 175. (LT n.8)
² Saint Thomas, In Metaphysicam, II, 1.1, n.282. (LT n.9)
But: "mathematics holds the middle way between natural science and divine science," hence, its truths are more proportioned to the human mind, demonstration will give us greater evidence and certitude.

Boethius, then, will clarify the problem by the use of a demonstrative procedure of which the mathematical is the prototype.

X X X

Having decided upon his method, Boethius will proceed rigorously by establishing the principles that are to be as cause and security for the conclusions. But before entering upon the proof proper, he gives a definition of "common principle". In his commentary on this and in other texts, Saint Thomas explains at greater length the meaning of the first common principles which are self-evident, and are absolutely necessary for progress in any kind of knowledge but especially in scientific. If demonstration were our only way of arriving at necessary truths, then we could never have certainty, and the impossibility of demonstration itself would be destroyed. In order to see the necessary connection between the predicate and the subject of any conclusion, we would be obliged to reason through an indefinite series of predicates, back to a judgment that did not need to be justified by a previous one. Yet, obviously, we would never come to any such judgment if there were none but demonstrable truths, since it is of the very nature of demonstration to arrive at a conclusion through premises that are previously and better known.
As Aristotle and Saint Thomas say:

Demonstration is not the starting point of demonstration.¹

And the Saint comments thus on another text of the Philosopher:

He says first, therefore, that not all certain knowledge is demonstrative, that is, acquired through demonstration; for the knowledge of self-evident principles is indemonstrative, that is, not acquired through demonstration.²

And again:

Thus it is plain that there are certain principles from which the syllogism proceeds, which are not certified by the syllogism; otherwise there would be infinite regress in the principles of the syllogism.³

Hence, in order for man to arrive at certain scientific knowledge, he must first have a way of knowing other than by demonstration - a way that is not a reasoning process and yet gives truth that is more certain, more unshakable, and better known to us than all the conclusions of reasoned demonstration.

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¹ Saint Thomas, In Metaphysicam IV, 1. 15, n.710. (LT n. 10)
² In Anal. Post. I, ch.3, 1.7. (LT n.11)
³ In Ethic.VI, 1. 3, n.1148. (LT n.15) It is to be noted that the processus in infinitum is not to be excluded, as some believe, because of lack of time to pursue such a course, but rather because an indefinite series has no term. This means that no process in infinitum can arrive at a reason for what most certainly is. Since there must be a reason, and since it can not be found in such a process, it must be found elsewhere. In the present case, demonstration requires that there be principles which can not be demonstrated, nor need be; that is, principles which have certainty for us by themselves, for which reason we call them "dignities" -"dignity" being bonitas propter se. Cf. else Saint Thomas, In Anal. Post. I, ch. 22, 1.32,33.
1. Saint Thomas, In Anal. Post. I, ch. 2, 1.6; II, ch. 15, l.20; also, In Metaphy. IV, 1.6, nn. 597-599 where he shows that the most certain principles must be such that a) no one can err concerning them; b) they are derived from no previous principles; c) they come naturally.


3. Saint Thomas, De Veritate, q.15, a.1. In this there is an application of the principle that the highest in a lower order teaches the lowest in the higher order.

assent at once to the identity of the two terms in question, still, as a prerequisite there is needed an experience of singulants, several acts of induction yielding sense images from which the intellect may abstract the universal expressed by such terms, for example, as "equal" and "to take away". Although this prerequisite involves several acts of the mind whereby it acquires concepts and comes to understand their meaning by a comparison of terms; nevertheless, this activity terminates in the line of the first operation of the mind when it knows the meaning of the concepts. The intellect is firmly determined and convinced by one act of assent to the judgment uniting or separating these terms, and a habitus of first principles is engendered. In the following passage, Saint Thomas epitomizes the movement toward self-evident principles which are known by the natural light of the intellect in a primary judgment, and not by other judgments:

For from the natural light itself of the agent intellect first principles become known; they are not acquired by reasoning processes but only by knowing their terms. This comes about through the fact that a memory is obtained from sense impressions; and from memory, experience; and from experience, a knowledge of the terms; and these being known, the common propositions are known which are the principles of the arts and the sciences.1

Thus, to the truth of a common proposition, as for instance: "If from two equals you subtract equals, the remainders are equal," anyone will give immediate assent because it

1. In Metaph. IV, 1.6, n.599. (LT n.15)
is obvious to all that the known terms necessarily belong to
one another. As it is said in the commentary on the De Hebdo-
madibus:

If that which is signified by the subject and the predi-
cate falls within the knowledge of all, the consequence
is that a proposition of this kind is self-evident to
all. For instance, what "equal" means is known to all,
and likewise what it means "to take away"; and therefore
the aforesaid proposition is self-evident to all.

Elsewhere, Saint Thomas calls these first principles
"dignities" because they are self-evident not only in them-
selves, but for every person who has the use of reason. They
occupy first place in the order of all our knowledge and are
not themselves ordered by any previous judgments. The digni-
ties are, like the first simple apprehension of the mind, con-
cerned with what is most general, such as: It is impossible to
be and not to be at the same time and in the same respect; and:
It is impossible to affirm and to deny the same thing of the
same subject at the same time; and the others. The intellect
must, of necessity, adhere to these truths.

But there are other self-evident principles whose
truth is not immediately grasped except by those who have a wi-
der experience and more training in abstract thinking. Our
commentary says:

On the other hand, there is a principle common only to
the learned, which is derived from the first principles

1. DH, T, n.12.
3. Sum. Theol. I, q. 82, a.1, c.; a.2, c.; In Metaphy. IV,
   1.6, n.600.
which are common to all. Of such a kind is "incorporeal beings are not contained in a place." Principles of this kind are accepted not by the majority of men but only by the wise.¹

To the uncultured, their truth is not obvious. The reason is that:

only the intellect of the wise rises to the apprehension of an incorporeal being, for the intellect of the majority of men does not transcend the imagination which is only of corporeal things.²

As a summary, Saint Thomas's division of the common principles, as given in the Posteriora Analytica,³ might be set down in this form:

Principles per se nota

(Im themselves (quoad se) - this expresses (the fact that the predicate is of the (nature of the subject.

(for us (quoad nos) - this has reference (to the one who knows that the predicate (is of the nature of the subject.

Note: In the De Potentia it is well pointed out that a proposition may be per se nota de se and yet not be evident to this or that person who does not know the meaning of the terms. For example:

This proposition, God is, is per se nota in itself, since there is identity between the subject and the predicate; but for us it is not per se nota, since we do not know what God is. Hence, for us a demonstration is needed, but not for those who see the essence of God.⁴

The "dignities" are per se nota quoad se and also quoad nos, taking nos in its widest extension of all who have the use of

¹. DH, T, n.12.
². Log., cit.
reason. Aristotle says that any one who asserts that he does not accept these, is telling a lie; and Saint Thomas says that "no one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident." Positiones is a name given to principles per se nota quoad se and quoad nos, restricting the extension of nos to the sapientes, the wise. These are derived from the dignities.

And in a wider sense: propositions which are accepted as suppositions by an inferior science. These have been proved in another science from which they are borrowed; or they may be per se nota in the higher science to which the former science is subordinated, as are, for instance, the principles of our theology, which are evident in the science of the blessed in heaven.

Thus, we have seen what is the nature of the "bounds" and "rules" that Boethius intends to use for his demonstration. As Saint Thomas comments:

"Bounds", because the resolution of every demonstration comes to a stand in principles of this kind; "rules", because through them anyone is directed to the knowledge of conclusions that follow. From principles of this kind he intends to draw conclusions and make evident all the matters which afterwards are to be treated, just as is done in geometry and other demonstrative sciences.

Boethius next prepares the proof by setting down several propositions that are evident to the wise.

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2. Sum. Theol., loc. cit. (UT n. 17)
3. DH, T, n.8.
CHAPTER II
Exposition of Principles

Boethius now brings forward certain principles that are fundamental and necessary to the solution of the problem. These he states without further explication, as being evident to the wise - a tribute, indeed, to the mind of the deacon, John, as well as a response to his request for brevity. We shall seek their fuller meaning where it is made more explicit: in the commentary of Saint Thomas, and in other related texts.

Principles that are self-evident to the wise are derived from notions that are universally understood, as we have seen. The notions in question here are: being, the one, and the good; these, and in that order, provide the starting point for the proof that follows. For if we would come to see how created substances are good, we must first have clear in our minds several principles concerning the being of things. Hence, we begin with a consideration of the differences between to-be and what is:

\[ \text{To-be is different from that which is.} \]

The notion of to-be is the most formal, the most universal, the most actual of all notions; for it is the to-be that brings to perfection all other perfections. Unless these receive the actuality of their to-be, they remain in a state of

1. For the use of the form: to-be, see translation, p.11, n.1.
2. DH, B, n.13.
potency only; and on the other hand, once they are, absolutely, they can not exist more. As Cajetan says, speaking of to-be in its composition with essence:

... it is the ultimate actuality of that genus; for after the existence of Sortes, nothing more can come to him substantially. 1

And, in the De Potentia, Saint Thomas writes:

This that I call to-be is the most perfect of all: a fact that is obvious, since act is always more perfect than potency. Now any designated form whatever is not understood to be actual except through the fact that it is posited in being. For humanity or fire can be considered as existing in the potency of matter, or in the power of the agent, or again, as in the intellect, but that which has its to-be is rendered actually existing. Hence, it is clear that this that I call to-be is the actuality of all acts and therefore, it is the perfection of all perfections.

And elsewhere:

To-be, itself, is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that which is act; for nothing has actuality except in so far as it is. Hence, being is the actuality of all things, even of forms themselves. 3

On the other hand, the to-be of created things is in itself nothing unless it be received into something else and be specified by some nature, as Boethius states:

To-be is not as yet anything. 4

1. In De Ente et Essentia, ch. V, c. 10, n. 90. (LT m. 18)
2. De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 9 (LT n. 14)
3. Sum. Theol. I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3. (LT n. 20)
And Saint Thomas continues in the passage quoted above:

Therefore, it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received, but rather as the received to the receiver. When, therefore, I speak of the to-be of a man, or of a horse, or of anything else, the to-be is considered as a formal principle, and as something received, and not as that to which to-be belongs.

To-be, itself, takes its determination, its whole character, from that which it brings to actuality, which it posits in the world of reality. It is as act to which all else is as potency: remote or proximate. We say "remote" because matter in natural substances is not in proximate potency for the act of to-be; if, per impossibile, it existed as mere matter, then all form would be purely accidental, superadded to an already existing matter. Saint Thomas says:

The very to-be is not the proper act of matter, but is of the whole substance. For to-be is the act of that of which we can say that it is. Now, to-be is predicated not of matter, but of the whole. Hence, matter can not be called what is, but the substance itself is that which is.

Thus, neither is the form that which is in those things composed of matter and form; nor is the form the to-be. It is compared to the latter as whiteness is to "to be white". Form is, to be sure, the determining principle of a being; it is that by which (quo) a material substance is what it is. But it is not that which is (id quod est), nor does it confer existence on it. The to-be is that by which (quo) the substance comes actually to

1. Sum. Theol., loc. cit. (LT n. 31)
2. Con. Gent., II, ch. 54. (LT n. 22)
be and is called a being.

Hence, in things composed of matter and form, neither matter nor form can be called either that which is or the very to-be. Yet, form can be called that by which something is, according as it is a principle of to-be; but the whole substance is that which is. And the to-be is that by which the substance is denominated being. ¹

There is, therefore, a double composition in existing material substance: 1) that of matter and form which are the essential components of the substance; and 2) that of the ensuing composite and its to-be. In other words, the substance, thus considered, involves a twofold actualizing quo: the form which determines the matter, thus giving rise to a specific nature; and the to-be which makes the composite to exist outside its causes. ² And if we consider the supposit, it is possible to speak of a threefold quo in those things composed of matter and form: 1) the form which actualizes the matter; 2) the nature that results from the union of form and matter, as for instance, humanity; 3) the act of existing.

In created separated substances, however, in which there is no matter unless we understand every potency to be "Matter" in an improper sense), there is only one composition required for a substance to exist: the form is itself that which is; that by which it actually exists is its to-be. To continue with the passage in the Contra Gentes:

1. idem. (LTT m. 23)
2. Cajetan points out two ways in which these two compositions agree and ten ways in which they differ. In De Ente et Essentia, loc. cit.
In intellectual substances, however, which are not composed of matter and form, as has been shown, but in which the form itself is the subsisting substance, the form is what is, but the to-be is the act by which it is.\footnote{Con. Gent., loc. cit.; cf. also, infra, p. 161. (\textit{L.T} no. 24)}

In creatures, therefore, we find that the to-be is a terminal perfection both to other quo's and to quod est, whether this be material or spiritual. Hence, it is second act to all foregoing potencies and perfections.

In his commentary on the \textit{De Hebdomadibus}, Saint Thomas next explains the three differences that Boethius gives between what is and to-be, taken according to their intentions; he afterwards shows how these differences apply to things in the concrete when he develops the principles concerning the one.

The first difference is stated thus:

To-be is not as yet anything, but that which is, having received the form of to-be, is and has consistence.\footnote{DH, B, n. 14, 15.} Since to-be is not by itself anything, it cannot be the subject of to-be, just as to run cannot be the subject of the race; both, taken in themselves, are abstract. Something other than to-be will have to be, as something other than to run will have to run. To-be awaits, as it were, a subject in order to exercise its own actuality; it, itself, never stands in the relation of subject to some ulterior act. This point is brought out in the same passage of the \textit{De Potentia} to which we referred above:
Hence, to-be is not determined by another as potency is by act, but rather as act is by potency. For in the definition of forms, the proper matter is put in place of a differentia, as, for instance, it is said that the soul is the act of a natural body endowed with organs. And in this manner, one to-be is distinguished from another to-be in that it is of such or such a nature.

But on the other hand, that which is can be the subject of to-be, and subsists in itself in virtue of having received the act of to-be. Of this substance that is, the text says:

Being is not predicated properly and per se except of substance to which it belongs to subsist. For accidents are not called beings as if they themselves were, but only in as much as they are in some subject.

The second difference between the two notions is this:

That which is can participate in something else, but to-be participates in no way in anything.

Saint Thomas here mentions various ways in which one thing may participate, or take a part, in another; we give them in summary:

a) as when one thing receives in a particular way that which, considered in itself, is more universal, as man participates in animal, or Socrates in man. In other words, as a species participates in a genus; or as an individual, in a species or in a genus.

b) as a subject participates in accident; and matter, in form. The substantial form, universal when considered as to its nature, is limited by this or that matter;

1. De Potentia, loc. cit. (LT n. 25)
2. DH, T, n. 15.
3. DH, B, n. 16.
and in a similar way, the accidental form is determined in this or that subject.

c) as an effect participates in its cause. This is especially true when the effect is of lesser power, as is the light in the air from the sun.

