The Centralization-of-Power Thesis Revisited: A Multi-Level Analysis of the 2015 Migrant Crisis

Mémoire

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Résumé en français

Ce mémoire ré-explore la thèse de la centralisation du pouvoir aux niveaux supranational (UE) et national (Allemagne) lors de la crise des migrants de 2015. Cette thèse est largement étudiée et reconnue dans le domaine de la gestion des crises et prend place soit par une approche descendante - les niveaux supérieurs agissent unilatéralement - ou par une approche ascendante - les niveaux inférieurs délèguent aux rangs supérieurs. Au cours de la crise des migrants de 2015, il est attendu que la centralisation aux niveaux national et supranational prenne place avec l’intensification de la crise et par une approche descendante. Le document examine la crise de manière quantitative et présente une analyse de contenu chronologique de 94 déclarations officielles de la Commission Européenne et du gouvernement allemand. Les résultats obtenus confirment la validité de la thèse de la centralisation du pouvoir, son lien à l’intensification de la crise ainsi qu’une approche ascendante.
Abstract

This research paper assesses the well-known centralization-of-power thesis and analyses it at both the supranational level (European Union) and the national level (Germany) during the 2015 migrant crisis. The centralization-of-power thesis is a widely studied and recognized phenomenon in the field of crisis management building on the subsidiarity principle saying that power tends to be centralized in the hands of the highest ranks of a hierarchy when lower ranks are unable to cope with a crisis. The centralization can either take place through a top-down approach – highest ranks take the lead unilaterally – or a bottom-up approach – lowest ranks deliberately delegate power to the higher ranks. According to this thesis, in the case of the 2015 migrant crisis it is expected that the centralization of power happened at both the national and supranational levels as the context aggravated but also through a top-down approach, due to the complex context of the European Union and the highly decentralized structure of German federalism. The paper first examines the 2015 migrant crisis from a quantitative standpoint, tracing its evolution and aggravation. It also presents a computer-assisted content analysis of 94 official statements issued by the European Commission and the German Federal Government’s officials in response to the 2015 migrant crisis. The paper then provides a detailed analysis of the qualitative and quantitative evidence recovered that led to three main conclusions. Firstly, the centralization of power is observed at both the supranational and national levels during the 2015 migrant crisis, but in significantly different ways. Secondly, the centralization of power can be seen as triggered by the aggravation of the context and to the intensification of the crisis. Lastly, it was put into place as a top-down approach; it was German and European’s high officials that took over the crisis management effort and constrained lower levels of government to act accordingly.
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Abbreviations

CCCA: Chronological comparative content analysis
CFSP: Common Foreign Security Policy
EC: European Commission
ECJ: European Court of Justice
EU: European Union
EP: European Parliament
GFG: German Federal government
IR: International Relations
NGOs: Non-governmental Organizations
PJCCM: The Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters
UN: United Nations
UNHCR: United Nations Refugee Agency
„Wir schaffen das!”

“We can do it!” - Angela Merkel on August 31st 2015
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1. Introduction

The value of studying the crisis phenomenon is that crises are devices of change (Hermann, 1963: 63). Not only are there still a wide variety of threats to safety nowadays, but these threats keep on taking new or unexpected forms, consequently requiring governments to implement new techniques to face these challenges. This offers a fertile ground for researchers to explore the different facets of crises and also justifies the abundant organizational literature as well as that of crisis management. The main goal pursued by the experts in the field of crisis management has always been to create a coherent theory to explain how those unique contexts are handled and how decisions are made during crises at the State level.

However, many dynamics have influenced the shaping of the international security environment: “the rise of non-state security threats, the proliferation of non-state security actors and the emergence of new forms of coordination.” (Krahmann, 2005: 16) The focus is no longer exclusively on inter-state conflicts, but rather on threats as diverse as terrorism, trans-national crime, the proliferation or weapons of mass destruction but also on the intra-state conflicts that have regional or even international consequences (such as floods of refugees) (Pirozzi, 2015: 10). It is not only the nature of threats that has evolved but the interaction between a wide range of actors within that security environment. The traditional State level analysis is now confronted to the interactions between non-state, sub-state and trans-state actors. This new reality thus calls for “multi-level and networked modes of cooperation among actors – national, trans-national, regional and even global –” (Pirozzi, 2015: 10) to address these threats. Many fields have thus started to incorporate these evolutions undergone by the international security environment; international relations theories, EU studies and the whole field of Security studies including crisis management are still progressively adapting.

This being said, it still seems that the scholars from the field of crisis management have been reluctant to take the challenge of studying the European Union. Due to the complexity of the security environment itself, the added complication and sometimes ambiguity surrounding the European institutions and their contested role at the
international level as pointed out by Howorth (2007: 25-29) does not seem to appeal many of them. Accordingly, students of EU studies also usually chose to study specific and more concrete areas of the EU related to crisis management such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), Justice and Home Affairs, terrorism, etc. Very few studies have tried to elucidate with reliable examples the complex dynamics of the European crisis management system when faced with crises that are international, transnational as well as national. This research paper therefore seeks to fill the gap in the literature by focusing on studying crisis management within the European context to elucidate the dynamics at both the supranational and national levels during a crisis that took a multi-level extent.

Likewise, despite the ongoing and complex changes that the field of crisis management undergoes, there seems to be one frequently cited and largely corroborated proposition that withstands. Indeed, the thesis that points to a tendency towards the centralization of power in times of crisis has been corroborated at many points in history. This thesis stipulates that when faced with a crisis, traditional canals such as bureaucracy or governments are highly challenged and it results in the concentration of decision-making in the hand of the higher levels of an organizational hierarchy (Hermann, 1963; Staw, Sandelans and Dutton, 1981; ‘t Hart et al., 1993; Fourshee and Helmreich, 1998). However, it has been fundamentally studied from a state-level standpoint and was gradually put aside with the emergence of new dynamics above-mentioned. This research paper will thus try to fill another gap in the literature by reinvestigating the validity of this prominent thesis in the light of the latest dynamics, but also by adding the multi-level analysis to it.

This research paper attempts to answer three main questions: first, does the centralization-of-power thesis withstand the new forms of crises that – not only States – but supranational organizations are facing today? In other words, did Germany and the European Union centralized power while facing the 2015 migrant crisis? Secondly, in the light of the extensive literature reviewed in the following section, is there an existing connection between the intensification of the crisis and the tendency towards the
centralization of power? Finally, and based on the literature but also building on
deduction, is the process of the centralization of power realized through a bottom-up
approach or a top-down approach? The aim of the study is to test this pre-existing thesis
by applying it to a new case, which is the migrant crisis of 2015 gravely affecting both
the European Union (EU) and Germany. To this end, I provide a chronological
comparative content analysis (CCCA) for the European Union and Germany regarding
the 2015 migrant crisis. I also provide a chart illustrating the intensification of the crisis
at both levels to illustrate if the centralization of power concords with the aggravation of
the context. This method has, to my knowledge, never been used in order to support this
argument, and it will also allow providing empirical data on the subject.

The focus of this investigation is the centralization of power but also the process
by which it unfolds at both the supranational level (EU) and the national level (Germany).
Therefore, it refers to various concepts but principally those of centralization, delegation,
subsidiarity, and the top-down and bottom-up approach. It does not go into the details of
the strategies, institutions and operations that the EU has developed through the Common
Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP),
but I offer a brief overview of the principal mechanisms that have been put into
place to offer a complete picture of the EU’s approach to crisis management. The same applies for
the German level.

To this end, the first part of this paper provides an overview of the literature
targeted by this topic with a special focus on the centralization of power found within the
field of crisis management. Then follows a discussion on crisis management in the
European Union, including precisions on Germany’s relation with the EU as well as its
crisis management capacity and further precisions on the crisis under study and its
singularities. It then develops on the method: a quantitative and qualitative computer-
assisted content analysis of both the German and European responses to the migrant crisis
of 2015. As will be further discussed in the following sections, Germany and the EU were
chosen because they were both leading actors during the 2015 migrant crisis, which was
also one of the biggest challenges ever encountered by the EU since its creation. Finally, I
provide an extensive analysis of the results found as well as a section dedicated to various observations noted during the data collection.

This research paper finds that the centralization-of-power thesis is still accurate even though the nature of crises and the environment in which they take place have significantly changed, but also considering the context of the European Union derogating from the usual state-level analysis. It was found that even though the European Union does not yet have the full legal rights to act unilaterally as a crisis manager on its Member States’ territory, the centralization of power was witnessed: first, at the national level of the German State – the Federal government gradually monopolized the decision-making process to impose patterns of action to territorial administrative units such as the Länder and the Kommunen; and, then, at the European level in a rather drastic top-down unilateral manner rather than through a common agreement from all Member States. Data also suggests that there is a plausible correlation between the intensification of the crisis and the centralization of power and that the centralization of power was the result of a top-down approach chosen by higher instances.
2. Literature Review

As previously mentioned, this research paper revisits the well-known centralization-of-power thesis in the field of crisis management that has gained strong support in recent decades (‘t Hart et al. 1993; Bernhardsdottir, 2015: 58). The centralization of power thesis resulted from general observations of what seemed to be a natural instinct to look up at leaders when facing hard situations (‘t Hart et al, 1993). Based on these assumptions, researchers decided to dig deeper and analyze, mainly through study cases, the organizational processes underlying various types of institutions in times of crisis (‘t Hart et al, 1993). The centralization-of-power thesis says that, when facing hard times, power tends to be concentrated – deliberately or not – in the hands of a leader or a small group of leaders (‘t Hart et al, 1993; Boin et al, 2005). This thesis will be thoroughly explained in the next section but the topic under scrutiny and the context in which it is studied, are the result of an amalgam of different theoretical approaches that need to be captured and synthetized to “bridge the gap between the various levels of analysis” (Pirozzi, 2015: 9).

The first part thus covers the heart of this research, which is the centralization-of-power thesis and determines the conceptual framework. The second part offers a theoretical framework to support the multi-level approach and offer a foundation to the rest of the analysis. The third part gives an overview of some key approaches that have been used to elucidate the current features of EU crisis management. The fourth part goes over some concepts that will be repeatedly employed in this paper. Finally, the fifth part offers a discussion on some sub-fields that are directly targeted by this research and that need to be addressed in order to provide a clear understanding of the complex environment in which the crisis and the centralization of power occurred.

2.1 Centralization-of-power thesis

Crises in contemporary societies are no longer improbable or rare events (Rosenthal and Kouzmin, 1996). Their occurrence, timeframe and diversity have increased to the point that we now live in what Ulrich Beck (1992, 2008) referred to as “the global risk society”
Considering the ever-changing and usually unexpected dynamics of crises, researchers show “that governments typically find crisis management no easy task” (Rosenthal, Charles and ‘t Hart, 1989; Schneider, 1995; Rosenthal, Boin, and Comfort, 2001; Kettl, 2004; Boin et al., 2005; Drennan and McConnell, 2007; Sylves, 2008). The challenges are numerous and many things can go wrong (Boin et ‘t Hart, 2010). It is thus undeniable that in a crisis context it is almost impossible to act in a routine-like manner (Inbar, 1979) emphasizing the deficiency of heavy and complicated governmental and bureaucratic processes that become profoundly challenged. Decision-making then “appears to ask for ad hoc adaptation of the bureaucratic structure and culture” (‘t Hart et al., 1993, 14).

