THE MODAL ENUNCIATION

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PROPOSITIONS

1. Artes quae actiones et passiones humanas imitantur dependunt quantum ad veritatem ipsius artificii a synderesi et scientia morali.

2. Potentiae animae ab actibus et objectis specificantur.


4. Possibile absolutum definitur ex non-repugnuntia terminorum.

5. Radix contingentiae in rebus naturalibus est natura possibilis, per quam se habent ad fieri et non fieri, esse et non esse.
This thesis on the modal enunciation is occasioned by the generally inadequate and incorrect treatment of this subject in manuals of logic—even the Summulae of John of St. Thomas is not an exception. The principal purpose here is to arrive at the nature of the modal enunciation; both the chapters on the division of the modal enunciation and on its properties contribute to that end.

Since St. Thomas did not complete his commentary on Aristotle's Perihermeneias, there is no certainly authentic treatment by St. Thomas of this subject. It is Cajetan, who completed St. Thomas's unfinished commentary on the second book of the Perihermeneias, that best illuminates the text of Aristotle. St. Albert's paraphrase and commentary on the same text also clarifies a great deal, as does his commentary on the Prior Analytics.

This paper in no way attempts to narrate the historical development of various opinions about the modal enunciation, nor does it study the modern "modal judgment." It is an essay, rather, at a doctrinal exposition of the subject, and it contains no deliberate departure from the Aristotelian tradition.
Because the commentary of Cajetan is very formal and explicit, the second and third chapters of this paper are in the form of a commentary on his introductory paragraphs. The fifth chapter on the subjective parts of the modal enunciation expands, mostly from the *Metaphysics*, what the *Perihermeneias* indicates only very briefly about the modes of possibility and impossibility. The section on the contingent derives principally from St. Albert's extensive treatment of this mode in the *Prior Analytics*. Because the *Perihermeneias* is very explicit on the opposition and consequences of modals, there was no need to repeat what is already done at length and in detail. Cajetan's epilogue, however, on opposition by reason of quantity explains a great deal about the nature of the modal enunciation. The last chapter on the composed and divided senses of the modal enunciation, while not an integral part of a treatise on the modal enunciation, is nevertheless necessary because of some superficial and erroneous opinions found in medieval and modern writers.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: PLACE OF THIS TREATISE IN LOGIC

Aristotle and St. Thomas commonly divide logic according to the three operations of the human intellect, because logic is the art which directs man in the very act of his reason that he might proceed in good order, with ease, and without error. The first two acts of the mind are properly called acts of intellect rather than of reason, because they are not acts of discourse. The first act is an understanding of indivisible or incomplex things, and is therefore called simple apprehension. The part of logic pertaining to this operation is found in the Predicaments. The second act of the intellect is that of composition or division, in which truth or falsity is found. Aristotle treated what pertains to this act in the Perihermeneias. The third operation of the mind is properly called an act of reason, because it is that in which the mind moves from a knowledge of a known truth to a knowledge of a truth previously unknown. This is the act of discourse, that is, of going from one to another. The remaining books of the Organon are ordered to this act—the Prior Analytics, the Posterior Analytics, the Topics, and the Sophistic Refutations.

Just as the first of these acts is ordered to the second, and the second to the third, so the Predicaments is ordered to the Perihermeneias and the latter to the Prior Analytics and the books that follow. Here we are concerned with the modal enunciation which is treated by Aristotle in the Perihermeneias, the Latin title of which is De Interpretatione.

Place of the Perihermeneias

This section will be devoted to showing the place of the part of logic treated in this book in relation to what precedes and follows it. Since reasoning is the act most proper to the human intellect and since it is the act to which the other acts of the intellect are ordered, we can say, following St. Albert, that logic is the science through which we arrive at a knowledge of the unknown through the known. The unknown can be taken either as something simple, i.e., incomplex, or as complex. The simple can be known only by a definition, the complex only by the use of a syllogism. For the definition it is necessary to treat of how to find definable objects and defining terms, and therefore it is necessary to order the

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predicables and to show how the definition of something incomplex is arrived at by division. In the same way, we must now treat what is necessary for the syllogism, which is the instrument for arriving at knowledge of something complex. The subject of the *Perihermeneias* is among the things presupposed to the teaching on the syllogism.

Both the Greek and the Latin forms of the title mean "on interpretation." Since an interpreter explains something as true or false, an interpretation is an enunciative *oratio*,¹ in which truth or falsity can be found.²

¹There seems to be no exact English equivalent of *oratio*. Its Latin definition is, "vox significativa, cuius partium aliquid significativum est separatim, ut dictio, non ut affirmatic vel negatio." (Aristotle, *Perihermeneias*, 16 b 27.) The Oxford translation uses "sentence" (*The Works of Aristotle*, ed. W. D. Ross (11 vols; London: Oxford University Press, 1928), I, 16 b 27.) but only a perfect *oratio* can be called a sentence. "Expression" also seems inadequate, since it can mean a single word, the parts of which do not signify independently. For the sake of accuracy, it will be better to retain the Latin word here.

²S. Thomas, *In Periherm.*, Lib. I, lect. 1, n. 3. Thus *interpretatio* is the equivalent of *enunciatio*. St. Albert takes *interpretatio* to have a wider meaning than *enunciatio*. He takes it to include every way of explaining something, either as a part as in the noun and the verb, or as a whole as in the different kinds of perfect *orationes*. (St. Albert, *Periherm.*, p. 374 a.) But St. Thomas says the noun and the verb are rather principles of an interpretation than interpretations themselves, and the other *orationes*, such as the optative and the imperative, are rather expressions of affections than interpretations of what is in the intellect.
The enunciation then is the principal subject of the Perihermeneias, and the noun and verb are treated in it only insofar as they are parts of the enunciation.

It should also be noted that the enunciation is not formally the same as the proposition, for a proposition is an enunciation used in a syllogism. The properties of the syllogism, such as having three terms which are in the positions of subject and predicate, belong to the Prior Analytics. Here only the properties of the enunciation are considered, without reference to any possible syllogisms in which the enunciation might be used. The enunciation can be thus considered apart from the syllogism because each is a whole with its own parts and its own properties. The enunciation can, however, be called the remote matter of the syllogism (the proposition is the proximate matter), because it can be used in the syllogism. The enunciation can also be said to be ordered to the syllogism as to its end, because it is sought for the sake of the syllogism in which we can arrive at knowledge of what was previously unknown.

The enunciation is the sign of the act of the in-

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1 "Propositio est enunciatio stans sub forma syllogismi," S. Albertus, ibid., p. 374 b.

2 Ibid., p. 374 b.
tellect—composition and division. It is always a declaration of something complex, a composition of intelligible things in which those things are combined which are joined together in reality.\(^1\)

The end of the doctrine in the *Perihermeneias* is to construct an enunciatve *oration* about something in words that make a true and perfect enunciation.\(^2\) The further ordering of the enunciation to the syllogism is an extrinsic end.

To complete the brief outline of how we arrive at knowledge of the complex unknown from the known, we can say there must be (1) an interpretation of things by an enunciation, (2) a combination of these things which have been enunciated so that one follows from another, and (3) proof that they are so and cannot be otherwise. The first is treated in the *Perihermeneias*, the second in the *Prior Analytics*, and the third in different ways in the *Posterior Analytics* and the *Topics*.\(^3\)

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\(^1\)Ibid., p. 375 a, "In hac compositione interpretantur ea quae sibi invicem insunt secundum rem."

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 377 a, "Substantialis principalis hujus scientiae finis est constituere orationem interpretativam de re sub sermone veram interpretationem et perfectam perficiente."

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 377 b.
It was stated above that the book of *Predicaments* treated of simple or incomplex things, and in another place that the noun and the verb, which are certainly incomplex, fall under the *Perihermeneias*. There is no contradiction here, because simple expressions can be considered in three different ways: (1) absolutely, as they signify simple apprehensions, and this belongs to the *Predicaments*; (2) as they are parts of the enunciation, and thus the noun and the verb belong to the *Perihermeneias*; (3) as terms arranged in a certain order in the syllogism, and this belongs to the *Prior Analytics*.

**Order of the Perihermeneias**

Having seen the place of the *Perihermeneias* in the whole of logic, we must now consider the order of the book itself. As was noted above, the enunciation is the

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1 In view of the rigorous order of the parts of the *Organon* and the equally rigorous order of the *Perihermeneias*, it is difficult to see how anyone who has read the *Organon* in even the most superficial way can make a statement like the following: "Tous ses (i.e., Aristotle's) écrits et particulièrement ceux de l'Organon sont un amas mal ordonné de notices prises, corrigées et augmentées à l'occasion." (I. M. Bochenski, O. P., "Notes Historiques sur les Propositions Modales," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, XXVI (1937), pp. 673-692.) Certainly, in the *Perihermeneias* there is nothing that could be in a different order, as the commentaries of St. Albert, St. Thomas, and Cajetan clearly indicate.
principal subject of the *Perihermeneias*; the treatise is therefore divided according to the consideration of the enunciation and its parts.¹

After a preliminary chapter on signification and different ways of signifying,² Aristotle treats first the principles of the subject, i.e., the principles of the enunciation. These are of two kinds: material and formal. The material (or as St. Thomas refers to them, "quasi-material")³ principles or integral parts of the enunciation are the noun and the verb, the former signifying the substance of a thing and the latter signifying an action or a passion proceeding from a thing.⁴ The formal principle is the *oratio*, which is the genus of the enunciation.⁵

Having treated the principles of the subject, Aristotle now takes up the subject, i.e., the enunciation, in the rest of the book. This falls into two sections, the first is on the enunciation absolutely considered,⁶ the

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³Lect. 4, n. 1.

⁴Ibid.; the noun and the verb are treated in Aristotle, chap. 2 and 3; S. Thomas, lect. 4 and 5.

⁵Aristotle, chap. 4, 16 b 27-35; S. Thomas, lect. 6.

⁶Chap. 4, 17 a 1-chap. 9.
second is on the diversity of enunciations. The absolute consideration of the enunciation comprises three parts: its definition, its division, and its property of opposition.

The enunciation is defined as an oratio in which the true or false is found. The first division is into the enunciation which is simply one because what it signifies is one, and the enunciation which is one only by conjunction because it signifies many. The latter, called a composite enunciation, is one only secundum quid, simpliciter it is many. The second division is into the species of the enunciation: the affirmation and the negation. This division is primarily of the simple enunciation, but can also be applied ex consequenti to the composite enunciation.

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1Chap. 10-14; in the commentary of St. Thomas, the first is treated in lessons 7 to 15 of what he calls Book One, all the rest in the commentaries of St. Thomas and Cajetan is called Book Two.

2Chap. 4, 17 a 1-8.

3Chap. 5-6, 17 a 26.

4Chap. 6, 17 a 27- chap. 9.

5"Enunciatio est oratio, in qua verum vel falsum est," S. Thomas, lect. 7, n. 2.

6S. Thomas, lect. 8, n. 13.

7S. Thomas, lect. 8, n. 19.
These divisions are followed by a treatment of opposition between the subjective parts of the enunciation, i.e., between affirmation and negation. First, Aristotle shows how enunciations are opposed to each other, and, secondly, he answers a difficulty about whether in future singular enunciations in contingent matter one of the opposed enunciations must be true or false. To show how enunciations are opposed to each other he takes up first of all the opposition of affirmation and negation absolutely considered, i.e., without reference to differences arising from the subject. In this connection, St. Thomas points out that affirmation and negation divide the enunciation on the part of its very form or mode of enunciating, whereas the true and the false divide it in comparison to things.

Philosophus assumit duplicem diversitatem enunciationis: quarum prima est ex ipsa forma vel modo enunciandi, secundum quod dictum est quod enunciatio vel est affirmativa, per quam scilicet enunciatur aliquid esse, vel est negativa per quam significatur aliquid non esse; secunda diversitas est per comparationem ad rem, ex qua dependet veritas et falsitas intellectus et enunciationis. Cum enim enunciatur aliquid esse vel non esse secundum congruentiam rei, est oratio vera; alioquin est oratio falsa.

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1Chap. 6, 17 a 27- chap. 8; S. Thomas, lect., 9-12.
3S. Thomas, lect. 9, n. 2.
Then we see how enunciations are furthermore opposed by reason of their subjects.¹ This involves a new division of enunciations according to the quantity of the subject, i.e., according as something is predicated of many or of one only. Since a subject is either singular or universal, and since a predicate is said of a universal either universally, particularly, or indefinitely, there are four kinds of enunciations: singular, universal, particular, and indefinite.² Then, having seen how enunciations are opposed by reason of subject, we next consider how opposed affirmations and negations are related to truth and falsity.³ Finally, before attacking the difficulty about future singulars in contingent matter, Aristotle shows that to one affirmation there is one negation opposed.⁴

The remainder of the Perihermeneias⁵ is devoted to the enunciation as it is diversified by virtue of something's being added to it. First of all, something

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¹Aristotle, chap. 7, 17 a 37-17 b 22; S. Thomas, lect. 10, 11, nn. 1-5.
²S. Thomas, lect. 10, nn. 10, 14, 15, 16.
³Aristotle, chap., 7, 17 b 23-37; S. Thomas, lect. 11, nn. 16-11.
⁴Aristotle, chap. 7, 17 b 38-chap. 8; S. Thomas, lect. 12.
⁵Aristotle, chap. 10-14; Book Two of the commentaries.
can be added to a part of the enunciation, i.e., to the subject or to the predicate. Sometimes such an addition does not take away the unity of the enunciation, as when the subject or predicate is rendered infinite by the addition of a negative.\(^1\) Sometimes an addition takes away the unity of the enunciation in making it multiple, although the enunciation may appear to be simple.\(^2\) This section is important for the distinction of the divided and composed senses of the modal enunciation. Secondly, an addition can be made, not merely to a part of the enunciation, but to its very composition. Such an addition is a mode and distinguishes the modal enunciation from the \textit{de inesse} enunciation.\(^3\) Lastly, Aristotle treats the opposition of enunciations deriving from the additions made to the simple enunciation.\(^4\)

**Divisions of the Enunciation**

From the \textit{Perihermeneias} we can gather six ways of dividing the enunciation: by reason of unity, quality, quantity, time, matter, and expression or non-expression of the mode of composition.

\(^1\)Aristotle, chap. 10; S. Thomas and Cajetanus, Lib. II, lect. 1-4.

\(^2\)Aristotle, chap. 11; Cajetanus, lect. 5-7.

\(^3\)Aristotle, chap. 12, 13; Cajetanus, lect. 8-12.

\(^4\)Aristotle, chap. 14; Cajetanus, lect. 13-14.
From the first, we have enunciations that are simply one (una simpliciter) and those that are composite (una conjunctione). The former are sometimes called categorical, and the latter hypothetical.\(^1\)

This is an essential division of the enunciation, because it is a division on the part of the copula.\(^2\)

The second is into affirmation and negation, which St. Thomas frequently asserts is the division of the enunciation into its species.

Quae quidem est divisio generis in species, quia sumitur secundum differentiam praedicati ad quod fertur negatio; praedicatum autem est pars formalis enunciationis; et ideo hujusmodi divisio dicitur pertinere ad qualitatem enunciationis, qualitatem, inquam, essentialem, secundum quod differentia significat quale quid.\(^3\)

The third division is by reason of a difference found in the subject of the enunciation, according as it is said of many or only of one. St. Thomas says this division pertains to the quantity of the enunciation, for quantity follows matter, and the subject is as matter in

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2John of St. Thomas shows at some length that this division of the enunciation is substantially that of a genus into its species, although it takes on the mode of an analogical division, *ibid.*, pp. 157-161.

3S. Thomas, *In Periherm.*, Lib. I, lect. 10, n. 10. John of St. Thomas shows that it is not impossible to have more than one essential division, when these divisions are inadequate, i.e., when the essence to be divided is made up of several formalities each of which is divisible into its species. *Curs. Phil.*, I, p. 164 a 41-b 2.
the enunciation. But when the subject is a universal (i.e., it can be said of many) something can be predicated of it in three ways: universally, if the predicate belongs to the entire multitude in which the universal is found, e.g., "every man is an animal"; particularly, if the predicate is said to belong to an indeterminate individual that falls under the universal, e.g., "some man is white"; or indefinitely, when something is predicated of a universal without any sign of universality or particularity. Thus from the point of view of quantity, the enunciation is divided into singular, universal, particular, and indefinite.

The fourth division of the enunciation is according to time, i.e., into past, present, and future. As the third division was on the part of the subject, this is on the part of the verb, because every enunciation must have a verb or a form of a verb and must, therefore, consignify present, past, or future time. Both the third and fourth divisions are accidental, because they are according to a part of the enunciation.

The fifth division of the enunciation is according to matter, i.e., according to the relationship of predicate to subject. If the predicate is in the subject per se, the enunciation is said to be in necessary matter,

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1 In Periherm., Lib. I, lect. 10, n. 10.
2 Ibid., nn. 13-16.
3 Ibid., lect. 13, n. 3.
e.g., "man is an animal," or "man is capable of laughter." If it is per se repugnant that the predicate be in the subject, the enunciation is said to be in impossible or remote matter, e.g., "man is a horse." If the predicate is neither per se repugnant to the subject nor per se contained in it, the enunciation is said to be in possible or contingent matter.¹

The sixth and last division of the enunciation is into the de inesse and the modal enunciation, the former merely stating that the predicate is or is not in the subject, the latter stating the mode in which the predicate does or does not belong to the subject, i.e., necessarily, impossibly, possibly, or contingently.² The extremes of this division are the expression or the non-expression of the mode of composition of predicate with subject. In the modal enunciation the verb which is the sign of composition is affected by a mode which is added to it. It is this kind of enunciation that is to be treated in this paper.

The Modal Enunciation Pertains to Formal Logic

We have now described how logic is divided according to the three operations of the human intellect and where the modal enunciation is placed in this division. There

¹Ibid., n. 3.
²Cajetanus, In Periherm., Lib. II, lect. 8, n. 2.
is still another way of dividing the science of logic into formal and material logic. Divided in this way, the Perihermeneia and the Prior Analytics are principally formal logic; the Categories, Posterior Analytics, and Topics are material logic; and the Sophistic Refutations contains both formal and material logic. Where does a treatise on the modal enunciation fall in this division? It seems to belong rather to the matter of logic than to the form, because in the fifth division of the enunciation given above the members of the division were necessary, impossible, contingent, and possible matter; and these are also the four modes of the modal enunciation. In order to answer this question it will first be necessary to assign the difference between formal and material logic.

The act of intellectual knowledge terminates in the formation by the possible intellect of the expressed species, which is also called the mental word or concept. This concept can be considered in two ways: formally and objectively. The formal concept is a form by which (quod) we know the object. The objective concept is that which (quod) we know, i.e., the object represented by the formal concept.

In forming the concept, the human intellect has to construct certain relations which ten belong to the object only as it is in the state of being known, e.g., to be a
subject or a predicate. These relations are called second intentions because they belong to the object only in its second state, i.e., as known. Formalities which belong to the object in its first state, i.e., in itself, are called first intentions.\(^1\) The second intentions are relations of reason which are founded on first intentions, i.e., on the concept, which is nothing but the object itself, existing now in the intellect in an immaterial, intentional, and purely objective way.

All of logic is concerned with these relations which are constructed by the mind, i.e., with second intentions. The formal object of logic, in fact, is the second intention.\(^2\) But since, like all other relations, these relations differ from one another by reason of their foundations, second intentions will be divided according as the concept on which they are founded is divided.\(^3\) We have already said that the concept can be considered either formally or objectively. Formally, the concept is a sign; it is a sign which is a form; it is that by which the object is known. Objectively, it is

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\(^1\)Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Phil., I, p. 291 a.

\(^2\)The matter of logic (materia denominabilis) is all the things about which the mind forms second intentions. We can also speak of the materia dirigibilis of logic, which is the three acts of the mind that are directed by the art of logic. Cf. Joan. a Sto Thoma, ibid., p. 261 ff.

that which is known or signified by the formal sign. A second intention founded on the concept as a sign is said to belong to formal logic; it makes abstraction from certain determinations of matter; e.g., the noun is indifferent to the perfection of the object which it signifies: God, man, stone, triangle are all equally nouns. On the other hand, a second intention founded on that which is signified is said to belong to material logic, in which the determinations of the matter are taken into account, e.g., substance and accident.

Now the difficulty can be stated more clearly: is the modal enunciation, which is a second intention, founded on the formal sign or on the signified object? Since the four modes are necessity, impossibility, possibility, and contingency, and these express determinations of the matter, it would seem, at first glance, that the modal enunciation is based on the object signified and therefore is treated in material logic. But Aristotle treats modals in the Perihermeneias, which is a treatise of formal logic.