The third mode will be considered later. For the present we shall follow Saint Thomas's commentary which returns to the first two only. Viewed in the first mode, to-be is, itself, the most abstract, and hence cannot participate in anything else as a particular in a universal, or as a less universal in a more universal, as when this man is referred to man, or man to animal. It is true that some things spoken of in the abstract can still participate in something more universal, as "whiteness" in "color"; but there is nothing more universal than to-be, since in each thing it is that by which whatever is, is. Hence, unlike whiteness, to-be cannot participate in anything more universal. Thus it follows that neither can it, according to the second mode, participate as subject, in any substantial or accidental form.

Now, that which is is also most universal, yet it must participate in to-be. The solution is, as Saint Thomas points out, that the one universal is related to the other, not as one abstract to another, as the less universal to the more universal, but as the most universal by way of concretion: that which is (quod) to the most universal by way of abstraction: that by which (quo) that which is, is. Now since that which

1. DH, T, n. 18.
is, is because of to-be, that which is, while commensurate with to-be in universality, will be only in so far as it participates in to-be.

And this leads us immediately to the third difference:

That which is can have something besides what it itself is; but the very to-be has no admixture of ought besides itself.¹

Anything that is signified in the abstract, that is, as something "by which" something is such or such, cannot, thus unadulterated, have anything extraneous added to what it is; it is indivisibly confined to itself as that by which a thing is such. Humanity is that by which a thing is a man; whiteness, that by which the white is white. Whiteness is not that by which something white is also other than white, such as warm; nor does humanity admit of anything else but that by which a man is a man; for even what is accidental, such as whiteness, is, thus considered, indivisible and unmixed.

But when a thing is signified in the concrete, such as man, it may have something which is not of the nature of that by which it is such, as man may have something else than that by which he is a man, for instance, whiteness. Likewise, whereas whiteness cannot be warm, the white can also be warm—just as the warm can be white. Saint Thomas says of this:

¹. DH, B, n. 18. Cf. the commentary, n. 18, for what follows.
Thus, what is warm can have something extraneous to
heat added to it, as whiteness, but heat itself can
have nothing besides heat.\footnote{Sum. Theol., I, a.3, a.6, c. (LIT n.24)}

Hence, while the concrete subject, man, remains the
same, the formalities by which he is man, white, tall, learned,
warm, are many, as parts of one whole. That they are as parts
is seen from the fact that man is not humanity, nor whiteness,
nor learning, and so on. If concrete things were merely what
they are by one formality, they would be singularly impoveri-
shed. A universe constituted by such separately subsisting
forms would be tenuous indeed. But, as the commentary adds:

\textit{The fact that a man has human nature or whiteness does
not prevent him from having something else which does
not belong to the nature of these \footnote{DS, B, n. 19.} with the exception
of that which is opposed to these.}\footnote{DE, T, n. 18.}

On the other hand, nothing extraneous can be added to the very
to-be, for"to-be is signified as something abstract."\footnote{DS, B, n. 19.}

This third difference brings us to a new point of
view, for because of the fact that concrete substance can have
something besides its own essence, consideration must be given
to a twofold manner of being in things. The \textit{De Hebdomadibus}
says:

\textit{To be something absolutely is not the same as to be re-
latively... Every thing that is participates in to-be
so that it may be; in order to be relatively, it partici-
cipates in something else.}\footnote{DS, B, n. 19.}

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Sum. Theol., I, c.3, a.6, c. \footnote{LIT n.24}
\item[2.] DH, T, n. 18.
\item[3.] DH, B, n. 19.
\end{itemize}
And this difference in ways of being, follows from a difference in the formal principle:

For since form is the principle of to-be, it is necessary that according to whatever form is had, the thing having it be denominated. If, therefore, that form is not more than the essence of the thing possessing it, but constitutes its essence, then from the fact of having such a form, the thing having it is said to be absolutely, for instance, a man from the fact that he has a rational soul. If it be a form extraneous to the essence of the thing having it, according to that form a thing is not said to be absolutely, but to be relatively; as for instance, according to whiteness a man is said to be white.

In a number of passages, Saint Thomas marks well the distinction between absolute being and relative being, sometimes from the point of view of form, as in the text just quoted, sometimes from the point of view of the mode of existence, as in the following from the first question of the Summa Theologica:

Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality, a thing is, in consequence, said absolutely to be, according as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality, and this is precisely each thing's substantial to-be. Hence, it is by its substantial to-be that everything is said to have being absolutely. Thus to be white signifies being relatively, for to be white does not take a thing out of absolutely potential being, since it is added to a thing that actually has being.

Thus, that which is a being relatively (secundum

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1. DH, T, n. 18.
2. Sum. Theol., I, q.5, a.1, ad 1.  
   Cf. also: I, a.76, a.4, c, 
   where we read: the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be absolutely, but to be such, as heat does not make a thing to be absolutely, but only to be hot. But the substantial form gives being absolutely, and hence by its coming a thing is said to be generated absolutely.  
   C.  
   Be in loc. 9. 21, a.5, c.
quid) does not have a to-be of its own apart from the being to which it is added. It is of its nature not so much to be, as to be in (inessse) another as in a subject. Thus Saint Thomas writes in the Metaphysics:

...quantity and quality and the like, are not simpliciter beings, as will be said. For being is predicated as of that having to-be, but this is only substance, which subsists. Accidents are called beings, not because they are, but rather because by them something is; as white is said to be, because its subject is white. Therefore, he says that they are not called beings absolutely, but are beings of being, as for instance, quality and motion.

We must note that this division of being into absolute and relative, or into substance and accident, is made according to an absolute consideration of the nature of anything. Hence, the accident which is here opposed to substance is the predicamental accident. That this division is not the same as the one between ens per se and ens per accidens is made patent by the fact that ens per se is itself divided into the ten predicaments, of which nine are in the genus accident. The latter division is made according as something is predicated of another essentially or accidentally; accidental, here, has reference to the fifth predicatable.

A number of differences between absolute being and relative being are pointed out by Cajetan and Saint Thomas. Since it is the form that causes the to-be, Cajetan shows

1. Cf. p. 149
2. In Metaph., XII, 1.1, n.2419. (LTm. 28)
3. Op. cit., V, 1.9, n.3885. (LTm. 27)
how a difference in its function involves a difference in the to-be of substance and of accident. We shall give briefly the five ways in which he states that they are distinguished:¹

a) That which receives substantial form does not have a to-be apart from that caused by the substantial form; it is being in pure potency. Whereas the subject of accidental form is already actually existing.

b) From the union of substantial form with its subject, there comes a to-be by which a thing absolutely is; from the union of accidental form with its subject, there comes a to-be by which a thing is relatively. This difference arises from the first. For from the fact that the subject of substantial form is lacking to-be, it first is by the to-be which comes from form. But the subject of accidental form already enjoys its to-be and hence comes to be in some way, but not absolutely.

c) From the union of substantial form with its subject, there arises an unum per se. From the composition of accidental form with its subject, there does not arise an unum except per accidens. Unum follows ens.

d) From the union of substantial form with matter, a third reality, an essence, results; but not from the union of accidental form with its subject. This follows from the third difference: Essence is that which is signified by definition. The defined must be an unum per se. From the fact that the union of accidental form with its subject does not result in an unum per se, neither does an essence result.

e) Although substantial form is not a complete essence, it is part of a complete essence. Accident is neither. This difference follows from the fourth.

In the commentary on Boethius' work, Saint Thomas gives three differences between absolute being and relative being. They may be stated succinctly, in the light of the passage just presented from Cajetan:

a) It belongs to substance to be absolutely, since the substantial form determines the essence of the thing.

It belongs to accident to be relatively, since the accidental form is extraneous to the essence of a thing.

¹. In De Ente et Essentia, Ch. VII, n. 135.
2. DH, T, ff. 20-22.
b) In order to be absolutely, a subject participates in the very to-be.

In order to be relatively, a thing participates in something else.

c) First, a thing is absolutely. Afterwards, it is relatively.

This "first" and "afterwards" do not necessarily involve a passage of time in one and the same concrete thing; a thing has some of its accidental determinations when it first comes to be. "First" may also mean in the order of nature; thus, if there were not substance first of all, accidents would have no subject for their being. Taken absolutely, however, substance is prior in both the chronological order and the logical.¹

As a kind of summary for the matter we have just been considering, and as a prelude to the following principles which concern the one, we should like to quote one more relevant of Saint Thomas, text, taken from the Contra Gentes:

The very to-be cannot participate in anything which is not of its essence: although that which is can participate in something else. For nothing is more formal or more simple than to-be. And thus, the very to-be can participate in nothing. But the divine substance is to-be itself. Therefore, it has nothing which is not of its substance. Therefore, no accident can be in it.²

Sajetan, too, in considering a passage from the Contra Gentes, which deals with the real distinction between essence and existence, makes a profound observation drawn from the third difference noted by Boethius, between to-be and that which is. He

². Con. Gent., I, Ch. 23. (LT m. 50)
has said that every created essence has something conjoined with it, besides its to-be, but a to-be that would not be received into a subject, would have nothing added. He then comments:

The precise reason why a to-be may have something more than itself added, is that to-be is received in another, in which other, something else can be received. This is clear from the fact that the substantial to-be of Sortes and his to-be-white are united by no other reason except that each is received into Sortes, for they are one only in their subject. When, therefore, to-be will not be received, there will not remain any way in which it can have anything added.¹

In the following paragraph, he makes clear that although this addition follows upon to-be, it is not identified with it; nor can the substantial to-be stand as potency to an accidental to-be, because:

No to-be of actual existence can be posited as subject of another to-be, since it is the ultimate actuality.²

Therefore, Cajetan concludes:

It remains that they are united by the reason that both are received into a third; and so if the latter is taken away from the very to-be of actual existence ... there is also taken away the possibility of to-be's having anything more added. And this is what Boethius says in the De Hebdomadibus: that that which is has something besides itself added to it; but the very to-be, nothing.³

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We have found that the notions of to-be and what is

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¹ Op. cit., Ch. V, q. 12, n. 100. (LT n. 31)
² Loc. cit. (LT n. 32)
³ Loc. cit. (LT n. 33)
differ in nature; we now consider whether or not they differ in the actually existing thing. It is around this point that most of the controversy anent the distinction between essence and existence has been and is still carried on. We need not, for our present purpose, enter upon the history of that controversy. We are interested only in giving the answer of the De Hebdomadi-bus, together with several other texts that corroborate the same doctrine, so that we may be the better prepared to grasp the relations between to be and to be good.

John of Saint Thomas examines the case of the actually existing essence and presents as excellent a statement of the problem as we know. It merits quoting at length:

The difficulty is, whether two entities concur; one, that of essence which receives existence; the other, that of existence which renders essence actual; just as a white body, not only when the whiteness is removed but also while the body is subject to it, is distinguished from the whiteness by which it is rendered white. But there is this difference between white and existing: that the existing thing, when existence is removed, ceases altogether, and remains nothing; whereas the body, when the whiteness is removed, remains existing, and so it is easily seen how it is really distinguished from whiteness. But with regard to existence, it does not so easily appear that there is some entity distinguished from it, which is called essence: since this letter is in act only as long as it is the subject of existence; but when existence is removed, essence remains nothing, and only in a state of possibility. And from this fact, some maintain that essence and existence cannot be distinguished unless as one would distinguish nothing and being, or, a thing in a state of possibility and the same thing outside its causes. But that even while essence exists, it is distinguished from existence in such a way that one reality would be existence, and the other, essence, although one would be nothing without the other: this is the whole difficulty.1

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1. Curs. Theol. I, disp.4, a.3, n.3. (L7 m.34)
The question, then, is whether the substance that exists is really distinguished from its existence, so that there is a real composition of these two in the concrete; or if they are distinguished only by a distinction of reason, so that the substance and its existence would be one and the same reality.

Saint Thomas unmistakably stands for a real distinction in creatures. The principle, as stated in the text of Boethius, is:

In every composite, to-be is one thing and that which is is another.

The commentary on this furnishes a proof that we have not found elsewhere in just the same form, drawn from what was previously said concerning the to-be. This is the argument:

Every to-be does not participate in anything else; hence its nature cannot be constituted by anything other than to-be.

To-be does not have anything extraneous added, so there is no composition of accident in it.

Hence, there is no composition whatever in it, either essential or accidental.

Therefore, the composite cannot possibly be the same reality as its uncomposite to-be.

The next principle further develops this doctrine, and affirms that:

Every thing simple has its to-be and that which is as one.

1. DH, B, n.23.
2. DH, T, n.23.
3. DH, B, 2.24.
Saint Thomas begins dialectically by speaking of "simple things" in general, as if there were a number of cases to be considered. As he progresses, he rules out from the category of the absolutely simple, those things that might seem to be and yet are not truly so. First, simple bodies such as "fire" and "water"; then, separated, subsisting forms of sensible things such as Plato understood them; and then, separated forms, as Aristotle thought them. Of all these it may be said:

Nothing prevents a thing from being relatively simple in so far as it lacks a certain composition, and yet not be entirely simple.1

Briefly, this is the way the De Hebdomadibus disposes of each case. Fire and water are composed of matter and form as well as of the parts of quantity. Platonic subsisting natures are each determined to a species; hence, no one as the universal to-be, but each participates in it. Hence, each has some composition. The immaterial forms of a higher order than sensible things, as Aristotle taught, are distinguished from one another; hence, are particular forms participating in to-be. And therefore, these too have some composition. That will be truly simple which does not participate in to-be, but is the very to-be itself.

There is no need to dwell further on the case of fire and water, nor on that of the Platonic forms. But Aristotle seems to have envisaged in his immaterial forms, the intellec-

1. DH, T, N. 24.
2. Loc. cit.
tual substances that we know as angels. What of these spiri-
tual creatures, the angels, in their actual state of existence?
Will it be true of them, whose nature is pure form, that each
one, since it is simple in nature, has its to-be and what is
as one? Saint Thomas's answer certainly is "no". In the fol-
lowing passage he first makes a supposition with regard to sim-
ple quiddities:

Now if we should find some quiddity not composed of matter
and form: that quiddity is either its own to-be, or it is
not. If that quiddity should be its own to-be, then, it
will be the essence of God Himself, which is its own to-
be, and it will be entirely simple. But if it is not its
own to-be, it must have its to-be acquired from another,
as does every created quiddity. And since this quiddity
is supposed as not subsisting in matter, to-be will not
come to it in another, as in composite quiddities, but
will come to it itself; and so the quiddity itself will be
what is and its to-be will be that by which it is.

He then shows that in such a quiddity there will be potency and
act, since its quiddity, not being its own existence, must have
it from another; and he asserts that this is the case of the
angel and of the soul.

And in this way I understand the composition of potency and
act in angels, of quo est and quod est; and likewise, in the
soul. Hence, an angel or a soul can be called simple quiddi-
dity or nature in so far as their quiddity is not composed
of diverse things; but nevertheless, there is found in them
a composition of these two, namely, quiddity and to-be.