Hence, organizational strategies to cope with crises have been a leading research topic for the last few decades. The vast research effort complicates the reconciliation of all the paths explored going from the individual level approach encompassing mainly cognitive, behavioural and emotional responses to high levels of stress (Harris, 1981; Keinan, 1987; Taylor, Buunk, and Aspinwall, 1990; Hermann and Kegley, 1995), to the group approach covering responses of organizations, military structures, teams, enterprises, bureaucratic and governmental structures to stress or crises (Weber, 1922; Hackman and Morris, 1975; Smith, 1979; Janis, 1983; Foushee, 1984; Baum and Paulus, 1987; Driskell and Olmstead, 1989), to the multiple institutional approaches (March and Olsen, 1998; Greif, 2000; Migdal, 2001; Thiebault, 2003; Greif and Laitin, 2004; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004) as well as the contingency theory (Lorsch, 1967). Consequently, for the purpose of this study, the attention is focused on one of the most recurrent and also most studied structural adaptations during crises which is the centralization-of-power thesis, arguing that increased centralization and control are likely organizational outcomes of crisis and threats (Pfeffer, 1978).

But what is the centralization of power exactly? Many researchers have contributed to define this complex and multidimensional process: it can be described as an *upward shift*
In authority that centralizes powers and activities in the hands of a small group, a central government or a crisis government to facilitate the response and reduce uncertainty when faced with new challenges posed by a crisis (‘t Hart et al, 1993, 14). In fact, findings show that, in times of crisis, people intuitively look up to their leaders for protection from looming consequences (Boin, Ekengren and Rhinard, 2013), while leaders (executives mostly) also instinctively minimize increased uncertainty by centralizing control (Lavin Fernandez, 2014, 72). Actually, Bernhardsdottir (2015) highlights that it is as often as 7 out of every 10 cases that the crisis management data show contractions of authority in crisis response (58). According to his findings, “centralization occurs almost twice as often as the decentralization” (Bernhardsdottir, 2015: 58).

In their retrospection of the centralization-of-power thesis, ’t Hart, Rosenthal and Kouzmin (1993) retrace its starting point to Hermann’s (1963) classic analysis of the impact of crises on organizations. Hermann (1963) showed that organizations respond to stress by centralizing power and concentrating decision-making at higher ranks of the hierarchy. This set the pace for many other researchers that also observed “an increased tendency for subordinate group members to acquiesce to authority when under stress” (Fourshee and Helmreich, 1998; Staw, Sandelans and Dutton, 1981). Likewise, Rosenthal, 't Hart and Kouzmin (1991) showed that crises provide an environment encouraging the self-imposition of centralization but also that crises could even generate preconditions associable with dictatorship. Indeed, there seems to be a link between dictatorships and times of crisis (Hertzler, 1940); today, many countries have constitutional provisions that gives the Heads of States (or whichever leader concerned) power comparable to that of a dictator in those contexts – a practice referred to by Rossiter (2009) as constitutional dictatorship – or pre-established emergency/crisis management plans to facilitate coordination between organizations and minimize interagency rivalry during crises.

The thesis has also been linked to the subsidiarity principle of “upscalling”, also referred to as vertical coordination and linked to the concept of subsidiarity (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius, 2005). Despite the ambiguity surrounding the definition of this
concept, “subsidiarity is typically understood as a presumption for a local-level decision-making, which allows for the centralization of powers only for particular, good reasons” (Jachtenfuchs and Krisch, 2016). Essentially, when it comes to crisis management, it is the idea that “crises should be dealt with at the level closest to which they occur” (Boin et al., 2005: 58). In other words, if the crisis expands and spills over municipal or provincial borders for example, or if the local authorities fail to cope with it effectively, the higher authorities usually step in to take control.

In short, all the works above-mentioned seem to establish that “the greater the stress – or crisis – the greater the compulsion to give power to a central authority” (Hook, 1943; Korten, 1962; Driskell and Salas, 1991). This is another very important feature of this thesis: it is the intensification of the crisis that “strengthens the hierarchical structure of [a] group, such that (a) group members defer more to the leader and (b) the leader becomes less responsive to subordinates' task inputs” (Driskell and Salas, 1991: 474). The concentration of decision-making can have the effect of widening the gap between the decisions-makers and the scene (e.g. lower instances, civil society, and other subordinate groups); hence this is when the top-down approach (vertical approach) finds its relevance. These decisions being made by the central governmental officials while overlooking the preferences of the lower levels of governments is the main feature of the top-down approach.

Still, this observation obviously led researchers to explore what were the actual dynamics found within that scene (Boin et al., 2005: 58) seeking to see if a bottom-up approach could explain the centralization of power. So, as most had already observed, in times of crisis, coordination is needed, but the intensification of a crisis is only one of several feature that seem to jeopardize or maximize this coordination. First, it was noted that leaders depend on organizations both inside and outside their jurisdictions; meaning that the likelihood of centralization can be significantly affected by the interagency rivalry or simply by other organizations. These agencies or organizations can be as diverse as: countries that are allies or partners; international organizations (United Nations, NGOs, NATO); EU agencies coordinating with member states’ national agencies or even agencies
from non-EU member states; and public agencies such as political parties or ministries within countries (Boin et al., 2005). Second, it was also noted that information is a crucial factor during crises (Boin et al., 2005). Crises introduce a collective search for information, but it also impairs communication, thus sometimes putting medias on the spotlight since they can coordinate faster than organizations and influence the rapid evolution of a crisis context. Third, Boin et al. (2005) refer to the actions of involved bystanders; it is as simple as the popular pressures coming from the fact that crises have a disorienting effect on people – the motives of the people are different but their impact is substantial (60). Finally, another possibility that has not really been explored in the literature is that centralization could simply be a steady state; meaning that the various kinds of crises constantly affect countries and thus that centralization could have already been the established process before the crisis under study happened. All of these features can influence the organizational processes during a crisis and will be considered as potential alternative explanations to the centralization of power observed during the 2015 migrant crisis. Still, even though these dynamics of the scene (decentralized entities) can disrupt or influence the organizational process during a crisis, the centralization of power is still the most plausible outcome while dealing with large-scale crises.

Lastly, to answer the research puzzle, the argument will be based on the upscalling principle linked to subsidiarity, which establishes a valid and very clear scheme of the mechanisms underlying the centralization process. First, by its intensification of crisis feature, saying that the more intense a crisis gets (higher risks, uncertainties, spilling over national borders, high costs, etc.), the more likely is the centralization of power – which appears to be accurate for the 2015 migrant crisis. But also for its top-down approach (also called the vertical approach) of the centralization, meaning that it is more likely that Germany’s higher instances centralized the decision-making as the crisis intensified - rather than being the result of consensual decisions or pressures of all the entities constituting the lower instances. As shown in the previous section, these two features are extensively corroborated by a majority of the studies reviewed above and I believe that, based on preliminary observations, the most foreseeable explanations for the centralization of power during the 2015 migrant crisis is its escalation beyond expectations that forced higher
instances to take action and thus impose – in a top-down process – strategies to lower instances.

2.2 International Relations and EU studies

This part seeks to locate the research in the vast field of international relations (IR) and EU integration studies. As rapidly overviewed in the introduction, international relations and EU studies are still adapting to the changing security environment. Thus, many approaches struggle to seize the new role played by the EU as a crisis manager. Indeed, the neo-realist approach (Waltz, 1979; 1986) considers national governments as the only relevant actors when it comes to security and defense within the EU. It is focusing mainly on the balance of power and thus falls short in explaining the formation of interests at the national, trans-national and international level. On the other side, the neo-functionalist approach (Haas, 1976) sees the EU’s security and defense policies as the result of a spillover\(^1\) effect surfacing from economic integration and does not offer any insight of the process leading to the current EU’s security and defense policy. These two approaches are thus useful to retrace the historical features of crisis management within the European context, but cannot further explain the development of EU crisis management capacity.

In the area of EU integration studies, the institutionalization approach offers a good framework to study the process “by which a norm, a law, a practice of an organizational structure takes on institutional characteristics” (Pirozzi, 2015: 11). It is a very useful approach to understand how a policy is gradually integrated within the European structure

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\(^1\) Once the first supranational structure is implemented, the integration process is perceived by Haas as an irreversible and incremental phenomenon; the transnational coordination will then initiate growing demand for every related field. This is what has been identified as the spillover effect mainly developed by Tranholm-Mikkelsen in 1991 (13). It is first applied with the field of economy, but then he elaborates a theory implementing the functional, the political and the institutional spillover. **Functional spillover** refers to instances when a societal sector fights for extended allowed privileges granted to a similar sector. **Political spillover** is the process by which, with the growing transnational interactions, actors redefine their identity by leaving aside their national identity to adopt the supranational one. **Institutional spillover** is the tendency of the elites from existing supranational organizations to campaign for a strengthening of the institution building. (Schimmelfenning and Rittberger, 2006)
but leaves out the dynamics of bargaining between levels as well as their interests or preferences and their interactions with the environment; it principally focuses on policy implementation and the importance of feedback and political support.

In the same field, intergovernmental institutionalism (Moravcsik, 1992), building on the neo-realist, assumes that Member States’ domestic politics drive their behaviour within the European institution, and thus that crisis management should only be a national competence. Borrowing features from the Rational choice theory (Herrnstein, 1990), Member States are the main actors at the EU level and they come with fixed and pre-determined preferences. According to this theory, the bargaining at the EU level is the result of an analysis of costs and benefits; usually leading to an agreement based on the lowest common denominator. This approach fills the gap that the neo-realist approach was lacking by offering an explanation on preferences, but fails to explain the influence of the regional and international politics.

On the other hand, the constructivist approach offers a rather different perception of integration: main players are seen as rule-followers rather than utility-maximizers and they are guided by the logic of appropriateness.\(^2\) It considers socialization and institutionalization as determinants of a policy outcome at the EU level; preferences are not pre-identified but rather the result of “interaction and progressive institutionalism”. (Pirozzi, 2015: 11) These two approaches offer interesting and complementary features that are useful to the understanding of the recent developments in the field of EU crisis management and will be useful to seize how the centralization of power happened.

Hence, building on the assumptions of both the intergovernmental institutionalism

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\(^2\) “The logic of appropriateness is a perspective on how human action is to be interpreted. Action, policy making included, is seen as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized into institutions. […] Actors seek to fulfill the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices, and expectations of its institutions.” (March and Olsen, 2011: 478)
and constructivism, but also taking into account the changing security environment in which the EU is evolving, this study tries to evaluate the EU crisis management process during the 2015 migrant crisis by focusing on the interactions between the national, intergovernmental and supranational levels.

2.3 Crisis, crisis management and additional precisions

Before digging deeper into the other fields that this research tackles, it is also important to define some useful concepts that will be frequently used.

Therefore, the term crisis has become somewhat normalized nowadays. It is used in various contexts and usually refers to an undesirable or unexpected situation (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius, 2005: 2). The word has borne many definitions depending on the fields in which scholars approaching it specialized. In the context of this research and to ensure coherence with the literature reviewed below, the term crisis is defined as:

“a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions.” (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius, 2005: 2)

This definition is still broad but offers three key and discernable features attributable to a crisis: a perception of time pressure, high uncertainty and severe threat. In the same way, the concept of crisis management may seem self-explanatory but still requires precision. Crisis management is “the process by which an organization deals with the handling, containment and resolution of a threat” (Pirozzi, 2015: 2). The word organization refers to entities such as governments or institutions, but also includes enterprises and teams.

Finally, the top-down approach was one of the first approaches studied in the
implementation literature. Policy implementation literature usually focused on the matter of efficiency and was divided along two main approaches: the top-down (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979) and the bottom-up (Hjern and Hull, 1982). The essential feature of the top-down approach or process is that “it starts with a policy decision by governmental (often central government) officials” (Sabatier, 1986: 22) without necessarily considering the lower levels of governments, while the bottom-up approach focuses on identifying the network of actors involved in a specific area at all levels of an organization and “provides a mechanism for moving from street level bureaucrats (the bottom) up to the ‘top’ policy-makers in both the public and private sectors (Hjern et al., 1978)”. The top-down approach has been largely criticized for the fact that they “start from the perspective of (central) decision-makers and thus tend to neglect other actors” (Sabatier, 1986: 30). This being said, it must still be understood that the fact that higher instances (central government) implement a policy, or makes a decision unilaterally, does not mean that it necessarily runs counter to the preferences or needs of the lower instances (lower levels of government).