First of all, it is well to observe how the modal enunciation differs from the de inesse enunciation. "All men are animals" and "All old men have grey hair" differ by reason of their matter: the first is necessary, the

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1The term formal which is used in formal logic is from the form which is the fourth species of quality, not from the form which is a substantial principle. It is a form in the sense of that which terminates quantity: the parts of a syllogism, for example, are arranged in a certain configuration which is formal in the sense of formal logic.
second is contingent; but they do not differ as enunciations. On the other hand, "All men are animals" and "That all men are animals is necessary" differ precisely as signs, and not at all in their matter. One is as necessary as the other, but the necessity is signified only in the modal enunciation; the modal is therefore a new sign. But such a sign presupposes another sign already formed, i.e., the de inesse enunciation which, then, as the dictum, becomes the subject of the modal. The de inesse enunciation is a sign of a concept which represents a composition found in things. The composition is expressed in the formal concept by a relation of predicate to subject joined to the concept. The enunciation signifies the concept with the relation joined to it. The mind, reflecting on the simple inherence signified by the de inesse, can form a new concept expressing the mode of inherence. This new concept will be accompanied by a new relation of reason, i.e., a new second intention. It is the new concept with its relation that is signified by the modal enunciation.

The formal concept, which is itself a sign, manifests either simple composition or composition with its mode even before the formation of the relation of reason, which the mind uses in its act of knowledge. The mode of signification is, therefore, anterior to the formation of the second intention. Since the mode of signification
is already found in the formal concept, logical doctrine based on the mode of signification will belong to formal logic. The modal enunciation is defined by its mode of signification and, consequently, is treated in formal logic. "Man is an animal" is an enunciation in necessary matter, but it is not a modal. "That man is an animal is necessary" is a modal. The two enunciations do not differ in matter, but in their mode of signification. In each case, the predicate belongs to the subject necessarily, but only in the second is the necessity expressed. The proximate foundation for the modal enunciation is the composition signified by the de inesse enunciation. The object signified is only its remote matter.
CHAPTER II

THE MODAL ENUNCIATION: AN SIT?

The Division of Cajetan's Commentary

Perihermeneias. Bk. II

I. Cajetan's introduction, lect. 8, nn. 1-6.
   A. There are modal enunciations, n. 2.
   B. Which modes properly make a modal enunciation, n. 3.
   C. The subject and predicate of a modal; definition and unity, nn. 4, 5.
   D. How this treatise is ordered to the preceding; necessity of a special treatment of modals, n. 6.

II. Opposition of modals, lect. 8, n. 7-lect. 9, n. 5.
   A. Problem: Is the contradictory of a modal made by negating the verb of the dictum or by negating the mode, n. 7.
   B. Should the verb of the dictum be negated? nn. 8-14.
      1. Argument for, nn. 8-12.
   C. The mode should be negated, lect. 9.

III. Consequences of modals, lect. 10-lect. 12, n. 9.
   A. What are the correct consequences? lect. 10.
      1. Preliminary notions, nn. 2, 3.
      2. Consequences according to the opinion of the ancients, nn. 3, 4.
      3. Consequences according to Aristotle, nn. 5-18.
         a) Ancients were right about the consequences of the impossible, n. 5.
         b) They were not wholly right about the necessary, nn. 6-18.
            (1) Examination of their view, nn. 6-12.
            (2) Statement of the truth, nn. 13-18.
   B. A problem, lect. 11-lect. 12, n. 9.
      1. The question: Does the possible follow on the necessary? nn. 1, 2.
      2. Solution, n. 3-lect. 12, n. 6.
         a) The correct doctrine absolutely speaking: Some possibles do not have a potency to opposites, n. 3-lect. 12, n. 4.
b) The correct doctrine applied to the matter in hand, lect. 12, nn. 5-9b.  
(1) Relation of physical and logical possibles to the necessary; answers to arguments, nn. 5, 6.  
(2) Order of modals starting from the necessary, nn. 7-9.

IV. Cajetan's epilogue, lect. 12, nn. 10-13.  
A. An additional note on quality of modals, n. 10.  
B. A note on their quantity, nn. 11, 12.  
C. Figure of opposition of modals, n. 13.

The Difference between a Modal and a De Inesse Enunciation

2. Quia ergo possimus dupliciter de rebus loqui; uno modo, componendo rem unam cum alia, alio modo, compositionem factam declarando qualis sit, insurgunt duo enunciationum genera; quaedam scilicet enunciantes aliquid inesse vel non inesse alteri, et haec vocantur de inesse, de quibus superior habitus est sermo; quaedam vero enunciantes modum compositionis praedicati cum subiecto, et haec vocantur modales, a principaliori parte sua, modo scilicet. Cum enim dicitur, Socatem currere est possibile, non enunciatur cursus de Socrate, sed qualis sit compositio cursus cum Socrate, scilicet possibilis.

In beginning the introduction to his commentary on Aristotle's treatment of the modal enunciation, Cajetan first indicates that there are modal enunciations. To do so he shows that besides the de inesse enunciation, which has been the concern of the Perihermeneias up to this point, there is still another kind of enunciation. The enunciation is a sign of the concept produced in the second operation of the human intellect. Now, this operation, which is that of composition, can be signified in two ways: by simply composing one with another, or by declaring
the kind of composition that exists between the two things. We can, for example, say, "Socrates is running," or "That Socrates run is possible." The first is called a de inesse enunciation, the second, a modal.

The composition, which is the second act of the mind, is not, however, a mere juxtaposition of two concepts, but is rather an act of comparing one with the other in order to know whether this predicate belongs to this subject. It is this very comparison which is the reason that a human intellect can see the connection between the two extremes. John of St. Thomas has explained the act of composition in the following way:

Unde formaliter loquendo compositio non consistit in eo quod pluribus speciebus intellectus utatur ad aliquid integre, et perfecte cognoscendum, sed quod indiget comparatione, et conferentia unius cum altero ad aliciendum judicium, et cognitionem de convenientia vel disconvenientia talis praedicati ad tale subjectum.¹

The reason for this act is that the light of the human intellect is a very feeble one that cannot penetrate the connection existing between different notions by an act of simple intuition. It must, rather, resort to the more roundabout method of comparison in order to manifest these connections.

Every enunciation signifies the concept formed by the mind in making the comparison of the extremes. The de in esse enunciation signifies a concept which composes one extreme with another, but when a new concept is formed manifesting how the extremes are composed, it is signified by the modal enunciation. They differ precisely in their modes of signification. It is very important for the teaching on the modal enunciation to insist that it is essentially a sign and that it is as a sign that it differs from the de in esse. The problem, therefore, is not one of "modality of judgment." The acts of composition and of judgment are distinct, and so, consequently, are the signs of these two acts. Judgment is the assent given by the intellect to something capable of that assent. It is, however, only a complex truth as signified by an enunciation which is capable of such assent. The act of judgment must, therefore, be distinguished from the formation of an enunciation. We know from experience that

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1Ibid., n. 29, p. 864.
we can construct enunciations without passing any judgment upon them. Only subsequent to the composition of an enunciation does the intellect assent. Although enunciation and judgment or assertion are distinct, they may be expressed by materially the same group of words and they may sometimes even be formed as if by one act. For example, in "Man is an animal" the "is" may be taken merely as a copula joining the extremes or as expressing an assertion. Only in the first case is it formally an enunciation.

In another passage, Cajetan points out that in a de inesse enunciation it is the verb, which signifies being or non-being, that is predicated of the subject, whereas in a modal enunciation that which signifies being or non-being is the subject.

Et dicitur quod quemadmodum in illis enunciationibus de inesse appositiones, idest praedications, sunt esse et non esse, idest verba significativa esse vel non esse (verbum enim semper est nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur), subjective vero appositionibus res sunt, quibus esse vel non esse apponitur, ut album, cum dicitur album est, vel homo, cum dicitur, homo est; eodem modo hoc in loco in modalibus accidit: esse quidem subjectum fit, idest dictum significans esse vel non esse subjecti locum tenet; contingere vero et posse appositiones, idest modi, praedicationes sunt.

The apposito in the modal enunciation is the entire predicate, e.g., "is possible".

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1 Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Phil., I, p. 145.
2 In Periherm., Lib. II, lect. 9, n. 2.
3 Ibid., n. 3.
The Mode Determines Composition, Not Things

(2. cont.) Signanter autem dixi modum compositionis, quoniam modus in enunciatione positus duplex est. Quidam enim determinat verbum, vel ratione significati ipsius verbi, ut Socrates currit velociter; vel ratione temporis consignificati, ut Socrates currit hodie; quidam autem determinat compositionem ipsam praedicati cum subjecto; sicut cum dicitur, Socratem currere est possibile. In illis namque determinatur qualis cursus insit Socrati, vel quando; in hac autem, qualis sit coniunctio cursus cum Socrate. Modi ergo non illi qui rem verbi, sed qui compositionem determinant, modales enunciationes reddunt, eo quod compositio veluti forma totius totam enunciationem continet.

In this section, Cajetan first says what kind of mode it is that makes a modal enunciation, and secondly, gives the reason, eo quod compositio.

A mode is commonly defined as an "adjoining determination of a thing," An adjective, for example, is said to modify a noun, and an adverb to modify a verb. But logic is not concerned with parts of speech, the treatment of which belongs, rather, to grammar. A logical mode is indifferent to the part of speech which is used to signify it: an adverb, an adjective, or even another verb can be used. Socrates currit contingenter, Socratem currere est contingens, and Contingit Socratem currere are grammatically different; yet their meaning remains exactly the same, and from the point of view of logic they are identical enunciations.

Since a modal enunciation expresses the kind of composition that exists between subject and predicate, and since the verb is the sign of composition, it is the verb that is affected or determined by the mode. The verb can, however, be affected in two ways: it can be modified by reason of what it signifies or consignifies, e.g., "Socrates runs swiftly," or "Socrates is running today"; or it can be modified insofar as it is the sign of composition, e.g., "That Socrates run is possible." If it is affected in the first way, the mode determines the res verbi and is called, in St. Albert's phrase, the modus rei praedicatae. If the verb is affected in the second way, the mode determines the composition. Only this latter mode which affects the composition is a mode that makes a modal enunciation, for the logician is not interested in when or how well Socrates runs, but only in the kind of connection between Socrates and his running.

At eo quod compositio, etc., Cajetan gives the reason that a modal enunciation must have a mode which determines the composition. The reason is that the composition is as a form which contains the whole enunciation. Thus, in "Socrates is running" the enunciation is constituted by the fact that "Socrates" is composed with "running." These two words are the parts of the composite. Taken se-

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parately, neither signifies an affirmation or negation; but taken as joined together in a composite, they are parts and they are related as subject and predicate. Now, it is precisely the whole which makes the parts to be parts. The whole is, therefore, as a form which includes or contains the parts. St. Albert corroborates Cajetan:

Et quia tales modi (scil. possibile, contingens, necessarium, et impossibile) sunt modi compositionis, et compositio formaliter ambit composita, et est principium intelligendi ea secundum quod stant sub compositione, et sic modus compositionis est modus totius enunciationis: et ideo isti modi totam modificant enunciationem et totam faciunt modalem.¹

That there is a composition at all is due to the fact that the subject and predicate are united by the verb "is."

In omni enunciatione oportet esse verbum, quod importat compositionem, quam non est intelligere sine compositis,

as St. Thomas says in the first book of the *Perihermeneias*.²

Or again, in the same paragraph,

Verbum est nota eorum quae de altero praedicantur.³

Since the verb is the very sign of composition in the oratio, a modification of the verb (i.e., the verb as composing, and not the *res verbi*) is

²*Lect. 8, n. 9.
³*Cf. lect. 5, n. 8.*
a modification of the composition. There is, therefore, no difference between a modification of the copula and a modification of the whole enunciation. "That Socrates run is possible" contains a modification of the entire enunciation, "Socrates is running." The composition of "Socrates" with "running," which is expressed by "is," is said to be possible. To state the same enunciation thus, "Socrates can run," changes nothing; the subject and predicate are still said to be composed in the mode of possibility.

1 The verb est primarily signifies actuality, and ex consequenti it signifies composition. "Ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum est consignificat compositionem, quia non eam principaliter significat sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute: nam est, simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse; et ideo significat per modum verbi. Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum est, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod cum volumus significare quamcunque formam vel actum actualiter inesse aliqui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum est, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid: simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. Et ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum est significat compositionem." Ibid., n. 22.

2 Fr. Bochenski, however, asserts, "Cependant Aristote confond constamment le modus comme qualification de la copule et comme qualification de la proposition entière." "Notes historiques sur les propositions modales," Revue des Sciences Philosphiques et Théologiques, XXVI (1937), pp. 673-692, n. 29. What is the difference? For an examination of the texts which he alleges support his contention, see Appendix.
There Are Four Modes: Possible, Impossible, Necessary, and Contingent

3. Sunt autem huiusmodi modi quatuor proprie loquendo, scilicet possibile et impossibile, necessarium et contingens.

Having determined above that only modes which affect the composition are properly called modes, Cajetan, following Aristotle, now says there are four modes which can be used in this way to make a modal enunciation: possible, impossible, necessary, and contingent. As has already been pointed out, it is the verb which is the *nota compositionis*. Now, it is peculiar to the verb to consignify time; in fact, it differs from the noun by that very quality. But only a verb that consignifies present time is a verb in the strict sense. Verbs in the past or future tenses are rather *casus verbi* and can be called verbs only in an imperfect sense.

Recte autem ea quae consignificant tempus praeteritum vel futurum, non sunt verba proprie dicta: cum enim verbum proprie sit quod significat agere vel pati, hoc est proprie verbum quod significat agere vel pati in actu, quod est agere vel pati simpliciter: sed agere vel pati in praeterito vel futuro est secundum quid.

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1 Periherm., 21 a 34-36.
Since the modes affect the verb in its very act of composing (and not as the res verbi), they will differ from each other according as they vary the verb as verb, i.e., according to what is peculiar to the verb. The modes, therefore, will vary the verb and the composition which it signifies according to the time consignified. The function of modal enunciation, consequently, is to extend the enunciation beyond the limits of present time to all time, to no time, or to future time.

Quatuor enim primi illorum modorum (i.e., possibile, contingens, necessarium, et impossible) compositionem (quae consignificat tempus) ampliant extra tempus praesens. Possibile enim et contingens ampliant praesens ad futurum, et ad esse, et ad non esse: quia contingens est futurum, et potest esse et non esse. Necessarium autem et impossible ampliant compositionem ad omne tempus: quia necessarium et impossible ponunt compositionem in omne tempus: et ideo illi sunt modi speciales facientes totam enuntiationem modalem, necessarium simpliciter omni tempore inesse, et impossible simpliciter numquam inesse.1

Ampliation is a property of a part of the enunciation and is defined as "the extension of a term from a lesser to a greater supposition."2 This can be done in two ways: by extending a common term to include more individuals or by increasing the times in which a term can be verified. It is the second way which is in question here.

2Extensio termini a minori ad majorem suppositionem, Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Phil., I, p. 37 a.
John of St. Thomas says that "possible" extends all the terms in the enunciation to be possible, e.g., in "It is possible that men be white," it is verified both of "man" and of "white." By thus extending the time of the esse of the dictum, the mode distributes the subject of the modal enunciation, i.e., the dictum, according to the parts of time. In this way, the modal enunciation is universal or particular in its quantity.

The True and False Are Not Modes

(3. cont.) Verum namque et falsum, licet supra compositionem cadant cum dicitur, Socratem currere est verum, vel hominem esse quadrupedem est falsum, attamen modificare proprie non videntur compositionem ipsam. Quia modificari proprie dicitur aliquid, quando redditur aliquale, non quando fit secundum suam substantiam. Compositio autem quando dicitur vera, non aliquam proponitur, sed quod est: nihil enim aliud est dicere, Socratem currere est verum, quam quod compositio cursus cum Socrate est. Et similiter quando est falsa, nihil aliud dicitur, quam quod non est: nam nihil aliud est dicere, Socratem currere est falsum, quam quod compositio cursus cum Socrate non est. Quando vero compositio dicitur possibilis aut contingens, iam non ipsam esse, sed ipsam aliquam esse dicimus: cum siquidem dicitur, Socratem currere est possibile, non substantificamus compositionem cursus cum Socrate, sed qualificamus, asserentes illam esse possibile. Unde Aristoteles hic modos proponens, veri et falsi nullo modo meminit, licet infra verum et non verum inferat, propter causam ibi assignandam.

The true and the false cannot be numbered among the modes which make modal enunciations for the reason that they

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1Ibid., p. 38 a.
2Cf. infra, chap. vi.
do not modify the composition. It is true that they affect the composition, but not by qualifying it. True or false applied to a composition of subject and predicate merely say that the composition is or is not. They do not say that it is such. True and false in no way affect the form of the enunciation; rather, they serve to compare any enunciation with the reality signified. Previously, in distinguishing affirmation and negation on the one hand from truth and falsity on the other, St. Thomas said,

Secunda diversitas est per comparationem ad rem, ex qua dependet veritas et falsitas intellectus et enunciationis. Cum enim enunciatur aliquid esse vel non esse secundum congruentiam rei, est oratio vera; alioquin est oratio falsa.¹

To say that an enunciation is true is to say that the very substance of the enunciation exists, but, as Cajetan points out, in a modal enunciation we are not signifying the substance of the composition but qualifying the substance of it (non substantificamus compositionem cursus cum Socrate, sed qualificamus, asserendo illam esse possibilem).

St. Albert casts further light on the reason that the true and the false do not make modal enunciations: they do not extend the time of the composition.² Since, as was indicated above, this extension beyond present time

¹In Periherm., Lib. I, lect. 9, n. 2.

²Non ampliant compositionem secundum tempus, Periherm., I, p. 440 b.
is the special function of the modal enunciation, the true and the false do not qualify as modes. St. Albert says they can, however, be called general modes of *de inesse* enunciations, although they do not make modal enunciations except in a secondary sense.\(^1\)

The objection might be raised that a negative added to a verb affects the composition of the enunciation, and, in fact, affects it as enunciation, not, however, by comparing the enunciation to that which it signifies as do the true and false. It would seem, therefore, that a negative added to the composition would render the enunciation modal. St. Albert again answers that such a negative does not extend the time of the enunciation nor does it inform the enunciation in a special mode, but it simply divides the enunciation.\(^2\) It should be borne in mind that "composition" is sometimes used to refer to the second act of the mind which includes both composition and division. Composition, in the second sense, is signified by an affirmative enunciation, and division by a negative enunciation, although in each case the enunciation can be said to be "composed" of subject and predicate. Affirmative and negative, however, are opposed as species of the enunciation, not as substance and mode.

\(^1\)"... dicunt generalem modum illarum de inesse, ideo non sunt modi speciales, sed sunt modi quidam non facientes propositionem modalem nisi secundum quid." *ibid.*

There Are No Subjective Modes

Some authors have held the opinion that, besides the necessary, impossible, possible, and contingent, there can be other modes, deriving from the subjective dispositions of the knower. In fact, in a work attributed to Scotus, the author says that any determination that affects a whole proposition can be called a mode.

Quod omnis determinatio nata determinare totam propositionem, potest dici modus; ita quod si illa determinatio potest esse unum extremum propositionis, respectu unius propositionis materialiter sumptae, quae est aliud extremum, tunc illa determinatio dicitur modus, ut patet de istis modis, scio, opinor, dubito, apparet, et de participiis ipsorum, et de istis modis, verum, falsum, et sic de singulis.1

To the objection that Aristotle did not treat subjective modals, respondetur, quod Aristoteles omisit propter brevitatem.2 In another place, Scotus lists the modes which, according to his opinion, can be used to make modal enunciations: necessarium, per se, verum, possibile, contingens, impossible, falsum, dubium, scitum, opinatum, apparent, natum, volitum, and dilectum.3

That such subjective modes are inadmissible is clearly shown from the reason given by St. Albert,

Quatuor autem sunt tales modi (impossible, possibile, necessarium, et contingens), quia in compositione non est nisi esse.4

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2 Ibid., p. 175 b.

3 Ibid., p. 143 a.

4 Periherm., I, p. 441 a.
An enunciation is a sign of a concept, and a concept is nothing but the object existing intentionally and purely objectively in the mind. The whole being of an enunciation is to signify things. That one enunciation is necessary and another is contingent depends entirely on the necessity or contingency of the connection between the objects signified by the enunciation. As was said above, formal logic does not abstract from objects, but only from certain differences of objects. Its object is not, therefore, a pure fiction or construction of the mind. All of logic is concerned with the relations of objects as they are in the state of being known; what is important here is that logic is concerned with objects.