Again, in his work De Spiritualibus Creaturis - after

1. I Sent., D. VIII, q. 5, a. 2, c.; cf. p. 148. (LIT m. 35)
2. Loc. cit. (LIT m. 34)
speaking of the twofold act and twofold potency in material composites (as we have seen\(^1\)) - he treats the question of the separated substances:

If there remains some form, of a determinate nature, subsisting in itself and not in matter, it will be compared to its to-be as potency to act. However, I do not say as potency separable from act, but rather which is always accompanied by its act.\(^2\)

Now it could hardly be made more definite than it is in the last sentence, that we are talking about an actually existing spiritual creature: a subsisting form not separated from its existence; and of this, Saint Thomas says:

In this way the nature of the spiritual substance which is not composed of matter and form, is as potency with respect to its to-be. And thus, in the spiritual substance there is composition of potency and act, and consequently of form and matter, if every potency be called matter and every act be called form. But yet, this is not properly said according to the common use of the terms.\(^3\)

These texts surely assert that in all created things there is a real composition of to-be and what is, whether the creature be composite in nature or simple. For further assurance, if need there be, we add another citation which offers an additional reason for this composition and distinction:

Every thing that is in the genus substance, is composed by a real composition, from the fact that that which is

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1. Cf. p. 147
2. De Spirit. Creat., Q.1, a.1, c. (\(L/L\) n. 37)
in the category of substance is subsisting in its own to-be, and so its to-be has to be other than itself, otherwise it could not differ in its being from those things with which it agrees in the nature of its ousddity... And thus every thing that is directly in the category of substance is composed at least of to-be and what is.

There is no creature, then, that is truly simple, since all can be shown to have some composition. That which is truly simple must be the existing nature of to-be itself, uncomposed in essence, uncomposed in existence, and receptive of no addition. Apart from this, every thing is, of necessity, more or less composite. Now, no matter what nature we consider, it can be only one and undivided in itself - one nature of animal, one nature of white, one nature of man, and so on; all the more is it obvious that there can be only one self-subsisting to-be. The dialectical consideration of simple things in general has thus cleared the way to a single Being that is perfectly simple.

Saint Thomas says:

1. De Veritate, c. 27, a. 1, ad 8, n. The same is not true of those things that are in the category of substance by reduction, as for instance, the principles of substance. Nor is this true of accidents, since they do not have their own to-be; these have a composition of genus and difference. Cf. also: De Spirit. Creat., loc. cit.: "God is His own to-be. But this can not be said of any other; for just as it is impossible to understand that there might be a plurality of separated whitenesses, since if white were separated from every subject and receiver, it would be only one; so it is impossible that the self-subsisting to-be should be other than one only. Therefore, every thing that is, after the first being, since it is not its own to-be, has its to-be received in another by which the to-be is contracted. And thus, in any created thing whatever, the nature of the thing that participates to-be is one thing, and the participated to-be, itself, is another." That God is not in the genus substance, cf: Sum. Theol., I, q. 3, a. 5, c.; In Sent. I, D. VIII, q. 14, a. 2.
But to-be, in that it is to-be, cannot be diverse: it can, however, be diversified by something besides to-be; as, for instance, the to-be of a stone is other than the to-be of a man. Therefore, that which is subsisting to-be can be only one. It has been shown (I, ch. 22) that God is His own subsisting to-be. Hence, none other than He can be its own to-be. Therefore, it must be that in every substance, except God, the substance is difference from its to-be.

In the De Hebdomadibus, too, Saint Thomas reaffirms a doctrine that is central in all his teaching: that in every created thing there is a real distinction between essence and existence, and that to God alone belongs absolute simplicity:

Now that alone will be truly simple which does not participate in to-be; not something inhering, but rather, subsisting. This, however, can be only one; because if the very to-be has no admixture of ought besides that which is to-be, as was said, it is impossible for that which is to-be, itself, to be multiplied by anything diversifying. Moreover, since it has nothing added besides itself, it follows that it can receive no accident. Now this simple being, unique and sublime, is God Himself.

To return now to the three modes of participation mentioned above, it is most important to understand correctly the nature of the first mode, lest we be logically led to the error of those who, confusing community of predication with causal community, identified the esse communissimum of the first mode with an existing reality, and understood that God is the formal to-be of all things. Saint Thomas warns us against this more

2. DH, T, n. 24.
3. Cf. p. 149.
4. Saint Thomas devotes I Con. Gent., ch. 26, to this problem; cf. also II Con. Gent., ch. 75 (secunda ratio).
than once, and makes it definitely clear that the self-sustaining to-be is not to be confused with the to-be that is universally common to all things.

In the De Potentia there is an objection stated as follows:

Being to which no addition is made is being that is universally common to all. But if God is His own to-be, He will be a being to which no addition is made. Therefore, He will be universal; and thus will be predicated of each and every thing; and God will be mixed with all things. And this is heretical...

The answer is given:

Universal being is that to which no addition is made; yet, it is not of its nature that it is impossible for any addition to be made to it. The divine to-be is a being to which no addition is made, and it is of its nature that no addition can possibly be made to it. Hence, the divine to-be is not to-be, taken in its community.

We must point out that the common to-be, considered in this very community, does not, itself, have a being apart from those things of which it may be predicated, but it is only in the mind. It is thus opposed to those things as the abstract to the concrete which participates in it, as Socrates in man. This community or universality differs from the universality of causality. For the universal cause is a being apart from those things of which it is a universal cause. The being that is the most universal cause, God, would be partici-

1. De Potentia, c. 7, a.2, obj.6. (47 n.4)
2. Idem, ad 6, c. 7; also: Capstan, op. cit., ch. 15, n.108: although the abstract universal to-be can exist in the mind without addition, it cannot exist outside the mind without addition and determination.
pated in according to the third mode of participation, the one Saint Thomas merely states without taking it up further. And we can now see the reason why he does not do so.

After the principles which have to do with being, we turn to others which concern the good; then, we shall have a preparation for solving the difficulty as to how substances are good. Since the good is defined in terms of appetite; that is good which all things desire, we are led to examine two principles in the domain of appetite. The first:

Every unlikeness is discordant; likeness, however, is desirable.

is drawn from the fact that each and every thing desires its own perfection. In desiring this, it will naturally desire in some way, such things as bear a likeness to its own being; that is, which are proportionate and suitable to it, and contribute to its development and attainment of its end. For since like is increased and perfected by like; and every thing desires to be perfected; then, every thing must desire its like. It follows that it will repel the unlike, since this is discordant with its perfection. The primary and fundamental assertion of this principle is found in each thing's desire to be, and to shun whatever is counter to its continuance.

Saint Thomas adds in his commentary that it is per accidens that the reverse is true: that an appetite desires

L. DH, B, n.25
the unlike and shuns the like. It seems that this may happen even while a thing is pursuing its proper perfection which "consists in a certain commensuration"; or, it may happen because a thing has turned aside from its proper perfection - as man may, through vicious habit. As illustration of the first possibility, Saint Thomas gives the example of the warmth of the body. There is a certain warmth that is proportionate to it; hence, like. This, the body desires. But if it has deviated from it, it may per accidens desire that which is unlike, namely, greater heat or greater cold in order to bring the body back to its commensurate warmth. Of the second possibility, perhaps the potter is an example. He should desire to hold commerce with others of his trade in as much as one may contribute to another's perfection cua potter, by sharing his competence in the art. Yet, if one desires profit and the other is taking away his client tele, the first disdains the second; this is per accidens.

But it is the like that is per se desirable; and from this fact, follows a second principle:

That which desires another shows itself to be naturally like to that which it desires.  

For, as Saint Thomas goes on to say:

If likeness is per se to be desired, consequently that

1. DH, T, n. 25.
2. DH, B, n. 26.
which desires another shows that it is naturally like 
that which it desires, namely, it has a natural incli-
nation for that which it desires.¹

This is an application, or a corollary, in the order 
of appetite, of two other more general principles: Every agent 
acts like itself - or, it might be said: Such as a thing is, 
such is the act it produces; and the second: Every agent acts 
for an end. Thus we see that there is a twofold determination 
in any created agent: one, on the side of form, to produce an 
act formally like itself; the other, on the side of appetite, 
to desire some thing other than itself as an end. If the act 
is like the agent, then so must its object be, for the act is 
specified by the object; it will not, then, be a like act un-
less the object is also like. Therefore, in acting for an end, 
every agent acts in some way for a likeness, since the end is 
as the object, to appetite. That it does so by "natural in-
clination" is attributable to its form; for:

From the diversity of forms whence things derive their 
specific differences, there follows also the difference 
of operations. For since things act according as they 
are actual ... and since a thing is actual by its form, 
athing's operation must needs follow its form. Accor-
dingly, if there be diverse forms, these must have di-
verse operations.²

And, with regard to the end:

Since each thing attains to its proper end by its proper 

¹. DH, T, n. 26.
². Con. Gent. III, ch. 97. (LT m. 43)
action, it follows that there must be diverse proper ends in things, although there is one common end for all.¹

This diversity of forms which is the root and source of diverse inclinations, may be in the substantial order or in the accidental. Hence, the De Hebdomadibus says:

This natural inclination sometimes follows from the very essence of the thing, as the heavy tends downwards according to its essential nature; but sometimes it follows from the nature of some supervening form, as when anyone has an acquired disposition, he desires that which is agreeable to him according to this disposition.²

It is because of this latter accidental formation, for instance, that a man's desires are set upon ends that are like to the habitus he has cultivated, although these may not be in line with his proper perfection. As Aristotle wrote:

According as a man is, such does the end seem to him.³

Thus is explained his turning away, per accidens, from objects properly suitable to human desire, and his seeking the unlike and the unsuitable. He is, however, desiring a likeness to some vicious habitus that he has cultivated. In speaking of the appetitive powers, Saint Thomas gives the basis for this:

Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Hence, each power desires by natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself.⁴

One power can be demanding, out of harmony with the whole. Hence,

¹. Loc. cit. (LT m. 44)
². DH. T. n. 26. art. 13, m. 516 (LTm. 45)
³. Sum. Theol., L, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3 (LT r. 46)
⁴. Sum. Theol., L, q. 80, a. 1, ad 3 (LT r. 46)
depending on the way and the order in which man habitually satisfies these powers, so will he be: like objects, like acts; like acts, like habits; like habits, like desires.

In the same question of the Summa Theologica, and in the following one, there is a division of appetite based upon the fundamental principle that some inclination toward a suitable end follows every form. First, take those things that lack knowledge:

For in those that lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being — that is, to the being which is natural to each. Now this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite.

But those things which have knowledge, may by that fact possess other forms besides the form which determines their natural being, since they can receive by their knowledge powers, the intentional forms or species of other things — of sensible things in the sense powers, and of intelligible objects in the intellect. And:

Therefore, just as in those beings that have knowledge, forms exist in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms, so there must be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination which is called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive part of the soul.

Saint Thomas then makes a distinction between the

1. I, q. 30, a. 1, c. (LT m. 47)
2. I, q. 30, a. 1, c. (LT m. 48)
sense appetite and the intellectual appetite, based on the
difference in their respective appetibles; for the appetible
is to the appetite as an active and motive principle to the
passive and movable. Hence, there must be a proportion be­
tween the appetible and the appetite. It follows that:

Since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is
apprehended by sense are generically different, conse­
quently the intellectual appetite is distinct from the
sense.1

In another unit, where Saint Thomas is considering
the will, there is a question which admirably epitomizes the
teaching concerning the appetite that we have just reviewed:
that appetite is of something good; that it is an inclination
towards what is like and suitable to the thing inclined; that
this inclination follows form, and is accordingly diversified.

Now every appetite is only of something good. The rea­
son for this is that the appetite is nothing else than
an inclination of a being desirous of a thing, towards
that thing. Now every inclination is to something like
and suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore,
everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a
good, it must needs be that every inclination is to
something good. And hence it is that the Philosopher
says that the good is that which all desire.2

Then, the different appetites are named:

But it must be noted that, since every inclination re­
results from a form, the natural appetite results from a
form existing in the nature of things, while the sensi­
tive, as also the intellectual or rational appetite,

1. [Loc. cit.] a.2, c. (LT n. 44)
2. [Loc. cit.] a.5, a.1, c. (LT n. 50)
called the will, follows from an apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing, so the sense appetite and the voluntary appetite tend to the apprehended good.

In the principles which have to do with appetite and the good, our attention has been directed primarily to the good and the like and the suitable that is desired. With these principles in mind, as well as the others which concern being and the one, we shall take up the question submitted by John, the deacon: How are created substances, considered in themselves, good?

1. Loc. cit. (LT m.51)
CHAPTER III
Solutions Rejected

Now that we are in possession of the principles, we enter into the problem that concerns created goods. But many ideas have passed through our minds since we stated the difficulty at the beginning of the first chapter; hence, it may well be repeated here:

It is said that created substances in as much as they are, are good; yet, on the other hand, it is said that creatures are not substantial goods, but that to be a substantial good is proper to God alone. Now whatever belongs to any thing in as much as it is, seems to belong to it substantially; and so if created substances, in as much as they are, are good, it seems that they are, in consequence, substantial goods.

And then, we put it this way:

Good is a transcendental attribute of being. Hence, whatever is, is good in so far as it is.

It would seem to follow, then, that substances, being ens per se should also be bonum per se.

Yet, it is said that this is true only of God. - And this is what John did not understand.

The statement of the question rests on the presupposition, as we see, that every thing that is, is good. But this preliminary assumption of the Deacon's is now given the support of solid proof, based on reasons taken from what precedes concerning appetite. The argument may be formulated thus:

2. DH, T. N. 29.
Every thing desires its like.
Therefore, whatever desires another, shows itself to be like that other.
But every thing desires the good.
Therefore, every thing is good.

Boethius had presented the principle: every thing desires the good, as one commonly accepted by the wise. And we find it stated over and over again in the works of Saint Thomas, with or without the addition: as the Philosopher says in the beginning of the Ethics. But now, in his commentary on the De Hebdomadibus, he does more than restate the principle, in his intent to have the whole solution stand firm. In a few deft words, he sets up a rigorous argument to prove it so:¹

The proper object of the appetite is the good.

Every thing has an appetite - intellectual, sense, or natural.

Therefore, every thing desires the good.

This reinforced the proof that was given that every thing is good, for:

Just as sound is that which is perceived by every act of hearing, so good must be that to which every appetite tends.²

Then, since every thing tends to its like, every thing is good.

Granted that all things are good, the problem still remains as to the manner in which they are good. Two possibi-

¹. Loc. cit.
². Loc. cit.
lities present themselves: by their essence or by participation. In the commentary, Saint Thomas calls attention to the fact that Boethius is presupposing here that "to be something by essence and something by participation are opposites"; and he shows the various ways in which these may be so taken, by making reference to the modes of participation given above. This may be:

a) When a subject participates in accident, for the accident is manifestly outside the essence of the subject. Hence, that which is per essentiam, namely, the subject, is in opposition to that which is per participationem: the accident.

b) Likewise, when matter participates in form, since form is not of the nature of matter.

c) In the case of a species participating in a genus, one is not the same as another according to the opinion of Plato, hence, they are in opposition: "for the idea of animal is one thing and of the biped, man, another." But according to Aristotle "who posits that man truly is that which is animal", then, something might be predicated by participation which is also predicated essentially. Hence, these two would obviously not be taken as opposite predications.