This conceptual framework provides clarity to this investigation by allowing me to analyze discernable features of the centralization of power during the 2015 migrant crisis, which is the main objective of this research paper. The next section offers a discussion on the sub-fields that need to be outlined in order to truly seize the dynamics underlying to the organizational processes but also to the crisis.
3. Discussion on crisis dynamics within the EU

As shown in the previous section, crisis management is a very broad, complex and sometimes controversial field. However, the use of study cases helps concretize and better understand these sometimes abstract concepts. Hence, both study cases, Germany and the European Union, have their own pre-established approaches to crisis management and tools that help them guide their actions when facing crises. This discussion seeks to clearly portray the underlying dynamics of the 2015 migrant crisis focusing on specific areas: the policy-making process at both levels; the crisis management mechanisms and instruments that they have developed; their approach to the subsidiarity principle; and will conclude on an overview of the singularity of the crisis under study. This section is purposefully located between the literature review and the methodological discussion sections since it marries an overview of the existing research effort and also serves as the case justification.

3.1 Features of EU crisis management

3.1.1. Policy-making

The case of the EU is exceptionally difficult to study, since the institution has a multi-layered and multi-dimensional nature (Pirozzi, 2015: 7). Since crisis management is already no easy task, the coordination required within an institution like the EU does not make it easier; this is reflected by the fracture found in the EU foreign policy-making literature. Indeed, while some argue that there is more information sharing, common values and a strategic culture focused on consensus, others show that the European power is highly divided and sometimes irreconcilable on certain issues (Tonra, 2003; Bucher, 2013; Peet, 2012; Meyer, 2006; Bicchi, 2012). There are even some scholars who positioned themselves right in the middle asserting that it is more of an “all or nothing”: the member states will either act homogeneously or act according to their own interests (Tonra, 2005; Smith, 2004). Additionally, it was observed that the countries that were most affected by a crisis were more inclined to opt for national solutions (Serrichio, Tsakatika and Quaglia,
2013). Likewise, it seems that instinctively, and because crisis management has always been recognised as an essential State function, States will tend to act unilaterally as an initial reaction, consequently becoming a major constraints to the EU’s crisis management capacity enforcement. However, it must also be noted that within the European framework, it has been observed that policy convergence increases with time (Beauregard, 2015).

This overview suggests that coordination between Member States – even though possible – is not a natural instinct and becomes even more challenging in times of crises. In the light of these observations, evidence should suggest that coordination was a complicated task and that Member States, especially those who were most affected, acted unilaterally instead of offering a solidary response to the crisis. Also, it could suggest that the coordination gradually took place with the progression of the crisis.

3.1.2. Crisis management

The main area of interest is the EU’s approach to crisis management. This section will not cover the entirety of the legal and institutional aspects of the EU’s crisis management system, since the goal of this research paper has not a prescriptive aim and does not evaluate the efficiency of those mechanisms but rather applies an existing organizational pattern and applies it to a precise context. It will still offer a brief overview of its rights, capacity and tools.

Before the entry in force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, crisis management was attached to the second pillar of the EU called Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)\textsuperscript{3}, which was one of the most sensitive areas of the institution because security has always been a fundamental competence of the sovereign State. It now falls into the

\textsuperscript{3} The European Union legally comprised three pillars: 1. The European Communities; 2. The Common Foreign and Security Policy; and 3. The Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM). The pillars concept has been abolished since the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty. (Pirozzi, 2015)
category of shared competences between the EU and its Member States. The concept of crisis management in the EU is still a very “fluid concept that has been characterised by scattered patterns of development and partial strategic elaboration” (Pirozzi, 2015: 7). With the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU’s crisis management model has been improved. The EU has thus substantial and growing capacity as a crisis manager despite the Member States’ reluctance to transfer more power to Brussels and, interestingly enough, even though the Treaty (2009) clearly stipulates that “national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State (Art. 4)” (Boin, Ekegren and Rhinard, 2013; Rosenthal, 1980; Schmitt, 1985). Indeed, studies on institutional development show that the EU now offers a growing number of common tools to face crises (Boin, Ekegren and Rhinard, 2013), and even when national governments are resisting, the EU has some mechanisms at its disposal for bringing about policy innovation (Falkner, 2012: 292).

Still, the division of competences between both levels (supranational and national) remains unclear as highlight Boin Ekegren and Sundelius (2016: 6). In their book *The European Union as a Crisis Manager* (2016), they clarify the EU’s ability to act as a crisis manager in three types of crises: the national, the external and the transboundary crises. For the national crisis, Member States can call on the EU to coordinate assistance from other states; the Solidarity Clause in the Lisbon Treaty enjoins member states to assist an overwhelmed member state (7). However, the EU cannot take over or step in as a crisis manager since it has no legal or political authority to do so. Member States also have a lot of freedom on the type of assistance they want to invoke, and the EU can, at best, support the national governments affected by the national crises. Still, the EU can handle the external crisis (also referred to as an international conflict, a large-scale disaster, or a failed state outside EU territory) by providing help, support or resources. The challenge resides in the fact that the EU and its Member States both need to act outside of their domain of sovereignty and thus need not only to create legitimacy but also to coordinate their response. Finally, the transboundary crisis is very complex since it implies an ambiguity on who owns the crisis; it cannot be handled unilaterally since it requires a collective response, but could also require the EU to provide critical assistance.
This part reaffirms the pattern identified in the previous section: Member States tend to act on their own while the EU can offer direct support to its Member States only if they request its assistance. The only exception is for the external crisis, but both the EU and Member States face some constraints in that arena. To this end, evidence should suggest the EU struggles to put its proposals and plans into action, but will most likely take action in the “external” arena (international level) since it is entitled to act within that sphere.

### 3.1.3. Subsidiarity principle

For the EU, the legally enforceable subsidiarity principle is relatively new and has been introduced in the Maastricht treaty of 1992 and, since then, has taken an increasingly prominent place. Subsidiarity at the EU level was welcomed as a response to the steady growth of powers at the center (Brussels) and to the criticism of the democratic gap of the institution; bringing the EU’s governance closer to the EU citizens was the ultimate goal of that principle. However, subsidiarity can mean two things: first, that the government gets closer to the citizens; but, second, that, if needed, the central government (or in this case, the EU) can centralize the power for what could be referred to as the common good. Obviously some criteria were created to avoid an abuse of the centralization, but Member States remain highly reluctant to the use of this principle by European institutions. In the Article 5 (3) of the Treaty on the European Union, it is explained as follows:

“[…] in the area of its non-exclusive competences, the EU may act only if – and in so far as – the objective of a proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the EU countries, but could better be achieved at the EU level” (Jachtenfuchs and Krisch, 2016).

When it comes to the crisis under study almost all the topics (such as migration and asylum, security, crisis management) fall under the category of shared competences. This
means that the EU has technically the right to make use of the subsidiarity principle.

Thus, if the hypotheses of the centralization and of a top-down approach hold true, evidence should suggest that, even if Member States are divided on the issue and that some dispositions of European Treaties forbids it to act unilaterally on a Member States’ territory if it has not been requested by that Member State, the EU will find a method to centralize power within its own institutions and ultimately act as the leading actor to face the crisis.

3.2 Features of German crisis management

3.2.1 Germany and the EU

Germany is a founding member of the European Union and has always strongly supported European institutions; it was often noted that Germany would ask for European solutions to national issues (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 2000). It has been a predominant actor in the shaping of EU institutions, which results in an outstandingly good fit between German interests, institutions and identity with the character of the EU. Likewise, the country has also always tended to shape the policy profile of the EU in a way that suits its ends. This explains why German policy-makers are largely at ease when it comes to conducting day-to-day policy in that institutional environment (Bulmer, Jeffery and Patterson, 2000: 9). Still, Germany’s power in the EU should not be considered as the pursuit of realist power; rather, it is a combination of “an influential vision, a valuable institutional model applicable to the EU, a solid domestic political consensus and some very significant bilateral relationships” (Bulmer, Jeffery and Patterson, 2000: 124). Germany remains the predominant actor in the economic sphere as well as the biggest contributor to EU budget (Pond, 1996: 30).
If the German interests are truly aligned with that of the EU, data should show Germany’s continual support to EU initiatives as the crisis unfolds and empirical evidence should demonstrate it as well.

### 3.2.2 Policy-making and crisis management

Interestingly enough, when it comes to policy-making, the consensus within the internal political structure of the country is very strong; the decentralized policy-making approach is thus not a disabling feature for the German leaders, even during crises. This suggests that the CCCA should show no instances where Germany was unable to bring about a policy because of national pressures.

Moreover, Germany is a federal republic consisting of sixteen *Bundesländer* (federal states). For the case of Germany, it should be mentioned that the federal government has embarked on an extensive reform of its federalism to give far-reaching powers to the *Länder* (Jachtenfuchs and Krisch, 2016; Scharpf, 2009). Indeed, power is divided along two main axes: the vertical referring to the power of ministries to handle their own policies, and the horizontal that refers to the federal-level institutions giving a lot of power to the *Länder* (Bulmer, Jeffery and Patterson, 2000: 22). This indicates that the German federal system is based on a very decentralized approach, thus suggesting that the centralization of power is not common practice.

Still, this reform has had a direct impact on the crisis management system, giving an extensive range of competences to the *Länder* in times of crisis. Indeed, when it comes to crisis management, according to the Official document on Crisis Management published in 2014 by the German Ministry of Interior (*Bundesministerium des Innens*), the federal level serves more as a coordinating and supporting tool to the federal states than as a leader. Germany’s states (*Länder*) are responsible for disaster management (prevention and response) to deal with crisis situations that are caused inter alia by natural disasters, climate change, large-scale emergencies, pandemics/ epidemics and threats posed by international terrorism. On the other hand, the Federation is responsible for defence, including protecting
the civilian population against war-related hazards. It is thus the Länder that are the leading actors when it comes to crisis management in Germany, especially when it comes to the crisis under study, showing the tendency towards decentralization. The federal government will provide the required resources, channel and coordinate information and assist the federal states when needed. Furthermore, the ministry with primary responsibility for the subject concerned oversees the crisis management effort at the federal level. In the case of the migrant crisis of 2015, the ministries involved were numerous, not only because of the singularity of the crisis, but also because of the extent the crisis took. Still the three main ministers involved were: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt), the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Migration and Refugees (Bundesministerium für Migration und Flüchtlinge). The overall crisis management system shows a lot of flexibility in the way crises are handled; “it is to be optimized further - independently of a specific threat scenario - in order to concentrate complex skills on strategic objectives and ensure a capacity for a flexible response”.

These pre-existing mechanisms offer a broad spectrum of competence to the lower government levels (lower instances), however it is the Federal government that has the responsibility of coordination and assistance. Based on these pre-existing mechanisms, evidence should show that lower instances enjoy a large extent of autonomy in the crisis management effort.

**3.2.4 Subsidiarity**

In opposition to the EU, the German constitution (Grundgesetz) does not even have any reference to subsidiarity as an organizing principle for its domestic federalism (but refers to it with respect to German participation in the EU). It does however contain what Jachtenfuchs and Krisch (2016) refer to as equivalent provisions when it comes to the federal legislation in areas of concurrent powers; the article 72 al. 2 mentions that the federal government can legislate for “the establishment of equivalent living conditions” or
“the maintenance of legal and economic unity”\textsuperscript{4}. Germany also considers subsidiarity to be a political process rather than a constitutional one, the use of this process being kept as a last resort efficiency necessity. In other words, if the current government was elected with a majority, it is entitled to decide if the use of the subsidiarity principle is legitimate or not. Consequently, it is expected that there will be no mention of the subsidiarity principle on Germany’s part.

