THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN SCIENCES AND THE STATE IN
GEORGE ORWELL'S NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, ANTHONY
BURGESS'S A CLOCKWORK ORANGE AND OWEN GREGORY'S
MECCANIA: THE SUPERSTATE.
Résumé

_Nineteen Eighty-Four_ de George Orwell, _A Clockwork Orange_ d'Anthony Burgess et _Meccania: The Superstate_ d'Owen Gregory révèlent trois régimes oppressifs qui manipulent la science dans le but de contrôler leurs populations. Les auteurs dénoncent la déshumanisation et l'esclavage générés par cette collaboration politico-scientifique. Ainsi, cette étude va explorer les dystopies susmentionnées en analysant leur critique du mariage politico-scientifique. Je vais montrer que la coopération entre les politiciens et les scientifiques est destinée à contrôler les individus et à pénaliser les éléments dissidents. Je vais examiner les mécanismes politico-scientifiques de surveillance et de punition, tout en montrant que les politiciens usent de la science pour assurer la continuité et la stabilité des régimes tyranniques. Finalement, je vais souligner la capacité de l’écriture à dévoiler les abus politico-scientifiques, et à prévenir une coalition entre la connaissance scientifique et le pouvoir despotique.
Abstract

_Nineteen Eighty-Four_ by George Orwell, _A Clockwork Orange_ by Anthony Burgess and _Meccania: The Superstate_ by Owen Gregory shed light upon three different oppressive regimes that manipulate science in order to discipline their populations. The authors respond critically to the cooperation between sciences and the state, as well as to the dehumanization and enslavement generated by this political-scientific collaboration. Accordingly, this study will delve into the aforementioned dystopias, analyzing their critical depiction of the marriage between science and politics. My argument is that the three novels critique the alliance that has been created between scientific knowledge and despotic power. I will assert that the cooperation between scientists and politicians is meant to control the individuals and to penalize the dissident elements. I will delve into the political-scientific mechanisms of surveillance and punishment, thus accentuating the role of scientists in ensuring the continuity and stability of dictatorial rule. Lastly, I will underline writing’s ability to unveil the political-scientific excesses, and to warn against the coalition between scientists and politicians.
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Introduction

Nowadays people are confronted by science, dealing with scientific gadgets in their everyday lives: they drive cars, fly on planes, take medications, have cosmetic surgeries, listen to music on their ipods, watch television, use computers, surf on the internet, and communicate via such social networks as Facebook and Twitter. Indeed, science has intervened positively in many aspects of today’s life. Scientists have discovered vaccinations, organ transplantation, sterility treatments, breast cancer cures, renewable energy, new agronomic methods and new planets. However, science’s achievements have also been used for political purposes on many occasions. In fact, many totalitarian regimes have relied on science in order to control the population. In the past, these practices happened in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Currently, they have occurred again in my homeland Tunisia under the dictatorial rule of Ben Ali. They have also happened in the Egypt of Hosni Mubarak, the Bahrain of Hamad Ibn Isa Al Khalifa, as well as the Yemen of Ali Abdallah Salah where dictators used tanks and fired live ammunition and tear gas against unarmed civilians. The case is even worse in Libya where a full military arsenal was unleashed against peaceful protesters. This evidence reveals that politicians’ monopoly and command of scientific research and inventions have made science a deadly means of discipline.

Grasping the threads of this political-scientific discipline implies an understanding of the key term “science”. Science is defined in André Lalande’s *Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie* as being “synonymous with knowledge” (953). It is an ensemble of research and knowledge discovered gradually and confirmed by well-defined methods of verification (954). Much in this vein, the meaning attributed to the term in *Encyclopedia Britannica* connects it to a system of knowledge occupied with the study of the physical world through objective observation and demonstrable experimentation (“Science”). These definitions are in line with Karl Popper’s explanation of the term in his *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* where he associates science with an enterprise constructing, developing and classifying knowledge in the form of provable explanations and testable predictions about the natural world (3). Indeed, the mention of the physical-
natural world refers us to the observable phenomena manifested in the realm of Nature, which makes the goal of science reside in understanding and construing natural laws.

The definitions presented so far make it clear that scientific understanding is no longer based upon superstition, faith, divinity, metaphysics, credulity, mythology, or folk beliefs. Premises are no longer assessed on the basis of their religious or spiritual relevance (Koyré 141). A new approach to science appeared in 1543 as a result of the methods used in Nicolaus Copernicus's heliocentric cosmology. This approach signalled the onset of a "scientific revolution" (Shapin 1) that broke free with previous beliefs in occultism (Clarke 283), spiritism and mysticism (Westfall Never at Rest 1-39). In *Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes’ Philosophy*, John Cottingham argues that the seventeenth-century revolution aimed at replacing scholastic obscurities with a scientific knowledge based upon a mechanical and systematic explanation of observed phenomena (79). The valorization of scientific observation led to the exclusion of all other types of observations, thus refusing to accept or acknowledge any truth beyond the limits of rigorous and precise scientific investigation (English 286). Dissociating science from metaphysics led to the view that Nature operates according to physical laws (Westfall *The Construction of Modern Science* 30-33). The new scientific perspective aiming at controlling these laws rests upon hypothesis, empiricism (Clarke 259), induction, deduction, experience, hypothesis and calculation (Westfall *Never at Rest* 1-39).