To say that I know one proposition with certitude and another with probability is not to say that the two differ as signs. The three propositions: "A is B," "That A is B is certain," "That A is B is probable" differ by reason of what is signified, but they do not differ as enunciations, i.e., as signs.¹ The composition of A and B is not qualified, nor is it extended beyond present time. That the same enunciation, e.g., "A is B," can be certain for one man and probable for another or even probable and certain for the same man at different times shows that certitude and probability do not enter into the composition

¹They do, of course, differ grammatically.
as such, but are rather qualities of the assent given to a composition. The "modes" of certitude and probability are, therefore, posterior to the formation of the sign which is the enunciation and can in no way affect the enunciation as a sign. A modal enunciation itself can be certain or probable.

Since there is nothing in a composition but being, as St. Albert said, the different modes of the composition can only be modes of being. It is on that basis that the kinds of modal enunciations will be distinguished one from the other, and on the basis of the expression or non-expression of the mode that the modal will be distinguished from the de inesse enunciation. How one mode is distinguished from another will be taken up in another chapter where the division of the modal enunciation is treated. What has been said is sufficient to show that the mode in a modal enunciation must be a mode of signifying the object, and that the "subjective modes" are not modes of signification at all. It was, therefore, truth rather than brevity that compelled Aristotle to omit a treatment of the "subjective modals."  


2Ockham also multiplied the kinds of modal propositions, according to the testimony of Fr. Bochenski. The number of syllogisms using modal propositions was, as for Scotus, increased proportionately. But since this increase in the
CHAPTER III

THE MODAL ENUNCIATION: QUID SIT?

The Integral Parts of the Modal Enunciation

4. Et quia enunciatio modalis duas in se continet compositiones, alteram inter partes dicti, alteram inter dictum et modum, intelligendum est eam compositionem modificari, idest, quae est inter partes dicti, non eam quae est inter modum et dictum. Quod sic perpendi potest. Huius enunciationis modalis, Socratem esse album est possibile, duae sunt partes; altera est, Socratem esse album, altera est, possibile. Prima dictum vocatur, eo quod est id quod dicitur per eius indicativum, scilicet, Socrates est albus: qui enim profert hanc, Socrates est albus, nihil aliud dicit nisi Socratem esse album: secunda vocatur modus, eo quod modi adiecti est. Prima compositionem quandam in se continet ex Socrate et albo; secunda pars primae opposita, compositionem aliquam sonat ex dicti compositione et modo. Prima rursus pars, licet omnis habeat propria, subjectum scilicet, et praedicatum, copulam et compositionem, tota tamen subjectum est modalis enunciationis; secunda autem est praedicatum.

Having determined what is meant by "modal enunciation," Cajetan now begins to arrive at its definition by treating first its integral parts. He points out that in a modal enunciation there are two compositions: one between the parts of the dictum and the other between the dictum and the mode. It is the first composition which is

2(cont.) number of valid syllogisms depends on false logical doctrine, it is difficult to agree with Fr. Bochenski's judgment, "C'est donc un beau progrès: partant de 125 d'Aristote à travers les 300 de Pseudo-Scot nous sommes arrivées à 1000." "Notes historiques sur les propositions modales," Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, XXVI (1937), pp. 673-692, No. 8.
said to be modified. In the enunciation "That Socrates be white is possible," the dictum is "that Socrates be white"; the mode is "possible." The dictum contains the composition of "Socrates" and "white" and, considered in itself, it is a complete enunciation with subject and predicate, copula and composition; yet as dictum it becomes a part, the subject, of the modal enunciation in which the mode is the predicate. The dictum, whether its grammatical form be an accusative with the infinitive or a noun clause, becomes the subject or suppositum for the verb "is" which joins the mode to the dictum.

Since the dictum can be stated separately as a de inesse enunciation, e.g., "Socrates is white," the dictum is properly said to signify esse or non esse. It is the esse or non esse which becomes the subject of the modal enunciation.

Esse quidem subjectum fit, idest dictum significans esse vel non esse subjecti locum tenet; contingere vero et posse appositiones, idest modi, praedicationes sunt.

Once more it is necessary to insist that the apposito does not depend on its grammatical form.

Adverte quod modos, appositiones, idest, praedicationes vocavit (Aristoteles), sicut esse in illis de inesse, intelligens per modum totum praedicatum enunciationis modalis, puta, est possibile. In cujus signum modos ipsos verbaliter protulit dicens: Contingere vero et posse appositiones sunt. Contingit enim et potest, totum praedicatum modalis continent.

1S. Albertus, Periherm., I, p. 441 b.
2Cajetanus, In Perih., Lib. II, lect. 9, n. 2.
3Ibid., n. 3.
The Mode Modifies the Composition of the Dictum

Although the modal enunciation has its own subject, the dictum, and its own predicate, the mode, it is not called modal as if the mode qualified the composition of its predicate with its subject. The mode qualifies, rather, the composition of the parts of the dictum. It is the composition of "Socrates" and "white" that is said to be possible.

Cajetan's last two sentences specify what is proper to the modal enunciation and what is common to it and the de inesse. The modal does not declare that one thing is in another or not, but, assuming that one thing is or is not in another, it declares in what mode. In that, it differs from the de inesse. The modal does not, however, make a new signified object (nec proprie componit secundum significatum), but merely adds a mode to the composition of things. Thus, it does not differ from the de inesse by reason of the things signified, but precisely as a sign. It is a new sign which adds something to the de inesse enunciation, although it demands nothing but the de inesse. The composition, therefore, of mode
with the dictum is a composition which is made solely in the order of the enunciation, which is a sign, not in the order of what is signified (compositionis non est compositio). What has just been said serves to prove very clearly that the modal enunciation is defined in the order of signification and is distinguished from the de inesse enunciation in its mode of signification.

If the modal enunciation is considered purely under the common notion of the enunciation, its mode is a predicate of the modal enunciation. Considered, however, as a species of the enunciation, i.e., formally as a modal enunciation, its mode is a determination of the composition of the dictum. The mode, in addition to being a predicate, is a syncategorematic term that affects the esse of the dictum, distributing it according to the parts of time. In this respect, the mode is like "all" and "some" which affect the subject of a de inesse enunciation.¹ St. Albert says:

Modus enim quamvis sit praedicatum enuntiationis, tamen est modus dicti qui ad compositionem dicti habet referri. Hoc enim non est inconveniens, quod aliquid respectu diversorum sit praedicatum et modus. ²

In another place, St. Albert brings up the objection that a predicate is not a determination of composition.

¹Cf. infra, chap. vi.
²Periherm., I, p. 453.
In answer, he cites the solution of Alexander who says the objector is right when the predicate is predicated as being; but a predicate which is a mode is not predicated as being, but as a mode of the being signified by the composition of the dictum. The mode is, therefore, both a predicate and a mode of composition.¹

The Definition

(4. cont.) unde nihil aliud est enunciatio modalis, quam enunciatio dicti modificativa.

The preceding analysis permits Cajetan to conclude to the definition of the modal enunciation: an enunciation which modifies its dictum. "Enunciation," is, of course, the genus, and "which modifies its dictum" is the difference. In the definition all the integral parts of the modal enunciation are contained: the dictum, which is its subject, the mode, which is its predicate, and the copula, which is implied in the genus enunciation.

¹Ibid., p. 441 b. "Et si dicitur, quod praedicatum non est determinatio compositionis. Ad hoc respondet Alexander, quod verum est quando praedicatum praedicatur ut esse, et non ut modus, sicut currit cum dicitur, homo currit: vel sicut album cum dicitur, homo est albus. In enuntiatione autem modalis quia non subjicitur substantia cui insit praedicatum, sed subjicitur dictum cum sua compositione, praedicatum modus praedicatur non ut esse, quia hoc dicit praedicatum dicti: sed praedicatur ut modus esse quod dicit compositio dicti: et ideo et est praedicatum et est modus compositionis. Et haec solutio nata est: quia ad multa valet et hic et in scientia libri Priorum."
The definition given by Cajetan is superior to that cited by John of St. Thomas in his *Summulae*,

Proposito modalis est "in qua praedicatum inesse subjecto cum modo, quo illi inest et convenit."¹

The latter definition does not state the difference as formally as Cajetan's *dicti modificativa*. The definition from the *Summulae* defines the modal enunciation as if it were only a *de inesse* enunciation with something added; it fails to indicate that the mode is also a predicate that qualifies the dictum which is the subject of the modal enunciation. The definition given by Peter of Spain in his *Summulae Logicales* is merely a description.

Proposito modalis est quae determinatur aliquo isticorum sex modorum.²

**The Modal Enunciation Is One**

5. Nec propterea censenda est enunciatio plures modalis, quia omnia duplicata habeat: quoniam unum modum de unica compositione enunciat, licet illius compositionis plures sint partes. Plura enim illa ad dicti compositionem concurrentia, veluti plura ex quibus fit unum subjectum concurrent, de quibus dictum est supra quod enunciationis unitatem non impediant. Sicut nec cum dicitur, domus est alba, est enunciatio multiplex, licet domus ex multis consurgat partibus.

Despite the fact that all the elements of the enunciation are doubled in the modal enunciation, it is

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¹*Curs. Phil.*, I, p. 48 a.

²*Ed. Bochenski* (Rome: Marietti, 1947), p. 11; Peter later eliminates the true and false from his consideration.
not thereby many. The reason, as Cajetan says, is that it declares one mode of one composition. Although the dictum which is the subject includes a plurality of parts in its composition, it is nevertheless one by reason of its composition. It is of the dictum taken as a whole that the mode is predicated.
CHAPTER IV

DIVISION OF THE MODAL ENUNCIATION: PRINCIPLE OF THE DIVISION

After having considered the definition of the modal enunciation, it is now necessary to consider its division. Before each of the subjective parts, or species, can be treated in detail, the very basis on which the division is made must be analyzed. In a previous chapter, the four modes necessity, contingency, possibility, and impossibility were distinguished according to the way in which they extend the time consignified by the verb which is the sign of composition. There, the consideration was solely of a distinction of signs; here, it will be of the foundation of that distinction. Because, as St. Albert says, in compositione non est nisi esse, the foundation for the division of that composition will be in the division of being. Accordingly, the doctrine on which the division of the modal enunciation is based is properly metaphysical.

Besides being divided according to the ten predicaments, being is also divided into potency and act, and it is that which is in act which is most properly said to be either true or false. His opinion, therefore, is true who thinks that to be divided which really is divided;

1Periherm., I, p. 441 a.
2S. Thomas, In Metaph., Lib. IX, lect. 11, n. 1895.
likewise, he who thinks that to be composed which is composed in things. But the opinion which holds things to be other than they are is false. From Aristotle's example that you are not white because I think you are, but rather I think you are white because you are, St. Thomas draws this conclusion,

Unde manifestum est, quod dispositio rei est causa veritatis in opinione et oratione.¹

Then he explains further the relation between the composition and division in things and the composition and division in the mind, the latter being signified by the composition and division in speech.

Hoc autem addit ad manifestandum quod supra dixerat, quod verum et falsum est in rebus componi et dividir. Oportet enim veritatem et falsitatem, quae est in oratione vel opinione, reduci ad dispositionem rei sicut ad causam. Cum autem intellectus compositionem format, accipit duo, quorum unum se habet ut formale respectu alterius: unde accipit id ut in alio existens, propter quod praedicata tenetur formaliter. Et ideo, si talis operatio intellectus ad rem debeat reduci sicut ad causam, oportet quod in compositis substantiis ipsa compositio formae ad materiam, aut ejus quod se habet per modum formae et materiae, vel etiam compositio accidentis ad subjectum, respondet quasi fundamentum et causa veritatis, compositioni, quam intellectus interius format et exprimit voce. Sicut cum dico, Socrates est homo, veritas hujus enunciationis causatur ex compositione formae humanae ad materiam individualem, per quam Socrates est hic homo: et cum dico, homo est albus, causa veritatis est compositio albedinis ad subjectum: et similiter est in aliis.

Et idem patet in divisione.²

¹Ibid., n. 1897.
²Ibid., n. 1898.
The composition in the mind and in speech, since it depends on the composition in things as on its cause, will be divided according to the differences of composition of things. Aristotle and St. Thomas are speaking, of course, of composed substances.¹

Some things are always composed and cannot be divided; others are always divided and can never be composed; still others can be either composed or divided. The modal enunciation is divided according to these divisions of being. Things that are always composed are necessary, those that are always divided are impossible; and those that can be either composed or divided are possible or contingent.

St. Albert has stated this doctrine explicitly:

¹Truth and falsity in the knowledge of simple things is taken up beginning at n. 1901 of the same lesson.
²Ibid., n. 1899.
Quatuor autem sunt tales modi, quia in compositione non est nisi esse. Quod autem dicit esse aut dicit esse permixtum potentiae, aut quod est in actu perfecto. Si primo modo: tunc est esse possibile, vel contingens. Et haec duo differunt in hoc, quod possibile determinat esse secundum se: et contingens autem in comparatione ad causam non stantem: unde esse non stans, est possibile: contingens autem est, quod non habet causam stantem. Si autem est esse perfectum secundum actum: aut accipitur in ipso esse, et sic est necessarium: aut accipitur in ipso non esse, quod ad simpliciter esse est oppositum, et sic est impossibile. Contingens autem et possibile non possunt accipi secundum divisionem esse et non esse: quia utrumque dicit esse permixtum cum non esse.¹

The correspondance to the differences of composition is evident: things which are always composed correspond to esse perfectum secundum actum (accentum) in ipso esse; those which are always divided, to the same in ipso non esse; those which can be either composed or divided, to esse permixtum potentiae. The distinction between the possible and the contingent will be taken up later.

Near the end of his commentary on the modal enunciation, Cajetan gives the reason for the order which should be observed in the table of equipollent modals. Just as there is an order in the grades of the universe, so should there be an order in the table of modals.² The first grade of the universe is those things which are in act without any admixture of potency; the second, those which are in...

¹Periherm., I, p. 441 a.
²In Periherm., Lib. II, lect. 12, n. 9.
act but with potentiality, e.g., all mobile beings; the third, those which will never be in act but will always remain in potency, e.g., motion, time, and the infinite division of a magnitude, because act is repugnant to them. Cajetan then says the order of modals imitates this order of the grades of the universe.

Posuimus siquidem primo necessarium, quod sonat actu esse sine potestate seu mutabilitate, imitando primum gradum universi.—Locavimus secundo loco possibile et contingens, quorum utrumque sonat actum cum possibilibus, et sic servatur conformitas ad secundum gradum universi. . . . Ultimum autem locum impossibili reservavimus, eo quod sonat nunquam fore, sicut et ultima universi pars dicta est illa, quae nunquam actu est.1

It is, therefore, on the division of being that the division of the modal enunciation is founded. The examination of each of the four modes which make a modal enunciation will show in exactly what sense each mode is to be taken.

1 Ibid., n. 9b.
CHAPTER V

DIVISION OF THE MODAL ENUNCIATION: ITS SUBJECTIVE PARTS

The Necessary

The first of the four species of the modal enunciation is that made by the addition of the mode of necessity. The necessary will be treated first because it implies eternity and the eternal is prior to the temporal. Aristotle says,

Manifestum est autem ex his quae dicta sunt, quod id quod ex necessitate est, secundum actum est: quare si priora sunt sempiterna, et quae actu sunt potestate priora sunt.¹

The necessary implies eternity because it implies being in act which excludes all mutability and, consequently, time. The possible, however, implies time because it does not exclude the possibility to be and not to be; it is therefore posterior to the necessary.²

It is in the fifth book of the Metaphysics where Aristotle treats the various senses of the necessary.³ In his commentary on this chapter, St. Thomas begins by showing that Aristotle treats the necessary immediately after his treatment of causes because the necessary belongs to the very notion of cause. A cause, in fact,

³Chap. 5.
is that on which something else necessarily follows.\footnote{1} That the necessary implies a relationship of cause to effect is shown also by the way in which the necessary is distinguished from the contingent. A contingent effect is contained in its cause with the possibility of proceeding from the cause or not, whereas the necessary effect is in its cause only with the possibility of proceeding from it.\footnote{2} More will be said about this in connection with the contingent; what is important here is that "necessary" is said with respect to the cause of a being.

The necessary is, therefore, not limited to necessary being, which has no cause whatsoever. A being that is in anyway caused is in potency with respect to that cause and, consequently, is not a necessary being. However, the necessary used here in logic is solely concerned with the necessity of the connection between subject and predicate, regardless of whether the being itself which is signified in the composition is necessary or contingent. Even in contingent beings

\footnote{1}{Lect. 6, n. 827. "Distinguit nomen quod significat aliquid pertinens ad rationem causae; scilicet necessarium. Causa enim est ad quam de necessitate sequitur alium."

\footnote{2}{S. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Lib. I, cap. 67, ed. Leonina. "Contingens a necessario differt secundum quod unum quodque in sua causa est: contingens enim sic in sua causa est ut non esse ex ea possit et esse; necessarium vero non potest ex sua causa nisi esse."
(i.e., caused beings) there are certain notions which are necessarily connected, e.g., that an animal is necessarily corruptible.

Dicitur . . . necesse esse in enunciationibus, quando scilicet coinherentia praedicati cum subjecto inevitabilis et necessaria est. Tale necessarium non est ens necesse: quia tale necessarium esse nihil prohibet habere causam: quinimo illud possibile praedicatur de eo quod est necesse esse causam habente.¹

The knowledge we have of necessary being is such that even in the case, for example, of the attributes of God one is the reason for another (e.g., the eternity of God is because of His immutability). There is, of course, no causality exercised by one attribute on another in God Himself, but our knowing one attribute is the cause of our knowing another.

Modes of the Necessary

Aristotle distinguishes four modes of the necessary: (1) that which is necessary because something cannot be without it, e.g., an animal must breathe in order to live, or in order to be in a distant city it is necessary to travel to it; (2) that which is necessary for the well being of something, e.g., although it is possible to reach the distant city on foot, a vehicle of some kind is necessary for making the trip easily and well; (3) that which is necessary by reason of violence; (4) that which is absolutely necessary.² The first two, necessary ad esse and

¹S. Albertus, Periherm., I, p. 451 a.
²Metaph., Bk. V, chap. 5; S. Thomas, In Metaph., Lib. V, lect. 6, nn. 827-832.
ad bene esse, are modes of necessity from the final cause and the third is from the efficient cause. Thus, the first three modes are from extrinsic causes and are necessary secundum quid. The absolutely necessary is defined as that which cannot be otherwise. It is absolute because it is necessary from an intrinsic cause, from what is intimate and proximate to a thing. This intrinsic or absolute necessity can be on the part of the matter, the form, or the essence of a thing. Because of its matter, an animal is necessarily corruptible; because of its form, an animal is necessarily sensitive; because of its essence, an animal is necessarily an animated, sensible substance. However, Aristotle reduces all the other modes of the necessary in some way to the fourth, for it is true to say of each of them that that which is necessary cannot be otherwise, regardless of the cause of that necessity. It should be noted that necessarium absolute is here opposed to necessarium secundum quid, the former being from an intrinsic cause and the latter from an extrinsic cause. In the Perihermeneias.

1S. Thomas, ibid., nn. 832, 834, 835.
2Quod non contingit aliter se habere, ibid., n. 832.
3Cf. S. Thomas, IIIa, q. 46, a. 1 with Cajetan's commentary; Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Phil., I, p. 252 a.
Aristotle calls the absolutely necessary, *necessarium simpliciter*.\(^1\)

To avoid some possible objections, it should also be noted that the *absolute necessarium* is used in different senses. The first of these is the same as the fourth mode of the necessary defined above: that which is impossible to be otherwise, e.g., man is necessarily a rational animal, because it is repugnant that man not be a rational animal. The absolutely necessary is necessary from its very terms. To this absolute necessity is opposed the necessity of immutability, i.e., the necessary which cannot be changed but which, absolutely speaking, could have been otherwise. Thus the divine science of vision is not necessary by absolute necessity since God was free to have willed otherwise, but it is necessary by the necessity of immutability, since what God has known from all eternity, He knows always, and this knowledge cannot be changed.