3.3 The crisis

When it comes to European integration, some areas are highly integrated while others are still a work in progress. Referring to the EU foreign policy-making literature overviewed previously, there are some issues on which the European power is irreconcilable and the matter of migration is one of them. This section outlines the dynamics underlying the field of migration in the EU context and how this could have an influence on how the crisis was handled.

3.3.1 The challenges

The complexity of the migrant crisis lies within the fact that it blurred the line between domestic and foreign policy. Indeed, it took such an extent that it ended up being a national, transnational as well as international crisis. The existing mechanisms – mainly the Dublin Regulation – that the EU had put into place to deal with refugees’ inflow were quickly found obsolete. The Dublin regulation\textsuperscript{5} is a law that determines the EU Member State responsible for the examination of an application for asylum seekers seeking

\textsuperscript{4} “Grundgesetz, Art 72 (2) Auf den Gebieten des Artikels 74 Abs. 1 Nr. 4, 7, 11, 13, 15, 19a, 20, 22, 25 und 26 hat der Bund das Gesetzgebungsrecht, wenn und soweit die Herstellung gleichwertiger Lebensverhältnisse im Bundesgebiet oder die Wahrung der Rechts- oder Wirtschaftseinheit im gesamtstaatlichen Interesse eine bundesgesetzliche Regelung erforderlich macht.” (Bundesministeriums der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, 2015)

\textsuperscript{5} “One of the principal aims of the Dublin Regulation is to prevent an applicant from submitting applications in multiple Member States. Another aim is to reduce the number of "orbiting" asylum seekers, who are shuttled from member state to member state. The country in which the asylum seeker first applies for asylum is responsible for either accepting or rejecting the claim, and the seeker may not restart the process in another jurisdiction.” (European Commission, 2017)
international protection (according to the Geneva Convention). The inadequacy of this law caused it to be suspended during the crisis, principally by Germany witnessing the fact that many States were overburdened and thus made use of the sovereignty clause to handle more asylum applications.

Another big issue that the EU was confronted with because of the migrant crisis was the Schengen area; the abolition of borders within the Union complicated the management of refugees’ influxes. This is how the problem grew exponentially: the inflows were so massive that many asylum seekers were falling through the cracks and were not registered as they entered the Union. The Schengen area is one of the greatest accomplishments of the EU, however, once an asylum seeker entered the Union, he/she had access to all other Member States. This means concretely that instead of limiting the issue to a few Member States (principally border States), the entire Union was rapidly affected. The Border States undeniably required assistance from the rest of the Union, but instead of coordinating one another to offer a solidary response, they acted according to their preferences and thus missed the chance of achieving an organized and controlled relocation of refugees.

Pollack (2005) highlights that “both member states and supranational institutions matter in the EU policy-making, but their respective roles and influence remain highly variable across different modes of EU policy-making”. When it comes to the issue of migration and asylum, the EU and the national level share competences. Migration policies are formulated by the EU, the institution has the competence to lay down the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals. The Member states, however, still retain the right to determine admission rates for people coming from third countries to seek work. Still, common asylum arrangements are not yet harmonized between member states. The absence of a defined policy for this new issue demanded for an immediate response that was found to be highly uncoordinated.

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6 “The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, also known as the 1951 Refugee Convention, is a United Nations multilateral treaty that defines who is a refugee, and sets out the rights of individuals who are granted asylum and the responsibilities of nations that grant asylum.” (UNHCR, 2010)
7 “Article 3(2) of the Regulation, the sovereignty clause, provides that a State “may” take responsibility for an asylum application even if it would not otherwise be responsible.” (European Parliament, 2016)
The empirical evidence may show that there was a growing concern when it came to the inefficiency or pre-existing mechanisms. Their failures could possibly be linked to the centralization of power.

3.3.2 The subject matter

On another note, the sensitivity of the subject matter surrounding the crisis must have influenced the way it was handled; an area that is highly integrated will most likely facilitate coordination between member states, while an area that is a new or problematic will usually formalize national practices thus complicating coordination (Guiraudon, 2001; Favell, 2011). Indeed, the theme of migration (including immigration and asylum policies) has always been a sensitive issue for European Member States. In order to deal with the nationalist and sometimes xenophobic tendencies of their populations, Member States’ officials have traditionally retained its management within a small group of national decision-makers. Even today, these networks, that were basically transnational reproductions of the existing national systems, have hardly allowed new actors to intervene within the sphere.

European cooperation in this problematic field has developed initially as a set of _ad hoc_ networks between the Member States’ Ministries of Interior concentrating uniquely on domestic prerogatives. "Progressive" immigration and integration policies, such as laws against discrimination, multiculturalism or policing policies sensitive to ethnic diversity, have almost always been elaborated with certain “paternalism” by the Elites, anticipating a public opinion that they once again considered to be xenophobic (Favell, 2011). Hence, Europe is left with legislation that aims at harmonizing _a minima_ the practices of each Member States, rather than building its own coherent set of policies. It is another common example of decisions made by consensus on the basis of the lowest common denominator, which is clearly not enough when facing crises of the extent of the 2015 migrant crisis.
This dimension has high relevance and probably played a significant role in how the crisis was handled. However, chances are that the CCCA will not reveal any direct statement referring to xenophobic tendencies or even to the sensitivity of the topic of immigration.
4. Methodological Discussion

Hence, this research seeks to test the accuracy of the centralization-of-power thesis in a new context; not only with a new crisis taking place in a changing world order, but also in a unique framework which is that of the EU. It also seeks to see if the intensification of a crisis could trigger the centralization of power, but also how these organizational processes took place.

The method chosen to answer the research puzzle could be considered as a mixed-method, even though it is mostly qualitative. First, quantitative data will be retrieved to graphically illustrate the intensification of the crisis at both the European and German level. This part will allow observing if the centralization of power could be related to the aggravation of the crisis as the subsidiarity principle introduced by Boin et al. (2005) suggested.

Second, a chronological comparative content analysis (CCCA) will be realized to identify the chronological evolution of the discourses during the crisis. This part is the main section of the analysis, which will confirm or infirm the occurrence of a centralization of power. It will also provide evidence of the mechanisms underlying the organizational processes and offer concrete examples of the fundamental motivations behind these processes.

Both methods are complementary to answer the research puzzle: the CCCA supports the accuracy or inaccuracy of the centralization-of-power thesis and offers an overview of how it occurred while the quantitative data supporting the aggravation of the crisis serves as a comparative standpoint to draw further conclusions.

4.1 Quantitative representation of the crisis’ intensification

As briefly stated previously, this part of the method relies on quantitative data and will provide a visual account of the intensification of the crisis. Indeed, since the main
trigger of the centralization-of-power thesis is presumed to be the intensification of the crisis – aggravation of the perceptions of severe threat, high uncertainty and time pressure – it is essential to offer a visual support of the most critical moments of the crisis during the year 2015. The timeframe for the analysis of the discourses has been established from April to December 2015. During that period, there was an obvious intensification of the crisis: starting with the triggering event of the tragic 800 deaths in the Mediterranean Sea in April raising the awareness of the European states to the severity of the crisis, showing a rapid growth during the summer, reaching critical points at the end of the summer of 2015 and then marginally decreasing at the end of the year. Also, for the purposes of this study, the concept of “intensification” is directly associated with the growing numbers of migrants arriving in Europe and Germany.

First, the data was retrieved from the Eurostat website for both the European Union and Germany. The data retrieved is the monthly data of the Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, since the numbers found in this graph are the most reliable. Many databases offered monthly records of the overall migration flows in Europe and Germany in 2015, but all the numbers were estimations, since it was barely impossible to keep track of all the movements within the EU. Hence, for a matter of reliability the data showing the number of asylum applications in 2015 were chosen; though these numbers are not as striking as the ones revealing the overall migration of that year, they attest of a corresponding intensification of the influx of refugees within the same timeframe. Second, instead of presenting the cumulative numbers for the overall migration during those months, the graph illustrates only the difference of entries from month to month (e.g. if 10,000 migrants arrived in April and 20,000 migrants arrived in May, the numbers will not be cumulated, so April will have 10,000 entries and May 20,000 rather than 30,000). For the European Union, a noticeable intensification can be traced around June 2015 and grows rapidly reaching critical points in September and October, decreasing slightly in December. For Germany, the radical rise in entries is observed around July 2015 reaching its most critical point in November 2015 and decreasing marginally in December. It is thus expected that the centralization of power will be observed around those peaks of the crisis or in the months following as a repercussion.
The main limit to this method was briefly mentioned but it is that the migration flows were incredibly acute during this period and made it hard to keep track of an exact number of migrants crossing both European and German borders. However, by choosing the data linked to asylum applications, the margin of error is significantly reduced and it does not undermine the validity of the data retrieved (see Table Y).

4.2 Chronological comparative content analysis

As previously stated, I will also provide a chronological content analysis (CCCA) for the discourses pronounced by the European Commission (EC) and the German Federal government regarding the 2015 migrant crisis. Analyzing official statements is particularly pertinent because they stem from prior negotiations and represent a consensual formula of a position adopted by the EC as well as the German Federal Government (GFG).

This section begins with a brief justification of the case selection. First, these two instances were chosen because: first, they had never been studied in the light of this thesis, and second, they were the two main European actors during the migrant crisis. On one hand, the European Commission is the core actor at the supranational level (i.e. European Union) that persistently offered propositions, means of coordination as well as support to the Member States during then crisis. On the other hand, Germany has been a leading actor of the 2015 migrant crisis, it was also one of the most affected State, and the country has always played a central role in the construction of a more integrated Europe along with its singularity being a shaper rather than a taker in EU’s foreign policy (Alecu de Flers and Müller, 2012: 23). Equally important, focusing on both the supranational and national level is particularly interesting for the thesis as it allows evaluating the centralization thesis in a new organization of States. The choice of the migrant crisis was also simple: it is a crisis that is still a hot topic; it also took an unprecedented extent and involved a rather sensitive area of European integration.
Nevertheless, building on the literature, a crisis is a process characterized by three main features: it gives rise to perceptions of severe threat, high uncertainty, and time pressure (Rosenthal, ‘t Hart & Charles, 1989: 9). These features result in a substantial number of declarations by officials usually in a very short timeframe. Furthermore, the responses formulated under these intense and often-unpredictable contexts are a good way to observe which organizational techniques prevail at different stages of the crisis. The officials state clearly which individual, group, ministry or instance will undertake a specific action to face the crisis to reduce uncertainty. The crisis under study is thus a good case to evaluate the centralization-of-power thesis since it grew to such an extent that it became national, trans-national as well as international. First, the migrant crisis was characterized as the biggest challenge ever faced by the European Union as well as for Germany, thus confirming the feature of a perceived severe threat. Second, the pace and the extent at which the crisis unfolded highly challenged the obsolete pre-existing European mechanisms in the field of migration, as well as Germany’s own national mechanisms to cope with an unforeseen number of migrants, thus confirming the feature of high uncertainty. Third, the time pressure feature was introduced with the growing number of deaths of refugees seeking asylum on their way to Europe, thus requiring an immediate action to avoid more disastrous events.

The CCCA method offers a new and efficient way to rebuild the chronological sequence of official declarations and enables a precise qualitative comparison. This method is conducted in five main steps described below along with how the steps were conducted for this study.

1. The first step consists in the selection of official statements according to specific criteria that stipulate the topic, the timeframe and the type of document. These statements are then retrieved from official archives. For the current study, 94 official declarations were retrieved from the official websites of the European Commission and Germany’s Federal Government’s website. The files consist of official statements or speeches given by high-ranked officials of both instances among which: Germany’s Chancellor, President, Minister of internal affairs,
Minister of foreign affairs, the European Commission’s President and various Head Commissioners. The analysis seeks to focus on the intensification of the crisis and thus the timeframe in which these statements were made goes from April 2015 to December 2015.