Despite the occurrence of earthquakes, floods, tsunamis and volcanic eruptions, many assert that Man's reliance on these new scientific methods has enabled him to achieve Descartes' dream of dominating the natural world and become "the lord and master of nature" (84). This initial success has generated many optimistic views of science. Particularly, "Descartes’s success-of-science argument" (Sorell 70) generated a new faith and confidence in scientific research and results. The popular idea was that science would deepen the human knowledge of the world, enrich our understanding of Nature, alter the conditions of our lives, extend humans' lifespan by decades, lighten workers' burden, give them time for leisure and enjoyment (Oppenheimer 170), and achieve a soaring movement of "constant ascent" (Koyré 134).
In “Science and Utopia: On the Social Ordering of the Future”, Helga Nowotny assumes that science has provided Man with tools capable of turning his daydreams into a lived reality. She holds that science and technology function as “the most efficient operator of human wish fulfilment” (4). In so doing, she probes the old scientific myth of exposing nature and delving into her secrets. She maintains that utopian thinking is intrinsically related to science, specifically to expectations regarding future scientific discoveries and technological innovations. The idea is that science will come to incarnate and materialize humankind’s utopian dreams and visualizations. Nowotny argues that the eighteenth-century understanding of the notion of scientific progress “took on the characteristics of a movement that marked the rise towards unending improvement” (7, emphasis added). The popular idea was that science’s increase of human control over nature “is supposed to increase happiness and well-being” (5). She sustains that science has set up a utopian project consisting of imprinting scientific rationality onto society. In order to understand this project in its entirety, it is necessary to comprehend the key term “utopia”.

The term “utopia” finds its roots in the Greek combination of ou, meaning “not” and topos which denotes “place” (Cuddon 957). Utopia is defined in Abrams’s Glossary of Literary Terms as being an “ideal and nonexistent political state and way of life” (217). Utopia’s non-existence is underlined by Carol Franko who acknowledges utopia’s being a “no-place” (207) intrinsically linked to the notion of perfection (208). This unearthly dimension is stressed by C.W. Sullivan who equates utopias with non-existent societies that are regarded as significantly better than those of the reader (385). Abrams’s glossary conveys that some utopias were “intended as blueprints for social and technological improvements in the actual world” (218), as is the case for Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis which depicts Bensalem’s scientific institution.

However, the whole utopian enterprise has been thwarted by science’s alliance with politics against the common Man. Indeed, science’s mission of dominating nature has shifted into dominating humans because science has come under the influence and control of politics. Here it is essential to note science’s division into two main branches: physical or natural, and social or human sciences. The former is defined in Encyclopedia
Britannica as concerned with explaining different phenomena observed in the physical world. The definition focuses on physics, thus regarding it as one of the principal physical sciences that probe the properties of matter by studying the origins of the forces operating on the different bodies, as well as the behaviour of these bodies ("Principles of Physical Science"). The second scientific division is related to the human or social sciences which refer to any discipline analyzing the social and cultural features of human behaviour. These include anthropology, sociology, economics, psychology and political science ("Social Science" Encyclopedia Britannica).

The point is that science's laboratory is no longer confined to the realm of Nature. It has broadened to include society. According to Nowotny, the change from a natural to a human setting of scientific experimentation is motivated by a will to abolish all societal irrational tendencies and to establish order in society (5). Applying the rational order to societal phenomena is meant to harmonize the social order through science. However, the scientific endeavour of ending disorder by establishing rational organization has resulted in a "surplus of order" (6). The latter image of excessive order brings forth the idea of the control exacted by science. Consequently, the initial optimism vis-à-vis a scientific utopia shattered on the verge of political control. When René Descartes called enthusiastically for the reform of sciences (Hatfield 20), he expected the onset of an era in which a Universal Science would "raise our nature to its highest degree of perfection" (cited in Clarke 138). Ironically enough, science has ended up perfecting politics' control over human life and nature, rather than perfecting this nature itself. Indeed, the reality of the scientific-political coalescence has shown Descartes to be a mere "dreamer" (36), to use Anthony Grafton's word. All aspirations towards a "scientific feasibility of universal happiness" (Nowotny 7) have been thwarted by politics' intrusion in the domain of science. The idea is that science's utopian ideal has turned into a dystopian reality supervising people and penalizing audacious dissidents.

This shift in the expectations and results of science has been documented and critiqued by literature, particularly dystopian literature. In her Encyclopedia of Literature and Science, Pamela Gossin mentions literature's function as a "cultural criticism of science" (xvi), and that the dystopian genre is one of the pre-eminent literary categories that
critique the utopian dream of a liberatory and emancipatory science by revealing its cooperation with politics. The reality of the techno-political coalescence has thwarted all claims regarding a utopia triggered by scientific advances.