Saint Thomas says that for our present problem, Boethius is speaking according to the first way, that is:

according to that mode of participation by which the subject participates accident; and therefore, that which is

1. DH, T, n. 31.
2. Cf. p. 149
predicated substantially is placed in opposition with that which is predicated by participation, as is clear from the examples he subsequently gives.¹

The examples referred to are "white", "heavy", "round", "colored", "and the like." There would be no question here of the second mode mentioned, since we are presuming substances already determined by form; nor of the third, for we are not Platonists in this respect.

Having made this neat distinction between that which is per essentiam and that which is per participationem, we run into an impasse, however, whether we say that substances are good in one way or the other.

For if we hold that substances are good by participation as a subject participates in accident, then they are not good in themselves, per se. And in order to make this clear, Saint Thomas comes back several times to the meaning in which per se is to be understood. In one instance:

("In themselves is posited as being whatever is said in the very definition of that about which it is said, just as man is in himself animal. For whatever is put in the definition of any thing pertains to its essence, and so it is not said of it by that participation of which we are now speaking.²"

And again, after quoting the example Boethius uses as an illustration: that which is white by participation is not white in itself, he adds:

"That is, in that which itself is, which pertains to the first mode of saying per se."³

². DH, T, n. 32
³. Loc. cit.
This text does not give the various modes of \textit{per se} predication, but we know from the commentary on the \textit{Posteriora Analytica} that there are four.\textsuperscript{1} It will not be amiss to restate them here, as we shall have other occasion to refer to them; thus, we shall see more precisely the distinction at issue.

The first mode follows upon the formal cause. When that which is predicated of a thing, belongs to its form, it is said to be predicated \textit{per se}. Hence, since the definition is most formal in a thing, whenever the definition, or anything included in the definition, is predicated of a thing, this is \textit{per se} according to the first mode.

The second mode involves the material cause, and occurs when a proper attribute is predicated of its subject. That to which a proper accident is attributed is its proper matter and subject - although it does not constitute it essentially - and is put in its definition. Accidents which do not include the subject in their definition, are predicated not \textit{per se}, but \textit{per accidens}.

The third mode is not one of predicing, but rather of existing, so that something "is \textit{per se}" when it exists by itself and not in another. This will be true of those things in the genus "substance", but not of such things as inhere in another, such as "walking" and "white".

The fourth mode is one of causing, and is had when the proper reason of the predicated is in the subject as its efficient cause. John of Saint Thomas gives as example of this: the builder is building, but not: the builder is walking. And again, in showing that something could be in the first mode \textit{per se} and not in the fourth, since essential identity suffices for the first, he exemplifies thus: animal and rational are identified and belong to man \textit{per se} according to the first mode; but "the animal is reasoning" is not a \textit{per se} predication according to the fourth mode, because in \underline{animal} there is not given the formal reason of \underline{reasoning}.

For the purposes of our inquiry, there must be made a clear cut distinction, because if there is any case in which

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Cf. Post. Anal. I, 1. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Cf. Curs. Phil., Edit. Reiser, p. 769.
\end{itemize}
something is per se on the subject and yet is predicated participatively, then in that case it will not be true to say that if substances are good by participation, they are not good per se. Now this is precisely the case of the proper accident, which is predicated according to the second mode of saying per se, and yet is predicated of the subject participatively. Hence Saint Thomas says:

Boethius, therefore, takes participation here as a subject participates an accident, but he takes in itself for what is posited in the definition of the subject.

Thus, if we say that substances are good by participation, it follows that they are not good in their own substance, per se, as we have noted in the example of white. And the same may be said for other accidents. The fact of a man's being tall or short, white or brown, just or unjust, does not penetrate at all into the constitution of his substance; it is "outside the essence of the subject." It is not the substance, as such, that is brown or tall; the substance remains "rational animal". Hence, neither would the substance be good if goodness were predicated of substance by participation as a subject participates an accident; the substance itself would not be good any more than it is brown or tall. Saint Thomas concludes this part of the investigation thus:

Therefore, if all beings are good by participation, it follows that they are not good per se, that is, by their

L. DH, T. N. 32.
substance. From this, then, it follows that the substance of beings does not tend to the good, and the contrary of this was granted above, namely, that all beings do tend to good. It seems, therefore, that beings are good not by participation, but by their substance.

Having ruled out one possibility, we now take up the other. Are creatures good in substance, good per se, that is, by definition; hence, "necessarily good according to that very fact: that they are"? The reasoning proceeds in this wise:

The substance of any thing concurs with its to-be.
That things are, this they owe to their to-be; "a thing is when it has received to-be."
Therefore, if the subject of to-be is good, so is the to-be.
Therefore, is all things are good in substance, then the to-be of all things is good.
Conversely, "if the to-be of all things is good, then those things that are, in so far as they are, are good; so that it would be the same thing for any thing whatever to be and to be good."

Now we have arrived at creatures that are good in their substance, per se, and not by a participation of goodness. We have a world full of beings in which to be and to be good are identified. Then all would be substantial goods like unto God, since only in the First Good are being and goodness identified. But: "Nothing other than itself is like to it, namely, as to the mode of goodness"; and so it follows that all things would be the First Good itself:

If then all are the first good itself, then since the First Good is no other than God, it follows that all

1. DH, T, n. 32.
2. DH, T, nn. 35-38.
things are God. And to say this, is blasphemous.¹

Having reached this impossible conclusion, we must reject the premises. All things, then, are not substantial goods, nor is the to-be itself in them good; and so it is not true that all beings are good per essentiam.

We have shown that the substance of created things does not become good by participation in accident; we see that it is not good by its own substance. But substance and accident are all that make up the creature. It seems, then, that things are in no way good in themselves. Consequently, they do not tend to the good. But it was granted that they do. The solution must be elsewhere.

¹. DH, T, n. 42.
CHAPTER IV
Solution of the Problem

Our first inquiry into the goodness of created substances has come to an end in a neither-nor dilemma. Substances cannot be rendered good by participation in some accidental form of goodness. By such participation they would not be good at all in their own being, and therefore, would not tend to the good: a conclusion that is contrary to every best opinion. Yet, neither are substances good by reason of their own nature, per se good, necessarily good in that they are. For this would make all things to be substantial goods; it would endow every creature with the prerogative of the First Good; it would set up multitudinous idols. But it seems that they must be good either by their own essence, or by accident; and we have shown that they are neither. If there is no way to escape the dilemma, we are left with created substances closed to any and all ingress of goodness.

Here, the De Hebdomadibus brings into play our power of abstraction in order to examine the condition of things, prescinding, as it were, from the First Good. Before drawing the conclusions from this supposition, Saint Thomas briefly justifies the procedure adopted by Boethius. Since things are not in the knower by the same mode of existence that they have in reality, but rather by a second existence which is according to the nature of the knower, it is possible for the mind to consider separately the vari-
ous formalities of a thing, although these are not actually separated in the thing. This use of the power of abstraction, if properly exercised, does not lead to falsehood, as some have thought. We must, however, be careful to distinguish its right use from the wrong, for abstraction may occur in two different ways:

First, by way of composition and division and thus we may understand that one thing does not exist in some other, or that it is separated from it. Secondly, by way of a simple and absolute consideration; and thus we consider one thing without considering another. Thus, for the intellect to abstract one from another, things which are not really abstract from one another, things which are not really abstract from one another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply falsehood.¹

This falsification would occur in the first mode, for example, if the intellect were to consider man entirely separated from matter as if to have a body were not of his very nature. Or, as Saint Thomas exemplifies in the De Trinitate where he treats this subject at greater length: if I should abstract man from whiteness by saying, man is not white, and should signify separation in the thing — whereas in reality man and white were not separate.²

But, in the second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things which are not really abstract from one another, does not involve falsehood.³

According to the second mode, one may reflect on the soul of

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1. Sum. Theol., I. 85, a. 1, ad 1. (L 5
2. In Boeth. de Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3, c. (L 53
3. Sum. Theol., loc. cit. (L 54)
man without considering the body, while knowing that this is not the whole man; or, as the text suggests, on the nature of a triangle apart from the sensible matter out of which this or that triangle is made. The reason for this is put simply, in the De Hebdomadibus:

Things are in the mind in one way and are in matter in another. It can be, therefore, that something, according to the way in which it is in matter, might have an inseparable union with something else; yet, according to the way it is in the mind, not have an inseparable union with it, because the notion of one is distinct from the notion of the other.¹

For instance, the notion of body and the notion of soul are distinct; the notion of triangle and the notion of chalk or of wood. Thus, where two notions are distinct, one may be considered without the other, according to the second way of abstraction, without falsifying the true nature of reality.

Now, if we were to separate all creatures from the First Good in the first way, as if creatures could be without any dependency on the First Being and Good, this would be false, as it is false to separate man from body. But according to the second way:

Nothing prevents the effects of the Highest Good from falling under our consideration without our considering the First Good itself.²

This is because we know the sensible effects of God before

¹. DH, T, M. 48.
². DH, T, n. 50.
rising to a knowledge of God Himself; hence, the effects can be considered apart from their cause. So in order to proceed with the inquiry into the goodness of creatures, we are asked to prescind from the existence of the First Good, for the time being, although we can know "from the judgment of the learned and of the unlearned and even from the religions of uncivilized peoples" that the First Good exists. Our procedure will be this:

The First Good having been prescinded from by the intellect, let us posit that other things are good ... Then let us consider in what way they could be good, if they had not proceeded from the First Good.

Our first conclusion from this will be that in created things, to be good would not be the same as to be absolutely, or to be any other thing. But to arrive at this conclusion, we must give attention to the nature of virtue.

For the goodness of any thing at all is understood to be its virtue by which it effects a good operation. For virtue is that which makes the thing having it good and its work good.

Here, Saint Thomas refers us to the Philosopher in the book of Ethics. The matter of virtue is, in fact, too important for a right understanding of how created things are good, to let pass without further observations. The virtue of which we speak ordinarily is human virtue, since this is

1. DH, B, T, n.51; cf. also: Sum. Theol.I, q.2, a.1, and ad 1. The proposition: God exists, is self-evident quoad se but not quoad nos. "To know that God exists, in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature...but not to know absolutely that God exists."
2. DH, T, n. 52
3. DH, T, n. 55
the main concern for each of us. Yet, virtue may be understood in a more general and original sense. Such expressions as: "the virtue has gone out of it," applied to remedies; or: "it has not great virtue," applied to herbs, and the like, remind us that virtue stands for an effective power. In Saint Thomas's commentary on the Ethics, this is further confirmed:

He says, therefore, that every virtue both makes the thing of which it is the virtue to be good and makes the work of that thing to be good. As, for instance, it is the virtue of the eye by which the eye is good and by which we see well, for this is the proper work of the eye. Likewise, it is also the virtue of the horse which makes the horse good and which makes it do its work well, which is to run fast, to carry its rider gently, and courageously to await the enemy.

A reason is then added why it is the virtue of a thing that gives assurance of its goodness and the goodness of its work; for virtue, as the name signifies, is the perfection of power, its utmost strength:

The virtue of anything at all is taken according to the ultimate reach of its power, as for instance, in one that can carry a hundred pounds, its virtue is determined not from the fact that it is carrying fifty, but from the fact that it carries a hundred, as is said in the first book, De Caelo. 2

In an opusculum on the virtues, Saint Thomas again treats of virtue as the perfection of power. For since every thing is for the sake of its operation, the proximate end of

1. In Ethic. II, lect. 6, n. 307. (LT p. 55)
2. Idem., n. 308. (LT p. 56)
of a thing will be its perfect operation. Thus any thing is
good according as it has complete ordination to its end; and
it has this, through its virtue. Hence it is that virtue "
"makes the thing and its work good" - whether this be the vir-
tue of a horse, a stone, or of a man, or of any other thing.

We must not, however, take virtue univocally in all
these instances. While a stone truly does have virtue, it
does not have it in the same sense that a man has virtue, nor
that a horse does. Virtue is predicated analogically in these
instances, by an analogy of proper proportion. We find in the
treatise just mentioned, on the virtues, that the root of the
analogy is in the diverse condition of the powers. The sub-
stance of the passage where this diversity is explained,1 is
in the following paragraph.

Some powers are only active; some are only acted
upon, or moved; and some are both actâve and acted upon. In
the first group, the virtue of the power is the very power
itself; such are: the divine power, the active intellect, and
the natural powers. In the second group, it is not in the
powers to act or not to act, except as they are moved by o-
thers; and they act according to the impetus of the mover.
Such are the sense powers, considered in themselves. These
powers are perfected for their acts by something superinduced,
not in the manner of a form, but only in the way of a passion,
as, a likeness is in the pupil of the eye. In the third group,

1. De Virtutibus in Commund, c.l, a.l, c.
the powers that are both active and acted upon, are perfected for acting by something superinduced in them, not in the manner of a passion, but rather in the manner of a form remaining in the subject; yet, in such a way that the power is not of necessity compelled to one act. These powers are rational in some way, and dominate their act. Moreover, to quote the summary statement:

The virtues of these latter powers are not the powers themselves; nor passions, as in the sensitive powers; nor qualities acting of necessity as are the qualities of natural things; but they are habitus by which any one can act when he will.

We need not here go into the whole theory of virtue and habit. Our immediate interest is to know what the substance of a thing has to do with the goodness of things; how created things are good. We have seen that the goodness of things must be considered in relation to their virtue. And the text has said that if we prescind from the First Good, we shall find that any goodness that the creature may have, will be extraneous to its substance; the substance will not be good. Taking things as they are, it is by their virtue that they are rendered good. With this in mind, let us return to the diversity of virtues, and to the examples cited in the text.

The divine virtue is the divine power, the divine omnipotence. Since in God, there is absolute, simple identity of substance and to-be, nothing is wanting to His per-

1. Loc. cit. (LT mu. 57)
fection. He is omni-potent; all power in Him is perfect, and every perfection is His power. The divine virtue is the divine goodness, in complete one-ness of divine Being.

But in the creature - we may see from the texts quoted that the virtue, in which consists the goodness of a thing, is something other than the substance itself, for in each instance cited, the virtue could be decreased or even lost while the substance remained the same. The eye, for example, can possess its power with greater or less strength, with no change in the substance. A horse, too, would still be a horse if it developed a limp in running, threw its rider, and ran from the attack of the enemy; but it would not be a good horse absolutely. In man, although the agent intellect is a necessary property of his rational nature, and the "virtue of the power is the very power itself", yet, it is not of equal strength in all men; but their humanity itself is equal. Moreover, it is rather by those virtues of the third group, subjected in, or participating in, the passive intellect and the will, that man is perfected in his operations; most especially by the virtues of the will, since it is the latter that desires the good under the precise formality of the good. ¹ Now a man, while remaining a man, can turn away from the truly good; but he will not be a good man absolutely. We can conclude, then, that the virtue is not the substance; for, when of two things,

¹. Although it is by the will that man is rectified in his desire of the end, he can not possess the end by an act of the will, since this is not a power of possession. It either desires before the end is attained, or enjoys after attainment.
one thing changes while the other remains constant, it is obvious they are not identical.