S. Thomas also uses *necessarium absolute* in the broader sense of the *necessitas consequentis* to oppose it to *necessitas consequentiae*. For example, in the proposition, *Socrates currit, si est praescitum a Deo*, he says, \(^1\)

\(^1\)Bk. II, chap. 13, 23 a 15.
Antecedens est necessarium absolute, tum ex immobilitate actus, tum etiam ex ordine ad scitum.\footnote{I Sent., dist. XXXVIII, q. 1, a. 5 ad 4; cf. Ia, q. 14, a. 13 ad 2; De Veritate, q. 2, a. 12 ad 7.}

Here the absolutely necessary is that which is necessary in itself and without dependence on another proposition; according to this sense, a proposition is necessary when what it signifies is necessary. If the antecedent were necessary merely because God had seen it, it could not be absolutely necessary, but only by reason of consequence.

\[\text{Si unumquodque a Deo cognoscitur sicut praesentaliter visum, sic necessarium erit esse quod Deus cognoscit, sicut necessarium est Sortem sedere ex hoc quod sedere videtur. Hoc autem non necessarium absolute, vel, ut a quibusdam dicitur, necessitate consequentiae sed sub conditione, vel necessitate consequentiae. Haec enim conditionalis est necessaria: Si videtur sedere, sedet.}\footnote{S. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, Lib. I, cap. 67.}

The absolutely necessary is used to include both the necessary which from its very terms is impossible to be otherwise (\textit{necessarium absolute} in its first sense) and the necessary by reason of immutability.\footnote{Syl. Ferrariensis, Comment. In Summam Contra Gentiles, Lib. I, cap 67, ad. Leonina, Vol. XIII, p. 194, nn. 9, 10.}

A necessary modal enunciation can signify any of these meanings of the necessary, because there is necessity in an enunciation when there is an inevitable and necessary inherence of the predicate in the subject.\footnote{S. Albertus, Periherm. I, p. 451 a.} There is, therefore, no reason to distinguish three kinds of necessary propositions as does Scotus: \textit{de necessario conditionali},
The necessity required for a necessary modal enunciation is concerned only with the inherence of the predicate in the subject and not with the reason for the necessity of that inherence. This necessity abstracts from differences of kinds of necessity, for these differences are rather on the part of the matter of the enunciation than of its form.

The Possible and the Impossible

Physical Possibility

The mode of possibility by which the composition of subject and predicate is qualified is founded on the possibility in the composition of things. Since something is said to be possible because of a potency, it is necessary to distinguish the different senses of potency before the senses of possible. "Possibile a potentia nascitur." A potency or power is realized first of all in something which is a principle of change in another as other. "As other" is added because, e.g., someone who has the art of medicine can cure himself, but it is himself as other, not as having the art of medicine that is cured. This kind of potency is an active potency. A second kind...
of potency is the passive potency which is a principle of receiving a change from another.¹ A third potency is the power to do something well or as one would like to do it, as when we say that someone cannot walk or talk if he cannot walk or talk well.² A fourth potency is that of a disposition whereby a thing is rendered impossible or difficult to change for the worse, e.g., that whereby something is unbreakable.³

To these four kinds of potencies there are corresponding modes of the possible. Something is possible by an active potency when it can be done by an agent either immediately by himself or mediately through another to whom the agent communicates its power. Something is possible by a passive potency when it can be changed either for better or for worse. Corresponding to the third and fourth kinds of potencies things are said to be possible because they can act well or can be changed easily, and others are possible or powerful because they cannot be changed for the worse.⁴

Since impotence is the privation of a potency, impotence will be a taking away of such a principle from

¹Princípium quod aliquid moveatur ab alio, inquantum est aliud. ibid., n. 1777; cf. n. 956.
²Princípium faciendi aliquid non quocumque modo, sed bene. ibid., n. 959; cf. n. 1780.
³Dispositio quaedam ex qua aliquid habet quod non possit pati transmutationem in deterius. ibid., n. 1778, cf. n. 960.
⁴Ibid., nn. 961-966.
a determinate subject and at a determinate time. Some¬
thing is said to be blind, for example, only when it is
a being which is naturally capable of sight and at a time
when he should be capable of it. The modes of impotence
are distinguished according to the modes of potency of
which they are the privation, because privatio et habitus
sunt ejusdem et secundum idem. Likewise, there are modes
of the impossible corresponding to modes of the possible.

All the kinds of potencies can be reduced to the
active potency. The passive potency is that which is
moved by the active potency; it is an active potency which
can do something well; and, again, it is with reference
to an active potency that something cannot be changed for
the worse. In the same way all the modes of impotence
can be reduced to the first. Therefore, the division
of potencies is an analogical division: per prius of
the active potency, per posterius of the others, because
they refer to the active potency and depend on it for
their very definitions. St. Thomas, accordingly, gives
as the proper definition of potency, principium permutationis
in alio inquantum est alium. It should be noted that the

1Ibid., n. 967.
2Ibid., n. 1784.
3Ibid., nn. 975-976; nn. 1776-1780.
4Ibid., n. 976; cf. n. 1780.
potencies which have been treated are all called po-
tenties for the same reason: they are all physical po-
tencies¹ and are distinct from logical or mathematical
potencies which are potencies only equivocally.

Rational and Irrational Potencies

"Potency" can not only be distinguished according
to different modes but potencies can differ according to
the beings in which they are found, e.g., active and pas-
sive potencies are found in animate and inanimate things.
Now some of the potencies found in animate beings do not
differ from those found in the inanimate, e.g., gravity,
which is common to all bodies, and the nutritive and sen-
sitive potencies which, although they exist only in living
beings, nevertheless operate from a natural impulse as
do inanimate potencies. But there are other potencies
over whose act the soul exercises dominion; these are
found in the rational part of the soul and are called
rational potencies. Such potencies are the arts whose
actions are transitive, e.g., the art of housebuilding,
and the sciences, whose operations do not pass into an
external matter, e.g., moral science and logic. All of
these habits can be called potencies because they are
principles of change in another as other.² Corresponding

¹Cajetanus, In periherm., Lib. II, lect. 12, n. 1.
to the rational and irrational potencies are two senses of the possible, rational and irrational. It is evident that rational potencies can be found only in animated beings, whereas irrational potencies exist in both inanimate and animate, even in man.\(^1\)

Among the active potencies, the rational potency differs from the irrational in that one and the same rational potency can be related to contraries, e.g., the art of medicine can cause health or sickness. The rational potency, on the other hand, cannot be related to opposites: one potency can have only one effect per se, e.g., the heat of the sun per se can only heat an object, although it could cool an object per accidens.\(^2\) Since such a potency is determined to only one of the opposites, it is in potency neither to contradictories nor to contraries, e.g., heat cannot both heat and not heat, nor can it heat and cool.\(^3\) The reason that the rational potency is not limited to one object but can be related to contraries is that the rational potency is a certain nature of a thing as it is known; and the thing and the privation of it are known by the same means.

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1Ibid., lect. 4, n. 1817.
2Ibid., lect. 2, n. 1789.
3Cajetanus, In Beriherm., Lib. II, lect. 11, n. 4.
Scientia, quae est potentia rationalis, est quaedam ratio rei scitae in anima. Eadem autem ratio rem manifestat et ejus privationem, licet non similiter; quia primo manifestat eam rem existentem, per posterius autem autem ejus privationem. Sicut per rationem visus per se cognoscitur ipsa visiva potentia, ex consequenti vero caecitas; quae nihil aliud est, quam ipsa carentia visus in eo quod natum est habere visum. Unde necessarium est, si scientia est quaedam ratio rei scitae in anima, quod eadem sit scientia contrariorum. Unius quidem per prius et secundum se, alterius vero per posterius. Sicut medicina per prius est cognoscitiva et factiva sanitatis, per posterius autem infirmitas; quia et hoc, ut jam dictum est, est de ratione rei scitae in anima, quae est unus oppositorum secundum se, et alterius secundum accidentem.¹

Irrational potencies, however, operate through forms which inhere in them, not through an intentional form. Since contrary forms cannot inhere in the same being, it is impossible that one and the same natural thing perform contraries. Natural things can do only one thing, whereas a being that operates by means of the knowledge it has can do opposite things.²

What has been said about irrational potencies is true of active irrational potencies, but there remains the special problem of the passive irrational potencies. Such a potency is a principium datiendi; i.e., a potency to be heated. But that which can be heated can also be cooled. A passive potency, therefore, is capable of contrary acts; there is one and the same subject of a

¹S. Thomas, In Metaph., Lib IX, lect. 2, n. 1790.
²Ibid., n. 1792.
form and of the privation of it.\(^1\) St. Albert calls the passive potency a material potency to being, which is a potency with privation. Since it is with privation, it is a potency to being and to non-being, and therefore the possible which corresponds to it is in possibility to be and not to be.\(^2\)

It is important for the enunciation with the mode of possibility to note how the active potencies are reduced to act. Whenever an irrational active potency is brought into the presence of that on which it can act, it is necessary for it to act, unless it is impeded, e.g., fire burns that which is combustible when the two are brought together. *Pragmae passo, necessario operatur, deductis impedimentis.*\(^3\) The same is true of all potencies that act apart from reason, since they act as from a natural form, e.g., one swallow instinctively builds its nest in the same manner and at the same time as another. Even the will ut *natura* which is distinguished from the *voluntas ut ratio*, is necessitated by certain objects.\(^4\) If the irrational active potency sometimes is

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\(^1\) Cajetanus, *In Periherm.* Lib. II, lect. 11, n. 7.

\(^2\) *Periherm.* I, p. 451 b.


\(^4\) Cf. S. Thomas, IIIa, q. 18, a. 5.
not in act, this is per accidens, because it has nothing on which it can act. The rational active potencies, however, are not necessitated by the presence of that on which they can operate. If they were so necessitated, it would follow that they would at once do contraries, which is impossible. Because such a rational potency is related as something common to contrary objects and because a determinate effect does not proceed from a common cause unless the common cause be more determined to one effect than to another, the rational active potency is reduced to act by something outside itself, i.e., by choice. The agent is moved to act when he desires that which it is in his power to do.

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1 S. Albertus, Periherm., I, p. 451 b.
2 S. Thomas, In Metaph., Lib. IX, lect. 4, n. 1819.
3 Ibid., n. 1820. In free choice itself there are both an active and a passive aspect: the power to act and the indetermination or indifference to objects. If indetermination or indifference to act are considered on the part of the potency, they imply imperfection, mutability, and a passive potency; if they are considered on the part of their object, they imply an operative potency which has dominion over its act and over the object which specifies its act. For a detailed discussion of this point, see N. Del Prado, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, (Friburg, 1907), Vol. II, pp. 267-270.
One last point about the rational active potency is very important for the teaching on modals, particularly for what concerns the composed and divided senses of certain modal propositions used in theology. To say that a potency is at one time capable of contraries is not to say that it is in potency to possess both contraries at the same time, for that would be impossible. Rather, it means that at one and the same time the potency is capable of each of the contraries. Cajetan says,

Unde et dici solet et bene, quod in hujusmodi est simultas potentiae, non potentia simultatis.¹

Logical Possibility

In the preceding, there has been consideration of physical potencies and their analogical division. This is potency in its proper sense, and the corresponding possibles and impossibles are so because they contain an active or passive principle in themselves. But possible and potency are also spoken of in another sense. In this case it is not because of a principle which they have in themselves; the potency, consequently, is called potency only equivocally.² One kind of equivocal potency is the mathematical potency, which is called a potency metaphorically because it does not have an intrinsic principle, but only a certain

¹In Periherm., Lib. II, lect. 11, n. 7; cf. S. Thomas, In Metaph., Lib. IX, lect. 4, n. 1822.
²S. Thomas, In Metaph., Lib. IX, lect. 1, n. 1773.
similitude of one. In geometry, e.g., a line is said to be in potency to be a square, because the line can be produced and brought back to itself to make a four-sided figure. Likewise, in numbers, three has the power of becoming nine if it is squared, i.e., three multiplied by itself is nine. We can speak of a mathematical potency in the line or in a number because of the similarity they have to matter from which things are generated. The mathematical possible is considered here only to be excluded.

There is, secondly, the logical possible, which does not come from a potency in the proper sense, but from a non-repugnance of the terms in a proposition. In this sense, possible and impossible are used, not only because of the potency or impotence of a thing, but because of the truth and falsity of a composition or division in propositions.

Unde impossibile dicitur, cujus contrarium est verum de necessitate.²

In logicis dicimus aliqua esse possibilitia et impossibilitia, non propter aliquam potentiam, sed eo quod aliquo modo sunt aut non sunt. Possibilitia enim dicuntur, quorum opposita contingit esse vera. Impossibilitia vero, quorum opposita non contingit esse vera. Et haec diversitas est propter habitudinem praedicati ad subjectum, quod quandoque est repugnans subjecto, sicut in impossibilitibus; quandoque vero non, sicut in possibilitibus.³

¹Ibid., n. 1774; Lib. V, lect. 14, n. 974.
²Ibid., n. 971.
³Ibid., n. 1775.
Answer to a difficulty.—There seems to be a contradiction in the two foregoing quotations from St. Thomas. In the first case, he says the impossible is that cuius contrarium est verum de necessitate. In the second, Impossibilia vero, quorum opposita non contingit esse vera. The difficulty arises chiefly in the second statement about the impossible, since the first is the common definition of the impossible. The solution must be sought in the context. He is talking about the logical possible and impossible. The first opposition of propositions is that of affirmation and negation. The opposita, then, are an affirmative and a negative proposition. But the diversity of possible and impossible, he says, comes from the connection of subject and predicate.¹ If, by a consideration only of the relation of subject and predicate, one of the opposites is necessarily false because the predicate is repugnant to the subject, then the other

¹"Impossibile quod dicitur secundum nullam potentiam, sed secundum se ipsum, dicitur ratione discohaerentiae terminorum. Omnis autem discohaerentia terminorum est in ratione alicujus oppositionis; in omni autem oppositione includitur affirmatio et negatio, ut probatur X Metaph. (text. com. 15); unde in omni tali impossibili implicatur affirmationem et negationem esse simul." S. Thomas, Quaest. disp. de Potentia, q. 1, a. 3 corp.
opposite is necessarily true, but both opposites cannot be true. For example, "man" and "irrational" are repugnant, and the affirmative proposition, "Man is irrational," is necessarily false; its opposite, "Man is not irrational," is necessarily true—*opposita non contingit esse vera*, i.e., from the very relationship of the terms of the proposition both opposites cannot be true. But if the predicate is not necessarily connected or separated from the subject, both the affirmative and the negative propositions can be true from the sole point of view of the relationship of terms. For example, "Socrates" and "sitting" have neither a necessary connection nor a repugnance; both the affirmation, "Socrates is sitting," and the negation, "Socrates is not sitting," can be true—*Possibilia quorum opposita contingit esse vera*. The fact that *opposite* is plural is important; it shows that St. Thomas is not speaking of the proposition opposed to a certain affirmative or negative proposition but of both the affirmative and negative propositions that can be formed from the same subject and predicate. There is, therefore, no contradiction between the two quotations. An impossible proposition is one whose contrary is necessarily true. Something is impossible if the relation of subject and predicate which signifies it prevents either an affirmation or a negation from being
true.\textsuperscript{1}

It is necessary, furthermore, to distinguish between what is false and what is impossible. If a subject and a predicate are not repugnant, only one of the propositions (either the affirmative or the negative) will be true; the other will be false although not impossible. If a subject and a predicate are repugnant, the affirmation of their connection will be false and impossible.

Quaedam vero sunt falsa tantum, sed non impossibilia, sicut Socratem sedere et stare. Non enim idem est falso esse et esse impossibile; sicut te stare nunc est falso, sed non impossibile. \ldots\ldots quaedam sunt possibilia, licet sint falsa. \ldots\ldots quaedam sunt falsa et impossibilia.\textsuperscript{2}

As St. Thomas says in the paragraph preceding the one just quoted,

\begin{quote}
Illa solum possibile est esse aut fieri, licet non sint, quibus positis non sequitur aliquid impossibile.
\end{quote}

Further explanation of the logical possible.--The twelfth lesson of Cajetan's commentary on the second book of the \textit{Perihermeneias} explains further details of the logical possible.

\textsuperscript{1}Cf. Cajetanus, \textit{In Lamen}, q. 9, a. 2, n. VI, "Aliquid est possibile logicum, quod tamen est necessarium reale. Possibile quidem logice: quia neutra pars contradictionis de secundo adiacente, implicat contradictionem; puta, nec ista, caelum est, nec ista, caelum non est."

\textsuperscript{2}S. Thomas, \textit{In Metaph.}, Lib. IX, lect. 3, n. 1809.
Logica potentia est qua duo termini coniungi absque contradictione in enunciatione possunt.¹

This kind of potency and the possible include that which is possible because it already exists, e.g., it is possible that Socrates walk when he is already walking. This possible, which is possible because it actually is, is distinct from the possible which is possible because it can act. That which is possible because it actually is cannot be related to opposites as can the physical potencies. The potency to be because it actually is is therefore called a potency only equivocally.²

However, the definition of the logical potency and the logical possible is not verified solely of that which is possible because it is. To be in act without involving an impossibility is also true of mobile beings which are in physical potency and of necessary things which cannot be otherwise. The logical possible is not, therefore, divided against the physical possible, but is related to the physical possible as the more common to the less common, for logical possibility includes necessary, immutable, and mobile things.³ In a word, what is logically possible is not impossible.⁴

¹N. 1.

²Ibid., n. 2.

³Ibid., n. 3. The community of the logical possible is that of a purely logical genus.

⁴Ibid., n. 4.
But if the logical possible is what is not impossible, and the impossible is what is necessary not to be,\(^1\) it follows that this possible includes everything that can be, regardless of whether it ever was or will be. It includes, therefore, all possibles, even those that will never be realized. This is important for the teaching on the omnipotence of God and His knowledge of simple intelligence, which is His knowledge of things which neither are, nor were, nor will be.\(^2\) Something is not possible for the reason that God can do it, because the argument would be circular: a thing would be possible because it is not repugnant to the divine omnipotence, and it would not be repugnant to the divine omnipotence because it is possible. The reason, consequently, for that which is absolutely possible is not to be found in the active power of God.

John of St. Thomas explains the distinction between the physical and the logical possibles by pointing out that the physical possibility is on the part of a subject, i.e., something which is subjected to a potency, whereas the logical or absolute possibility is on the part of the object, although it is denominated possible from an active power.

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\(^1\)S. Thomas, De Potentia, q. 1, a. 3 corp.

\(^2\)S. Thomas, Ia, q. 14, a. 9; Contra Gentiles, Lib. I, cap. 66; De Veritate, q. 20, a. 4 ad 1.
Unde communiter distingui solet duplex potentia, alia logica, alia physica: logica solum explicant rationem objecti aliquidus potentiae activae, et accipit denominationem possibilitatis a potentia ipsa et virtute activa: potentia physica est potentia subjectiva et per modum materiae, quae potest suscipere id quod produci potest, et subjicitur agenti ut ex illa producat, non illi objicitur sicut res producibilis.¹

Absolute possibility is not considered as being subjected to a potency and its physical influence, but rather according to a non-repugnance of terms, which is something logical. Physical potency is always potency in a subject. Absolute possibility can not be explained in reference to existence, because the existence of a thing depends on the physical influence of an efficient cause putting the thing outside its cause and in existence. It is explained rather as a capacity for existing, and capacity can be defined as a certain non-repugnance to that for which it has a capacity.² This capacity to exist is on the part of the essence. Such possibility is necessarily included in the essence of all created things. As an essence is that which can exist, so the possible is that which can exist. Any object capable of existing, which is the same as an object capable of an essence,


²Ibid., disp. XXXI, a. 1, n. 5, Solesm., III, p. 578 a.
can be called real regardless of whether or not it actually exists. This is real being as divided against fictive being. Fictive being is that which is incapable of an essence and therefore cannot exist. Cajetan makes explicit the two meanings of "real."

Ens reale dupliciter accipitur: uno modo ut distinguitur contra ens ab intellectu fabricatum, alio modo ut distinguitur contra non existens actu. Primo modo omnis res praedicamentalis est ens reale sive sit sive non. Secundo modo id tantum quod realiter existit extra causas suas est ens reale.¹

What pertains to existence belongs to the efficient cause and demands the intervention of the will. The truth which is implied in the possibility of things before their passage to existence is transcendental truth which is the very intelligibility of an object. It is real being as opposed to fictive being which is the object of the divine omnipotence.

Objective or absolute possibility is explained in logical terms as the non-repugnance of predicate to subject.