J.A. Cuddon’s *Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory* emphasizes the unfeasibility of utopia (959), an idea that is shared by Richard Toby Widdicombe who points out the “limitations of such a working method” (93), as well as by Shell Heather who considers utopianism a naive dream (1075). Valerie Paulus and Tom Maylan are two other scholars who have considered it a demand for the impossible (Fitting 354). George Orwell himself dismisses utopian writing in his essay “Can Socialists Be happy?” where he considers all efforts at describing permanent happiness as failures and contends that utopias’ popularity in the past three or four centuries has not spared it from being unappetizing, and from lacking in vitality (504). Utopia has come to be seen as impossible (Mohr 5), “boring” (Cooke 390) and “outmoded” (Baccolini 518). Some critics have even gone as far as to claim that “utopia is dead” (cited in Stephens 22). Accordingly, utopia’s failure has led to the rise of dystopia (Cuddon 959). The result is that “the worst of all possible worlds”, to use Dennis Rohatyn’s words (99), has come to displace and substitute the utopian visions of the universe. As many of these utopian perceptions were based upon expectations regarding scientific progress, multiple dystopian narratives aimed at countering this naive and sentimental hope. Science’s disappointing reality has been captured by the dystopian genre, many of whose authors direct their critical gaze towards the politicization of science.

Some scholars restrict dystopia’s investigation of science to its critique of technology, whereas others broaden this critique, thus making it encompass the whole concept of modernity. One champion of the latter group is Frederic Jameson who sees dystopian writing as an offspring of modernity (11). This assumption is shared by Mark Decker who assumes that “modernity is frightening and so one of its by-products is a way of thinking and telling stories that depicts the material culture of modernity crushing humanity” (1). He sees dystopias as relying on problematic science in order to critique the interaction between politics and science. Gorman Beauchamp belongs to the second group that extends dystopia’s exploration of science to a critique of modernity. In his
"Technology in the Dystopian Novel", he assumes that warnings against the growing potentialities of modern technology inform the dystopian novel (53). He goes as far as to term dystopias technotopias, thus accentuating totalitarianism's dependence upon technology. In this view, dystopian authors are considered as technophobes countering the arguments of technophiles who assert technology's neutrality. Beauchamp even assimilates the technological apparatus to Frankenstein who ends up becoming his creator's master (54). Much in this vein, Peter Fitting accounts for the ebb and flow of the utopian current by linking the blossoming of the anti-utopia to the disappointment with technological optimism following the use of the atomic bomb against Japan (353).

From this evidence, it seems that the coalescence between science and politics represents one of the most prominent questions that haunt the dystopian genre. Although Beauchamp's use of the term "technophobe" might suggest an extreme and irrational fear of technology, the fear of scientists' cooperation with politicians is by no means excessive. Rather, this fear underlies the real threat of a marriage between science and politics. Grasping the dynamics underlying the dystopian criticism of the coalition necessitates an understanding of the term "dystopia". In Abrams's glossary dystopia "represent[s] a very unpleasant imaginary world in which ominous tendencies of our present social, political and technological order are projected in some disastrous future culmination" (218). The definition's tripartite combination of societal, political and scientific influences sheds light upon the political coalescence that has been exposed by such dystopias as George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Anthony Burgess's *A Clockwork Orange* and Owen Gregory's *Meccania: The Superstate*.

These three works are science-fiction dystopian novels that reveal their authors' vision of the near future. The periods featured in the three novels are chronologically proximate from one another: Orwell's book portrays life in 1984, Gregory's novel is set in 1970, and Burgess's work is set in a non-specified near future. The three of them are twentieth-century novels. *Nineteen Eighty-Four* was published in 1948, *A Clockwork Orange* in 1962, and *Meccania: The Superstate* in 1917. The three dystopias are centred upon the experience of a protagonist confronting the regime to which he is subjected. In these works, the writers criticize the totalitarianism characterizing the regimes under which
individuals live. Most importantly, the authors respond critically to the cooperation between science and the state, as well as to the homogenization, estrangement and alienation generated by this political-scientific collaboration.

It is helpful to investigate, here, the criticism that has been written on these three dystopic works. We can divide the literature on Nineteen Eighty-Four along these major lines: on the political level, Irvin Howe, Christopher Booker, V.S. Pritchett, Johnn Strachey, Phillip Zimbardo, Michael Rademacher, Darias Kejali and Jefferey Meyers probe the issue of totalitarianism, conveying the coercion and mind-control exercised by the party on its population. On the linguistic level, Homi Bhabha, Edward S. Herman and David W. Sisk study the theme of language. On the sexual level, Blu Tirohl, John Haldane, Cass R. Suntein and Robin West delve into the idea of sex as a weapon of rebellion. Paul Haak explores the party’s dynamic of control via an investigation of its monopoly of music.

Few articles, though, have been written on the theme of science. One of these is Richard A. Posner’s “Orwell Versus Huxley: Economics, Technology, Privacy and Satire” wherein he compares the technological, economic and political facets of life in Nineteen Eighty-Four and A Brave New World. He contends that the two works are best understood when regarded and assessed as artistic literature, rather than as social critique, refuting the argument that Nineteen Eighty-Four features a world of control and surveillance created by science’s alliance with politics. Posner holds that Nineteen Eighty-Four has not “much to teach us about what it means to live in an age of technology” (183). His article celebrates the technological advantages ranging from the increase of economic sale, through the efficiency of control and the betterment of competition to the spread of democracy (186-188). Probing Nineteen Eighty-Four, he argues that the novel would not be “different in essentials without any telescreens” (197). The same ideas are found in Peter Huber’s Orwell’s Revenge where he mentions that the “telescreen will not abide tyranny” (67), thus demonstrating the impracticality and infeasibility of the whole gadget (168-171). Huber’s major arguments are mentioned in Lawrence Lessig’s “On the Internet and the Benign Invasions of Nineteen Eighty-Four” where he refers to the claims regarding technological primitiveness, Oceanians’ lack of
attention to this gadget, as well as the ambiguity concerning the administration and the functioning of the telescreen. In contrast to these scholars, I argue that Nineteen Eighty-Four is a novel that delves into the political-scientific coalescence question, thus revealing the oligarchy’s enslavement of citizens through two main mechanisms: war and the telescreen.