The De Hebdomadibus proceeds in another way to the same conclusion. It has been said that if we pressing from the First Good, then the substance of a creature would be one thing, its roundness another, its color another, and so on. Now, having said that it is the virtue of any thing that makes this thing and its work good, Saint Thomas adds:

That this is something distinct from the substance of the thing, he (Boethius) proves by this, that if each of the foregoing were the same as the substance of the thing, it would follow also that they all would be identical, one with the other, namely, that weight would be one and the same as color; one and the same as good, and as white, and as round; for things that are the same as one and the same thing, are identical with each other. But nature does not allow all those to be identical.¹

To assert that weight, and whiteness, and goodness, and roundness are all identified with one another by essential necessity in a substance, is entirely inconceivable. Given the supposition that was made, then, we must conclude that to be absolutely would not be the same as to be relatively: good or white or any thing else. Hence, it follows that in created things, to-be would not be the same as to be good; their to-be would not be good. Granted even that a goodness belonged to every thing, this goodness would in each case be exterior to the substance, since it could not be identified with it. As the text says:

¹. DH, T, n. 56.
And thus, the aforesaid position having been taken, things might indeed be good, yet their very to-be would not be good. Thus, therefore, if in some way things were, not from the First Good, and yet were good in themselves, it would follow that it would not be the same thing that they are such as they are, and that they are good; but their to-be would be one thing, and to be good would be another.1

If, to avoid the consequences of that conclusion, we were to maintain that in created things, to be absolutely is the same as to be good, we would again find ourselves in a position we were obliged to abandon in the preceding chapter. For to be good by essence is to be simply and necessarily good, to be essential goodness - not just a good man or a good horse or a good stone, but goodness unreceived, existing as such; it is to be the first principles of things. Hence, we would be saying of each and every thing that it is the first principle of things. We would then be in a pantheistic position, for;

There is only one that is of such a nature that it is just good and nothing else.2

No creature, then, is by its own substance, good. The essence of this rose is not, of its essence, good; nor of this horse, nor of this man. Neither is the essence of the sun, the moon, the stars, nor of the angels, to be reckoned good substantially. To say otherwise is to make the creature like unto God, as Boethius and Saint Thomas have solidly stated.

Thus, by the device of prescinding from the First

1. DH, T, 58,59.
2. DH, T, n. 61.
Good, we have come to see that apart from God, there is no possible way in which any other substance can be good in itself. Even granted that things might in some way be good, this would be by an accidental goodness which would be an adjunct to the substance, as is whiteness or roundness. This goodness would not be predicated essentially. On the other hand, to say that things are good *per essentiam* "is blasphemy". There is nothing whose essence it is to be good, except God. With these points in mind, we shall the better understand how created substances are good, in very truth.

For the solution, we return to the principles which concern the one, and we recall that no created thing has absolute simplicity; that only God is perfectly one, perfectly simple. There is more or less composition in everything else. In fact, all other things -

Since they are not simple, could not have been at all unless that which alone is good had willed them to be.¹

The root of this impossibility of the creature to be unless that which is good had so willed, is in the fact that every composite must have a cause, "for things in themselves diverse, cannot unite unless something causes them to unite."² Hence, those things whose essence is not their to-be, would never come to be, without a cause uniting existence to essence. And this causality must be traced ultimately to

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¹. *DH, B, T, n. 63.*
². *Sum. Theol., I, q. 3, a. 7, a. (LIV, 58)*
the one, simple, uncaused, subsisting to-be.¹

That the existence of all things must have its ultimate reason in that alone whose nature is to-be, is well explained in the De Potentia. In the first place, diverse causes having diverse natures and forms, have diverse proper effects, since a proper effect follows from the nature or form of the cause. Now, when diverse causes, besides producing their proper effects, produce an effect in common, this common effect must be in virtue of some higher cause of which it in turn is the proper effect. And this is the case of to-be, throughout creation:

All created causes have in common one effect which is to-be, although each and every cause has its own proper effect, in which respect they are distinguished. For heat makes warmth to be, and a builder makes a house to be. Therefore, they agree in this: that they cause to-be; but they differ in this: that fire causes fire, and a builder causes a house. There must, therefore, be some cause higher than all, in virtue of which they all cause to-be, and whose proper effect is to-be. And this cause is God. Now, as to the proper effect of any cause at all, it is issued according to a similitude to the nature of the cause. Hence, it must be that that which is to-be, is the substance or nature of God.²

We see from this text that God is the only per se cause of to-be, properly speaking, in the fourth mode of passing per se.³ The passage also brings into clearer light a distinction already made between esse in commune and esse in causando.⁴ All things created share universally in to-be. But

¹. q. xi Con. Gent., ch. 15. (I.1.57)
². De Potentia, c. 7, a. 2, c. Cf. also: I, q. 65, a. 1, c.; also: that God is the one cause of all to-be, Con. Gent. II, ch. 15; that God’s essence is His to-be: I, q. 3, a. 4, c.
³. Cf. p. 177.
⁴. q. 10, p. 164.
this to-be does not exist qua universal, except in the intellect; its foundation in the real order is the to-be of each and every thing. To identify this universal to-be with God, would be to commit brave errors. It is obvious in the text just quoted, that to-be in commune is a universal effect of the one to-be in causando, whose very nature is to-be. Saint Thomas points this out in the reply to an objection, the same article:

The divine to-Be, which is His substance, is not to-be taken in its community, but is to-be distinct from any other to-be whatever.

We have already seen that of no other being can it be said that its essence and its to-be are identical; that to-be is its very nature. We know from Holy Scripture that in speaking to Moses, God Himself gave His name as He Who Is. Any thing else that is, must have its to-be by participation from God, the First to-Be, and self-subsisting.

Now, He who is self-subsisting by essence, is also goodness essentially. The proof may be formulated thus:

In any thing, to be in act is the good of that thing. But God not only is being in act, but is His very to-be, as we have shown above (ch. 22). He is, therefore, not only good, but is goodness itself.

And we might well add two other proofs, based on principles considered in the second chapter:

1. De Potentia, c.7, a.2, ad 5; cf. also: IICon Gent., ch.52
2. Saint Thomas gives the reason why He Who Is, is the most proper name of God: Sum.Theol., I, q.13, a.11, c.
3. Cf. op. cit., I, c.44, a.1, c.
4. Con.Gent., I, ch. 38. (LT n.61)
That which is can participate in something else; but the very to-be can not participate in anything else.

For that which participates is potency; but to-be is act.

But God is the very to-be.

Therefore, He is not good by participation, but is essentially good.¹

Also:

Any thing simple has its to-be and that which is, as one.

For if these were diverse, simplicity would already be lacking.

But God is entirely simple.

Therefore, in Him, to be good is not other than Himself.

Therefore, He is His goodness.²

Hence, just as God is the unlimited perfection of to-be, so He is the unlimited good, infinitely perfect:

For the divine being contains the whole fullness of perfection ... Therefore, since a thing is good so far as it is perfect, God's being is His perfect goodness.

Now, just as created things could not be unless He Who Is had willed them to be, so neither could their substance be good had they not come from Him whose essence is His goodness. In truth, then, they are secondary, participated goods, derived from the First Good who is good in that He is. Goodness penetrates all that they are, concomitantly

¹. Loc. cit. (LT m. 62)
². Loc. cit. (LT m. 63)
with the \textit{to-be} that brings them to absolute actuality.

Since, therefore, the \textit{to-be} of all things has flowed from the First Good, it follows that the very \textit{to-be} of created things is good, and that any created thing in so far as it is, is good. But thus, created things alone would not be good in that they are, if their \textit{to-be} had not come from the Highest Good.\footnote{DH, T, n. 66.}

And here Saint Thomas presents a brief summary in order to make the position of Boethius clear:

Therefore, his solution amounts to this: the \textit{to-be} of the First Good is according to its proper nature good, since the nature and essence of the First Good is nothing else than goodness. But the \textit{to-be} of the secondary good is indeed good, not according to the nature of its proper essence, because its essence is not its goodness, but is either humanity or something else of this sort; but its \textit{to-be} owes what goodness it has to its relation to the First Good which is its cause.\footnote{DH, T, n. 67.}

That created substances are not good "according to their proper nature", but that their goodness is derived, with their \textit{to-be} from the First Good to whom they are compared as to their first principle and last end, is given further emphasis in the text by drawing a parallel between the substance of the creature thus related to its cause, and something that is called healthy from the fact that it is ordered to the end of health. Now this latter is so called by an analogy of attribution; the health is properly in the animal, and that which is ordered to this and so may be
called healthy, is in no way properly healthy itself. That it is called so, is entirely consequent upon its being ordered to health. So with the essence of a creature. It could in no way be called good if it were cut off from the First Good; it is humanity, or horse-ness, or gold-ness, or something else, but it is not goodness, nor good. That the human person in his essence, for instance, or that any other created essence is called good, comes from the ordination of its to-be to God, the one substantial good. And Saint Thomas competes this parallel with the more specific example: as a thing is called medicinal in that it is from an effective principle of the medical art, which better conveys the notion of a property flowing from cause to effect.

Although dismissing Plato's theory of separated subsistent forms of natural things, Saint Thomas gives credit to his identification of absolute being and absolute one with the highest good which he called God, and from whom all other things have a participated good. The Summa Theologica states:

It is absolutely true that there is something first which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God...Aristotle agrees with this. Hence, from the first being, essentially being and good, everything can be called good and a being inasmuch as it participates in the first being by way of a certain assimilation, although distantly and defectively.

These conclusions, then, have been reached concern-

2. I, q.6, a.4, c. (LITMUS)
ing the substance of created things:

The substance of a thing is not the goodness of a thing. The substance, considered in itself apart from the to-be, is not actually good.

The substance cannot be made good by participation in an accidental goodness.

The substance is good only by reason of its ordination to the First Good from whom it has its to-be.

We find this same teaching repeated by Saint Thomas in many contexts. For instance, in the *De Veritate*:

Nothing which is predicated of a thing by participation belongs to it by its essence. But a creature is called good by participation, as is made clear by Augustine, *De Trinitate*, ch. 3. Therefore, a creature is not good by its essence.

Moreover, every thing that is good by its essence is a substantial good. But creatures are not substantial goods, as is made clear by Boethius in the *De Hebdomadibus*.

And in the *Summa Theologica*, to give but one more citation:

Although every thing is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not being itself, and therefore it does not follow that a creature is good essentially.

It must be further noted that the goodness that any created thing has because of the dependence of its absolute being on the First Good is not its absolute goodness, its goodness *simpliciter*. It is a goodness *secundum quid*, a relative goodness. If the goodness of its substance were its absolute goodness, it could never grow in goodness;

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1. *De Veritate*, q. 21, a. 5, *sed. cont.*; cf. p. 84.
2. I, q. 6, a. 3, ad 2. (ff m. 2)
this would be as invariable and fixed as the constitution of its nature which, in itself, never changes. It does not admit of the slightest more or less; as a circle, for instance, cannot be more or less circle. A comment of John of Saint Thomas points the way in this regard:

Substantial goodness does not vary in creatures, but absolute and complete goodness which depends on accidents does; yet, this substantial goodness is had by participation and according to its to-be, and dependently on the first to-be. Saint Thomas admits, therefore, that some substantial and invariable goodness is given, and this goodness he distinguishes from absolute and complete goodness which is goodness absolutely.

We know, in fact, from common experience that beings do change; they both grow and deteriorate in goodness. The periphery of their possibility to become good is of much wider extent than their substantial being, and if they fall short of it, we are quite prone to say of them that they are no good. Think, for instance, on blighted crops, a blind horse, stunted trees, a man without virtue.

Hence it is that Saint Thomas points out a twofold goodness in the creature and shows wherein it lies. In the De Hebdomadibus he says:

It is to be noted according to what has previously been said that in created goods there is a twofold goodness. one is that goodness by which they are called good because of their relation to the First Good; by reason of this, their to-be and whatever is in them from the First Good, is good. But another goodness is considered in them absolutely, namely, in that any one thing is called

good in so far as it is perfect in its to-be and its operation. And in truth, this perfection does not belong to created goods according to the very to-be of their essence, but belongs to something superadded which is called their virtue, as was said above; and according to this, the to-be itself is not good.

There is another exposition of this doctrine in the \textit{De Veritate}. Saint Thomas has just said that, as being is multiplied substantially and accidentally, so also is the good. Yet, there is a difference:

Anything is said to be absolutely on account of its substantial being, but not so on account of its accidental being: hence, since generation is motion toward being, when anything receives substantial being, it is said to be generated absolutely, but when it receives accidental being, it is said to be generated relatively; and the same is true of corruption by which being is lost. But the reverse is true of the good. For according to its substantial goodness a thing is said to be good relatively; but is called good absolutely according to its accidental goodness. We do not call an unjust man absolutely good but only relatively, in as much as he is a \textit{\ldots} man; but a just man we call absolutely good.

Again, in question V of the \textit{Prima Pars}, there is an even more explicit passage. Although it is long, we do not hesitate to quote it in full:

Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless, since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in the same way. For since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality, a thing is, in consequence, said absolutely to have being according as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality; and this precisely is each thing's substantial being. Hence, it is by its substantial to-be that every thing is said to have being absolutely; but by

1. DH, T, n. 67.
any further actuality, it is said to have being relatively. Thus, to be white signifies being relatively, for to be white does not take a thing out of absolutely potential being, since it is added to a thing that actually has being. But goodness expresses perfection, which is something desirable, and hence it expresses something final. Hence that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection) is not said to be perfect absolutely nor good absolutely, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its first (i.e., substantial) being, a thing is said to be absolutely, and to be good relatively (i.e., in so far as it has being); but viewed in its complete actuality a thing is said to be relatively and to be good absolutely. Hence the saying of Boethius, "that in nature, the fact that things are good is one thing, that they are, is another," is to be referred to being good absolutely and being absolutely. Because, regarded in its first actuality, a thing is a being absolutely; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good absolutely, though even in its first actuality it is in some way good, and even in its complete actuality it is in some way being.

In these texts, we have traced for us, as it were, the unfolding of the creature in the order of being and in the order of good. That it may reach its completion, there must be added to the essence a threefold perfection from predicates accidentally supervening: its to-be, and the additional accidents of operation and end. John of Saint Thomas writes the reason thus:

The goodness of a thing results from the fact that it has the perfection which is due and suitable to it, since good expresses the nature of perfect which is appetibile: and if it is good absolutely, it must be perfect absolutely. Therefore, it must have not only its first actuality, but also the consummate and ultimate actuality from those things which are due it. But a created substance cannot in its own self have all the perfection which is consummately and ultimately due it, except by something superadded to it accidentally.2

1. I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1. (LT m. 7)
2. Op. cit., disp. 6, a. 3, n. 5; cf. also: nn. 3, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 22; De Ver., q. XXI, a. 5, c.; DH, T, n. 67.
In the first place, the essence in its constitutive notes is not yet either properly being nor properly good, but awaits existence to establish it in actuality and in relative goodness. Now, although existence is not among the predicamental accidents; yet, since there is not a necessary connection between the essence and the to-be of any creature, to-be is attributed to a creature subject according to the fifth group of predicables. Any act must be in the same genus as the potency it perfects; hence, no substance could be actualized by a to-be in the genus, accident. But, on the other hand, neither is the to-be any part of the essence of a thing.