2. Second, the retrieved files are then imported into a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software, in this case, the QDA Miner software. Variables are then associated with the imported documents to facilitate finding relevant information. The variables that were associated with the documents imported in the software were the date, the institutional source of the document (e.g., European or German) and author of the declaration analyzed.

3. Third, a codebook is put together. The codebook is divided in two main parts: first, a clear set of rules to regulate the coding process; second, a variety of codes related to the subject is selected and put together. The goal of the codebook is to facilitate the identification of the organizational adjustments during the crisis. For this study, I created the codebook based on both the relevant literature on the matter under study as well as discussions with colleagues that have previously put together a similar codebook. The codebook consists of 23 codes and will be detailed below.

4. The fourth step is the process whereby the discourses are coded and the codebook is inductively refined. The coding process is the action by which the coder associates the codes previously established to segments of text found in the discourses. During the coding process, the coder can face issues that were not previously identified in the codebook. A new code can then be created or an existing one can have its definition adjusted to include the specificity. The author completes the coding process. A second coder also coded some segments to compare the results and thus minimize subjectivity.

5. The last step is to extract the positions from the coding, by looking at the instances
when high-ranked officials have touched upon or directly mentioned the organizational procedure adopted at different moments of the crisis. The software, QDA Miner, allows the researcher to easily retrieve the pertinent segments of text along with the dates of every change to establish a clear chronology. Tables will be used to present the results obtained when the coding process will be completed. The result section will present the changes in the organizational structure that were discovered in the analysis and will also illustrate the validity of their justifications.

This method is useful to provide answers for the research puzzle, but has its limitations. The main one is that, discourses are the result of a common agreement and thus do not reveal some negotiations or agreements could have been made behind the curtains. Still, CCCA is a “transparent method as long as the coded documents, the coding rules and results retrieved from it are explicit and can be contested” (Beauregard, 2015: 16).

4.3 The codebook

This section gives a more detailed overview of the codebook (see A1). As mentioned in the previous section, the codebook is based on the literature explored as well as discussions with a colleague who is familiar with this method (Philippe Beauregard – see Paquin and Beauregard, 2013; Paquin and Beauregard, 2015; and Paquin, Massie and Beauregard, 2017) or from recommendations made from fellow students and Professors of Université Laval’s Political Science Department (Francesco Cavatorta, Ece Ozlem Atikcan and Marc Bodet) while formally presenting the final draft of the research proposal. The first page of the codebook covers all the rules that were established for the coding process. The second page introduces the actual codebook, which has been separated according to themes. Each theme is associated to a number (e.g. 1) and each theme is subdivided into codes bearing a number associable to their categorization (e.g. 101, 102, 103…). The numbers are not relevant to the reader but greatly simplify the coding process in the QDA Miner software for the coder. Each theme is also associated to a definition and some concrete examples: this helps the coder delineate which segments should be covered by the code, but
also gives precisions on some expressions or formulations that may be misleading (see Appendix 1 for more details). Most categories’ main purpose is to identify the centralization-of-power thesis and its underlying mechanisms.

The first category is titled *irrelevant* since not all segments of the discourses retrieved for the analysis are pertinent. Segments such as the titles, salutations, precisions on who pronounced the discourses, and segments that are not related to the crisis under study all fall under this category.

The second section called *crisis’ indicators* covers the three features of a crisis identified by Rosenthal, ‘t Hart and Charles (1989: 9): perceptions of *time pressure*, *high uncertainty* and *severe threat*. The codes are used to identify if these three features of crises are consistently used throughout the discourses and to identify if their recurrence can be correlated to the centralization of power at both levels. These codes are expected to be some of the most recurring ones.

The third category is entitled *centralization’s indicators* and contains two codes: *centralization* and *delegation*. The code *centralization* refers to an upward shift in authority that is hypothesized to be unilateral and *top-down*. Concretely, it will be used to identify instances where the EU makes a decision unilaterally or acts by itself, most likely without the consent of member states or when Germany’s federal government imposes a path to its lower governmental instances (*Länder*, *Kommunen* or *Gemeinden*). The code *delegation* was created to identify segments that may reveal a *bottom-up* approach where lower instances deliberately chose to delegate their power to higher instances – for example, instances where the EU mentions that all member states agreed to give up their power so that the EU could act on their behalf, or Germany’s lower instances calling for the intervention or management of the Federal government. The code *delegation* could also be considered an alternative explanation since it goes against the hypothesis that the centralization of power is a top-down process. Still, these two codes will allow a better understanding of the processes underlying the centralization of power: when it happens, whether it is more of a *top-down* approach as argued, a *bottom-up* approach or even a mix
of both.

The fourth and fifth categorizations are analyzing the European and German levels. First, the *European level* is divided into four codes: *European response* refers to instances during which the EC calls for a more coordinated or united approach to establish its legitimacy as a crisis manager; *European action*, on the other hand, refers to the concrete actions taken by the EC to face the crisis (such as operations, meetings, quotas and plans); finally, the *European support to member states* and the *European support to non-EU countries* will allow to observe how common it is for the EC to assist states (both members and not) in times of crisis as well as the recurrence or intensification of this support. For the latter’s relevance, it can be said that the EU struggles to speak in unison to formulate a European foreign policy but somehow has been quite successful in putting together joint missions in faraway hot spots during crises, thus enhancing its crisis management capacity and asserting its leadership.

The *German (national) level* is also divided in four codes: first, the *German response* will help identify the instances when Germany takes action to face the crisis and will also help identify if it gradually gives place to a European response with the intensification of the crisis; the second and third codes, the *Higher national instances* (referring to the Federal Government’s entities and officials) and the *Lower national instances* (federated entities such as the Länder, Kommunen and Gemeinden’s organization and officials), could allow identification of a centralization of power by their presence, absence or recurrence within discourses; and finally, the *German support to the EU* will help identifying if the German interests aligned with that of the EU (Bulmer, 2001), if Germany worked under the tutoring of the EU or if the country established a clear distinction between the competence and focus areas. These codes will also help control the alternative explanation according to which the centralization of power was already in place before the 2015 migrant crisis and might have just been highlighted because of the magnitude it reached.

The sixth category is entitled *Relations* and covers the overall network of relations
that both levels may have initiated and secured during the crisis. The relations can also be linked to conceivable alternative explanations to the centralization of power at both the national and supranational levels. Indeed, the centralization of power might have happened because of the relations that Germany or the EU developed or intensified during the crisis, which required them to act as a united entity. This section will also draw a clear picture of the interconnectedness of today’s security environment. For this purpose, this category will identify the instances where Multilateralism, Partnerships, Unilateralism or an involvement of the United Nations happen.

In the same way, the seventh category offers five additional codes covering alternative justifications to the centralization of power as explored by Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern and Sundelius (2005) and overviewed in the literature review section. So rather than being an natural organizational process in reaction to aggravated perceptions of time pressure, high uncertainty and severe threat by higher hierarchical instances, the centralization of power could be attributed to intra-governmental pressures, popular pressures, the pressure or initiative of an EU member state or a non-EU country, and finally, the possible influence of the medias.

In short, the codebook covers not only features that will allow supporting the main argument of a centralization of power during the 2015 migrant crisis, but also allows looking for other features contrasting the argument or just to observe different dynamics or tendencies taking place during crises. More precisely, it controls alternative explanations and may help draw meaningful conclusions on organizational processes and crisis dynamics that were not necessarily previously foreseen.

Finally, during the coding process, notes were be taken on each discourse coded to keep track of singularities or any information that could be relevant to the analysis. This information will be gathered in Word documents, one for each level under study, and each discourse will be referred to by its saved title (date of the pronunciation of the discourse).
5. Analysis

This research seeks to elucidate the following statement: the widespread centralization-of-power thesis is valid and will be observed first at the national level (the German case) and then at the supranational level (the European case) during the 2015 migrant crisis. It is hypothesized that the centralization of power is the result of the intensification of the crisis but that it is also a top-down process, meaning that it is the result of a decision made at the higher instances of the hierarchy – Germany’s Federal Government for the case of Germany and the European Commission for the case of the EU – imposed on the lower instances of the hierarchy – German federated entities, Kommunen and/or civil society for the case of Germany and the Member States for the case of the EU; and that this process is triggered by the intensification of the crisis. More clearly, the hypotheses leading this research paper read as follows:

1. The centralization of power thesis is still accurate even in a national / supranational dynamic;
2. The centralization of power happens in the face of the intensification/aggravation of a crisis;
3. The centralization of power is a top-down process rather than a bottom-up process.

The first part of this analysis offers and overview of the context and graphically illustrates the aggravation of the crisis at both the European and German levels. It offers a visual support to identify when the crisis reached its peaks; this will allow drawing further conclusions when compared with the results obtained with the CCCA and thus answering the second hypothesis above mentioned. The second part of this analysis presents the results obtained with the CCCA; it is the heart of this research. It provides empirical data and concrete examples to support and confirm the three hypotheses listed above.

5.1 The migration influx

Migration is an ongoing reality. However, the migration crisis of 2015 took an unexpected turn and reached numbers that had not been seen in Europe since the Second
World War. According to the UNHCR, in 2015 only, the number of migrants worldwide was estimated to be around 60 million. The Syrian War was one of the main issues causing this disruption worldwide; one-quarter of 2015’s asylum applicants in Europe were Syrians (The Economist, 2016). Neighbouring countries such as Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon were gravely affected; they became some sort of buffer zone for the European Union by welcoming millions of migrants. Still, the EU had to face the truth: people were fleeing war; many were dying trying to reach the European continent; border Member States were gravely affected and struggling to assist refugees and control the influxes; the European dispositions of the Dublin Resolutions were obsolete; and the Schengen area complicated the management of refugees’ influxes. Europe was unprepared for this challenge and this led to an incoordination of policies and a lack of solidarity between Member States.

The official numbers concerning migration flows collated by Eurostat reveal that 4.7 million people immigrated to one of the EU-28 Member States during 2015; Germany reported the largest total number of immigrants with 1 543.8 thousand (Eurostat, 2017). These numbers are still approximate since it was impossible to keep track of all the movements from one State to another, especially with all the smuggling. Hence, the asylum and first time asylum applicants’ data was chosen to illustrate the evolution of the crisis with reliable data. Even though the numbers may not be as striking as those of the overall immigration, especially at the German level, they still clearly show the evolution of the crisis.

As shown in Figure A, the crisis worsened significantly around August and reached its highest peak in October/November of 2015 at both level. According to the second hypothesis found in the previous section, it is expected that the CCCA will reveal a centralization of power within the August until December timeframe for both levels. The following sections validate this argument.
5.2 The German response to the migrant crisis

As expected, the chronological and thematic analysis confirms the tendency towards a centralization of power at the German national level and the European level during the 2015 migrant crisis.

The evidence in Figure B shows that the German Federal government (GFG) started to centralize power as the crisis worsened. Referring to Figure A it can be observed that the influx of people entering Germany significantly increased in August, reaching its highest peaks around the months of October and that until December. It is precisely in this timeframe that the theme of centralization begins to be very recurrent and reaches its highest peaks, thus suggesting a plausible correlation between both phenomena. Even in the discourses, it can be noted that the aggravation of the circumstances led the Federal government to centralize power.