Multiple other analyses have been written on A Clockwork Orange. Many of these have been devoted to the study of violence. In Le Miroir de la Société: La Violence Institutionnelle chez Anthony Burgess, Dorris Lessing et Pat Barker, David Waterman studies the manifestations of violence through a focus on both Alex’s ultra-violence, and the subsequent violence that is inflicted upon him. “The impossibility of Violence in A Clockwork Orange” by Emmanuel Aretoulakis, “What’s it going to be then, eh?” Deciphering Violence and Adult Corruption in A Clockwork Orange” by Sam Johnson and “The Manichee World of Anthony Burgess” by John J. Stinson represent three other articles dealing with the same issue of violence. The question of free will constitutes another major concern in Burgess’s novel. Anthony Burgess by A.A. De Vitis, The Consolation of Ambiguity and “The Bitter Fruits of Freedom” by Robert K. Morris focus on Alex’s brainwashing and on his subsequent deprivation of choice. Some articles have been devoted to the study of music, among them Roger Craik’s “Some Unheard Melodies in A Clockwork Orange” and Gianfranco Marrone’s Le Traitement Ludovico: Corps et Musique dans Orange Mécanique. Some other studies have focused on the film version of the novel, as is the case of Pat J. Gehrke, Kate McQuiston and Vincent A. O Keefe.

As for Meccania: The Superstate, only a few pages have been published on it: five of these are in The Dictionary of Imaginary Places by James Cook, and two in Science-Fiction: The Early Years. The notes in this latter book represent a synopsis of the novel. They introduce the chief features of life in Meccania, mainly the tyranny, control, chauvinism, jingoism and over-regulation reigning in the country. As for the five pages in The Dictionary of Imaginary Places, they provide us with an overall idea about the Meccanian mechanism of total state control in terms of class, gender, reproduction, health, industry and economy. There are two other sentences on Owen Gregory in The Science Fiction Encyclopedia by Peter Nicholls. They present Gregory as the writer of a
futurist dystopia depicting a German totalitarian state ("Gregory, Owen"). The name of the author also figures in the first volume of *Science Fiction and Fantasy Literature* by R. Reginal. Here, nothing is mentioned on him except that he is the author of *Meccania: The Superstate* (224).

This study will delve into the aforementioned science fiction dystopias, analyzing their critical depiction of the coalition between science and politics. My argument is that the three novels critique the alliance that has been created between scientific knowledge and despotic power. Accordingly, I will study this theme through a focus on three major guidelines: control, punishment, and writing as warning. My aim in the first chapter will be to convey that science enables the states of the three novels to control individuals. Hence, I will start by presenting the cornerstone notion of control. Then, I will study the control exercised by the party in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* through its ownership, command and monopoly of weaponry and the telescreen. The theme of control will be investigated in *A Clockwork Orange* through a focus on the government’s recourse to an aversion therapy meant to control Alex’s divergent behaviour. The surveillance imposed on people in *Meccania: The Superstate* will be first studied in terms of the medical investigation forced upon them by doctors and politicians as part of the entrance procedures. Supervision will be revealed through a focus on sociologists’ and psychologists’ involvement in the Meccanian political surveillance system. The coalescence will be investigated through an exploration of Meccanian experts’ intrusion in the educational, industrial, artistic and nutritionist scenes.

In the second chapter I will explore the role of science in determining the fate of dissenters in the three novels. My analysis of the penalties inflicted upon Winston, Alex and Stillman will rest upon an investigation of the mechanism of power, as is illustrated in room 101, the lunatic asylums, and the state reclamation centre. This part will focus on the role of psychologists and psychiatrists in perpetuating coercion, tyranny and torture. The electric shocks inflicted upon Winston will be compared to the Ludovico method that is forced upon Alex, and to the isolation that is imposed on Stillman in *Meccania*. I will comment upon the fact that the three punishments occur in hospitals with the presence of doctors and officials, and delve into the concepts of sanity, health and cure which are not
only present in the three dystopias, but which justify the penalty inflicted upon the prisoner in each novel.