Possibly as concise an estimate as could be found of the status of the very existence of a creature, is in Saint Thomas's answer as to whether the to-be of an angel is an accident of the angel. He first makes the point that since an accident comes to something already existing, the to-be of an angel obviously cannot be an accident, for it does not exist previous to its own to-be. He completes his answer with reference to any creature whatever, that the substantial to-be of a thing is not an accident, but is the actuality of an existing form, whether this be with matter or without it. But "accident" is used in a wide sense for all that is not part of the essence. The to-be of the creature is a terminal perfection, an actus secundus, accidentally supervening and terminating the substantial actuality of a being, whereby it is said to be absolutely.1

1. Cf. Quadlibetum XII, q.5, a. 5: Utrum esse angeli sit accidentes ejus.
We have already seen that the absolute being of a thing cannot change, while it remains the substance that it is; not the least variability toward more or less can touch it. The thing is what it is: a star, a rose, a bird, a man, an angel, without ever increasing or diminishing in star-ness, rose-ness, humanity, and so on. If these all remained at the level of their first, absolute being, however, they would be miserably dwarfed. They would surely not be perfect, nor appetible: an object of desire. In that state, they are not accounted good, taken in its full and proper sense: to be perfective in the manner of a final cause. In the De Veri- tate, Saint Thomas says:

In itself a thing is perfected so that it may subsist by essential principles; but in order that it may be in due measure to all things that are outside itself, it is not perfected except by the medium of accidents superadded to the essence; because operations by which one thing is joined to another proceed from the essence by the medium of virtues superadded to the essence. Hence, it does not attain goodness absolutely, except as it is complete according to both substantial and accidental principles.  

For, substantial being, as subjected to existence is the root and cause of further perfections which, like to-be, are not essential to it, do not constitute it, but which enrich and complete it. In the order of being these accidental perfections get more than they give. They have no existence of their own apart from the substance. They are the "being of being"; they make the thing to be in a certain way. Yet, from the point of view of physical being, the

1. De Verit., q. 21, a. 5, c.: cf. p. 86
most tenuous bespeak the finest perfection. We are thinking for the moment of the radiance of a flame as compared with a chunk of coal; of the light and warmth of the sun as compared with its mass; or of the justice of a man as compared with his pounds. The radiance, light, warmth, and the justice belong to the "operations by which one thing is joined to another"; they "proceed from the essence by the medium of virtues." It is true that they do not have the status of absolute being; they are only relatively being. Their nature and aptitude is to inhere in a subject. Yet, it is such "being of being", the "accidental", such "what is not in itself" that brings perfection to the subject.

Without its operations, a substance could not tend to any end, for as we have said, it is necessarily stable. We do, however, see things achieving ends which they did not have in the beginning. Therefore, besides the accidental added perfections of to-be and operation, there is a third perfection extraneous to the essence, namely, the end for which operation strives. This is ultimate perfection, proportionate to and consummating every creature, beyond which it can not reach nor be. It is one with the fullness of being of the thing; it marks its absolute goodness, considered precisely in its formality of end, diffusing itself in the manner of a final cause, moving the appetite and perfecting the appetent. This status of a final cause, creatures have only through their participation in the goodness of God, the
ultimate end and perfect good of all.\textsuperscript{1}

In the order of being, then, a creature is a being absolutely by reason of its substance; it acquires all the further actuality which completes and perfects it by additions which are only relatively being. Since they are not identified with the essence, the substance holds them in itself with more or less firmness and security, and for this reason, as Saint Thomas says:

complete and absolute goodness in us may be increased and diminished and totally lost ... although substantial goodness always remains in us.\textsuperscript{2}

And again, replying to an objection which asserts that the creature must be good by its essence since this is derived from the First Good:

It is not possible for a creature not to be good with an essential goodness which is goodness relatively, yet it is possible for it not be good with accidental goodness which is goodness absolutely.

In the texts cited, Saint Thomas makes it plain that the order of good is the reverse of the order of being. The absolute being of a thing, which it has according to its essential, substantial nature, is only relatively good, a goodness derived, as we have seen, from its dependence on the First Good. The absolute goodness of a thing, on the other hand, comes to it from accidental perfections which are only relatively being. Thus, that which is greater in being

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} I \textit{De Veritate}, a.21, a.5, c.; cf. p. 96.
\item \textsuperscript{2} Idem, ad 1; cf. p. 89.
\end{itemize}
is the slightest in good, and the slightest in being is greatest in good.

In his commentary on the De Ente et Essentia, Cajetan, too, brings out the significance of the proposition: A thing is perfect simpliciter not by reason of its first perfection, but by reason of its ultimate. After quoting from the present chapter of Boethius' De Hebdomadibus, and referring to a text from Saint Thomas, he takes up for analysis another text from the Summa Theologica, treating of perfection. Saint Thomas has asked whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone," and begins his answer with a quotation from Boethius: all things but God are good by participation. He asserts that only God is good essentially, by showing that whereas the perfection of any thing created is threefold, in God, perfection is one with His essence. As to this triple perfection, we shall read Cajetan's words:

The first (is) according to which a thing is constituted in its to-be, as the first perfection of a man is his substantial to-be; the second is according to which he is proximately capable of his perfect operations, as the powers of the soul and habitus informing them, by which man is able to issue perfect operations; but the third perfection is according to which he is joined to his end, as by speculation which unites man to separated substances.

Cajetan continues by saying that from this it is manifest that a man who enjoys the goodness of his nature alone is not perfected absolutely, nor is one who is far

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1. Ch. 5, n. 104: Secunda propositio est: (LT m.68)
from his proper end. He then concludes that the order of absolute being and relative being is the reverse of the order of good, or perfected, absolutely and perfected relatively.

Hence, the relation of being simpliciter to being secundum quid, is the opposite of the relation of perfected simpliciter to perfected secundum quid; for according to his substantial to-be a man is called a being absolutely, but perfected secundum quid. For he who has no other perfection except the fact that he is a man, is not claimed to be perfected absolutely; but rather, with qualification we say that he is perfected according to his substantial to-be. But according to accidental to-be, such as is that of habitus and operations, a man is said to be being secundum quid, but perfected simpliciter; for nothing then is wanting to him of those things which are required for perfecting a man. Therefore, the meaning of the proposition is clear, namely, that a thing is perfected simpliciter from its ultimate perfection.

The twofold goodness in creatures makes it evident that no matter to what heights their final achievement in perfection may take them, they can never be like the First Good because their absolute being itself will never be absolutely good; it will always be good only relatively, by a relation to the First Good. As the De Hebdomadibus says, referring to their absolute good:

This perfection does not belong to created goods according to the very to-be of their essence, but belongs according to something superadded which is called their virtue, as was said above; and according to this, the to-be itself is not good.

1. Loc. cit. (17 m. 69)
2. DH, T, n. 67.
In contradistinction, there is the absolute perfection of God whose very to-be is His essence and absolute goodness:

But the First Good has perfection in every respect in its very to-be, and therefore, its to-be is good of itself, absolutely.¹

Or, better still are the words of the De Veritate:

Whatever perfection a creature has from its essential and accidental principles conjoined, God has as a whole in His one simple existence; for His simple essence is His wisdom and His justice and His fortitude, and all such perfections which in us are superadded to essence. Thus, absolute goodness in God is the same as His essence; but in us it is considered according to those perfections which are superadded to essence... In this way Augustine seems to say (De Trinitate VIII, ch.3) that God is good by essence, but we by participation.²

Besides explaining the mind of Augustinæ, Saint Thomas in the same passage refers to the authors of the De Causis and of the De Hebdomadibus for other differences between the goodness of God and that of the creature. One difference is taken from the fact that no created thing has the nature of good in its essence alone, considered as a nature; it must have received existence as an individual, for "the good is in things." Now, whereas the divine nature or essence is its own existence, the nature or essence of any created thing has its existence by participation; hence, even if the absolute goodness of a creature were the same as its absolute being, this goodness would still be by participation.

¹ Loc. cit.
² C. XXI, a.5, c.; cf. p.36
Thus in God there is pure existence since God Himself is His subsisting existence; but in a creature existence is received or participated. For this reason I say that if absolute goodness were predicated of a created thing according to its substantial being, it would nevertheless still remain true that it has its goodness by participation just as it has participated existence. God, however, is goodness by essence in as much as His essence is His existence. This seems to be the meaning of the Philosopher in the De Causis.

The next difference is from the point of view of final cause; "for goodness has the nature of final cause."

It is clear in the De Causis that in all secondary causality, there must be an influx of the First Cause. Hence, no creature can be a good, finalizing as an end, without the concurring causality of God, the ultimate end:

Now God has the nature of final cause since He is the ultimate end of all things, just as He is the first principle; from this it must be that every other end does not have the condition or nature of end except by reason of its order to the First Cause, since the secondary cause does not flow into the caused, unless the influx of the First Cause be presupposed, as is clear in the book De Causis (prop. 1). Therefore, the good, which has the nature of end, cannot be predicated of the creature unless there be presupposed an order from the Creator to the creature.

And the last difference that is given here, brings us back to the De Hebdomadibus and the meaning of Boethius. In this, Saint Thomas stretches our minds to the metaphysical limit concerning the being of the creature - and still its good would be by participation. For:

1. Loc. cit.
2. Loc. cit.
Granted that a creature were its own existence just as God is; yet, the existence of the creature would still not have the nature of the good without presupposing an order to the Creator. For this reason it still would be called good by participation and not absolutely in that it is. The divine Being, however, which has the nature of the good without having anything presupposed, has of itself the nature of the good. This seems to be the meaning of Boethius in the De Hebdomadibus.  

Beyond this last possibility, there is no other. We are left to meditate as best we can the words of Saint Matthew:

None is good but God alone.  

And these others, of the Gloria of the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass:

Thou only art holy.  
Thou only art most high.

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1. Loc. cit.  
2. Ch. 19;17
CHAPTER V
Answer to Objections

The manner in which created substances are good has now been shown. Before leaving the matter, however, Boethius wants to make sure it is understood that the solution which shows that these substances are good in that they are, in no way changes the stand he took when he rejected the conclusion that created substances are good in themselves, and hence like the First Good. And so he repeats:

For they are not like the First Good from the fact that they are good in that they are, because the to-be itself of created things is not good absolutely in whatever way it is, but only according to a relatedness to the First Good. But since the to-be of created things cannot be unless they are derived from the First Good, for that reason their to-be is good; yet it is not like the First Good in goodness.

Thus, they are good in that they are, by reason of their relation to the First Good; but they are not absolutely good in that they are, nor in every way that they are. The to-be of created things is not in any single case, the to-be of an absolute good. The pure actuality of goodness, of perfection, is God alone: ipsum esse subsistens; He Who Is. The to-be of the creature is of a very limited perfection which makes a man to be, or a tree to be, or a rock to be, but never makes goodness to be. But since this to-be could not be unless it were derived from the First Cause of all

1. DH, B, T, n.69.
being, who is also the First Good, so, as it participates in the very to-be, it participates by that same fact, in goodness.

We have seen that the absolute being of the creature is not its absolute goodness; that its absolute goodness comes to it from superadded accidents which bring it to completion. And even when it is perfected in being and operation, there is yet a world of perfection outside its compass, which is not embraced by its own to-be. Hence, no creature can ever belike the First Good in goodness. Saint Thomas adds:

For the latter absolutely is good in every way that He is, since nothing is in Him except the very essence of goodness; and this is because there is in Him no perfection by way of addition, but in His simple to-Be He has perfection of every kind, as was said.¹

There are a number of texts in which Saint Thomas treats of the divergence between the created good and the divine. Perhaps the most extensive – too long for quoting here in entirety – is in the Contra Gentes where he considers: How things imitate the divine goodness. Various aspects of the question are viewed, but we are particularly concerned just now with the teaching it offers on comparative perfections, with which thought our text concludes.

In the first place, the creature can never be good as God is good, for a creature can never be in one simple

¹. DH, T, 71.
act, the fullness of even its own perfection; man, for instance, possesses in a multiplicity of successive acts his wisdom, his love, his happiness, his various virtues - all of this in the accidental order. Whereas God is nothing other than His to-Be and hence is simultaneously universal perfect being, in one simple, substantial act:

Therefore, since a thing is good in so far as it is perfect, God's being is His perfect goodness; for in God, to be, to live, to be wise, to be happy, and whatever else is seen to pertain to perfection and goodness, are one and the same in God.¹

Moreover, the to-Be of God is His very substance; it is His definition and His name. But to-be enters into the definition of no created thing. There is none that is its to-be; no creature can be named that which is. Therefore:

If a thing is good so far as it is, and if no creature is its own being, none is its own goodness, but each one is good by participating in goodness, even as by participating in being it is a being.²

We are then given a tableau of goodness in their hierarchical order, according to their degree of simplicity or of composition, ranging from God, unique in His simplicity, down through the various gradations to prime matter.

And we come to another difference drawn from diverse ways of possessing perfection. Again, it has its explanation in the fact that only God is ultimate simplicity,

¹. Con. Gent., III, ch. 20. (LT n. 70)
². Loc. cit. (LT n. 71)
and hence is infinite perfection in one undivided and indi-
visible act; whereas the creature, being more or less com-
posite, must use a variety of powers and operations to ar-
rive at its proper perfection:

For, as we have stated, God, in His very being, con-
tains the supreme perfection of goodness. But the
creature has its perfection, not in one thing but in many, because what is united in the highest is mani-
fold in the lowest. Therefore, in respect of one and
the same thing, virtue, wisdom, and operation are pre-
dicated of God; but of creatures, they are predicated
in respect of different things, and the further a crea-
ture is from the first goodness, the more does the
perfection of its goodness require to be manifold.

Any thing created, then, must progress from its
first actuality, which is its absolute being and its rela-
tive goodness, by way of a multiplicity of operations to its
final actuality which is its end and fulfillment and abso-
lute goodness, although achieved by that which is accidental
in the order of being. John of Saint Thomas, speaking of
the simplicity of God, shows how He is thereby distinguished
in not having passed from first act to second act. He is
ultimate and complete act, but never was first act:

for there remains another which is second, actuating
the first and thus better than it.

Since God is, in His eternity, self-subsisting Being, there
never was question of filling up the total measure of His Being
by operation bringing it to perfection. His existence, His

1. Loc. cit. (LT m. 72)
2. Curs. Theol. 1, disp. 4, a.5, n.8. (LT m. 73)
operations, His end are identical with His essence.