Dicitur autem aliquid possibile vel impossibile absolute, ex habitudine terminorum; possibile quidem, quia praedicatum non repugnat subiecto, ut Socratem sedere; impossibile vero absolute, quia praedicatum repugnat subiecto, ut hominem esse asinum.²

And in the same article, he says,

¹In de Ente et Essentia, cap. 4, q. 6, n. 59, ed. Laurent (Turin: Marietti, 1934), p. 92.
²S. Thomas, Ia, q. 25, a. 3 corp.
Esse autem divinum, super quod ratio divinae potentiae fundatur, est esse infinitum, non limitatum ad aliquod genus entis, sed praebens in se totius esse perfectionem. Unde quidquid potest habere rationem entis, continetur sub possibilibus absolutis, respectu quorum Deus dicitur omnipotens.

Nihil autem opponitur rationi entis, nisi non ens. Hoc igitur repugnat rationi possibilis absoluti, quod subditur divinae omnipotentiae, quod implicat in se esse et non esse simul. Hoc enim potentiae; sed quia non potest habere rationem factibilis neque possibilitis.

That a predicate be repugnant to a subject and that it be contradictory that a subject be with a predicate mean the same. To be contradictory is to imply that something at the same time can both be and not be; this is the very root of impossibility, since the first self-evident principle is that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time. The first principle cannot be proved, but is known from its terms: because what is proposed in to be is taken away by not to be, and consequently to be and not to be at the same time is to be proposed and taken away at the same time, as is evident from the terms themselves. But if a predicate is repugnant to a subject, it is opposed to it and destroys it. If it could be proposed with the subject, it would not be repugnant to it. It is for this reason that St. Thomas says that the reason for impossibility is found in the repugnance of terms and the reason for possibility comes
from a non-repugnance of terms. If terms are not repugnant, they can be at the same time, for that is the very meaning of non-repugnance. Therefore, where there is non-repugnance of terms, there is possibility, because they are able to be.1

To apply this teaching on the possible to the modal enunciation it is necessary to recall that the possible is spoken of in two ways, just as there are physical and logical potencies. In one sense, the possible is opposed to the necessary, as when something is possible because it can be and not be. In the second sense, the possible is common to necessary and contingent things and is opposed to the impossible.2 It is the physical possible which is opposed to the necessary, and the logical possible which includes the necessary. The necessary here is the necessarium absolute or simpliciter. That which is possible by an active irrational potency is assimilated to the necessary, because it is determined to one object and acts necessarily when that on which it acts is present and there is no impediment. These distinctions are important for ordering the consequences of modal enunciations as will be evident in a later chapter.3

1Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Theol., disp. XXXI, a. 1, n. 11, Solesm., Ill, pp. 579-580; cf. S. Thomas, De Potentis, q. 1, a. 3.

2S. Thomas, In Metaph., Lib. IX, lect. 3, nn. 1811, 1812; Contra Gentiles, Lib. III, cap. 86.

3Cajetanus, In Periherm., Lib. II, lect. 12, n. 5.
Under the logical possible is included those things which are possible because they are in act, although they are not necessary from an intrinsic cause. Both the rational active and the material or passive potencies can be taken in two ways: before they are in act and as existing in act. For example, while Socrates is sitting he has the possibility of walking, even though he is not exercising that possibility. When he is actually walking, it can also be said that it is possible for him to walk. This latter is possible because it actually is. When that which was in potency to opposites and, therefore, was opposed to the necessary becomes actualized, it approaches the necessary in that the possible is not in pure act but in act mixed with potency. This possible becomes necessary by what St. Albert calls "reduplication of the act," e.g., a man necessarily walks while he is walking.¹

¹Periherm., I, p. 452 a.
Divisio Possibilis

Possibile Logicum (ex potentia aequivoce dicta)
(non-impossibile ex non-repugnantia terminorum)

Necessarium
Possibile Physicum (ex potentia proprie dicta)

Irrationale
(in animatis et in animatis)

Rationale
(ad opposita)

Activum
(determinatum ad unum)

Passivum
(ad opposita)

N.B. Possibile physicum potest denominari necessarium quia ex hoc quod est actualiter est impossibile quod non sit; ergo, necesse quod non sit.
The Contingent

Difference between the Possible and the Contingent

Before defining the contingent and its modes, it is well to distinguish the contingent from the possible. Since they are convertible, they are materially the same but formally different. Since in its first meaning the contingent is opposed to the necessary, the possible which will be convertible with it is not the possible which is opposed to the impossible but the possible opposed to the necessary. This latter possible is the physical possible.¹

Possible being is opposed to necessary being as caused to uncaused. That which is possible depends for its being on a cause. As was shown in the section on the possible, a thing is called possible in reference to a potency from which it can proceed. As physical potency is divided into rational and irrational and into active and passive, so is the possible. That which is possible is an act of a power, whether this be an action or an effect

¹"Sed possibile vel contingens quod opponitur necessario, hoc in sua ratione habet, quod non sit necesse illud fieri quando non est." S. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, Lib. III, cap. 86; cf. comment. Ferrariensis in hoc loco (n. III, 2), "Alio modo accipitur possibile ut opponitur necessario. Et tunc possibile idem est quod contingens, quod scilicet potest esse et non esse, sicut necessarium non potest non esse."
of an action, e.g., heat heats and causes another body to be heated.

On the other hand, we call something contingent which proceeds from a cause which is not a necessary cause. Such a cause can produce its effect and it can fail to produce its effect; a contingent effect, therefore, can be and it can not be. Insofar as a being (i.e., an effect) is virtually contained in its cause and is not yet produced it is contingent, since it can either be or not be. The contingent is divided according to the different ways in which an effect can proceed from its cause: frequently, rarely, or with indifference. Note that it is the mode of procession from the cause which is the basis for the division. The fallibility of such a procession is rooted in the nature of the cause from which the effect proceeds. Such fallibility is due to a defect in the cause, and a cause is defective because of its matter or potentiality.

The possible, therefore, is distinguished from the contingent in that a thing is called possible because of its actuality, but is called contingent because of a defect in its cause which is due to potentiality. The contingent is being as it is in potency, i.e., precontained in its cause. The possible is being as it is the act of a power which can produce it.

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This distinction is clarified by a passage from the commentary of Sylvester of Ferrara on the Contra Gentiles where he says that a necessary or a contingent effect can be considered in two ways: either absolutely and as it is in itself a certain thing and a nature or as an effect and in its relation to its cause. Considered absolutely, a necessary thing by its very nature cannot not be, whereas the contingent can not be. This contingent is properly called possible and corruptible. Considered as an effect in relation to its cause, a necessary effect proceeds from a cause that acts necessarily and cannot be impeded, whereas a contingent effect can fail to proceed from its cause. As a defectible nature a thing is called possible, as an effect it is called contingent.¹

John of St. Thomas in discussing the nature of the contingens ad utrumlibet throws light on the contingent as such. What he says is applicable also to the contingens natum with the difference that the natural contingent is not completely indifferent but is more inclined to being than to non-being, even though the possibility of defect always remains, as will be shown below.

Contingens dicitur aliquid ex causa indifferenti ad utrumlibet in actu primo, et antequam de facto producat;

¹Lib. I, cap. 67, comment., n. VI.
ergo, antequam effectus producatur, ex eadem parte, ex qua habet contingétiém, habet indeterminationem, scilicet ex causis: extra causas autem nondum aliquid habet, vel si aliquid habet determinate, ibi amittet contingentiam ubi habet determinationem.1

Modes of the Contingent

There is an important difference between the modal enunciation which is necessary and that which is contingent. The first differs from the de inesse enunciation only by reason of the mode which is added to signify explicitly that the composition of subject and predicate is necessary. The contingent, however, differs from the de inesse not only because of the mode, but also because of the way in which the predicate inheres in the subject, i.e., with the possibility of not inhering.2 For this reason, syllogisms generated from necessary propositions will be like those made up of de inesse propositions, whereas those generated from contingent propositions will sometimes follow different rules, depending on the sense in which the contingent is taken. Similar differences are found in the conversion of modal propositions. It does not fall within the scope of this paper to treat the generation of syllogisms from

contingent (or any other kind of modal) propositions but only to distinguish the senses of the contingent, since these are differences of the contingent enunciation even though their importance is largely in reference to the syllogism.

Since in its primary meaning the contingent is opposed to the necessary, this contingent is called the non-necessary contingent. Such a contingent is mixed with potency and implies at the same time being in act and the possibility of not being. That which is not necessary is possible to be and not to be. This sense of the contingent is, therefore, convertible with the physical possible which can be in potency to opposites and which is opposed to the necessary.¹ The non-necessary contingent is found in two modes: the natural contingent (conticcens natum) and the infinite contingent. An effect is said to be a natural contingent when it comes about frequently or for the most part. Its cause is more inclined to being than to not being, although it always retains the possibility of failure and, in fact, does fail, but only rarely. For example, it is natural that a man become grey haired as he grows old, or that a child increase in size as he becomes older; these things happen universally, because their causes are innate in man, but they do not happen with necessity

¹S. Albertus, Priora, I, p. 538.
since the action of these causes can be impeded by the inequality of the matter in the subject in which they operate. No natural being is entirely in act at once, but always remains in potency in some respect from which it must pass to act through the medium of a movement. Because of the variability of that movement, natural causes do not always attain the effects to which they are ordered. They do, however, attain their ends frequently or ut in pluribus, and while this is similar to the operation of a necessary cause in that it is inclined toward being, nevertheless the natural contingent fails from the continuous necessity of the necessary cause and is, therefore, non-necessary. The second mode or species of the non-necessary contingent is the infinite contingent which is indifferent to being and non-being and is in potency to each equally. For example, it is indifferent for an animal to walk or not, or that there be an earthquake while he is walking. The cause is not more determined to being than to non-being. Such a cause is in potency \textit{ad utrumlibet}, i.e., to either of two contrary or contradictory effects.\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{Prior Analytics}, Bk. I, chap. 13, 32 a 17-32 b 15; S. Albertus, \textit{Priora}, I, pp. 538-539.}
The contingent is properly non-necessary and is opposed to the necessary, but there is a second sense of the contingent which is the same as the necessary and is called the necessary contingent. If something is necessary, it follows that it can be (*contingit esse*). For if it did not follow, the opposite would be true, with the following consequence: what cannot be (*non contingit esse*) is not possible to be, what is not possible to be is impossible to be, and what is impossible is necessary not to be. But what is necessary not to be is not necessary to be, which is incompatible with the original proposition that something is necessary. The necessary can, consequently, be called contingent.¹ But as St. Albert points out, the necessary is said to be contingent only analogically with respect to the non-necessary contingent.²

There is still a third sense of the contingent which is superior to the two senses of necessary and non-necessary. This is the common two senses of necessary and non-necessary. This is the common contingent or *contingens altum*. The latter name is given, because it does not descend to the special modes of the contingent, ³

²Ibid., p. 537 b.
³Ibid., p. 537 a.
as a genus descends to its species, but remains distinct and above them, since it has properties which do not belong to the species.¹ This common contingent is convertible with the logical possible, which is opposed to the impossible; the common contingent is, in fact, frequently referred to as the possible contingent or simply the possible. It can also be said to be non-necessary, but not in the same way as the natural and the infinite contingent are non-necessary. The common contingent is not necessary not to be, whereas the natural and infinite contingents are not necessary both to be and not to be. For this reason, the common contingent can follow on the necessary, since what is necessary is also not necessary not to be.

¹Ibid., p. 476b.

²Ibid., I, p. 481 b; at(#) the text inserts a non, which is manifestly false, since in the second order of modals contingens non esse and possibile non esse are equipollent; Cf. Cajetanus, In Periherm., Lib. II, lect. 10, n. 18.
Of the three modes of the contingent, the non-necessary contingent, which is divided into the natural and infinite contingents, is contingent both to be and not to be. The necessary contingent is contingent only to be, and the common contingent is contingent only not to be, i.e., it is not necessary not to be. The natural and infinite contingents are opposed both to the necessary and to the impossible, whereas the common and the necessary contingents are opposed only to the impossible.\(^1\)

The senses of the contingent follow the division of being and the relation of being to its cause. All creatures are in some way contingent: either by virtue of a potency in themselves or by virtue of another's power. But even before distinguishing these divisions of real being, it is necessary to take note of another sense of being, ens verum, which consists merely in the relation of terms. As was shown above, something is said to be possible because of a non-repugnance of terms; this was called the logical possible and is the same as the common contingent. Such possibility or contingency abstracts

\(^1\)S. Albertus, Priora, I, pp. 484 b-485.
Divisio Contingentis

Contingens Commune (seu Altum)
(non necessarium non esse)
(convertitur cum possibili logico)

Contingens Necessarium
(contingit esse tantum)

Contingens Non-necessarium
(contingit esse et non esse)

Contingens Natum
(Ad esse plus-quam non esse)

Contingens Infinitum
(Aequaliter ad esse et ad non-esse)
from any real potency either in itself or in another.\(^1\)

Included in this sense of the contingent or possible are all possible creatures. They are all real in the sense that each has an essence capable of existence, but not all are real in the sense that they actually exist.\(^2\)

Opposed to this logical being is real being which is distinguished into necessary and possible according to the substantial principles intrinsic in things themselves. Being in this sense is divided according to whether it is always, frequently, or rarely.

\[\ldots\] eorum quae dicuntur esse, quaedam sunt semper et ex necessitate. \ldots sic enim necessarium dicimus quod impossibile est non esse.--Quaedam vero sunt ut in pluribus, sicut quod homo nascatur cum quinque digitis in manibus: hoc enim non semper est ex necessitate, cum contingat aliquem nasci cum sexto digito; sed est ut in pluribus.--Quaedam vero nec sunt ut in pluribus, neque semper ex necessitate, sed contingenter eveniunt; sicut si "frigus fiat sub cane," idest in diebus canicularibus. Sed non semper et ex necessitate neque in pluribus, sed tamen quandoque accidit etiam hujusmodi ens. Quia autem raro accidit, et non semper et ex necessitate, neque ut in pluribus, vocatur ens per accidens.\(^3\)

Beings which are necessary, such as the separated substances, can suffer no privation of their substantial form. They contain no potency to being incompatible with

\(^1\)"Hoc modo abstrahunt a potentia in se vel in alio: imo ab omni potentia proprie dicta," Cajetanus, \textit{In Iam}, q. 9, a. 2, comment. n. VI.

\(^2\)Cf. supra, p. \textit{77}.

\(^3\)S. Thomas, \textit{In Metaph.}, Lib. XI, lect. 8, n. 2276.
what they are, and, therefore, they are not in potency
to non-being.¹ Such beings are not contingent by virtue
of a potency in themselves; they are, in fact, necessary
and immutable, because they contain no privation of
substantial form in virtue of which they could change.
They are, however, mutable with respect to another's
power, i.e., the divine power. Every creature is mutable
from nothing to something, and, therefore, can also be
annihilated, for every creature depends on the divine
will for its creation and conservation in being. Necess­
ary beings are contingent in this way.²

But every created being is not only mutable by a
power which is found in another, but also by reason of
the potentiality which is contained in itself. A creature
can be in potency, and therefore mutable, to being or to
its end. Necessary beings are excluded from the first kind
of potentiality, as has been shown, but not from the se­
cond. Corporal beings, on the other hand, are subject
to change both in their substantial being and in their
accidental being.³ Corresponding to these kinds of mu­
tability are the different senses of the contingent.

¹"Oportet ut res carens potentiam ad aliud esse incompos­
sibile huic, careat etiam potentia ad non esse." Cajetanus,
In Iam, q. 9, a. 2, comment., n. VI.
²S. Thomas, Ia, q. 9, a. 2.
³Ibid.
Beings that come about from causes that operate according to nature and succeed frequently (ut in pluribus) are said to be naturally contingent (contingens natum). Those that proceed from an indifferent potency, such as the will, belong to the contingens infinitum, as do all beings that have no determinate cause. These latter are beings per accidens.

That there be an earthquake while a certain animal is walking, that a man be white, that a builder be also a musician, that a food which tastes good be also healthy—all these are entia per accidens, because they do not have a determinate cause.\(^1\) The art of cooking, for example, is for making delicious food. If the food also happens to be healthy and nourishing, that is beyond the intention of the art, and is not done per se by the art. Nor is a home built by a builder as musician, but by the builder as builder. Hence, delicious healthy food is an ens per accidens, as is a musical builder.

Since all science is about that which is always or for the most part, there is no science of the per accidens. The reason is that the per accidens is not properly being, but is, rather, non-being, since it is not per se and properly one. One and being are convertible, and every science is of being. There can be, therefore,

\(^1\)S. Thomas, In Metaph., Lib. VI, lect. 2, n. 1185.
no science of the \textit{per accidens}.\footnote{Ibid., Lib. XI, lect. 8, nn. 2279, 2272.}

The Contingent and the Demonstrative Syllogism

It follows from what has been said that there can be no demonstrative syllogism constructed from propositions which are \textit{contingens infinitum}. St. Albert says there could, however, be a formal syllogism from such propositions, but he adds that questions are not usually asked about something which is \textit{contingens infinitum}, because a question is about something determinate, and the infinite contingent is indeterminate.\footnote{Priora, I, p. 540 a.} A demonstrative syllogism can be made from propositions which are of the natural contingent, i.e., of that which is \textit{ut in pluribus}.

Orationes et considerationes (ad quaestiones determinandas et problemata) pene omnes fiunt de contingentibus, quae dicuntur secundum contingens natum. Dico autem \textit{pene}: quia in talibus in quibus est contingens natum in quantum esse possunt et non esse, non demonstratur, nec de ipsis est disciplina demonstrativa, sed potius in quantum stant sub esse et referuntur ad innatam sibi causam: sic enim considerata ista contingentia conveniunt cum necessariis, quamvis deficient ab ipsis in quantum non habent stantem causam: in tantum enim sunt necessitatis non continuas.\footnote{Ibid.}

The natural contingent is like the necessary, except that its necessity is not continuous, i.e., a natural cause can sometimes fail to produce its effect. This occasional defect is an \textit{ens per accidens} and is called the \textit{contingens ut in paucioribus}.\footnote{S. Thomas, \textit{In Metaph.}, Lib. VI, lect. 2, n. 1183.} This \textit{ut in paucioribus} effect, however,
does not belong to the **contingens infinitum**, since its cause is not indifferent and equally inclined to being and non-being. Its cause is the **contingens ut in pluribus**, as St. Thomas says.\(^1\) Since the **contingens ut in paucioribus** can neither be the **contingens natum** nor the **contingens infinitum**, it is the **contingens non-necessarium**.\(^2\)

\(^1\)Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

PROPERTIES OF THE MODAL ENUNCIATION

Opposition by Reason of Quality

Having treated the definition and division of the modal enunciation, it is now necessary to take up its properties. The first of these is the contradictory opposition of affirmation and negation in modals. Since this is treated at considerable length by Aristotle¹ and by Cajetan in his commentary² as well as by St. Albert,³ there will not be need of an extended explanation here. Aristotle begins by asking whether the contradictory of an affirmative modal enunciation is made by adding a negative to the verb of the dictum or to the mode. He first argues in favor of the first position and then shows that this leads to an admission that contradictories are simultaneously true, since "possible to be" and "possible not to be" can be verified at the same time of the same subject. As was shown above, both of these possibilities are verified of the non-necessary contingent, here called possibile ad utrumlibet, which can be in act but is not always in act.

¹Perihermeneias, chap. 12, 21 a 34-22 a 13.
²Lib. II, lect. 8, nn. 7-14, lect. 9.
There have, nevertheless, been some who have insisted that a negative added to the verb of the dictum makes the whole modal enunciation negative. A Scotist, for example says,

\[\text{Qualitas in modalibus divisis attenditur eodem modo sicut in cathegoricis de inesse, scilicet ex parte copulae totalis vel principalis partis.}\]

For him, a modal enunciation is affirmative if the dictum is affirmative, and the enunciation is negative if the dictum is negative; e.g., \textit{Sortem possibile est non currere} is negative, because the more principal part of the copula, the infinitive, is negated.

Since the addition of the negative to the verb of the dictum does not make the modal enunciation negative, the negative must be added to the mode. The reason is that an enunciation is rendered negative by a negation of the joining of a predicate with its subject. In a modal enunciation, it is the mode that is so predicated. Therefore,

\[1\text{Petrus Tataretus, }\textit{In summulas Petri Hispani Exactae Explicationes} (Venice: 1581), \text{p. 28 B. Tataretus is called, on the title page, "Ioannis Duns Scoti, Doctor Subtilis, sectator fidelissimus."}\]

\[2\text{Another author seems to subscribe both to the Aristotelian teaching and the Scotist opinion, despite the fact that they exclude each other, "If the mode is affirmative and the dictum negative, or inversely, the proposition is purely and simply negative." J. Maritain, }\textit{Logic}, \text{trans. Imelda Choquette (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1937), p. 137.}\]
the negative must be added to the mode. Just as in de
inesse enunciations in which being or non-being is pre-
dicated of a subject, so in the modal enunciation the
modes are predicated of the being or non-being signified
by the dictum which is as the subject. The predicate is
as a form, and an enunciation is negative if that form
is denied of the subject. The denial of the predication
of the mode makes the modal enunciation negative. Cajetan
points out that the "apposition" or predication in the modal
enunciation is the whole predicate, e.g., "is possible."¹
Furthermore, since truth and falsity follow on affirmation
and negation, the latter should be found in the same respect
as truth and falsity. In a de inesse enunciation truth or
falsity follows on the being or non-being signified by the
enunciation. In the modal, the enunciation is true if
the mode qualifies the dictum in conformity with the actual
composition of the dictum. Therefore, just as in the
de inesse the negative is added to the verb which signi-
fies being, so the negative is added to the mode.