The third part will show that the aim underlying these three dystopias is to warn against the political-scientific alliance. The three works will be considered records of, warnings against, and ways out of the tyrannical political-scientific conspiracy. I will investigate the technique of familiarization and defamiliarization used by the three authors in order to demonstrate the messages of warning underlying the process of identification and separation employed in each narrative. The importance of the writing act will be underlined through references to writing, as well as through probing moments in which the characters actually write in the books. In discussing the three novels, I will start by Nineteen Eighty-Four because it is the most famous one. Then, I will probe A Clockwork Orange. By writing on Gregory at the end, I will underline his originality as an unknown precursor, thus conveying the importance of his work despite its lack of fame.
Chapter 1: Control

The term “control” evokes ideas related to regulation, governance, domination, restriction and hegemony. Control is frequently understood in connection with the key term “surveillance”. Surveillance represents a technique of governance through which regulation is applied. In order to assert their power, political entities construct a complex system of permanent visibility that enables them to police populations through installing a panoptic framework of interaction (Backer 101). Panopticism works through a strategic process of observation and information gathering (102). The result is that governance is achieved via the regulatory effects of surveillance (104). The scope of control surpasses observatory acts to regulatory practices. Lary Cata Backer’s “Global Panopticism: States, Corporations and the Governance Effects of Monitoring Regimes” makes it clear that surveillance depends on various technologies of control (116). This is the case of the control system of Nineteen Eighty-Four where warfare technology is used to discipline the people.

In Orwell’s novel supervision is enacted through the telescreen’s technology of observation. Surveillance is implemented mainly via this gadget that enables the party to monitor the population. The technology of the screen is also used in A Clockwork Orange for disciplinary and regulatory aims because the projected films are meant to control Alex’s devious behaviour. Control does not only rely on the technological aspect of science. Rather, the psychiatric and psychological branches of science intervene in the enactment of surveillance, as is the case with the doctors working in the rehabilitation centre. Other aspects of psychology might influence the process of controlling the social organization. This is the case of Meccania’s educational, industrial and theatrical psychologists whose research and experiments aim at monitoring the population. Another feature of the human sciences’ involvement in political control is seen in sociology. Indeed, the sociologists serving the Meccanian Superstate exemplify Backer’s maxim of “surveillance as information” (121), for the data gathered by them is diffused to and manipulated by the oligarchy. Then, the sociological “data collection” turns into a political “data use” (122).
In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* war represents another means of control, for it exercises a camouflage of truth. Not only does it distract Oceanians from focusing on their social and economic problems, but it alienates them from their reality through maintaining a delusive and manipulative belief in the continuous existence of a fight. In *A Clockwork Orange* control is exercised via a dehumanizing therapy that conditions aversion to violent stimuli. In so doing, it prevents those who undertake it from the freedom and spontaneity of choice. In *Meccania: The Superstate* the Time Department intervenes in the supervision system. It applies its regulatory surveillance thanks to the assistance of the Department of Sociology. The point of intersection between these dystopias resides in the three dictatorships’ reliance on scientific research and institutions in order to control their populations.

In *Power and Its Disguises: Anthropological Perspectives on Politics*, John Gledhill draws a comparison between “weak” and “strong” states. In his view, weak states rely on open violence and “physical coercion”, whereas the strong ones “secure their ends through the more subtle and manipulative practice of power associated with Northern ‘surveillance’ societies” (21). The subtle exercise of control is manifest in the three dystopias. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the telescreen is presented as a means of informing Oceanians about the political and economic situation of their country, but it ends up scrutinizing all their thoughts and motions. In *A Clockwork Orange*, the Ludovico technique is presented as a reclamation treatment, but its real objective is to control the dissident members. In *Meccania*, the government’s administration of all institutions has led it to penetrate and govern each aspect of Meccanians’ lives. The Superstate’s monopoly of the state institutions has laid out a solid infrastructure of control and surveillance. The three dystopias feature continuous control as the essence of the ubiquitous state machine. Indeed, the institutional apparatuses which underpin these three works function as policing bodies. The dystopian atmosphere penned by the three authors is meant to divulge how the abiding supervision harasses individuals. Manifestations of control abound within the three texts. The three dystopias depict political monopolists of scientific knowledge and expertise, for each of them offers a different account of scientifically-produced forms of control.
A focus on the three aforementioned science fiction dystopias allows us to understand control as a political system of governance through diverse scientific methods of observation, information gathering, retrieval of data and enactment of totalitarian ideologies. Acknowledging the diversity of scientific supervision suggests the multiple technological, psychological, sociological and educational layers of political-scientific control. One pre-eminent manifestation of this multi-layered mechanism of regulatory control is seen in the warfare apparatus of Nineteen Eighty-Four.

1.1. Nineteen Eighty-Four

Nineteen Eighty-Four’s world is composed of three super states that are engaged in a perpetual war. The state of abiding fighting is the result of a political-technical alliance according to which scientists supply the state with research meant to develop the hydrogenic armaments that are in their turn meant to make the war continue. In this respect, M. Keith Booker asserts that the research conducted by the party is limited to the development of weaponry (Dystopian Literature: A Theory and Research Guide 208). In the same vein, V.S. Pritchett assumes that the collective oligarchy benefits from maintaining the war. In his opinion, the main profit is that the war allows the new governing party to keep a low standard of living for the masses and to annihilate their understanding and intelligence. Pritchett argues that “the party can operate securely only on a war footing” (21), hence its slogan “war is peace”. Lionel Trilling shares the same view, and assumes that “perpetual war is the best assurance of perpetual absolute rule” (26). It is noteworthy that politicians’ use of scientists in order to launch war is not restricted to Nineteen Eighty-Four. In Meccania: The Superstate, the regime directs scientific research towards the development of chemical weapons.