The chapter we have been reading in the *Contra Gentes* concludes this analysis of perfection in God and in creatures thus:

> From what has been said, it is evident that, although God possesses His perfect and entire goodness according to the manner of His simple being, creatures nevertheless do not attain to the perfection of their goodness through their being alone, but through many things. Therefore, although each one is good inasmuch as it exists, it cannot be called good absolutely if it lack other things that are required for its goodness. Thus a man, who, being despoiled of virtue, is addicted to vice, is said indeed to be good in a restricted sense, namely, as a being, and as a man; but he is not said to be good absolutely, but rather evil. Accordingly, in every creature to be and to be good are not the same absolutely, although each one is good inasmuch as it exists; whereas in God to be and to be good are absolutely one and the same.

These passages express more fully the meaning of the *De Hebdomadibus*: created things are not like the First Good... in His simple to-Be He has perfection of every kind. The cry of Saint Michael: Who is like unto God! takes on new significance as we try to penetrate more deeply into the doctrine of these texts.

In the commentary, Saint Thomas returns to a concession he made previously concerning creatures, when considering whether or not they could be good if *per impossibile* they were not from the First Good, and he repeats that they might have a goodness belonging to them, from something superadded;

1. *Con. Gent.*, loc. cit. (LT n.17)
and he also repeats that this goodness would not, however, make the thing be good in that it is:

For its to-be, itself, would not be good if it were not derived from the Good from which relatedness the to-be of created things is good.

The only reason that things are good in that they are, is that their to-be is derived from the First Good, which is

...the very to-Be because its to-Be is its substance; and is goodness itself since it is the very essence of goodness; and existing Good because in it to-Be does not differ from what is.

Thus, Saint Thomas brings to a close the explanation of the goodness of created things by setting forth the full strength of its reason:

The First Good is the very to-Be.
The First Good is the essence of goodness.
Therefore, it is existing Good, since its to-be and what is are simply one.

The text now deals briefly with two objections that may be raised against the solution.

In the first place, if all things are good in that they are, since it has come from the will of the First Good that they be good, then it seems that all white things, in that they are, ought to be white, since it has come from the will of God that they be white.

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1. DH, T, n. 73.
2. DH, T, n. 77.
3. cf. DH, B, T, n. 78.
But these two cases are not the same. On the part of things: to be absolutely is not the same as to be relatively. It is one thing to \textit{be} according to essential principles and another thing to be white. On the part of God: He is essentially good, but He is not essentially white. Therefore, things are good in as much as they are, because the First Good willed them to be good, and because their \textit{to-be} has been produced by the First Good. But the same cannot be said of the white. For we cannot say that things have come either from the will of the white, or from the first white. All we can say is that God willed some things to be white - but not in that they are. For:

Such a property does not follow from the Divine \textit{will}, that that which is created be white in that it is, for the reason that is did not flow from the will of the white as good things flowed from the will of the Good, so that it could be said that their \textit{to-be} is white in as much as they are from the first white... But since God who is good willed all things to be good, therefore they are good in that they are, in so far, namely, as their \textit{to-be} has the nature of good because it is from the Good.

The answer to the first objection seems to give ground for a further objection. Granted that God is not white, there is no doubt that He is just. Then, since things are good because they are from the Good, they must also be just, since "He is just who willed them to be."\textsuperscript{2}

Saint Thomas gives the two reasons of Boethius why this does not follow. In the first place, each thing is called

1. \textit{DH}, \textit{T}, nn. 82,83.
2. \textit{DH}, \textit{B}, \textit{T}, n. 84.
good according to the perfection of its nature. But a person is called just, or any other virtue, by reason of his act. In a question where Saint Thomas is considering whether there is justice in God, he makes this very passage from Boethius the matter of an objection. The answer will serve our purpose here equally well. The objection claims:

Whatever is in God is His essence. But justice cannot belong to the divine essence. For Boethius says: Good refers to the essence; justice to the act. Therefore, justice does not belong to God.

And the answer is:

Although justice refers to an act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence of a thing may be a principle of action. But good does not always refer to an act, since a thing is called good not merely with respect to its acts, but also with respect to the perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said that the good is related to the just as the general to the special.*

In God, it is true that His goodness is His justice, because in Him to be and to act are one and the same; His act is His substance. But they are not the same in us. Saint Thomas points this out forcibly when he treats the question: Whether the angel's act of understanding is its substance. He says:

On the contrary, the action of anything differs more from its substance than does its to-be. But no creature's to-be is its substance, for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was said above. Therefore, neither the action of an angel, nor that of any other creature, is its substance.²

1. Sum. Theol. I, q. 21, a. 1, obj. 4. (LT m. 75)
2. Idem., ad 4. (LT m. 74)
3. Op. cit., I, c. 54, a. 1. (LT m. 77)
In the response, three reasons for this are given. We shall quote only the first, which is the most fundamental, stating why it is "impossible for the action of an angel, or of any other creature, to be its own substance."

For an action is properly the actuality of a power, just as being is the actuality of a substance, or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality, because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His being and His action.

Thus, all creatures are, and hence are good; but not all act justly. Even in those who are just, this virtue and its act are not identical with their to-be, as we have seen. Hence, not all things are just in that they are.

Moreover, it may be answered: justice is one species of good, as is any other virtue. Now God, who is self-subsisting to-Be, is the subsisting nature of goodness; hence, He is just. But the particular species of good, which is justice, is not found in all things. The text says:

Not all kinds of goodness are to be found in all things, but different kinds in different things. On that account it is not necessary that that species which is justice come to all beings as goodness comes to them. Hence, of beings, some are just and some have another kind of goodness; yet, all are good in so far as they are derived from the First Good.

Here Saint Thomas ends the exposition of the De Hebdomadibus. And with his words we bring these notes to a close.

May God be praised by all. Amen.

1. Loc. cit. (IV, 71)
2. DH, T, n. 89.
Since the complete Latin text will be given for the De Hebdomadibus, the De Veritate, q.21, and the Cursus Theologicus I, disp. 6, a.3, the Latin will not here be given for direct quotations from those texts.

1. "Si quis aperuerit cisternam," dicit Glossa Gregorii: *Oui in sacro elocuio jam alta intelligit, sublimes sensus coram non capiendius per silentium tegat, ne per scandalum interius aut fidelem parvulum, aut infidelem qui creder po- tuisset, intermitterat. Haec ergo ab his quibus nocent, occultan-
da sunt; sed in collocutione potest fieri distinctio, ut ea-


3. "Unde Augustinus, 4 de doctr. Christ.: *Sunt quaedam quae vi sua non intelliguntur, aut vix intelliguntur, quanta-
libet, et quantumlibet dicentis plenissime versentur eloquio: quae in populi audientia vel rero, si aliquid urget, vel nun-
quam omnini mistenda sunt. Sed in scribendo non potest talis distinctio adhiberi: quia liber conscriptus ad manus cuorum-
libet pervenire potest; et ideo sunt occultanda verborum ob-
scuritatibus, ut per hoc prosum sapientibus cui ea intelli-
gunt, et occultentur simplicibus qui ea capere non possunt." Loc. cit.

4. "...et Dionysius, 2 cap. cael. Hierar.: *Audi sancte dicta, divinus divinorum, in doctrina factus, et mentis occul
to sancta circumabscondens ab immunda multitudine ut cuam 
uniformia custodi." Loc. cit.

5. "Si enim per fabulas veritas obumbretur, non potest sci-
ri quid verum sub fabula lateat, nisi ab eo qui fabulam con-
fixerit." In Metaph. III, lect. 11, n. 468.

6. "Vocumque igitur a vobis dejeci oculos, id est ad cuos-
cumque respexi, non ad vos tantum, 'considerationi meae occur-
rit partim,' id est in aliquibus, 'ignava,' id est stulta, 'se-
gnities,' id est pifritia; 'partim livor,' id est invidia, 'cal-
licius,' id est estatus ac nocendum; intantum 'ut contumeliam 
videatur irrogare divinis tractatibus, cui haec,' sādeict di-
vina, 'projecerit,' id est inordinate exposuerit, 'talibus mon-
stris hominum.' Monstra dicuntur homines qui in corpore humano
cor gerunt bestiale, per peccatum similes effecti bestiis in affectu. 'Non agnosceda potius quam conculcanda projecerim:' cuia non tam quaerunt agnoscere, quam vituperare quaecumque dicuntur, propter invidiae:..." In Boet. de Trinit., Proem. Parma, p. 351b.

7."...unde Matth. 7,6: 'Nolite sancum dare canibus, nec qui mittatis margaritas vestras ante porcos, ne forte conculcent eas.' Loc. cit.


9."... sunt autem maxime cognoscibilia secundum naturam suam, cuae sunt maxime in actu, scilicet entia immaterialia et immobilia, quae tamen sunt maxime nobis ignota. Unde manifestum est, quod difficultas accidit in cognitione veritatis, maxime propter defectum intellectus nostri. Ex quo contingit, quod intellectus animae nostrae hoc modo so habet ad entia immaterialia, quae inter omnia sunt maxime manifesta secundum suam naturam, sicut se habent oculi nycticoracum ad lucem diei, quam videre non possunt, quamvis videant obscura." In Metaph. II, lect. 1, n. 282.

10."Nam 'principium demonstrationis non est demonstratio,' idest de eo demonstratio esse non potest." In Metaph. IV, lect, 15, n. 710.

11."Dicit ergo primo cuod non omnis scientia est demonstrativa, idest per demonstrationem accepta; sed immediatorum principiorum est scientia indemonstrabilis, idest non per demonstrationem accepta." In Post. Anal. I, ch. 3, lect. 7.

12."Sic ergo patet quod sunt quaedam principia ex quibus syllogismus procedit, quae non certificantur per syllogismum: alioquin procedetur in infinitum in principiis syllogismorum, quod est impossibile ut probatur in primo Posterorum." In Ethic. VI, lect. 3, n. 1148.

13."Unde quamvis cognitio humanae animae proprie sit per viam rationis, est tamen in ea aliqua participatio illius simplicis cognitionis quae in substantiis superioribus inventur, ex quo vim intellectualiam habere dicuntur; et hoc secundum illum modum quem Dionysius, VII cap. de divin. Nominibus,
assignat dicens, quod divina sapientia semper fines priorum conjungit principis secundorum; hoc est dictu quod inferior natura in suo summo attingit ad aliquid infimum superioris naturae." De Veritate, q.15, a.1, c.

14. "Dicendum quod ratio humana non potest participare ad plenum dictamen rationis divinae, sed suo modo et imperfecte. Et ideo sicut ex parte rationis speculativae per naturalem participationem divinae sapientiae, instis nobis cognitione commum communium principiorum, non autem cuiuslibet veritatis propria cognition, sicut in divina sapientia continetur." Sum. Theol. I-II, q.91, a.3, ad 1.

15. "Ex ipso enim lumine naturali intellectus agentis prima principia sunt cognita, nec acquiruntur per reticulationes, sed solum per hoc cuod eorum termini innotescunt. Quod similem fit per hoc, quod a sensibilibus accipitur memoria et a memoria experimentum et ab experientia illorum terminorum cognition, quibus cognitis cognoscentur hujusmodi propositiones communes, quae sunt artium et scientiarum principia." In Ethic. IV, lect. 6, n. 599.

16. "Haece autem propositio, Deus est, quantum est de se, est per se nota, quia idem est in subjecto et preedicato; sed quantum ad nos non est per se nota, quia cuius est Deus nescimus; unde aper nos demonstratione indiget, non autem apud illos cui Dei essentiam vident." De Potentia, c.7, a.2, ad 11.


18. "Extremum vero illud, quod in secunda compositione se habet ut actus, est ultima actualitas illius generis; post-existentiam enim Sortis nihil sibi substantiale amplius advenit." Cajetan, In De Ente et Essentia, ch. 5, c.10, n.90 (quarto).

19. "...hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum; quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectior potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel ignitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum." De Potentia, c. 7, a.2, ad 9.

20. DimeHuum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium; comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem
nisi inquantum est; unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum." Sum. Theol. I, c.4, a.1, ad 3.


22. "Secundo autem quia ipsum esse non est proprius actus materiae, sed substantiae totius. Eius enim actus est esse de quo possimus dicere quod sit. Esse autem non dicitur de materiae, sed de toto. Unde materia non potest dici quod est, sed ipse substantia est id quod est." II Con. Gent., ch. 54.

23. "Unde in compositis ex materia et forma nec materia nec forma potest dici ipsum quod est, nec etiam ipsum esse. Forma tamen potest dici quod est, secundum quod est essendi principium; ipsa autem tota substantia est ipsum quod est; et ipsum esse est quod substantia denominatur ens." Loc. cit.

24. "In substantiis autem intellectualibus,uae non sunt ex materia et forma compositae, ut ostensum est (capp. 50, 51), sed in eis ipsa forma est substantia subsistens, forma est quod est, ipsum autem esse est actus et quod est." Loc. cit.

25. "Unde non sic determinatur esse per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam. Nam et in definitione formarum ponuntur propriae materiae loco differentiae, sicut cum dicitur quod anima est actus corporis physici organici. Et per hunc modum hoc esse ab illo esse distinctitur, in quantum est talis vel talis naturae." De Potentia, loc. cit.


27. "Nam cum ens dicit aliud proprie esse in actu, actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam, secundum hoc simipliciter aliud dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscumque; unde per suum esse substantialia dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem superadditos, dicitur aliud esse secundum quid, sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid; sic et non enim esse album auferit esse in potentia simpliciter, cum adventat rei iam praeeistenti in actu." Op. cit. I, c.5, a.1, ad 1.

28. "...quantitas et qualitas et hujusmodi non sunt simpliciter entia, ut infra dicitur. Nam ens dicitur quasi esse habens, hoc autem solum est substantia, uae subsistit. Accidetia autem dicuntur entia, non quia sunt, sed quia magis ipsis
aliquid est; sicut albedo dicitur esse, quia ejus subjectum est album. Ideo dicit, quod non dicuntur simplicer entia, sed entis entia, sicut qualitas et motus." In Metaph. XII, lect. 1, n. 2419.

29. "Dicit ergo, quod ens dicitur quoddam secundum se, et quoddam secundum accidentis. Scienam tamen est quod illa di-
visio entis non est eadem cum illa divisione quod dividitur ens in substantiam et accidentis. Quod ex hoc patet, quia ipse postmodum, ens secundum se dividit in decem praedicamenta, quorum novem sunt de genere accidentis. Ens igitur dividitur in substantiam et accidentis, secundum absolutam entis considera-
tionem, sicut ipsa albedo in si considerata dicitur accidentis, et homo substantia. Sed ens secundum accidentis propt hic sumi-
tur, oportet accipi per comparationem accidentis ad substant-
tiam...Unde patet quod divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidentis, attenditur secundum quod igitur praedicatur de al-
quo per se vel per accidentis. Divisio vero entis in substan-
tiam et accidentis attenditur secundum hoc quod igitur in na-
tura sua est vel substantia vel accidentis." Op cit. V, lect.9, n. 885.