Since each mode can make two affirmative enunciations,
the following negative enunciations will be their contradicto-
ries: (the contingent is convertible with the possible)

¹In Periherm., Lib. II, lect. 9, n. 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affirmative</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possible esse.</td>
<td>Non possibile esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible non esse.</td>
<td>Non possibile non esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necesse esse.</td>
<td>Non necesse esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necesse non esse.</td>
<td>Non necesse non esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossibile esse.</td>
<td>Non impossibile esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossibile non esse.</td>
<td>Non impossibile non esse. 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The being or non-being signified by the dictum are always as the subject in a modal enunciation. The modal is negative only if the mode is negated. It is important too to note that the contradictory of any affirmative modal is obtained only by negating the same mode, e.g., possible and not possible. Cajetan points out a peculiarity of modals in that the same opposition is obtained by adding the negative either to the mode or to its verb, but not, however, to the verb of the dictum, e.g., the opposite of possibile est esse is not only non possibile est esse, but also possibile non est esse. 2

This treatment of the opposition of modals by reason of quality is sufficient for the second property of the modal enunciation, the equipollence or consequence of modals.

**Consequences: Equipollence**

Aristotle treats this second property of the modal

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1Note that both impossibile esse and impossibile non esse are affirmative enunciations, even though impossibile is the equivalent of non possibile; there is no negative added to impossibile.

2*In Periherm.,* Lib. II, lect. 9, n. 5.
enunciation in the thirteenth chapter of the Perihermeneiai, Cajetan in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth lessons of his commentary, and St. Albert in the third to the sixth chapter of the second tract in his second book of the Perihermeneiai. The consequence is defined in common by John of St. Thomas as an oratio in which something follows from something else which is given. Here, however, is a special case of the consequence.

Suppositae modalium consequentiae nil aliud sunt quam aequipollentiae eorum, quae ob varium negationis situm, qualitatem, vel quantitatem, vel utranque mutantis, fiunt.

There are other consequences besides equipollence, e.g., conversion: All men are animals; therefore some animals are men. Equipollence itself is defined as propositionum oppositarum penes variationem negationis aequivalentia et ejusdem sensus significatio. As was pointed out in the last section, each of the four modes makes two affirmative and two negative modal enunciations. There are, therefore, sixteen possible modal enunciations. Some are the same in


2I, pp. 445 a–453 b.

3Curs. Phil., I, p. 59 a, Oratio, in qua uno dato aliud sequitur.

4Cajetanus, In Periherm., lib. II, lect. 12, n. 10.

5Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Phil., I, p. 46 a.
meaning as others, e.g., "not possible to be" is the equipollent of "impossible to be." It is the ordering of all of the modals according to equipollence that will be treated in this section.

Cajetan points out, first of all, that a modal is called a simple affirmative if both the mode and the dictum are affirmative, and an affirmative declinata if the mode is affirmative but the dictum is negative. It is called a simple negative if the mode is negative and the dictum is affirmative, and a negative declinata if both are negative. ¹

Since the possible and the contingent are convertible, contingens esse is the equivalent of possibile esse and non contingens of non possibile. Secondly, the impossible is always the equivalent of the contradictory of the possible or the contingent, and the not impossible is the equivalent of the contradictory of the not possible and not contingent. Therefore, the negation of the impossible follows on the affirmation of the possible, and the negation of the possible follows on the affirmation of the impossible, e.g., impossible est esse is the equipollent of non possibile esse. ²

¹In Periherm., Lib. II, lect. 10, n. 3; the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth examples given by Mr. Maritain are incorrect, Logic. p. 137.

²Cajetanus, In Periherm., Lib. II, lect. 10, n. 5.
The necessary, however, offers a more complex problem. Some of the predecessors of Aristotle made tables of the equipollent modals which Aristotle proves to be wrong because they had taken the impossible and the necessary to follow the possible in the same manner. He then gives and justifies his own order of consequences of modals. It will not be necessary to repeat all of his discussion, since it is already done in much detail in the text of the Perihermeneias as well as in Cajetan's commentary.

The impossible and the necessary are related as contraries and therefore do not follow on the possible in the same way but rather in contrary ways. If something is impossible, it does not follow that it is necessary, but rather that it is necessary not to be. Thus, on possibile esse there follow non impossibile esse and non necesse non esse. Aristotle proves that non necesse non esse follows on possibile esse by showing that the other three necessary enunciations do not follow.

Non necesse esse does not follow on possibile esse (contrary to the opinion of the ancients) for the following reason. Possible esse follows on necesse esse; otherwise, non possibile esse would follow, and this would be contradictory. Non impossibile esse follows on possibile esse.
Then if *non necesse esse* followed on *non impossibile esse* (as the ancients held), *non necesse esse* would follow on *necesse esse*, and there would be a plain contradiction. Therefore *non necesse esse* does not follow on *possibile esse*.¹

Nor do *necesse esse* and *necesse non esse* follow on *possibile esse*. To say *possibile esse* is to say at the same time *possibile non esse*. But *necesse esse* excludes *possibile non esse*, and *necesse non esse* excludes *possibile esse*. Both of these consequents would diminish the antecedent, *possibile esse*. But no formal consequent diminishes its antecedent. Therefore neither *necesse esse* nor *necesse non esse* follows on *possibile esse*. There remains only *non necesse non esse*, which follows on *possibile esse*.²

It is important to note that possible here is used in the sense of the logical possible which is superior to the necessary and the physical possible. Note also that Aristotle does not say that the necessary is possible and therefore must be possible not to be. What he is saying is that, granted that something is possible, it follows that it can be necessary or not necessary. The superior

¹*Ibid.*, n. 11.
contains its inferiors only in potency, whereas the infe-
erior must contain the superior in act as "man" actually
contains "animal," but "animal" contains "man" only con-
fusedly and potentially.¹

Consequences of Modal Enunciations

According to the Four Orders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Order</th>
<th>Third Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possible est esse.</td>
<td>Non possibile est esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingens est esse.</td>
<td>Non contingens est esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non impossible est esse.</td>
<td>Impossibile est esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non necesse est non esse.</td>
<td>Necesse est non esse.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Second Order</th>
<th>Fourth Order</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possible est non esse.</td>
<td>Non possibile est non esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingens est non esse.</td>
<td>Non contingens est non esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non impossible est non esse.</td>
<td>Impossibile est non esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non necesse est esse.</td>
<td>Necesse est esse.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the table of consequences it will be noted that
the enunciations in the third order are the contradictories
of those in the first, and those in the fourth contradict
those in the second. Also, the contradictories of a given
order of consequences are consequent upon one another.²

Aristotle next answers a difficulty about whether
or not the possible follows on the necessary. Again, the
distinction of the various senses of the possible is neces-
sary to answer the question. As the division of the possible

¹Ibid., nn. 12, 15.
²Ibid., n. 18.
was made above at some length, there is no need to repeat it here. Since the logical possible is common to the necessary and the physical possible, it follows the necessary as a universal whole follows its subjective part. The physical possible does not follow the necessary, but is, rather, opposed to the necessary.¹

Lastly, Aristotle proposes a new table of equipollent modals which differs from the previous table only in that he places the necessary first. Just as in the universe that which is in act without admixture of potency should come before that which is mixed with potency, so in the table of modals the necessary should precede the possible.² The possible precedes the contingent, because, although they are convertible, the possible implies act whereas the contingent is so named because of a defect in its cause. Since act is prior to potency, the possible should be prior to the contingent.³ The impossible, which is never in act, is placed last.⁴

The table of equipollent modals follows:

¹Ibid., lect. 12, n. 6.
²Cf. supra, chap. iv, p. 44.
³Cf. supra, chap. v, p. 71 ff.
⁴Cajetanus, In Periherm., Lib. II, lect. 12, nn. 9, 9b.
### Opposition by Reason of Quantity

To Aristotle's treatise on modals Cajetan adds some considerations to complete the doctrine on the opposition and consequences of modals. Not only are enunciations opposed by reason of their quality, i.e., negative and affirmative enunciations, but they are also opposed by reason of their quantity. The quantity of an enunciation is a property of its subject, for quantity follows matter and the subject is as matter in an enunciation. In a de inesse enunciation the subject is either a singular or a common term. If it is common, it either has no modifying particle or is modified by a sign such as "all" or "some." Consequently, the de inesse enunciation is singular, indefinite, universal, or particular in its quantity. These variations in quantity combined with variations in quality account for the oppositions of enunciations as commonly indicated by the square of opposition.

1Ibid., n. 7.
From peculiarities of the modal enunciation come peculiarities of its properties. Since the nature of the whole is known from the nature of its parts, the properties of the modal can only be known by an analysis of its parts. As has been said above in treating the integral parts of the modal enunciation, the mode is the predicate and the dictum, which signifies being or non-being, is the subject. The dictum is itself composed of a subject and a predicate in the manner of a de inesse enunciation. The mode, Cajetan says, has a distributive force, i.e., it distributes its subject, the dictum, according to the parts of time. The necessary and impossible modes distribute the subject into all time, taken either simpliciter or within certain limitations. The possible and contingent modes distribute into some time—not, however, a determinate time, but "some time" in communi.

It has already been shown that the modal enunciation has a twofold quality, viz., of the dictum and of the mode. The modal has furthermore a threefold quantity. First, the dictum has a subject which has a quantity like the subject of a de inesse enunciation, universal, particular, or singular, e.g., that Socrates, some man, every man, or no man

1 Chap. iii, p. 35 ff.

2 "Modus . . . . continet in se vim distributivam secundum partes temporis." In Periherm., Lib. II, lect. 12, n. 10.
run is possible. Secondly, the dictum, taken as dictum, has a quantity—it is always singular. "That man be white is possible" means "This dictum, 'that man be white,' is possible." "This dictum" is singular in quantity, just as "this man." Thirdly, because the mode has a distributive force, there is another quantity, called the modal quantity, which is either universal or particular. Therefore, the quantity of the subject of the dictum, the quantity of the dictum, and the modal quantity.¹

Just as a modal enunciation is simpliciter affirmative if its mode is affirmed of the dictum, and simpliciter negative if its mode is denied of the dictum, so the modal enunciation is quantified simpliciter by its predicate, the mode. The enunciation is simpliciter universal if its mode is universal; simpliciter particular if its mode is particular.

The reason that the mode affects the subject in this way is that the modal predicate is not only a predicate, but is also a syncategorematic term which has the effect of distributing the subject according to the parts of time.² In a de inesse enunciation, the quantity varies

¹Ibid., n. 11.

²"Predicatum modalis, scilicet modus, non habet solam habitudinem praedicati respectu sui subjecti, scilicet esse et non esse, sed habitudinem syncategorematis distributivi, sed non secundum quantitatem partium subjectivarum ipsius subjecti, sed secundum quantitatem partium temporis ejusdom." Ibid., n. 12.
according to the division or lack of division of the subject, e.g., "every animal" is a common term taken in its undivided universality, and "some animal" is a subjective part of the whole which is "animal." In the modal that which is subjected is the composition of the subject and predicate of the dictum which is signified by the verb of the dictum. The proper quantity of a verb is time, since the verb signifies after the manner of movement, whose measure is time. Consequently, the quantity of the subject of the modal is divided according to time, and the mode distributes the subject, i.e., esse or non-esse, according to the parts of time. Therefore, a modal enunciation is universal when the modes of necessity or impossibility distribute the esse or non-esse of the subject throughout all time, e.g., that man is an animal is necessary or impossible. The foregoing example is universal simpliciter. Universal can also be taken within certain limits (universaliter acceptum), e.g., that man run today is necessary or impossible; or universal can be taken as something actually is, e.g., while he is running, that a man run is necessary. A modal is particular when the modes of possibility or contingency distribute the esse or non-esse of the subject only throughout some time, e.g., that man be white or that man run is possible or contingent.
That a mode quantifies its subject insofar as it is a syncategorematic term might demand some explanation. In the first book of his commentary on the *Perihermeneias* St. Thomas says,

\[ \text{Syncategoremata, quae secundum se non significat aliquid absolutum, sed solum habitudinem unius ad alterum.} \]

Again, in another place, after speaking of the noun and the verb as well as the pronoun and the participle, he speaks of the *syncategoremata* in these terms:

\[ \text{Alia vero sunt magis colligationes partium orationis, significantes habitudinem unius ad aliam, quam orationis partes; sicut clavi et alia hujusmodi non sunt partes navis, sed partium navis coniunctiones.} \]

A syncategorematic term, therefore, does not signify in the way the noun and the verb signify, i.e., as parts of an *oratio*, but they signify in joining parts of the *oratio*. As John of St. Thomas says, they signify *aliqualiter*, which does not mean that they do not truly and properly signify, but rather that they do not represent the object they signify as a *res per se*, but as a mode of something, i.e., as modifying something. He says also that the categorematic term is distinguished from the syncategorematic as in the Latin language *significativum* or

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1 Lect. 6, n. 3.
2 Lect. 1, n. 6.
3 Curs. Phil., I, p. 12 a 7-16.
praedicativum is distinguished from consignificativum.¹

Thus, the mode in a modal enunciation can be taken merely as a predicate which is predicated of this dictum, and can also be taken as modifying the verb which signifies the composition of the dictum. It then "signifies with" the esse or non esse of the dictum and is properly syncategorematic. The mode does not signify something absolute, i.e., not a thing, but the relation of one thing to another, i.e., the relation of the predicate of the dictum to its subject. In the enunciation, "That man be white is possible," the composition, the esse of the dictum, is signified by "be." "Possible" consignifies with "be" and exercises a certain modification of the esse in distributing the esse of the dictum throughout some time. The enunciation is, therefore, particular in virtue of the syncategorematic term which is the mode. "Possible" is truly a modification of the esse of the dictum and truly signifies aliquamiter. This clarifies the nature of the modal enunciation, because it is precisely in exercising its function as a syncategorematic term that the mode (which also is a predicate) is properly a mode.

¹Ibid., p. 11 b 43-46; cf. p. 92 a 3-12.
The quantification of the modal enunciation is wholly parallel to that of the \textit{de inesse}. In each case the distribution of the subject is effected by a syncategorematic term. In the \textit{de inesse}, the terms, "all," "some," "no," and the like distribute a common term throughout all or some of its subjective parts. In the modal, owing to the fact that its subject is the very \textit{esse} or \textit{non esse} of the dictum, the terms "possible," "contingent," necessary," and "impossible" distribute the \textit{esse} throughout all or some time.

If the difference of quantity proper to modals be combined with the differences of quality, four kinds of modal enunciation are obtained. The universal affirmative is signified by the necessary mode which distributes to all time. The universal negative is signified by the impossible mode which distributes to no time. The particular affirmative is signified by the possible and contingent modes both of which distribute to some time. The particular negative is signified by the possible and contingent modes both of which distribute to some time. The particular negative is signified by such expressions as the not-necessary and the not-impossible which distribute to not-being sometime. To each of these four kinds of
modal enunciations there corresponds one of the orders of equipollent modals. All the enunciations in the first order are universal affirmatives; those in the second, universal negatives; those in the third, particular negatives; and those in the fourth, particular affirmatives.

Just as in the equipollence of de inesse enunciations, the different opposed enunciations can be made equipollent by the correct placing of the negative. A negative before the mode makes an enunciation equipollent to its contradictory; placed after the mode, i.e., with the verb of the dictum, the enunciation is equipollent to its contrary; and negatives placed both before and after the mode make it equipollent to its subaltern. Thus, the first order of equipollent modals is contrary to the second, contradictory to the third, and the fourth is subalternated to it.¹

¹ Apparently dating from the medieval logicians, there are found in some logic books mnemonics for the opposition and equipollence of modals, e.g., Petrus Hispanus, Summulae Logicales, ed. Bochenski, pp. 13-14; Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Phil., I, pp. 50-51. For the quality of the modals the following letters were used: E dictum negat, Ique modum, nihil A, sed U totum. Using these letters, the following words were constructed to indicate each group of equipollent modals: Amabimus, edentuli, iilliace, purpurea. The same order of modes is kept in each word: possible, contingent, impossible, and necessary. Thus in amabimus, a stands for an affirmative possible, the second a for an affirmative contingent, i for a negative impossible, and u for a negative necessary with a negative mode.
Table of Opposition of Equipollent Modals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Universal Affirmatives --Contraries--</th>
<th>Universal Negatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necesse est esse.</td>
<td>Necesse est non esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non possibile est non esse.</td>
<td>Non possibile est esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non contingens est non esse.</td>
<td>Non contingens est esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impossible est non esse.</td>
<td>Impossible est esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subalterns</td>
<td>Subalterns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Particular Affirmatives --Subcontraries--</td>
<td>Particular Negatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non necesse est non esse.</td>
<td>Non necesse est esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible est esse.</td>
<td>Possible est non esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingens est esse.</td>
<td>Contingens est non esse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non impossible est esse.</td>
<td>Non impossible est non esse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conversion of Modals

Since the subject of this paper is the modal enunciation, it is not proper to it to treat of the use of modal propositions in syllogisms. However, in treating the latter subject in its proper place in the Prior Analytics, Aristotle takes up the conversion of the modal proposition. Conversion is considered in connection with the syllogism, because it is principally useful in reducing imperfect modes of the syllogism to perfect modes. Nevertheless, since an enunciation is convertible or not regardless of whether it is used in a syllogism, conversion is a property of the enunciation and will, therefore, be treated here briefly in order to complete the doctrine on the modal enunciation.