As I am dealing with the theme of political-scientific coalition in its warfare dimension, it is essential to highlight the role of science in creating the arms threat. Indeed, Winston’s childhood memories usher us into this political-scientific cooperation because they reveal much about the scares invented by science. The psychological
implications of war are illustrated via Winston's post-traumatic dreams and recollections. Probing war trauma in his "Fateful Memories: Industrialized Wars and Traumatic Neuroses", Eric Leed asserts that "the traumatic memory recurs involuntarily against the wishes of the rememberer" (87). Hence, Winston's repetitive dreams and recollection of the war scenes reveal his being one of wars' "psychic victim[s]." His dream about his mother's desperate attempt to shield him from bullets by stretching her arm over him underscores the horror of atomic bombing, a horror that has been created by scientists and used by politicians. The destructiveness and bleakness of the scene is reflective of the devastation and savagery of the political-scientific alliance. The fact that this war memory comes to the surface through a dream, and not through the telescreen, adds more layers of meaning to our understanding and analysis of the political-scientific cooperation. From a Freudian standpoint, dreams are expressive of hidden desires and threats (Quinn 96). Freudian theory fits very well into an analysis of the political-scientific conspiracy because it reveals that dreams and memories have become the only means of channelling and exteriorizing one's trauma in the stifling society of Oceania.

While the telescreen is expected to keep track of the nation's past, to depict its present, and to show its goals for the future, politicians' use of it aims at concealing the destructiveness of the techno-political alliance. Indeed, not only does science provide politicians with the weapons necessary to launch deadly wars, but it also supplies them with tools to hide their horrendous deeds. As Brigid Rooney states, the proles are kept down through both "mass propaganda and random bombing" (82). The telescreen is the best illustration of a scientific invention used by politicians to implement their tyrannical agenda of complete control. All that Oceanians know is that the world is divided between Oceania, Eastasia and Eurasia. The role of mass media is confined to informing them about the existence of an ongoing war between these entities. Whenever these states change alliances, the previous history of battles and fights is thrown into oblivion. The historical events and circumstances of the war are erased by the telescreen which diffuses falsified information pointing at another hazardous foe and inciting people to loathe him.

The multiple falsifications have made Oceanians ignorant about the countries against which they fight (Pritchett 20). Indeed, being the only medium of communication
between the people and their government, the telescreen should inform the public about the different interior and foreign policies, particularly the wars in which Oceania takes part, because the various mass media of each country are charged with the role of forming what Jurgen Habermas calls “the public sphere” (1). From this perspective, the telescreen is supposed to enlighten the people, and to shape public opinion through the data it broadcasts. Nevertheless, rather than enlightening the masses, Oceania’s chief medium of information aims at keeping the mob in a state of ignorance that does not clash with the regime’s interests. The consequence of this media-based obscurantist strategy is a hegemonic control resting upon people’s inability to grasp the dynamics, incentives, costs, objectives, results or even the territory of the war. It is worth revealing that ignorance is not an exclusive characteristic of the Oceanian people. In fact, the Meccanian population is characterized by the same trait. Just like Oceanians, Meccanians are only (mis)informed about what the state allows them to know.

Furthermore, Oceanians are conditioned by unconscious brainwashing to happily obey the regime. Their consciousness is shaped entirely by the slogans diffused on the telescreen. This idea might bring to mind publicity and marketing: the advertizing industry works through repetition. They are based upon presenting and representing the product several times to the consumer. The rule is that the more one sees it, the more likely one will be convinced by its importance, and the sooner one will buy it. By the same token, the more one listens to the propaganda of a particular leader, the more likely one will be to champion the ideas to which he or she has been introduced. This is the reason why presidential candidates compete in order to have more spots on television during electoral campaigns. This competition occurs in democratic countries where multiple parties try to win control of the government. In contrast, the Oceanian government monopolizes the whole media apparatus through its control of the telescreen. Not only does the party’s monopoly of the telescreen enable it to broadcast its mottos, but it has also allowed it to engrave them in people’s minds and memories regardless of their opinion of them.

1 The public sphere “is a site for the production and circulation of discourses that can in principle be critical of the state” (Frazer 57).
Indeed, persuasion occurs through the repetition of slogans, and reaches its polemical ends by means of music. Repetition is a key means of brainwashing and conditioning individuals: in order to control Alex’s delinquency the government of *A Clockwork Orange* exposes him repetitively to brutal movies. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* repetition is not confined to the films broadcast on the telescreen; it also includes the ongoing diffusion of pro-party programmes and songs. In his article “Is Big Brother Watching?” Paul Haak explores the party’s dynamic of control via a study of its monopoly of music, highlighting the “propagandizing and mind controlling” aims to which music has been reduced. Haak’s conclusion is that “in Orwell’s world of 1984, music has been reduced and relegated to the functions of signalling, propagandizing, appeasing and controlling, almost always to curtail human dignity and freedom” (26). The control function attributed to music is also present in *A Clockwork Orange* where symphonies become a means to condition Alex’s devious behaviour.