30. "Ipsum enim esse non potest participare aliquid quod non sit de essentia sua: quamvis id quod est possit aliquid aliud participare. Nihil enim est formalius aut dimplicius-
quam esse. Et sic ipsum esse nihil participare potest. Di-

31. "...sed praeclisa causa, quare esse habeat aliquid praec-
ter se annexum, est, quia esse est receptum in alio, in quo potest recipi aliquid: quod patet ex hoc quod esse substantiale Sortis et esse album igitur nulla alia ratione adunatur, nisi
quia utrumque recipitur in Sorte, sunt enim tantum unum sub-
jecto. Cum ergo esse non erit receptum, non remanebit aliquid modus quo potest habere aliquid sibi annexum." Cajetan, op. cit., ch. 5, q.12, n. 100.

32. "...quia nullum esse actualis existentiae potest poni subjectum alterius, sum sit ultima actualitas." Loc. cit.

33. "Remanet igitur quod ea ratione adunetur quia ambo recipiuntur in tertio: et ideo sublati hoc ab ipso esse actualis existentiae, quod sit, scilicet receptum, aut tertius etiam quod possit haber e aliquid sibi annexum; et hoc est quod Poet-
tius dicit in Hebdomadibus quod ipsum quod est aliquid habet sibi praeter se conjunctum: ipsum vero esse nihil." Loc. cit.

34. "...difficultas est, an duplex entitas concurrat, al-
tera essentia quae recipit existentiam, altera existentiae quae reddit illam actuallem; sicut corpus album non solum re-
remotâ albedine, sed etiam dum est sub illa, distinguatur ab
albedine per quam redditur album; sed haec est differentia inter album et existentiam, quod res existens remotae existentiae desinit omnino, et manet nihil: corpus autem remotae albedine manet existens, et ita ibi facile dignoscitur quomodo ab albedine distinguatur realiter; respectu vero existentiae, non ita facile apparent quod ab illa distinguatur aliqua entitas quae vocatur essentia: quia solum inventur actu quando est sub existentia; illa vero remotae, essentia manet nihil, et solum objective et in statu possibilitatis. Et ex hoc aliqui intulerunt non posse distinguere existentiam et existentiam nisi sicut nihil et ens, et sicut res in statu possibilitatis et ipsam in statu extra causas; quod autem etiam dum essentia existit, distinguat ab existentia, ita quod alia realitas sit existentia, alia essentia, licet una sine alia nihil sit: haec est totae difficultas. John of Saint Thomas, Cursus Theologicus I, d. 4, a. 3, n. 3.

35. "Si autem inveniamus aliquam quidditatem quae non sit composita ex materia et forma, illa quidditas aut est esse suum, aut non. Si illa quidditas sit esse suum, sic erit essentia ipsius Dei, quae est suum esse, et erit omnino simplex. Si vero non sit ipsum esse, oportet quod habeat esse acquirendum ab alicui, sicut est omnis quidditas create. Et quia haec quidditas posita est non subsistere in materia, non acquiratur sibi esse in aliter, sicut quidditatis compositae, immo acquiratur sibi esse in se; et ita ipsa quidditas erit hoc 'quod est', et ipsum esse suum erit 'quo est'." In I Sent., d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, c.


37. "... si remaneat aliqua forma determinatae naturae per se subsistens, non in materia, adhuc comparabitur ad suum esse ut potentia ad actum. Non dico autem ut potentiam separabilem ab actu, sed quam semper suus actus comitetur." De spirit. Creaturis, c. I, a. 1, c.

38. "Et hoc modo natura spiritualis substantiae, quae non est composita ex materia et formae, est ut potentia respectu sui esse; et sic in substantia spirituali est compositio potentiae ae actus, et per consequens formae et materiae; si tamen omnis potentia nominetur materia et omnis actus nominetur forma; Sed tamen hoc non est proprie dictum secundum commenem usum nominum." Loc. cit.
39. "Omne cuod est in genere substantiae, est compositum reali compositione; eo quod id cuod est in praedicamento substantiae est in suo esse subsistens, et oportet cuod esse suum sit aliud quam ipsum; alias non possit differre secundum esse ab illis cum cuibus convenit in ratione suae quidditatis... et ideo omne quod est directe in praedicamento substantiae, compositum est saltem ex esse et quod est." De Veritate, c.27, a.1, ad 8.

40. "Esse autem, inquantum est esse, non potest esse diversum: potest autem diversificari per aliquid quod est praeter esse; sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab esse hominis. Illud ergo cuod est esse subsistens, non potest esse nisi unum tantum. Ostensum est (lib.I, cap. 22) autem cuod Deus est suum esse subsistens. Nihil igitur aliud praeter ipsum potest esse suum esse. Oportet igitur in omni substantia suae est praeter ipsum; esse aliud ipsum substantiam et esse eius." II Con. Gent. oh.52.

41. "...ens cui non fit additio, est ens omnibus commune. Sed si Deus sit ipsum suum esse, erit ens cui non fit additio. Ergo erit commune; et ita praedicabitur de unoquaque, et erit Deus mixtus rebus omnibus; quod est haereticum..." De Potentia, q.7, a.2, obj. 6.

42. "...ens commune est cui non fit additio, de cujus tamen ratione non est ut ei additio fieri non possit; sed esse divinum est esse cui non fit additio, et de ejus ratione est ut ei fieri non possit; unde divinum esse non est esse commune." Idem, ad 6.

43. "Ex diversitate autem formarum, secundum quas rerum species diversificantur, sequitur et operationum differentia. Cum enim unumquodque agat secundum quod est actu... est autem unumquodque ens actu per formam: oportet quod operatio rei secuatur formam ipsius. Oportet ergo, sa sint diversae formae, quod habeant diversas operationes." III Con. Gent. ch. 97.

44. "Quia vero per proprium actionem res quaelibet ad proprium finem pertingit, necesse est et proprios fines diversificari in rebus: quamvis sit finis ultimus omnibus communis." Loc. cit.

45. "...quae est unusquisque, talis finis videtur ei: id est tale aliquid videtur ei appetendum quasi bonum et finis." In Ethic. III, lect. 13, n. 516.


47. "In his enim quae cognitione carent, inventur tantum-
modo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur." Op. cit., I, c. 80, a. 1, c.

48. "Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habendibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita optaret quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam..." Loc. cit.

49. "Sicut igitur formae alterius apprehensum per intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitivo." Idem, a. 2, c.


51. "Sed considerandum est quod cum omnis inclinatione consequatur aliquam formam, appetitus naturalis consequitur formam in natura existentem; appetitus autem sensitivus, vel etiam intellectivus seu rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas, sequitur formam apprehensam. Sicut igitur id in quod tendit appetitus naturalis, est bonum existens in re; ita id in quod tendit appetitus animalis vel voluntarius, est bonum apprehensam." Loc. cit.

52. "Dicendum quod abstrahere contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum compositionis et divisionis; sicut cum intelligimus aliquid non esse in alio, vel esse separatum ab eo. Alio modo, per modum simplicitatis: sicut cum intelligimus unum, nihil considerando de alio. Abstrahere igitur per intellectum ea quae secundum rem non sunt abstracta secundum primum modum abstrahendi, non est absque falsitate." Sum. Theol. I, c. 85, a. 1, ad 1.

53. "Sed secundo modo abstrahere per intellectum quae non sunt abstracta secundum rem, non habet falsitatem." Loc. cit.

54. "Et cuia veritas intellectus est ex hoc quod conformatione rei...intellectus abstrahere non potest vera quod secundum rem conjunctum est, cuia in abstrahendo significatur esse separatio secundum ipsum esse rei; sicut si abstraho hominem ab albedine, dicendo, Homo non est albus, significo separationem esse in re. Unde si secundum rem homo et albedo non sunt separata erit intellectus falsus." In Boet. de Trinit., c. 5, a. 3, c., Parme, p. 534b.
55. "Dicit ergo primo, cuod omnis virtus subjectum cujus est, facit bene habere, et opus ejus bene se habens. Sicut virtus oculi est, per quam et oculus est bonus, et per quam bene videmus, quod est proprium opus oculi. Similiter etiam virtus eculi est, quae facit eculum bonum, et per quem eculum bene operatur opus suum, quod est vehiculit currere, et suavitier ferre ascensorem, et audacter expectare bellatores." In Ethic., II, lect. 6, n. 307.

56. "Et hujus ratio est, cuia virtus alicujus rei attenditur secundum ultimum cuod potest, puta in eo, cuod potest ferre centum libras, virtus ejus determinatur non ex hoc quod fert cuincauginta, sed ex hoc quod fert centum, ut dicitur primo Caeli. Ultimum autem ad quod potestia alicujus rei se extendit, est bonum opus. Et ideo ad virtutem cujuslibet rei pertinet, cuod reddat bonum opus." Idem, n. 308.

57. "Harum potentiarum virtutes non sunt ipsae potentiae; neque passiones, sicut est in sensitivis potentiiis; neque quaitates de necessitate agentes, sicut sunt qualitates rerum naturalium; sed sunt habitus, secundum mos potest quis agere cum voluerit..." De Virtut. in Communi, r.l, a.l, cl


60. "...esse divinum, cuod est ejus substantia, non est esse commune, sed est esse distinctum a qualibet alio esse. Unde per ipsum esse Deus differt a qualibet alio ente." Idem., ad 4.


64. "Ipsum enim divinum esse omnem plenitudinem perfectionis obtinet... Unde, cum unumquodque in tantum sit bonum in quantum est perfectum, ipsum divinum esse est eius perfecta bonitas." III Con. Gent., ch. 20.

65. "...tamen hoc absolute verum est, quod aliquid est primum, quod per suam essentiam est ens et bonum, quod dicimus Deum... Huic etiam conscientia concordat Aristoteles. A primo igitur per suam essentiam esse et bonum, unumquodque post dicti esse et ens, inquantum participat ipsum per modum cuiusdam assimilationis, licet remote et deficienter...

Sum. Theol., I, c. 6, a. 4, c.

66. "Dicendum quod licet unumquodque sit bonum inquantum habet esse, tamen essentia rei creatae non est ipsum esse; et ideo non secutur quod res creata sit bona per suam essentiam". Op. cit., I, q. 6, a. 3, ad 2.

67. "Ad primum ergo. Dicendum quod licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem, quia tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter, et bonum simpliciter. Nam cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu, actus autem proprie ordinem habet ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernit esse... ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid; non enim esse album auferit esse in potentia simpliciter, cum adveniat rei iam praecogniti in actu. Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile, et per consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo perfectum, dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam perfectionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquid perfectionem inquantum est actu, non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. - Sic ergo secundum primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum quid, idest inquantum est ens; secundum vero ultimum actum, dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter. Sic ergo quod dicit Boethius, quod "in rebus aliud est quod sunt bona, et aliud quod sunt," referendum est ad esse bonum et ad esse simpliciter; quia secundum primum actum est aliquid ens simpliciter, et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter. Et tamen secundum primum actum est quodammodo bonum, et secundum ultimum actum est quodammodo ens." Op. cit. I, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1.
68. "...prima secundum quam res constituitur in suo esse, sicut prima perfectio hominis est esse suum substantiale; secunda vero est secundum quam est quos proxime ad suas perfectas operationes sicut vires animae et habitus eas informantes, cuius homo in perfectum operationem potest exire; tertia autem perfectio est secundum quam conjungitur suo fini sicut speculatio cuius hominem substantialis separatis unit." Cajetan, \textit{Op. cit.}, ch. 5, n. 104: Secunda propositio est.

69. "Manifestum est autem non esse hominem simpliciter perfectum cui sola maturae bonitatis gaudet aut qui aproprio fine procul est; unde ordo entis simpliciter ad ens secundum quid oppositus est ordini perfecti simpliciter ad perfectum secundum quid; secundum namque esse substantiale homo ens simpliciter dicitur, perfectus autem secundum quid. Ideo enim qui nullam aliam perfectionem habet nisi cuius est homo, perfectus non assertur simpliciter, sed cum additione dicimus quod est perfectus secundum esse substantiale. Secundum vero esse accidentaliter quale est habitum et operationem, ens secundum quid homo dicitur, perfectus autem simpliciter; nihil enim tunc sibi deficit eorum cuius ad perfectionem hominem exiguntur. Patet ergo intenta propositio quod scilicet res est perfecta simpliciter ex ultima perfectione." \textit{Loc. cit.}

70. "Unde, cum unumquodque in tantum sit bonum in quantum est perfectum, ipsum divinum esse est eius perfecta bonitas; idem enim est Deo esse, vivere, sapientem esse, beatum esse, et quicquid alius ad perfectionem et bonitatem pertinere videatur, quasi tota divina bonitas sit ipsum divinum esse." III \textit{Con. Gent.}, ch. 20.

71. "Unde, si secundum quod res quaelibet est, bona est; non est autem earum aliqua suum esse: nulla earum est sua bonitas, sed earum quaelibet bonitatis participatione bona est, sicut et ipsius esse participatione est ens." \textit{Loc. cit.}


74. "Manifestum est ergo ex dictis quod, licet Deus secundum suum simplex esse perfectam et totam suam bonitatem habeat,
creaturae tamen ad perfectionem suae bonitatis non pertingunt per solum suum esse, sed per plura. Unde, licet quaelibet earum sit bona inquantum est, non tamen potest simpliciter bona dici si aliis careat suae ad ipsius bonitatem requiruntur: sicut homo cui, virtute spoliatus, vitiis est subjectus, dici-tur quidem bonus secundum quid, scilicet inquantum est ens et inquantum est homo, non tamen bonus simpliciter, sed magis malus. Non igitur cuilibet creaturarum idem est esse et bonum esse simpliciter: licet quaelibet earum bona sit inquantum est. Deo vero simpliciter idem est esse et esse bonum. Con. Gent., loc. cit.

75. "Praeterea, quidquid est in Deo, est eius essentia. Sed hoc non competit iustitiae; dicit enim Boethius in libro De Hebdom., quod 'bonum essentiam, iustum vero actum respicit.' Ergo iustitia non competit Deo." Sum. Theol. I, col. 21, a.1, obj. 4.

76. "Dicendum quod licet iustitia respicit actum, non tamen per hoc excluditur quin sit essentia Dei; quia etiam id quod est de essentia rei, potest esse principium actionis. Sed bonum non semper respicit actum, quia aliquid dicitur esse bonum, non solum secundum quod agit, sed etiam secundum quod in sua essentia perfectum est. Et propter hoc ibidem dicitur quod bonum comparatur ad iustum, sicut generale ad speciale." Loc. cit.


78. "Actio enim est proprae actualitas substantiae virtutis; sicut esse est actualitas substantiae vel essentiae. Impossible est autem quod aliquid quod non est purus actus, sed aliquid habet de potentia admixtum, sit sua actualitas, quia-actualitas potentialitati repellatur. Solus autem Deus est actur purus. Unde in solo Deo sua substantia est suum esse et suum agere." Loc. cit.
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