Conversion is the exchange of the subject and predicate of a proposition, the quality and the truth remaining the same.\(^1\) In simple conversion, the quantity remains unchanged; in conversion \textit{per accidens}, the quantity is changed—from universal to particular. Since the species of conversion are distinguished according to

\(^1\)"Mutatio extremorum propositionis de subiecto in praedicatum et de praedicato in subiectum servata qualitate et veritate." Joan. a Sto Thoma, \textit{Curs. Phil.}, I, p. 47 b.
quantity, it is important to know which quantity of the modal enunciation is to be considered. When a modal proposition is used in a syllogism, its quantity is neither that of the dictum as singular nor the modal quantity, but the quantity of the subject of the dictum. This is what makes it possible to generate a syllogism from one modal and one de inesse proposition, e.g., that every man run is possible; Socrates is a man; therefore, that Socrates run is possible. Likewise, the quantity that changes or remains unchanged in the conversion of modals is the quantity of the subject of the dictum.¹

It should furthermore be noted that in addition to conversion in terms, that has just been described, there is another kind of conversion that is found only in non-necessary contingent modals—conversion to the opposite quality. This is due to the peculiar nature of the contingent. Whatever belongs to the natural or the infinite contingent is contingent not only to be but also not to be, and what is contingent to all is contingent to none.²

¹S. Albertus, Periherm., I, p. 442 a.
²S. Albertus, Priora, I, p. 477 b.
The conversion of necessary (and impossible) propositions offers no difficulty, because they are converted in the same manner as de inesse propositions. The universal negative converts simply: it is necessary that no B is A; therefore, it is necessary that no A is B. The universal affirmative converts per accidens: it is necessary that all B is A; therefore, it is necessary that some A is B. The particular affirmative converts simply into a particular affirmative, and the particular negative is not convertible.¹

The conversion of contingent modals does offer some special problems, however, since the non-necessary contingent is at once contingent to be and contingent not to be. Aristotle takes up affirmative contingents first.² If the contingent is taken in the senses of the necessary or of the common contingent which follows on the necessary, it is evident that such contingents are converted in the same way as necessary propositions: universals are converted per accidens, particulars simply. The same is true for the non-necessary contingent, although a particular proposition in this contingent is not in every case

¹Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Bk. I, chap. iii, 25 a 26 ff.
²Ibid., 25 a 37-25 b 3.
converted into the same kind of contingent. If an af­
firmative particular proposition of the infinite con­
tingent is converted, the converted proposition is also
of the infinite contingent; e.g., it is contingent that
some man be walking; therefore, it is contingent that the
being which is walking be a man. But if a like propo­
sition be taken in the natural contingent, e.g., it is
contingent that some man be a grammarian, the converse,
it is contingent that some grammarian be a man, is not
a natural contingent at all, because it is necessary
that a grammarian be a man. The affirmative particu­
lar in the natural contingent, therefore, converts to the
common contingent which follows on the necessary.¹

In the conversion of negative contingent propo­
sitions, the same rules are observed for the necessary
and common contingents as for necessary and de inesse
propositions: universals are simply convertible, parti­
culars are not convertible. But negative non-necessary
contingent propositions do not convert in the same way
as necessary and de inesse propositions. A universal
negative in the natural contingent or infinite contingent
is not convertible in terms, because if it were so con­
verted, it would follow that a universal affirmative could

¹S. Albertus, Priora, I, pp. 477 b-480 a.
be converted simply. This is impossible. The proof follows: if in a natural or an infinite contingent, it is contingent that all B is A, it is contingent that no B is A. If it is contingent that no B is A, and if such a proposition is convertible, it follows that it is contingent that no A is B. If it is contingent that no A is B, it is contingent that all A is B. Therefore, with the first proposition, it is contingent that all B is A, there stands the proposition, it is contingent that all A is B. A universal affirmative would have been converted simply. Consequently, the universal negative in the natural and infinite contingents cannot be converted. On the other hand, in such contingents, the particular negative can be converted to a proposition of the same contingent, because such a particular is convertible to the opposite quality. If it is contingent that some B is A, it is also contingent that some B is not A. A particular affirmative is convertible in terms. Therefore, the particular negative is also convertible in terms.¹

Nevertheless, St. Albert points out that the universal negative in the natural or infinite contingent is convertible to a different acceptation of the contingent,

¹Aristotle, Prior Analytics, Bk. I, chap. iii, 25 b 3-18; S. Albertus, Priors, I, p. 482.
viz., the common contingent. That it is contingent that no man be white is a non-necessary contingent (ad utrum-libet), but its converse, it is contingent that no white thing be a man, is a common contingent the sense of which is that it is not necessary that some white thing be a man.¹

¹Ibid., p. 484.
An additional problem to be discussed is that of composite and divided modals. The distinction is a legitimate one; it is made by St. Thomas and there is also foundation for it in Aristotle. However, the problem arises, rather, from a distinction of the modal enunciation made by some authors into two systems of modals with different definitions and properties. In the preceding chapters, no such distinction was made, since the teaching followed was that of Aristotle, St. Albert, and Cajetan in the Perihermeneias. The purpose of this chapter is to expose the errors resulting from a misunderstanding of this distinction as well as to explain briefly its correct understanding.

Erroneous Opinions

In the Summulae found in the volume of logic by John of St. Thomas, the author says there are two ways in which the mode can effect a proposition, thus accounting for the composed and the divided modal.
Modalis composita est, in qua modus se habet ut praedicatum et ipsum dictum ut subjectum, ut si dicas: "Petrum disputare est possibile." Modalis divisa est, in qua modus adverbialiter sumptus fertur in copulam, ut "Petrus possibiliter disputat."  

The composed modal, in which the mode is predicated of the dictum, corresponds to the modal treated in the preceding chapters. The divided modal, in which the mode is an adverb affecting the copula, has not been treated heretofore if, indeed, it differs from the composed modal.

These two forms of the modal enunciation give rise to two senses.

Et isti sensus consistunt in hoc, quod in sensu composito significatur ipsa simultas et unio duplicis formae in uno subjecto; in sensu autem diviso significatur unio seu convenientia duplicis formae in subjecto non simul, sed successive seu una excludente aliam, hoc enim est divisivé. 

Thus the composed sense implies the simultaneous presence of two forms in one subject; the divided sense, their successive presence. The composed sense, the author says, is signified by a composite modal in which the mode is predicated of the whole dictum, for this modal signifies the simultaneous union of subject and predicate. The divided sense is signified by the divided modal in which

1Curs. Phil., I, p. 48 b.
2Ibid.
the mode only affects the copula and thus denotes that the mode belongs to the subject. For example, *sedentem stare est possibile* signifies in the composed sense and means that the union of sitting and standing is possible. *Sedens possibiliter stat*, however, signifies in the divided sense and means that the sitter has the power to stand, although he cannot stand at the same time he is sitting.¹

In a subsequent paragraph, the same author asserts that in divided modals the quantity is determined in the same way as the quantity of a *de inesse* enunciation:

Si dicas: "Omnis homo possibiliter currit," ly omnis distribuit simpliciter.²

Such a property is not compatible with the quantity of the modal already discussed.³ It must be concluded, therefore, that the divided modal described by the author of the *Summulae* is not really a modal enunciation at all.

Exactly the opposite opinion is espoused by the Scotist, Peter Taretus: only the divided modals are truly modals. The enunciation in which the mode is predicate of subject is not properly a modal, but is

³*Supra*, chap. vi.
really a de inesse enunciation, e.g., possibile est Sortem currere. In the divided modal, the mode is a determination of the copula, e.g., hoc possibiliter est currens.

Et adverte, quod in propositionibus modalibus compositis illud verbum, est, sine determinatione dicitur copula; sed in divisis semper sumitur cum determinaciones: ut quando modus tenetur adverbialiter: tunc, est, dicitur esse copula totalis, et modus determinatio, et non est pars copulae: ut Sortes possibiliter currit. Sed quando modus tenetur nominaliter, tunc aggregatum ex isto verbo, est, est isto infinitivo, esse, explicite, vel implicite dicitur esse copula totalis.1

His point is that in possibile est Sortem currere there are two verbs; hence, est is not the whole verb. In hoc possibiliter est currens, est is the whole verb and is truly affected by the mode, which is an adverb.

The two foregoing opinions take the composed and divided senses in a purely grammatical way. As was said above,2 the modal enunciation is indifferent to the grammatical form in which it is expressed; it is essential only that the mode qualify the composition of the dictum. Its definition is enunciatio dicti modificativa.3 It can be expressed with one verb, Socrates currit contingenter,

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1In Summulas Petri Hispani Exactae Explicationes, p. 27 E.
3Cajetanus, In Periherm., Lib. II, lect. 8, n. 4.
or with two, *Socratem currere est contingens*, *Contingit Socratem currere*--there is no difference in meaning. The preceding enunciations differ neither in what they signify nor in their logical mode of signification, but only in their grammatical mode of signification. In each, the *esse* of the dictum is qualified as contingent. The distinction of divided and composed modals, therefore, is not on the part of the grammatical arrangement of words. Furthermore, there is no difference between a modification of the copula and a modification of the whole dictum, for the copula is the very sign of the composition of the dictum. It is this composition, the *esse* or non *esse* signified by the verb of the dictum, which is qualified by the mode.

It is true that some examples of the divided sense imply a succession of forms in a subject, but such succession is not essential to the divided sense. The proposition, *Voluntatem efficaciter motam dissentire est possi-bile*, is true in the divided sense, not because of a succession of forms or acts but because of a simultaneity on the part of the potency. More than one act cannot determine the will at one time, but, granted one act, the will considered as separate from that determination (i.e.,
considered in the divided sense) is in potency to the opposite act. Absolutely speaking, the will can be reduced to the opposite act; although on the supposition that it is already determined to one act, it cannot at the same time be determined to the opposite act. The distinction between the composed and divided senses, therefore, is not essentially that of simultaneity of acts opposed to succession of acts, but simultaneity of acts opposed to simultaneity of potency.\footnote{1}

Both in the \textit{Summa}\textsuperscript{2} and in the \textit{De Veritate}\textsuperscript{3} St. Thomas answers the following objection: the distinction of composed and divided senses is valid only in reference to forms which can be in a subject successively, e.g., as blackness and whiteness; but it is impossible that something be at one time known by God and, at another, unknown; therefore, \textit{Omne scitum a Deo esse est necessio} cannot be distinguished according to the two senses, but must be taken to mean that the thing known is necessary. His answer is that the objection would be correct if \textit{scitum} implied a disposition inhering in the subject. However, \textit{scitum} implies rather an act of the knower.

\footnote{1}{Cf. Joan. a Sto Thoma, \textit{Curs. Theol.}, disp. 25, a. 6, n. 50, ed. Solesm., III, p. 239.}
\footnote{2}{Ia, q. 14, a. 3 ad 3.}
\footnote{3}{Q. 2, a. 12 ad 4.}
Consequently, the thing known can have attributes that belong to it as it is in itself, but which do not belong to it as it is in the state of being known; just as material existence is attributed to a stone taken in itself, but not insofar as it is intelligible. He says, furthermore, that a thing is referred to divine knowledge in its state of being present, but "being present" is not always an attribute of the thing.

Quamvis scientia Dei invariabilis sit, et semper eodem modo, tamen dispositio secundum quam res referetur ad Dei cognitionem invariabilem, non semper eodem modo se habet ad ipsam: refertur enim res ad Dei cognitionem secundum quod est in sua praesentialitate: praesentialitas autem rei non semper ei convenit; unde res potest accipi cum tali dispositione, vel sine ea; et sic per consequens potest accipi allo modo quo refertur ad Dei cognitionem, vel alio modo; et secundum hoc praedicta distinctio procedit.1

The distinction of the composed and divided senses, accordingly, is founded, not on a succession of forms, but on different ways of considering the subject.

Explanation of the Distinction

One and the same enunciation can be considered in both senses. *Album esse nigrum est possibile* is true in the divided sense and false in the composed sense. The difference lies in how the subject is taken. In the composed sense,

1De Veritate, q. 2, a. 12 ad 4.
the meaning is *Album ut album esse nigrum est possibile.* In the divided sense, *Id quod est album esse nigrum est possibile.* In the first enunciation, *album* is taken for what it formally is, i.e., as having the form of whiteness. Since whiteness cannot become blackness, the mode of possibility cannot be predicated of the dictum. But in the second, *album* is taken for the subject which receives the form of whiteness. Since such a subject can also receive the form of blackness, the mode of possibility can be predicated of the dictum taken in this sense.¹

These two ways of considering the subject are differences in its supposition. Supposition is the taking of a term for that of which it is verified. If a term is taken for what it signifies primarily and immediately, it is said "to suppose" simply, e.g., "Man is a species." But terms are not only taken for what they signify formally and primarily, but also for that in which the primary signification is found. "Man" signifies human nature primarily and immediately, but mediately it signifies the individuals in

¹St. Albert, in clarifying the distinction between the composed and divided senses, points out that the composed sense signifies that the predicate is actually in the subject, not that the predicate is in that which can be in the subject. His example is *Posse non scribentem scribere.* "Non est verum quod in sensu compositionis non significet aliud quam quod praedicatum dicti possit inesse subjecto: significatur enim quod praedicatum dicti actualiter insit subjecto, quod est non scribentem: et hoc est possibile." *Liber I Elenchorum,* ed. Borgnet, II, p. 548.
which that nature is found. This second kind of supposition is called personal supposition, and is defined as the taking of a term for individuals or for that which is signified materially and mediately, e.g., "Every man is an animal" is true of individuals or persons.¹

In the composed sense, *album* is taken according to simple supposition, i.e., according to its primary, formal, and immediate signification. In the divided sense, *album* is taken according to personal supposition, i.e., materially and according to the supposit in which it is found. Likewise, in *Omne scitum a Deo esse est necessæ*, if *scitum* supposes simply, i.e., *ut scitum*, the composition of *scitum a Deo* and *esse* is necessary; but if *scitum* supposes only materially (personally), the composition of *id quod est scitum* and *esse* is not necessary. St. Albert explicitly says, in treating one kind of modal proposition,

> Quia sumpta in sensu compositionis termini in ea (affirmativa de necessario) sumpti supponunt simpliciter.²

Simple supposition always involves another property of propositions, called appellation. Appellation is the application of something formally signified to something

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¹Joan. a Sto Thoma, *Curs. Phil.*, I, pp. 29 a, 31 b, 32 a.
²Priora, I, p. 572 a.
else formally signified, e.g., in "Peter is a great logi-
cian," "great" modifies "Peter" as logician, but not abso-
lutely as Peter. The application of something formal to
something material would not be appellation, but simple
application or predication. John of St. Thomas says,

Unde appellatio inducit hunc effectum, quod ter-
minus appellans non absolute conveniat subjecto,
 sed ratione ejus, super quod appellat, et quasi
alligatus illi formalitati, media qua subjecto
applicatur; sicut in dicta propositione ly magnus
non absolute convenit Petro, sed ratione Logicae.¹

Thus nigrum can be predicated of a subject, but not if
that subject is under the appellation of album. In the
other example, esse is necessarily predicated of the sub-
ject of the dictum, if the subject is under the appellation
of scitum a Deo; but if the subject be taken materially
and not as formally signified by scitum, there is no
appellation, the supposition is personal, and the propo-
sition is false.² The Perihermeneias offers a parallel
in treating the inference Caesar est homo mortuus. ergo
est homo. Cajetan says,

¹Curs. Phil., I, p. 40 a.

²For an explicit example of a paralogism due to variation
of appellation see Joan. a Sto Thoma, Curs. Theol.,
"De Angelis," disp. 23, a. 2, nn. 33, 34, where a fallacy
is made by a failure to take potentia according to its
proper formality of tending toward its object.
Aliud est loqui de duobus terminis secundum se, et aliud de eis ut unum stat sub determinatione alterius. . . . . Secundo modo, homo et mortuus, non opponuntur, quia homo transmutatus iam per determinationem corruptivam importatam in ly mortuus, non stat pro suo significato secundum se, sed secundum exigentiam termini additi, a quo suum significatum distractum est.1

In the third part of the Summa, St. Thomas inquires whether this proposition is true: Homo factus est Deus.2 One way of understanding the proposition is similar in form to a modal proposition: if the factus is taken as a mode which determines the composition. It would then be stated, Hominem esse Deum factum est.3 In this sense, homo would have to have a simple supposition, because it is not true to say "This man became God," since the person of the Son of God was God from all eternity.

. . . . homo non habeat personalem suppositionem, sed simplicem. Licet enim hic homo non sit factus Deus, quia hoc suppositum, persona Filii Dei, ab aeterno fuit Deus: tamen homo, communiter loquendo, non semper fuit Deum.4

Thus, if the subject is taken formally (simple supposition) for human nature, the proposition is in a composed sense

1Lib. II, lect. 7, n. 4.
2Q. 16, a. 7 corp.
3Ibid., comment. Cajetani, n. II.
4S. Thomas, ibid.
and in true. But if the subject is taken materially (personal supposition) for the supposit, the proposition is in a divided sense and is false.\(^1\) Again, in the ninth article of the same question à propos of the proposition, *Ille homo, demonstrato Christo, incoeperit esse*, St. Thomas says that the proposition is simpliciter false, because *ille homo* designates an eternal supposit. Cajetan explains,

> Fundatur processus litterae super hoc, quod, quia tenetur materialiter pro supposito, ideo oportet attributum supposito non repugnare supposito, nec sufficit non repugnare naturae seu formae.\(^2\)

A further observation can now be made: that whenever a modal proposition is capable of being understood in both the composed and divided senses, the subject of the dictum is something apart from the essence of the supposit. A supposit cannot be denominated by two opposed forms at the same time, but since neither is an essential predicate, the supposit can be considered either according to its own nature or as denominated such or such. St. Thomas explains this when treating the question of predestination:

\(^1\)Cf. *ibid.*, ad 4.

\(^2\)N. IV.
Nigredo et albedo sunt quaedam formae existentes in subjecto, quod dicitur album et nigrum; et ideo non potest aliquid attribui subjecto nec secundum potentiam nec secundum actum, quod repugnet formae praedictae, quamdiu in subjecto manet; sed praedestinatio non est forma existens in praedestinato, sed in praedestinante, sicut et scitum denominatur a scientia quae est in sciente; et ideo quantumcumque immobiler sit sub ordine scientiae, tamen potest aliquid attribui ei considerando suam naturam, etiamsi repugnet ordini praedestinationis; hoc enim modo praedestinatio est aliquid praeter ipsum hominem qui dicitur praedestinatus, sicut nigredo est aliquid praeter essentiam corvi, quamvis non sit aliquid extra corvum; considerando autem tantummodo essentiam corvi, potest ei aliquid attribui quod repugnet nigredini ejus; secundum quem modum dicit Porphyrius (in Praedicam., cap. de accidentibus), quod potest intelligi corvus albus. Et ita etiam in proposito potest ipsi homini praedestinato attribui aliquid secundum se considerato, quod non attribuitur ei secundum quod intelligitur stare sub praedestinatione.¹

The denomination can be from something extrinsic to the supposit, e.g., praedestinatum or scitum, or from a form inhering in the supposit, e.g., album. Cajetan, in his commentary on the Perihermeneias, points out that opposites can be taken in two ways: formally or according to what they signify, and denominatively or subjectively, e.g., "father" and "son" can be taken for paternity and sonship or for him who is denominated father or son.

Dicendum ergo est quod, licet ad omnia opposita seu distincta contradictio sequatur inter se formaliter sumpta, non tamen ad omnia opposita sequitur contradictio inter ipsa denominative sumpta.²

¹De Veritate, q. 6, a. 3 ad 8.
²Lib. II, lect. 7, n. 5.
A denominative term implies three things: the den ominating form, the thing denominated, and the de­ nominative name itself. For example, a man is the thing denominated by the denominative name, "white," from the den ominating form, "whiteness." "White" and "whiteness" do not differ in what they formally signify, but in their mode of signification.\(^1\) "White" is a concrete terme and signifies something as a quod. "Whiteness" is abstract and signifies something as a quo. The concrete term includes its subject, and, therefore, is capable of a twofold supposition, i.e., simple and personal.

The modal enunciations cited from St. Thomas, scitum a Deo esse est necessa, Album esse nigrum est possibile, with his explanations are sufficient proof that one and the same enunciation can be taken in both the composed and divided senses and that the difference between the two senses is founded on the supposition of the subject of the dictum. Taken in either sense, the nature of the modal enunciation remains the same: the mode always qualifies the esse or non esse of the composition of the dictum. In answer to an objection that the definition of the modal enunciation implied in the Perihermeneias

\(^1\)Cajetanus, Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis, ed. Laurent (Rome: 1939), pp. 15, 16.
is true only of composed modals and that all divided modals would be false, St. Albert explicitly says,

Dicendum quod hoc non sequitur in praedicato quod non ut esse, sed ut modus praedicatur: quia quod ut modus praedicatur, non praedicatur ut modus sui, sed aliorum: et ideo ad alia potest referri, vel sub divisione, vel sub compositione, sicut patet cuilibet parum consideranti.\(^1\)

It must also be insisted that the properties of the modal remain the same in both its senses. The mode must be negated to form the contradictory of an affirmative modal; the equipollents are therefore the same; and the enunciation is quantified *simpliciter* by the mode which distributes the *esse* of the dictum according to the parts of time.

An objection, however, might be raised from the fact that St. Thomas speaks of the composed sense *de dicto* and the divided sense *de re*.

Omne scitum a Deo necessarium est esse, consuevit distinguiri. Quia potest esse *de re*, vel *de dicto*. Si intelligatur *de re*, est divisa et falsa; et est sensus: Omnis res quam Deus scit, est necessaria. Vel potest intelligi *de dicto*, et sic est composita et vera; et est sensus: Hoc dictum, scitum a Deo esse, est necessarium.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) *Periherm.* I, p. 442.

\(^2\) Ia, q. 14, a. 13 ad 3; cf., *I Sent.*, dist. XXXVIII, q. 1, a. 5 ad 5, ed. Mandonnet (Paris: 1929), I, p. 914.
The objection appears to be strengthened by the fact that he explains the divided sense with a de inesse enunciation which puts the necessity in the thing. Moreover, in the Summa Totius Logicae, a work falsely attributed to St. Thomas, the author distinguished modales de re from modales de dicto. However, the distinction made in this latter work is of no value, because it is a merely grammatical one: Socratem currere est necessae is a modal de dicto; Socratem necessae est currere is a modal de re. The two propositions are identical. Although this explanation of the modals de re and de dicto is inaccurate, the text from the Summa is not affected, because there the two senses really differ from each other.