Indeed, the centralization of power gradually took place to assure the efficiency of the actions taken by all levels of government; hence, it was not an abrupt change but more of a gradual process by which the federal government was taking growing importance into
the lower instances’ affairs by providing more funds, changing constitutional dispositions to support them, and eventually becoming the formal center of operations to manage the crisis. It started very broadly with a statement made on August 25th 2015, when the German chancellor states: “And crisis management – as necessary as it is- is not sufficient. The Federal government must help the municipalities to cope with it [the crisis].” However, at that point, the GFG is still commending the enormous efforts made at the Ländere and Kommunen’s levels – higher instances and lower instances still share the burden of crisis management. It is in October that the changes are more apparent; indeed, in a concern of efficiency and considering the intensification of the influxes, the GFG comes up with a new legislative package and Thomas de Mazière, Federal Minister of Interior, states on October 1st that “the asylum procedures will no longer be borne by the Länder”. Taking additional responsibility on October 15th, de Mazière introduces all the features that the new law is incorporating, which is giving significant prominence to the Federal government: by making billions of dollars available for the GFG to support the Länder and Kommunen; as well as setting up interventions of the Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamts) on the Länder’s territory to evaluate and testify of the situation around reception facilities and also coordinate and assist local authorities. This thus shows that, the Federal government gradually and unilaterally takes over to fix faulty and obsolete policies at the national level, and that, to offer a coherent and coordinated response to the crisis within its borders as it worsened.

Finally, the centralization code reaches its peak in December; however, it is not linked to the centralization of power at the German level but rather it is the German chancellor testifying that the European level is taking action (centralizing power) to strengthen its agencies and take the lead as crisis manager. It supports the argument that centralization is a top-down approach since Merkel never mentions that the Member States came to a common agreement to give more power to the EU. She rather observes that the complexity and lengthiness of implementation of EU proposals because of the aggravation

8 „Und Krisenmanagement - so notwendig es ist - wird nicht ausreichend. Der Bund muss den Kommunen helfen, damit umzugehen,“ – Bulletin der Bundesregierung vom 25. August 2015 - Author’s translation
9 „Asylverfahren gehen dann nicht mehr zulasten der Länder“ – Bulletin der Bundesregierung vom 1. Oktober 2015- Author’s translation
of the context caused the EU to take action and strengthen its position. She witnesses the unilateral action of the EU to strengthen its position (through agencies such as FRONTEX or the Coast Guard) and carry out necessary action in the Member States concerned when necessary.

For the code *delegation*, it must be noted that in the analysis of GFG’s discourses, it was exclusively used to code segments indicating Germany’s will to have “more Europe” or “a stronger role for Europe”\(^\text{10}\). Both codes (delegation and centralization) are hardly linkable since the delegation code was associated with GFG’s relation to European institutions rather than an indication that Germany’s lower national instances’ will to delegate their power to higher instances. The use of the code *delegation* could also support the hypothesis that the centralization of power if a top-down process since there was no evidence found in the discourses that Germany’s lower instances wanted or intended to voluntarily delegate their powers. Also, most of the discourses were revealing GFG’s efforts to offer better assistance to lower instances, initiating meetings and insisting on the need for better sharing of information and coordination between all levels of governance.

Interestingly, and referring to the discussion held on the matter, the analysis reveals that Germany’s interests are indeed very aligned with that of the EU. Germany puts forward its diplomatic skills to secure agreements for the EU with key partners such as Turkey, but also mobilized workforce as well as substantial financial contributions to support EU’s initiatives. It was also one of the first Member States to call for a European response to the crisis and constantly reasserted its support to the European Union – as stated in the chancellor’s discourse of April 29\(^{\text{th}}\) 2015: “We are stronger as the European Union, as compared to when every country is left to act on its own”\(^\text{11}\). This is also corroborated by the fact that the coding frequency of the need for a coordinate and solidary *European response* was one of the most recurrent (see Appendix 2). It should also be highlighted that expressions such as “European community responsibility”\(^\text{12}\), “pan-
European commitment\(^{13}\) and “European duty\(^{14}\)” are repetitively employed in all the discourses analyzed. Still, the German support to the EU goes a long way; indeed, on October 15\(^{th}\), Merkel goes as far as stating that the Member States need to act in solidarity and find a European solution to the crisis because “everything else will fail\(^{15}\)”. Furthermore, on September 22\(^{nd}\), the President of the EC pronounces a discourse in Germany and commends the country for its continual support to European institutions and the continual efforts they are making in order to better handle the crisis.

The findings also indicate that the alternative explanations to the centralization of power listed in the last section of the codebook were hardly found in the discourses analyzed. The segments coded under popular pressures almost exclusively referred to the sustained efforts made by the population that were simply asking for more resources to be more efficient in their attempt to facilitate the migrants arrival and integration processes. The only other instance when it has been used was to highlight the disturbance that extremist groups such as PEGIDA were causing and how it had to stop. However, as shown in Appendix 2 their recurrences in the discourses are not substantial and thus could not justify the centralization of power.

In sum, according to these findings, the centralization of power in the German context during the 2015 migrant crisis seems to have happen, but subtly. It is supported by clues above-mentioned found through the discourses, but it is never explicitly affirmed.

5.3 The European response to the Migrant Crisis

As mentioned in the previous section, the chronological content analysis also confirms the centralization of power at the European level.

\(^{13}\) “gesamteuropäisches Engagement“ - Author’s translation

\(^{14}\) “europäische Aufgabe“ - Author’s translation

\(^{15}\) “[...] alles andere wird scheitern.“ Bulletin der Bundeskanzlerin vom 15. Oktober 2015 - Author’s translation
First, the European discourses do not ever refer to a delegation of power from the Member States. In fact, it would have been exceptionally surprising to find a declaration of the EU saying that all Member States agreed to let the EU act on their behalf, especially since each State was affected to different degrees and reacted in accordance to their specific needs. It is thus no big surprise that the code *European response*, which is the code associated with mentions of a need for a solidary and coordinate European response, was one of the most recurrent in all the discourses analyzed. Indeed, it was very common of the EC to call for more solidarity and also to point out the inefficiency of Member States’ coordination and implementation of European initiatives. There were even times when all Member States would commit to support a European proposal but the implementation would be complicated, lengthy and sometimes simply avoided – it was the case for the redistribution scheme proposed by the EU in September. Still, almost every discourse contained a segment similar to: “We have no choice but to find a European solution to the
crisis” (Juncker, 2015) or “This is a European challenge that requires a European response”. (Juncker, August 2015)

As for the code centralization, it appears rather drastically and in December only. The timeframe going from April to November 2015 does not contain any reference to the concept of centralization; this could be explained by the fact that the EU was unable to obtain a coordinate and solidary response from all Member States thus leading it to focus on areas in which it could concretely take action for the time being. The EC organized many summits, provided help, support and resources to third parties and continued to work with the Member States in need. This can be corroborated through the constant use of the codes support to EU Member States, support to non-EU Member States, multilateralism and partnership (see Table Z). The EC tirelessly came up with new proposals and plans to better manage the crisis, but continuously struggled to get the necessary support to concretize them because of the lack of coordination between its Member States.

Figure D. Coding frequency for the codes: European support to Member States
Figure E. Coding frequency for the code: European support to non-EU Member States

European support to non-EU countries

Figure F. Coding frequency for the code: Multilateralism

Multilateralism
Still, it is only in December that the code centralization appears; it can be noted that compared to the German level, it was not a gradual process but rather a more drastic decision. Another thing that must be highlighted is that, as predicted in the methodological discussion, the centralization happened in December, thus following the highest peaks of migration within EU borders. The form that the centralization takes also seems to be a direct response to the aggravation of the context. It also drastically contrasts the German approach by being the creation of a concrete agency, rather than simply being a gradual intrusion at different levels. Indeed, the EC introduces the European Border and Coast Guard based on the pre-existing mechanisms of the FRONTEX program that coordinates European Border Management. One would believe that there is nothing alarming about creating this type of agency since most countries have their own Border and Coast Guard. However, the centralization code appears for a very specific reason: this new agency is enabled to act within the territory of a Member State without its consent if there is a failure to act in accordance with European values or if the context degenerates and no action is
taken by the concerned Member State. As stated by Commissioner Avramopoulos on December 15\textsuperscript{th} 2015: “Yes the agency will be able, in cases of pressure at external borders, to intervene both at the specific request from the Member States, and also without”. The agency that is put into place has a large measure of autonomy and “will also be able to initiate return operations, instead of just coordinate them”. (Avramopoulos, 2015) This agency is mainly an answer to the elements lacking to the Schengen agreement but also seems to be the result of an accumulation of frustrations from the inaction of some Member States from the EC. In the discourse pronounced on December 16\textsuperscript{th}, Juncker says:

“We have done this for the banking system by transferring preventive and remedial mechanisms and instruments were transferred to the European Level – because a crisis showed that national authorities could not be left alone\textsuperscript{16}.”

Compared to the German context, there is here a clear statement of a need for a leader, a center of decision to coordinate the response to a crisis, and that this specific action is put into place, unilaterally, to better handle to issue. This passage not only implies that it is not the first time that the EC centralizes power while facing a crisis, but also confirms that it was a top-down process since the Member States (the national authorities) could not coordinate their actions.

Finally, the codes associated to the theme alternative explanations were completely absent from the EC’s official statements. It was expected that there would have been some indicators of pressures coming from some Member States’ especially those who were most affected by the crisis or from a neighbouring country such as Turkey, but no statement referred to any action of that nature. Still, a plausible explanation is that statements are pre-constructed and might leave out some dynamics to avoid altering the message or influencing the main goal it aims to achieve.

\textsuperscript{16} Emphasis put by the author.
5.4 Further observations on the coding

5.4.1 General observations

This section covers the additional observations that have been made during the coding process or with the recovery of all the data.

First, in the methodology discussion covering the codebook, it was mentioned that the theme crisis indicators – covering all three pre-established features of a crisis: time pressure, high uncertainty and perception of severe threat – should be one of the most recurrently coded. The retrieval of all the data reveals that these codes were consistently found in the statements, and indeed were part of the most recurrent (see Figure E). However, I also postulated that the recurrence of these codes might be correlated to that of the code centralization; in other words, it was expected that when the usage of these codes would reach their highest peaks, it would correspond with the peaks of the centralization code. To this end, the total of occurrences of all three codes was combined to offer a better overview of their usage in Figure E. When compared to Figures B and C, the fluctuations found in Figure E do not suggest any type of correlation between both phenomena. Indeed, Germany’s centralization code reached its peaks in October and December and Europe only had one drastic peak in December; the results found in Figure E do not show any drastic peaks at those specific moments. Even though the recurrence of these codes cannot be linked to the recurrence of the code centralization, it does not rebut the hypothesis that it is the intensification of the crisis that triggered the centralization of power. Indeed, the recurrence of these codes in some segments of the statements depends on the topic discussed, on the length of the discourses and on various factors that cannot allow one to establish a valid causality between both phenomena only through the coding process.
On a different note, it seems that one recurrent issue stems from the fact that discourses are pre-constructed and agreed forms of communication; they have been built and usually framed to address some specific topics or issues in a very specific context. There is a whole dimension of reality that is being left out for strategic reasons and this reality cannot be captured by the CCCA. It is the same with the way decisions are made. There were no mention of any type of delegation of power at either level studied, however, the CCCA does not allow the researcher to know if there were some “behind the curtains” negotiations or if there was any type of pressure or influence from a third country. The next paragraphs highlight some example of those limitations.

First of all, it is relevant to point out that Germany was remarkably consistent when it came to the content of its statements. On the other hand, the EU was also very consistent
throughout the year but contradicted itself in July. Indeed, it seems that the discourses of
the EC were written in order to please or to fit the audience to whom they would be
presented. To give a concrete example, on July 8th 2015, there was discourse pronounced
by President Juncker in front of the European Parliament. In this discourse, Juncker was
fiercely criticizing the lack of coordination of the Member States, saying that they needed
to act as a unit and that at the moment the efforts and actions taken were simply not
enough. Still, on July 9th 2015, the very next day, Commissioner Avramopoulos was in
Luxemburg and gave a speech in which he was commending all the efforts made by
Member States, saying that they were moving in the right direction. He points to the fact
that there is significant progress being made. Here, the contrast between both statements is
striking and they were pronounced with only one day of difference. Even though this
happened only once out of 94 official statements, it legitimately raises the question of the
reliability of some of these statements as the only source of data. Many things could justify
the contrast such as: the negotiations that took place on the second day and their outcomes
– since they were attending some summits and discussing possibilities and action plans
with the Member States; the expectations that both speaker had; or the objectives that both
of their main offices were hoping for. Still, every method has its shortcomings and this
observation does not alter the key findings.