Most importantly, a sentence like “the telescreen had changed over to strident military music” (Orwell 9) shows that music could not have been directed towards such tyrannical goals in the absence of the radio and the telescreen that trumpet propagandistic tunes uninterruptedly. Hate songs are composed by the Music Department on the national occasion of Hate Week during which the autocracy’s enemies are demonized. These hate melodies could have never brainwashed subjects’ minds and fuelled their fury at the traitors without the telescreen, a fact that, again, accounts for a political-scientific alliance meant to control the individual. Through the telescreen, the party has installed a captivating sense of collectivity that depersonalizes the individual in the name of an organic selfless loyalty to the party. The subjects engage in the quasi-religious ritual of the Two-Minutes Hate during which they express their aversion towards the party’s foes, thus keeping themselves tied to Big Brother’s despotic ideals. The technological device through which the oligarchy issues its hate ritual is a poignant instance of a scientific policy employed by the state in order to maintain its totalitarian rule.

The term “telescreen” recurs forty-seven times in the first part of the novel, fourteen of which are in the opening chapter alone. In addition, the term “screen” is repeated eleven times in the first chapter. Another term that is used to refer to the telescreen is “the
metallic plaque” which is used twice in this same chapter. In none of these instances is the telescreen presented in a positive light, or is it suggested that it enlightens its audience. What is more, Nineteen Eighty-Four’s telescreen is associated with piercing and annoying sounds in the same way in which A Clockwork Orange’s screen is connected with irritating movies. Instances include the following: “a hideous grinding screech, as of some monstrous machine running without oil, burst from the telescreen” (13); “the maddening bleating voice that came from the telescreen” (16); “the telescreen was giving forth an ear-splitting whistle which continued on the same note for thirty seconds” (33); “yapped a piercing female voice” (34); “the telescreen let out a piercing whistle” (66); “Day and night the telescreen bruised your ears with statistics” (77); “It was a peculiar, cracked, braying, jeering note” (80); “The woman on the telescreen had started a new song. Her voice seemed to stick into his brain like jagged splinters of glass” (106).

These ear-splitting sonorous images function as auditory tropes suggesting how the party terrorizes and harasses Oceanians mentally, psychologically and physically through its command of the telescreen. The monotonous pattern of strident sounds is contrasted to the music of the bird whose song “went on and on, minute after minute, with astonishing variations, never once repeating itself, almost as though the bird were deliberately showing its virtuosity” (130). The only place in which the bird is seen and heard is the Golden Country which is thought to be telescreen-free. Albeit Winston ends up realizing that this rural landscape is not out of the party’s control, the comparison between the bird’s vivid and ever-renewed melodies and the irritating repetitive tunes of the telescreen communicates the beauty of living outside the range of telescreens. Indeed, telescreens’ control is introduced from the fifth paragraph of the novel which describes the metal plaque as “command[ing]” (4) the space within its vision. The verb “command” is repeated three pages later in reference to the telescreen’s ability to “command the whole room” (7). Throughout the narrative, telescreens are depicted as scrutinizing the population. The real commander is the party which uses this scientific gadget to maintain the stability of its despotic rule. The autocracy’s use of the telescreen allows it to see individuals, and to command their gestures, as is the case of the sport session during
which Winston is obliged to exercise for a period determined by a woman who appears on the screen, and orders him to bend lower in order to touch his toes.

Another manifestation of the scientific-political inspective mechanism is the police’s use of helicopters in order to spy on Oceanians. The technological knowledge has not generated well-being and affluence for the people because the uses to which the oligarchy has put technology stifle and terrorize individuals. In his article “1984: History as Nightmare”, Irving Howe claims that “the totalitarian state cannot come to rest for any prolonged period of time” (51). This statement bespeaks a bitter truth of endless control and pervasive governmental surveillance. My point is, again, that the Oceanian bleak reality of relentless surveillance and domination is caused by the telescreen, in its being both the epitome and the incarnation of a techno-political conspiracy meant to annihilate the possibilities for a private life. This is probably why Mario Varrichio considers it to be “the principal instrument of totalitarian control and invasion of privacy” (112).

The scientific-political coalescence is not manifested only in scientists’ creation of a telescreen that is to be owned and manoeuvred by the party. Science’s collaboration with the oligarchy is also seen on the level of the programmes broadcast on it, for science intervenes in the production of politically-oriented documentaries and news films: “There was the tele-programmes section with its engineers, its producers and its team of actors” (Orwell 45). The setting in which these engineered productions take place is the Records Department wherein truth is twisted by members of the inner party, which, again, underlines the political dimension of the programmes produced. Engineers are not the only men of science who work in this department, for other experts take part in adapting scientific knowledge for political ends: “There were [...] typography experts and their elaborately-equipped studios for the faking of photographs.” The technological expertise in photography and printed typography is used as a manipulative tactic meant to edify news, to falsify pictures and to create photos for traitors, or for loyal Oceanians who have never existed before, but who have come to life in order to enhance devotion to the party.