The solution must be sought in the elements which are composed in the dictum. In the composed sense, the subject and predicate of the dictum are taken as one; two forms are united and are qualified by the mode predicated of the dictum. The enunciation is, therefore, said to be de dicto. But in the divided sense, the form of the subject is left aside and only the thing or supposit, which is denominated by the form of the subject, is united to the predicate. The form of the predicate is thus joined directly

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\(^{1}\)Opuscula Omnia, ed. Mandonnet, V, p. 93.
to the subject taken materially. The mode qualifying this composition is rightly said to be de re, because it does not qualify the composition of the dictum according as the predicate is united to the subject standing under its appellation, but it qualifies the composition according as the predicate is united to the res which is the subject taken materially. That St. Thomas explains the meaning of the modal de re with a de inesse enunciation makes no difference, since every modal enunciation can be reduced to a de inesse enunciation.1

The Modal Proposition in the Prior Analytics

In the Prior Analytics, the composed and divided senses of modal propositions are important for the generation of valid syllogisms. St. Albert, following Aristotle,2 says that "to be contingent" can be taken in two ways:

Aut enim dicitur contingere id quod actualiter inest subjecto: aut dicitur hoc contingere cui subjectum contingit inesse.3

The predicate A can belong contingently to the subject B in either of two senses. Either it is contingent that A belong to that which is B according as B is actually inhering in that which is B; or it is contingent that A

1Cf. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, Lib. I, cap. 67 in fine and comment. Ferrariensis, n. XXI.
2Prior Analytics, Bk. I, chap. xiii, 32 b 24-38.
3Priora, I, p. 540 b.
belong to that which is B, not actually, but only contingently, for what is contingently B does not imply being actually B. A is predicated of all of B either secundum inesse or secundum contingere inesse.

When both premises in a syllogism are contingent, they are taken according to contingere inesse, e.g., B is said contingently of that of which C is said contingently, and A is said contingently of that of which B is said contingently--or stated otherwise:

It is contingent that that which contingently is B be A.
It is contingent that that which contingently is C be B.

The sense is that of a divided modal where the mode affects the composition of the subject materially taken and the predicate.

But when a syllogism is constructed from one contingent premise and one de inesse premise, the contingent is taken in the sense that A is said contingently of that of which B is actually predicated. This is secundum inesse and in the composed sense, i.e., the predicate of the dictum is contingently united to the subject formally taken.1

In another passage where there is question of a syllogism in which the minor is contingent and the major necessary or de inesse, St. Albert again says that, unless

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1 Cf. ibid., pp. 540 b-541 a.
the contingent is taken in the composed sense, a necessary or de inesse conclusion cannot follow. The reason is that a universal necessary affirmative affirms a predicate only of that which is actually contained under the medium which is the subject of the major premise. The predicate is not affirmed of what is contingently contained in the subject. Omnis homo de necessitate est animal does not mean "whatever can be man is an animal," but it means "whatever is man is an animal." If the minor is contingent in the divided sense, there is no actual affirmation of whatever is contingently contained in the medium.

Et ideo non sequitur conclusio de necessario affirmativa neque de inesse, nisi sumatur illa de contingenti in sensu compositionis: quia in utraque actualiter affirmatur praedicatum de subjecto.¹

Since it is not germane to this paper on the modal enunciation to treat the generation of syllogisms, the preceding passages have been cited only to substantiate from the Prior Analytics what was said above about the composed and divided senses. The passages also serve to indicate, contrary to the opinions of Scotus and Ockham as well as some modern historians, that there are not two complete systems of syllogisms generated from composed

¹Ibid., pp. 571 b-572 a.
and divided modals. Rather, in some combinations, the modals must be taken in the composed sense; in others, in the divided sense. Syllogisms are generated according to the _dici de omni_ and the _dici de nullo_, and not according to a mechanical arrangement of terms and propositions.

The composed and divided senses are not limited to modal propositions. A detailed treatment of other fallacies of composition and division can be found in St. Albert on the **Sophistics**.¹

The distinction of the composed and divided senses is of great importance in theology, as the foregoing quotations from the *Summa* and the *De Veritate* show. It is used in the solutions to problems such as the divine knowledge of future contingents, the necessity imposed on contingent beings by the divine will, the certitude of predestination, the operation of efficacious grace, and the freedom of negatively indeliberate acts.

¹*Elenchorum*, II, pp. 545 a-551 a.
In an article entitled "Notes Historiques sur les Propositions Modales," I. M. Bochenski O. F., sets himself the task of giving

... un aperçu rapide sur l'histoire de la logique formelle des propositions modales depuis Aristote jusqu'à Ockham.

Most of the article merely narrates what, according to Father Bochenski, Aristotle, Theophrastus, the Stoics, the Arabs, etc., thought on the subject. There would be no point in taking up the article author by author. But it is principally in his treatment of Aristotle, that the author gives evidence of having grasped neither the doctrine on the nature and properties of the modal proposition nor what the text of Aristotle actually says. The doctrine has been treated in the body of this thesis. It remains, however, to show from the words of Aristotle himself that Father Bochenski is not giving a true history of what Aristotle said.

First of all, Father Bochenski "to avoid misunderstandings" arbitrarily assigns only one sense to the word "contingent."

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Pour éviter les malentendus, nous emploierons toujours le mot possible au sens de non-impossible, en réservant le mot contingent pour la possibilité bilatérale, non nécessaire et non-impossible.

Having imposed his unique sense on the word, he then shows how confused Aristotle was because he uses the contingent in other meanings. Here, there will be cited, first, the text of Father Bochenski's article, and, secondly, the references to Aristotle which Father Bochenski himself makes in his footnotes. It will be useful to add a word here and there explaining in what sense "contingent" is being used. The commentary of St. Albert on the Priora is more or less indispensable to an understanding of Aristotle; there is no reason to be ashamed to have recourse to it. The quotation from Aristotle are all from the Latin text of the Priora given in the Opera Omnia Aristotelis which contains also the paraphrase by Sylvester Maurus.¹

années. Il fallut attendre le XIVe siècle pour y voir clair au point de vue systématique. Quant à l'aspect génétique du système, malgré les efforts de M. Paul Gohlke, nous sommes encore bien loin de l'avoir saisi.

Voici d'abord les thèses qui paraissent sûres. Le *De Interpr.* comprend un tableau d'équivalences entre des propositions modales en *δυσκόμον*, *δυσκορόν*, *δυσκρατία* et *δυσκαφία*. Il en ressort que les deux premiers sont équivalents et ont exactement le sens de notre *P.* Par contre dans les *Analytiques*, le *συγκρόν* n'apparaît presque jamais, et l'*ευκαλλη* est défini, quoique d'une manière assez confuse, au sens du *C.*

Aristotle, *Priora*, A 13, 32 a 18 ff: Contingens *id appello, quod cum sit necessarium, si ponatur esse, nihil inde sequitur impossible.*

This is the *contingens non-necessarium*.

Or, ceci implique des conséquences extrêmement graves et curieuses. D'abord, il est *C* que *p.* équivaut à: il est *C* que *non-p*; *p.* ex.: s'il est contingent qu'il pleuve, il est contingent qu'il ne pleuve pas.

Aristotle, ibid., 32 a 30-33: Converti inquam, non affirmativas in negativas, sed quaecumque affirmatim figuram habent secundum oppositionem, ut haec, contingit inesse, mutatur in hanc contingit non inesse... .

This is the conversion to opposite qualities of the *contingens non-necessarium*.

On peut démontrer rigoureusement cette équivalence en partant des thèses de la logique propositionnelle et de la définition de *C*. En outre, Aristotle affirme qu'une proposition affirmative universelle *C* équivaut à une proposition négative *C* aux arguments isomorphes, et de même pour les propositions particulières.
Aristotle, ibid., 32 a 34 ff.: . . . . et haec, contingit omni, in hanc contingit nulli vel non omni contingit. Eodem modo et in aliis fit conversionis. Cum enim contingens non sit necessarium, ac non necessarium possit non inesse, perspicuum est, si contingit ̃ a τω b inesse, contingere etiam non inesse, et si omni contingit inesse, etiam omni contingere non inesse. Similis est ratio affirmationum in parte, quoniam eadem est demonstratio. Ejusmodi vero propositiones sunt attributivae, non privativae.

Again, he is speaking of the conversion of the conversion of the conversion to opposite qualities of the contingens non-necessarium.

De là une autre conséquence paradoxaële: les propositions universelles négatives ne peuvent être valablement converties;

Aristotle, ibid., 3, 25 b 14 ff.: Quae vero quod plerumque eveniunt et ita natura sunt comparata, contingere dicuntur (quomodo definimus contingens) non similiter se habebunt in privativis conversionibus, sed propositionis universalis privativa non convertitur.

The contingent here is the contingens natum, but the contingens infinitum can also be included, according to St. Albert.\(^1\) In the preceding text, Aristotle denies conversion in terms to the universal negative in the natural contingent. In the paragraph before this one, he has just said that the negative propositions in the necessary contingent and the common contingent are converted in the same way as the de inesse propositions.

\(^1\)Priora, I, p. 482 a.
en effet, puisqu'elles sont équivalentes aux propositions universelles affirmatives G, celles-ci pourraient être converties simpliciter dans ce cas;

Aristotle, _ibid._, 17, 36 b 35 ff.: _Primum ostendendum est, contingens privativum non converti._ Ut si \( \tau b \) a contingit nulli \( b \), non est necesse etiam \( \tau b \) b contingere nulli a. Hoc enim ponatur, et contingat \( \tau b \) b nulli a inesse. Cum igitur contingentes affirmationes mutentur in negationes, tam contrariae quam oppositae, et contingat \( \tau b \) b nulli a inesse, perspicuum est, contingere etiam ut \( \tau b \) b omni a insit. Hoc autem falsum est. Non enim si hoc illi omni contingit, necesse est etiam illud huic contingere. Quare contingens privativum non convertitur.

The negative contingent is not converted in terms, but it is converted to opposite qualities. Aristotle is here speaking of premises which are contingent _ad utrumlibet._

The universal negative in the common contingent is convertible in terms.

par contre, les propositions négatives particulières C (équivalentes aux particulières affirmatives C) sont convertibles simpliciter.

Aristotle, _ibid._, 3, 25 b 17 ff.: _Quae vero est in parte, convertitur._

The conversion here is in terms. The universal negative in the _contingens natum_ cannot be converted in terms.

Comme on voit, nous sommes loin de la bonne logique "aristotélico-thomiste" enseignée dans la plupart de nos manuels "traditionnels." De même la vraie lo-

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1S. Albertus, _ibid._, p. 578 a.
gique aristotélicienne ne connaît aucun mode légi-time à deux prémisses C en deuxième figure—car dans cette figure il nous faut avoir une prémisse negative, et toutes les prémisses négatives C équivalent à des prémises affirmatives C.

**Aristotle, ibid., 17, 36 b 26 ff.** In secunda figura, cum ambae propositiones contingentes accipiuntur, nullus erit syllogismus, sive attributivae sive privativae ponantur, sive universales sive in parte.

As indicated above, Aristotle is here speaking of the **contingens ad utrumlibet**.¹

D'autre part nous avons ici un grand nombre de modes avec deux prémisses négatives et pour la même raison.

Il faut noter, cependant, que ce tableau est bien loin d'être aussi clair dans le texte de l'*Organon*. Aristote (ou quelque copiste) brouille tout par des notes marginales sur les deux sens du C: d'une part il y aurait un C ינפכ (contingens natum, diront les scolastiques), d'autre part le C ינפכ (ad utrumlibet);

**Aristotle, ibid., 13, 32 b 4 ff.** His definitis rursus dicamus, contingere dici duobus modis, una, quod plerumque fit ac deficit a necessario, ut hominem canescere vel augeri vel tabescere, et omnino quod natura esse solet (hoc enim non habet continuum necessitatem, quia non semper homo est; sed si homo sit, aut necessario aut plerumque est). 

**Alio modo,** quod est indefinitum, quodque et ita et secus esse potest, ut animal ambulare, aut eo ambulante fieri terrae motum, et omnino quod fit a fortuna. Horum enim nihil magis ista natura comparatum est quam contrario modo.

These are the **contingens natum** and the **contingens infinitum** which are species of the **contingens non-necessarium**.

¹S. Albertus, ibid., I, p. 577 b.
These are the necessary contingent, the non-necessary contingent, and the common contingent which is convertible with the logical possible.

This is the **contingens natum** distinguished against the **contingens commune**. This property also belongs to the **contingens infinitum**.¹ The only property of which there is question here is the conversion of universal negatives.

¹S. Albertus, ibid., I, p. 482 a.
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En deuxième lieu, immédiatement après la définition du \( \gamma\nu\delta\varepsilon\kappa\mu\nu\) au sens de C, on nous l'explique en lui attribuant les propriétés du P.

Aristotle, *ibid.*, 13, 32 a 21-29: Hoc autem esse contingens quod diximus, perspicuum est ex negationibus et affirmationibus oppositis. Haec enim, non contingit inesse, et impossibile est inesse, et necesse est non inesse, aut eadem sunt aut sese mutuo consequuntur. Quare etiam his opposita, id est, contingit inesse, et non impossibile est inesse, et non inesse, aut erunt eadem aut sese mutuo consequentur. Non de omni re vel affirmatio vel negatio vera est. Ergo contingens est non necessarium, et non necessarium contingens.

The common contingent is convertible with the possible and follows on the necessary. The common contingent is not necessary not to be, and therefore is common to the necessary and the non-necessary.

Enfin un autre texte distingue deux sens du \( \upsilon\pi\rho\kappa\varepsilon\upsilon \); il y aurait un \( \alpha\tau\rho\lambda\delta\varepsilon\upsilon \) \( \upsilon\pi\rho\kappa\varepsilon\upsilon \) et un \( \upsilon\pi\rho\kappa\varepsilon\upsilon \) \( \kappa\alpha\mu\iota\ \chi\rho\omicron\omicron\upsilon \); seul le deuxième pourrait être employé dans les prémisses de certains modes.

Aristotle, *ibid.*, 15, 34 b 7 ff.: Omni autem inesse accipiendum est non tempore definitum, ut nunc aut hoc tempore, sed simpliciter, quoniam ex hujuscemodi propositionibus syllogismos conficimus. Caeteroqui propositiones secundum tempus praesens accepta non erit syllogismus.

As the text says--INESSA--Aristotle is speaking of de inesse propositions, which can be used in syllogisms consisting of one contingent proposition and one de inesse proposition. What is the revelance of Father Bochenski's sentence?
The next three paragraphs will be omitted here.

In them, Father Bockenski makes the distinction between the two senses in which contingent premises can be taken: *contingere secundum inesse and contingere secundum contingere inesse*. He then continues:

On aurait cependant tort de voir dans cette distinction l'idée maîtresse du système historique d'Aristote. Il est vrai que seul le *sensus divisus* peut justifier l'équivalence des propositions universelles affirmatives et négatives, particulières affirmatives et négatives C. Elle servirait très bien aussi pour expliquer la structure de la syllogistique aristotélicienne. Mais si Aristote avait vraiment édifié son système sur cette idée, il n'aurait pas manqué de l'indiquer dans les textes où il cherche à justifier ses thèses paradoxales. Or il n'en est rien; et même quand il s'agit de justifier l'équivalence que nous venons de mentionner, il est dit expressément que le *modus* doit être considéré comme prédicat de la proposition entière.

Footnote n. 89--An. Fri or a A 13, 32 b 2; καὶ δέ ἐπερὶ τῆς μεταφορᾶς τοῦ ζητούμενος σημείωσις ἐπιφώνησεν πρὸς τοὺς συνόδους τούτους τοῦδε γνώσεως καὶ τῆς συνεργείας τῆς λογικής. Le *ἐπερὶ τῆς μεταφορᾶς* de 25 b 21 n'est naturellement pas conçu comme copule, mais comme prédicat; cf. Metaph. 7, 1017 a 7 ss. Cependant Aristote confond constamment le *modus* comme qualification de la copule et comme qualification de la proposition entière (cf. p. ex. An. Friora A 8, 29 b 29- A 3, 25 b 21 ss.)

Aristotle, *ibid.*, 13, 32 b 2: Nam contingit similiter ponitur in oratione ut verbum est, sicut prius dictum fuit.

3, 25 b 21 ff.: Nam contingit similiter ponitur in oratione ut verbum est; verbum autem est, quibuscumque attributis adjiciatur, semper et omnino affirmationem facit, ut: est non bonum, vel: est non album, vel ut simpliciter et uno verbo dicam: est non hoc. Sed ex sequentibus etiam hoc confirmabitur. Quod vero attinet ad conversiones, hae similiter se habebunt ut aliae.
Aristotle is merely pointing out that *contingit* is affirmative, just as *est* is affirmative. In a modal enunciation the mode is always a predicate. It modifies the composition of the dictum which is signified by the verb (copula) of the dictum. Whether the *est* of the dictum be considered as a copula with a *tertium相邻ens* or solely as a copula is of no consequence here; both are affirmative, e.g., *Socratem esse est contingens* and *Socratem esse album est contingens*.

8, 29 b 29: Quia vero diversa haec sunt, inesse et necessario inesse et contingere inesse (multa enim insunt quidem, non tamen necessario; alia vero nec necessario nec omnino insunt, sed possunt inesse), manifestum est etiam, horum cujusque syllogismum diversum fore ac terminis constare haud simili modo se habentibus, sed alium ex necessariis, alium ex his quae insunt, alium ex contingentibus.

Metaph., V, lect. 9, 1017 a 7 ff.: Ens dicitur hoc quidem secundum accidens, illud vero secundum se.

What is the relevance of these texts to which Father Bochenski refers?

En outre, en nous plaçant sur le terrain des propositions *divisae*, nous ne saurions expliquer comment une proposition N, dont seul le conséquent est qualifié, peut être légitimement convertie; et cependant cette conversion est partout présupposée comme correcte par notre auteur.

Footnote n. 30—P. ex.: An. Priora A 8, 30 a 2; A 10, 30 b 11. La théorie est préposée explicitement A 3 25 a, 27-36, où il faut noter qu'Aristote ne conçoit aucune différence entre les deux structures.

Aristotle, Priora, 8, 30 a 2: Nam privativum pronuntiatum eodem modo convertitur; et in toto esse omnique attribui, similiter trademus.

10, 30 b 11: Quoniam igitur propositio privans convertitur, \( r \rightarrow b \) nulli a contingit.

25 a 27-36: Eodem autem modo res se habebit etiam in necessariis propositionibus. Universalis enim privativa universaliter convertitur. Affirmativarum autem utraque universaliter convertatur in parte. Nam si necessario \( r \rightarrow a \) inesse nulli b, necessario est etiam \( r \rightarrow b \) inesse nulli a, quia, si aliqui accidit, etiam \( r \rightarrow a \) accidet aliqui b. Quod si necessario \( r \rightarrow a \) inesse omni aut aliqui b, necessario est etiam \( r \rightarrow b \) inesse aliqui a, quia, nisi necessario sit inesse, neque \( r \rightarrow b \) a necessario inerit aliqui. Quod vero est in parte privativum, ob eam ipsam, quam prius diximus causam, non convertitur.

Nous allons voir du reste que Théophraste ne savait rien du sensus divisus, ce qui serait surprenant si Aristote avait enseigné notre distinction.

En résumé, nous pouvons dire que la syllogistique modale d'Aristote pourrait être construite à base de deux postulats: 1°, l'\( \varepsilon \nu\nu\zeta\chi\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron\omicron \) a partout le sens du C; 2°, toutes les prémises sont *divisae*. 
Du premier postulat découle la non-convertibilité des propositions universelles négatives C et l'équivalence entre elles et des propositions semblables affirmatives--et, partant, l'invalidité de beaucoup de modes de la 2e figure avec la validité de nombreux modes à prémisses négatives.
Du deuxième postulat découle la possibilité de construire des syllogismes corrects, dans lesquels la conclusion semble plus forte que la plus faible des prémisses. Naturellement, le système devrait être corrigé sur plus d'un point. Mais Aristote ne s'est probablement pas rendu compte du deuxième postulat. C'est à cause de cela que son système contient tant d'inconséquences et d'erreurs.

The first "postulate" was shown to have no basis in the first part of this Appendix. The second is equally without foundation in the text of the Priora. In 13, 32 b 25-ff., he says,

*Quia vero haec locutio, contingit hoc huic inesse, bifariam accipi potest---aut namque significat cui hoc inest, aut cui hoc contingit inesse.*

In the following lines, Aristotle explicitly states that some premises (when both are contingent) are to be taken *divisae* (*cui hoc contingit inesse*) and others are to be taken *cui hoc inest*, which is *compositae*; how can it be said that all premises are *divisae*? The concluding sentences merit no serious comment.


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______. *Opuscula Omnia.* Edited by P. "andonnet. Vol. V.


______. *Quaestiones Disputatae.* Turin: Marietti, 1942.