5.4.2 The findings and the hypotheses

As mentioned in the introduction of this segment, this research seeks to answer
three main hypotheses, which read as follows:

1. The centralization of power thesis is still accurate even in a national / supranational
dynamic;
2. The centralization of power happens in the face of the intensification/aggravation of
a crisis;
3. The centralization of power is a top-down process rather than a bottom-up process.
According to the results obtained that were presented in the previous sections, all three hypotheses have been corroborated. Indeed, the first hypothesis was questioning the accuracy of the centralization-of-power thesis in a national and supranational dynamic. Evidence found in the CCCA suggests that there was indeed a centralization of power that took place at both levels. They did not happen at the same time – the German level’s centralization happened before the supranational level’s centralization – and they did not take place in the same way, but the centralization of power happened. For Germany, the centralization was more of an evolutionary process by which the higher instances gradually took growing importance within the lower levels’ spheres. At the EU level, it was more of a drastic and rather unexpected change at the end of the year. Consequently, it can be said that the centralization-of-power thesis is still accurate in this context and framework.

The second hypothesis stipulates that the centralization of power happens in the face of the intensification/aggravation of a crisis. Indeed, when comparing the graphics showing the centralization of power and the one showing the evolution of the crisis, the centralization of power has happened in the timeframe when the crisis reached its highest peaks. This suggests that the centralization of power happens in the face of the aggravation of a crisis. However, it is a hard causality link to prove considering that many other dynamics should to be considered. Still, this specific context suggests that this hypothesis is plausible.

Finally, the last hypothesis was about the mechanisms underlying the process. Data seems to support the process of a top-down approach: first, by the almost nonexistent indications of alternative explanations and of the code delegation that could be supporting a bottom-up approach in the discourses; and second, according to the clues previously mentioned found in the discourses indicating a unilateral action taken by the higher instances and imposed on lower instances.

In sum, all three hypotheses were confirmed through the mixed-method chosen. However, these observations only apply to the EU and the German cases.
5.4.3 The findings and the literature

This topic brought together a wide range of fields that were, for the most part, still very divided. This section aims at confirming or challenging some of the reviewed literature. Obviously, the sample constituting of only one Member State significantly limits the range of trends or conclusions that can be drawn for matters concerning the EU as a whole, but some patterns were still observed.

First, the policy-making within the EU was indeed a complicated task during the 2015 migrant crisis. As previously stated, the EC constantly asked for more coordination and more solidarity between Member States, and so did Germany. In the light of the investigation, it is not possible to attest that Member States initially acted unilaterally as a natural instinct since only one Member State was thoroughly analyzed. However, it can logically be deduced that the fact that many Member States did not put the necessary efforts to concretize a coordinate response from the EU inevitably required Member States to find alternative solutions to cope with the crisis. In other words, all Member States had to ultimately handle the crisis unilaterally since they could never coordinate to offer a common response.

Second, there were no mention of the subsidiarity principle at both the European and the German levels. This was expected principally at the German level since Germany’s constitution does not have any reference to a subsidiarity principle; even the two comparable provisions were not stated. The fact that it was not mentioned at the European level is also not surprising since it is not a very popular principle among Member States. The advantage for the European official is that the preparation of official statements allow them to avoid invoking such unpopular topics; the disadvantage for the researchers analyzing the official statements is that they cannot know if the principle was invoked or not. Consequently, the absence of the subsidiarity principle in the official statement does not confirm that it has not been utilized.
Third, at the German level, as expected, there was no opposition of the lower levels of government to the actions taken by the federal government. There was a great cooperation between all levels, and as GFG gradually took more of a leading role, there was no mention of an opposition. However, once again, it is hard to know if such dynamics would have been mentioned in official statements.

Finally, throughout the coding process of the discourses it was often noted that one observation from officials was recurrent: it was the biggest challenge that the EU ever had to deal with. It was the first time that the EU was faced with a crisis of this nature and of this extent since World War II. This being said, most mechanisms that were in place at both the German and European level were found to be obsolete and needed to be adjusted. It can thus be said that the nature of the crisis and the novelty of it, as well as the extent it took, may have had an influence on how it was handled. Still, there was no mention of the sensitivity of the subject matter.
6. Conclusion

It can be said that “crisis management has become a defining feature of contemporary governance” (Boin et al., 2005: 1). The complexity of the field has made its relevance obvious since so many questions remain unanswered. Not only are the dynamics numerous and complex but the very nature of crises are in constant evolution in a rapidly changing system that is under continuous stress. Every entity copes with crises in different ways making it hard to theorize or exactly predict organizational processes during these challenging periods. However, it is important to reaffirm the validity of some patterns, such as the centralization-of-power thesis, that helps contribute to both fields of crisis management and international security. Furthermore, most of the work on the matter has been cross-national case study research, but the multilevel governance study remains relatively unexplored because of all the challenges that the EU encompasses. The uniqueness of this institution has always been a challenging topic but is a particularly interesting one since the European integration processes necessarily affects how crises are handled, both at the European level as well as the national level.

In the concluding remarks, it must also be highlighted that the main goal of this research paper has been achieved: the three hypotheses were confirmed at both levels. First, the centralization of power was observed at the German level and later on at the European level, thus confirming that it is still a valid thesis even though the security environment has drastically changed. Second, according to the data retrieved, it was observed that the centralization of power seemed to be triggered by the intensification (or aggravation) of a crisis; thus confirming the second hypothesis. Third, it was noted that both levels adopted the top-down approach. The German level did it rather gradually by starting with some assistance and then increasingly imposing a line of conduct to the lower levels of government, while the EU drastically took over by creating a new agency entitled to act on Member States’ territories even without their consent. Interestingly enough, it was noted at the European level that the centralization of power seemed to be common practice; the same process happened when dealing with the Euro crisis.
Many other observations were drawn from the CCCA, but the focus here will be on the outstanding ones. First, the fact that the alternative explanations were barely mentioned was not expected. The centralization of power is often associated of a bypassing of the lower instances by the higher instances. In the same way, Trumbore and Boyer (2000) observed that during major crisis the domestic constraints might be muted for the sole purpose of limiting the amount of information reaching the “center” in charge of making decisions, some dynamics are omitted. These kinds of observations are often highlighted in the literature focusing on foreign-policy formulation. Another plausible justification is that the CCCA did not allow the observation of those dynamics since some of these alternative explanations could have taken place in complete secrecy.

Another particularly interesting observation is the alignment of Germany on EU’s interests. The dominant position of Germany within the EU could be used as leverage to obtain favours, but instead, Germany persistently calls for “more Europe” during the migrant crisis. This distinctive attitude was also illustrated through the use of the code delegation indicating Germany’s will to simply delegate more power to the EU. This reveals the uniqueness of the German case within the EU.

On a final note, some codes that were created for very specific purposes were found to be ineffective. No conclusions could be established from their presence or absence and thus could have been coded under the category irrelevant.

On another note, it must be said that the CCCA is a useful and innovative method to assess the processes underlying a crisis. However, it has some significant limitations that have been brought up in the preceding sections. Indeed, the first and most obvious one is that the analysis of statements does not offer any insight into the negotiation process that led to their concretisation. Hence, it is impossible for the researcher to know precisely what were the actual tensions or influences leading to this result, which topics were avoided for strategic purposes or even if things were framed to please a certain audience. Sometimes discourses also did not provide as many details as hoped for. There were many instances when the EU commended the “actions” or “agreements” put into place by certain states, but
these are very generic terms that give very little insight in what is actually being done. Regardless of these issues, the CCCA still resolved the research puzzle and provided many answers to sub-related questions.

Still, The contribution to the literature could be interpreted as rather limited, but it can also be seen as a new vision on a very specific field. Along with the confirmation of the centralization-of-power thesis for those specific instances, this paper provides the literature with new sets of empirical as well as statistical data on a very specific subject matter. It also slowly contributes to building the field of the processes underlying the EU crisis management system and in some way test the waters of this tricky and multilayered field.

For future research, and to insure the validity of the findings, it would be interesting to see if other Member States reacted in the same way or if the responses diverged. Germany was a good study case because of its favourable position within the European Union, both geographically and institutionally. Germany was also able to handle the crisis on its own, because it has the ability and resources to do so. However, other States found themselves in very different conditions: Italy and Greece were the first to be gravely affected and received continual help from EU agencies; Hungary became starkly affected during the summer and reacted in a radical way by building a wall; Sweden was geographically far but still received the largest amount of refugees per capita; while countries like Austria or Denmark decided to simply close their borders. This disorder in the responses offered to the crisis was influenced by many factors and shows why it was so hard for the EU to attain a solidary response to the crisis. For the purpose of this study, and due to the delimitation of it not being a doctoral thesis, only one study case was studied. However, it would be interesting to take more cases on board and compare the reactions and see if the outcome was the same. Furthermore, the timeframe could be stretched; it was a strike of luck that the centralization was observed at both levels in the chosen timeframe. The crisis was far from over in December 2015 and there might have been some interesting changes in the following year. By adding more study cases and a longer timeframe, it would be interesting to see if the findings stand still or if they are rebutted. In the same way, rather than only analyzing the official statements of central officials, it would be
interesting to also analyze those of lower levels of government or even agencies, groups and lobbies involved in the crisis. Undeniably, having a larger sample would help with the validation of the findings.
Appendix 1. Codebook

General rules

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding by themes</th>
<th>If a general sentence is about only one theme, the entire sentence is coded according to the corresponding code. If not, each part of the sentence or expression is coded according to the corresponding code.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Code zero</td>
<td>All sections of declarations not related to the crisis under study are coded 000 Irrelevant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code separation</td>
<td>A code stops when it meets another code not related to the current one or a segment of text relating to a different subject. General insignificant sentences such as “I think you’ll understand that.” do not end the code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-temporal coding</td>
<td>Text segments are coded no matter what verb tense the sentence is written in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral coding</td>
<td>Texts segments are coded no matter the form of the sentence (interrogative or negative).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensive coding</td>
<td>When the declaration discusses a regional or more general matter that is outside of the crisis in question, it is coded if it appears in a section relevant to the coding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content coding</td>
<td>Titles, journalists’ questions and declarations of other officials are not included in the coding. They are coded 000 Irrelevant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive coding</td>
<td>Codes are mutually inclusive and may overlap. For instance, a sentence discussing a UN Resolution may be coded in Multilateralism as well as United Nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coding answers</td>
<td>Answers to questions that are clearly asked about a code are coded according to the corresponding code, even if this code is not mentioned in the answer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODEBOOK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: Irrelevant</td>
<td>All segment of text not related to the crisis under study or questions from journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Crisis’ indicators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101: Time pressure</td>
<td>Any mention of time pressure, stress or need to act rapidly. Keywords: now, rapidly, urgent, immediate, quickly, accelerate, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102: High Uncertainty</td>
<td>Any mention of factors generating high uncertainty, including numbers showing the crisis’ intensification. Keywords: new, never seen, extent, numbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103: Severe threat (to society and values)</td>
<td>Any mention of a threat to the society or its values, including references to tragic incidents and terrorism. Keywords: threat, issues, tragic event, terrorism, security (as a principle).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Centralization’s indicators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201: Centralization</td>
<td>Any indication of an upward shift in authority, testifying of a centralization of powers. Examples: intervene without the consent of member states, initiate operations, will assume its responsibility, coordination at higher levels to help lower level (European/national or federal/provincial).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>202: Delegation</td>
<td>Any mention of a delegation made to higher instances from lower instances. Example: Kommunen delegating to the Länder, or the Länder to the federal government, or Member states delegating their power to the European level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: European level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| European response | Any mention of the will for or need of a coordinated European response to the crisis.  
Keywords: integration, united, solidarity, European values, coordinated, common, coherent. |
|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| European action   | Any mention of a concrete action taken by the EU or any resolution adopted by the EC in relation to the crisis under study.  
Keywords: FRONTEX, operations, treaties, quotas, emergency meetings. |
| European support to member states | Any mention of the European Union’s support to member states (after an explicit request of the member state).  
Example: offered assistance to Greece/Italy, financial support or human resources. |
| European support to non-EU countries | Any mention of the European Union’s support to a non-EU member state.  
Example: offered assistance / financial support to x or y country. |
| German (national) level | |
| German response   | Any mention of a national response to the crisis, including declarations of Germany’s national interests.  
Keywords: national response, German challenge (deutsche Herausforderung), Germany’s interest. |
| Higher national instances | Any mention of Germany’s higher instances.  
Keywords: Federal government, federal ministries, State’s officials (Ministers, Chancellor, President) |
| Lower national instances | Any mention of Germany’s lower instances.  
Keywords: Kommunen, Länder, Gemeinden and their officials. |
| German support to the EU | Any mention of Germany’s support to the European Union.  
Example: support to the Commission’s propositions, act in a way that is consistent with the EU’s level, and apply EU’s recommendations. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5: Relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **501: Multilateralism** | Any mention of cooperation with more than two countries, inside international organizations or not, or of demands addressed to many actors.  
Keywords: NATO, international community, cooperation/collaboration, consensus, coalition, talking to other countries, with others, talking to all parties |
| **502: Partnership** | Any mention of a special relationship or partnership with another country or people. Any mention of a discussion or meeting with another country or its leaders. Not coded when there is more than two countries (Multilateralism).  
Keywords: special relationship, always been close to X country, partner with, committed to working with, solidarity with, talking with X country, we are in touch/contact with, had a meeting with X leader, |
| **503: Unilateralism** | Any mention of the will to act alone, independently of other countries  
Keywords: unilaterally if necessary, alone if we must, act on our own. |
| **504: United Nations** | Any mention of a common action with the UN and/or a UN Resolution.  
Keywords: UN, UN Resolution, implement UN resolution X. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6: Alternative explanations of the centralization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **501: Intra-governmental pressure** | Any mention of intra-governmental pressure.  
Keywords: political parties, CDU-CSU, SPD, Die Grüne, Die Linke or AfD, ministers. |
| **502: Popular pressures** | Any mention of demonstrations, influential personalities or organized groups calling for more concrete action.  
Keywords: demonstration, intervention, PEGIDA, the people, the population. |
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>503: EU Member states’ pressure or initiative</strong></td>
<td>Any mentions of a member state of the EU imposing centralization or pressuring/initiating a change for a more centralized approach at the European level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>504: Non-EU Country’s pressure or initiative</strong></td>
<td>Any mention of a country (not in the EU) imposing centralization or pressuring/initiating a change for a more centralized approach at the European level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>505: Medias</strong></td>
<td>Any mention of the medias as an actor influencing the orientation of German or European Union’s positions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2. Table presenting the frequency of coding for all of Germany’s Federal government discourses of 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODE</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time pressure</td>
<td>3.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High uncertainty</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe threat</td>
<td>16.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European response</td>
<td>12.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European action</td>
<td>4.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European support to member states</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European support to non-EU countries</td>
<td>1.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German response</td>
<td>3.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher national instances</td>
<td>2.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower national instances</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German support to the EU</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
<td>6.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unilateralism</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra-governmental pressure</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular pressures</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Member States’ pressure or initiative</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU countries’ pressure or initiative</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medias</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevant</td>
<td>36.50%</td>
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Appendix 3. Table presenting the frequency of coding for all European Commission’s discourses of 2015

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<th>CODE</th>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
<th>November</th>
<th>December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time pressure</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.40%</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>2.40%</td>
<td>3.70%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High uncertainty</td>
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<td>2.10%</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
<td>8.10%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>4.50%</td>
<td>6.10%</td>
<td>2.30%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td>6.30%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Severe threat</td>
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<td>10.50%</td>
<td>5.80%</td>
<td>3.50%</td>
<td>1.40%</td>
<td>7.10%</td>
<td>5.30%</td>
<td>3.30%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegation</td>
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<td>19.60%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.20%</td>
<td>7.10%</td>
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<td>8.60%</td>
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<td>13.10%</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
<td>8.50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>European support to non-EU countries</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>7.80%</td>
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<td>5.30%</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>2.30%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intra-governmental pressure</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU member's states pressure or initiative</td>
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<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-EU countries pressure or initiative</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medias</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<td>Irrelevant</td>
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<td>24.00%</td>
<td>29.40%</td>
<td>27.60%</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
<td>27.50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4. List of the discourses and speeches selected

Germany

April
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 52-1 – Angela Merkel, 20 April 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 58-1 – Angela Merkel, 28 April 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 58-2 – Angela Merkel, 29 April 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 53-2 – Frank Walter Steinmeier, 22 April 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 53-1 – Thomas de Mazière, 22 April 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 58-4 – Frank Walter Steinmeier, 29 April 2015

May
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 59-2 – Angela Merkel, 05 May 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 69-1 – Angela Merkel, 21 May 2015

June
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 80-1 – Angela Merkel, 12 June 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 86-3 – Angela Merkel, 17 June 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 84-1 – Angela Merkel, 18 June 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 82-1 – Joachim Gauck, 20 June 2015

July
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 96-2 – Angela Merkel, 13 July 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 103-3 – Angela Merkel, 27 July 2015

August
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 103-1 – Angela Merkel, 26 August 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 102-3 – Frank Walter Steinmeier, 25 August 2015

September
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 105-1 – Angela Merkel, 03 September 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 108-1 – Angela Merkel, 09 September 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 113-2 – Angela Merkel, 17 September 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 114-1 – Angela Merkel, 18 September 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 114-2 – Angela Merkel, 20 September 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 117-1 – Angela Merkel, 24 September 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 107-4 – Thomas de Mazière, 08 September 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 108-2 – Frank Walter Steinmeier, 09 September 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 113-4 – Frank Walter Steinmeier, 17 September 2015
October
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 126-3 – Angela Merkel, 01 October 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 127-2 – Angela Merkel, 07 October 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 129-1 – Angela Merkel, 15 October 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 131-2 – Angela Merkel, 19 October 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 133-2 – Angela Merkel, 23 October 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 123-1 – Thomas de Maizière, 01 October 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 129-2 – Thomas de Maizière, 15 October 2015

November
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 140-2 – Angela Merkel, 06 November 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 149-1 – Angela Merkel, 19 November 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 155-2 – Angela Merkel, 24 November 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 152-1 – Angela Merkel, 25 November 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 136-3 – Frank Walter Steinmeier, 02 November 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 155-3 – Frank Walter Steinmeier, 28 November 2015

December
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 162-1 – Angela Merkel, 02 December 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 165-1 – Angela Merkel, 16 December 2015
Bulletin der Bundesregierung Nr. 161-1 – Joachim Gauck, 05 December 2015

European Union

April
Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos on the situation in the Mediterranean at the LIBE Committee in the European Parliament, 14 April 2015
European Commission Statement on developments in the Mediterranean, 19 April 2015
Statement by European Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimistris Avromopoulos and Minister of Interior of Spain, Jorge Fernandez Diaz, 19 April 2015
Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the debate in the European Parliament on the conclusions of the Special European Council on 23 April: “Tacking the migration crisis”

May
Statement by Commissioner Avromopoulos at the end of his visit to Egypt, 05 May 2015
Commissioner Avromopoulos’ remarks at the presentation of the European Agenda on Migration, 13 May 2015
First Vice-President Frans Timmermans’ Introductory Remarks at the Commission Press Conference, 13 May 2015
Press Statement by Commissioner Avramopoulos on the first measures under the European Agenda on Migration, 27 May 2015

June
Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos after the G6 meeting with Interior Ministers in Moritzburg, 02 June 2015
Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos after Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg, 16 June 2015
Joint Statement ahead of World Refugee Day on 20 June, 19 June 2015
Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos after his visit to Budapest, 30 June 2015

July
Transcript of the opening and the closing statements of President Juncker at the EP Plenary session on the Conclusions of the European Council (25-26 June) and the Euro Summit (7 July) and the current situation in Greece, 08 July 2015
Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos after informal Home Affairs Council in Luxembourg, 09 July 2015
Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos after the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 July 2015

August
Statement from Migration and Home Affairs Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos, 04 August 2015
Statement by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans, High- Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini and Migration and Home Affairs Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos on the recent incident in the Mediterranean, 06 August 2015 "A European Response to Migration: Showing solidarity and sharing responsibility", 14 August 2015
Joint statement by First Vice-President Timmermans and Commissioner Avramopoulos on Calais and European migration priorities, 20 August 2015
EU press briefing, Brussels, 20 August 2015
Statement by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans and Migration and Home Affairs Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos, 27 August 2015

September
Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos following his visit to Austria, 07 September 2015
State of the Union 2015: Time for Honesty, Unity and Solidarity, 09 September 2015
Statement of the European Commission following the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council, 14 September 2015
Remarks by Commissioner Johannes Hahn on the EU's support for Western Balkans, Turkey and neighbourhood in the addressing the challenges of refugee crisis, 17 September 2015
European Commission Statement following the decision at the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council to relocate 120,000 refugees, 22 September 2015
Speech by President Juncker at the Conference "EU Budget focused on Results", 22 September 2015
Speech by Commissioner Marianne Thyssen: EU funds in support of the refugee crisis, 25 September 2015

October
President Juncker’s intervention at the European Parliament Plenary session on the conclusions of the 23 September Informal European Council, 06 October 2015
Remarks of Commissioner Avramopoulos, Press Conference in Zagreb, 06 October 2015
Remarks of Commissioner Avramopoulos at the Press Conferences of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, 08 October 2015
Speech of President Juncker in Passau, Germany – Discussion ‘Menschen in Europa’: "Euro, Russia, Refugees – which perspective for the European Union?", 08 October 2015
Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos in Athens, 10 October 2015
Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos during his visit in Slovenia, 22 October 2015
Speaking Points of President Juncker – Press Conference on Western Balkans Route Leaders' Meeting, 26 October 2015
Presentation of the 2016 Commission Work Programme to the European Parliament Plenary by First Vice-President Frans Timmermans, 27 October 2015
Responsabilité et solidarité: un an à la Commission européenne, 08 October 2015

November
Remarks of Commissioner Avramopoulos in Athens to mark the first flight from Greece under the EU Relocation Scheme, 04 November 2015
Remarks by Commissioner Avramopoulos following the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council, 09 November 2015
Speech of First Vice-President Frans Timmermans at 'Prague European Summit' Conference, 13 November 2015
Meeting of heads of state or government with Turkey - EU-Turkey statement, 29/11/2015, 29 November 2015

December
Press Conference: Justice and Home Affairs Council, 04 December 2015
Joint Declaration On the Support to Greece for the development of the hotspot/relocation scheme as well as for developing asylum reception capacity, 14 December 2015
Vice-President Kristalina Georgieva in Athens to launch a scheme to provide 20,000 reception places for asylum seekers in Greece, 14 December 2015
Speaking points by Commissioner Avramopoulos - Borders Package, 15 December 2015
Speech by President Juncker at the EP Plenary – Preparation of the European Council meeting of 17-18 December 2015, 16 December 2015
European Commission - Statement
Joint Press point ahead of the European Council by President Juncker and President Schulz - Remarks by President Juncker, 17 December 2015
References

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Literature Review


Discussion


Methodological Discussion


Analysis


Conclusion