Furthermore, the various lies that sweep reality into oblivion are diffused on the telescreen that “dispenses non-news” (Meyers 123). The falsified figures that are issued
by the Ministry of Plenty in order to hide the country’s deficiency and the people’s hunger are broadcast on that same screen: “The telescreen announces a stream of false statistics, including a raise in the chocolate ration to twenty grams a week” (130). In “Privacy: Who Needs It?” Perry Glasser asserts that “in a Digital Age, populations are controlled by the flow of data” (80). Though not dealing with a digital age, Nineteen Eighty-Four mirrors technology’s cooperation with politics in order to manipulate the data broadcast on the telescreen. Hence, there can be no doubt that Oceanians are coerced by this screen that enslaves them through the maintenance of a high ignorance rate. All that the telescreen allows them to know is a good embellished economic, demographic and political image. Early in the story Winston thinks:

The fabulous statistics continued to pour out of the telescreen. As compared with last year, there was more food, more clothes, more houses, more furniture, more cooking-pots, more fuel, more ships, more helicopters, more books, more babies - more of everything except disease, crime and insanity. (Orwell 62)

This mediatised falsification has led Mario Varrichio to underline the party’s use of the screen to apply its “Ignorance Is Strength” maxim (103).

Moreover, the glorification of Big Brother is achieved through the telescreen. The Oceanian autocracy’s creation of “a cult of personality” through which it honours, and glorifies itself has ensured a total control of the population. The cult of Big Brother aims to create a benevolent public image meant to maintain people’s subjection. The apparent paternalism that promotes the cult of Big Brother is not exclusive to the Oceanian dictatorship. Indeed, the Meccanian Superstate indulges in publicizing and advertizing its benevolence towards its people through the use of the same family tropes. Hence, while the party presents its leader as a caring and loving big brother, the Meccanian regime presents itself as Meccanians’ father and mother: “The state is their father and mother” (Gregory 158).

Most importantly, Big Brother’s cult of personality has appeared as a result of the party’s manipulation of mass media, particularly the telescreen, in order to idealize Big Brother’s image for the people over which it rules. The continuous glorification of the
regime, the unquestioning flattery of its fulfillments together with the endless praise of its good governance that form the party’s cult of personality, are all propagated by the telescreen. The cult of personality that has allowed leader worship in Oceania should be read within Max Weber’s tripartite classification of authority in his The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Weber divides authority into three ideal types of political dominion: traditional authority, legal authority, and charismatic authority.

Weber makes it clear that traditional domination is a matter of authority stemming from tradition or custom, whereas legal authority arises from respect to legislation and regulations (The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 324-345). It is evident that the oligarchy has legal authority, but its power is also centred upon its charismatic authority. Indeed, the party’s cult of personality might be paralleled to this Weberian notion that arises out of the idealized, heroic, or charming image of an individual political personality. With this type of authority, people obey the leader because they believe in him, as well as in his power and charisma (The Theory of Social and Economic Organization 362). The fact is that men’s belief in the political leader’s outstanding potential is governed by the charismatic image they have of him, and in the case of Big Brother that image is propagated by the telescreen. The apotheosis of Big Brother is ensured by a techno-political coalescence incarnated in a telescreen exalting the party to a divine level.

A good illustration of the implications of the cult of personality created by the telescreen is the woman who extends her hands to the screen, and murmurs “My saviour” (Orwell 18) as she sees Big Brother on it. Indeed, the multiple times in which this woman has watched the meek portrait of Big Brother have made her interiorize and believe in his identity as a Christ-like rescuer and protector of the Oceanian people. This interiorization exacerbates the ghastliness of the techno-political alliance that brainwashes people’s minds. The Oceanian party is not the only autocracy that promotes a benevolent image of protection and care for its people. The Meccanian Superstate uses the same brainwashing strategy according to which all Meccanians are made to believe in “the beneficent protection of the State” (Gregory 129).
The hideousness of the political-scientific coalescence has led Aldous Huxley to stress the affinities uniting the two novels regarding the ongoing cooperation between science and the state. Dealing with the manifestations of the political-scientific conspiracy in both works, Huxley assumes that “the ruling oligarchy will find less arduous and wasteful ways of governing and of satisfying its lust for power, and that these will resemble those which I [he] described in Brave New World” (102). Carrying on the comparison in the letter he sent to George Orwell, Huxley points out the efficiency of conditioning and narco-hypnosis as instruments of government. His argument is that such scientific inventions and experiments can serve the political bodies better than jails do. For one thing, applying these scientific experiments makes people love their servitude and embrace it happily. For another, such application of science into the social and the political realm both induces and spreads a strong sense of obedience to the political-scientific machinery that predestinates them to submission (103). Huxley concludes: “I feel that the nightmare of Nineteen Eighty-Four is destined to modulate into the nightmare of a world having more resemblance to that which I imagined in Brave New World”. In conjunction with what has been said so far about control, we might consider that the “electronic eye of the telescreen which invades even the privacy of the bedroom” (Bernstein 26) represents the instrument of conditioning and narco-hypnosis.

The chief medium responsible for inducing this narco-hypnosis is the telescreen. In this regard, V.S. Pritchett states:

A telescreen is fitted, from which canned propaganda continually pours, on which the pictures of Big Brother, the leader and the ancient enemy and anti-Christ, Goldenstein often appears. Also, by this device, the thought police, on endless watch for Thought Crime, can observe the people night and day. What precisely thought crime really is no one knows; but in general it is the tendency to conceive a private life secret from the State. A frown, a smile, a shadow on the face, a sigh may betray the citizen, who has forgotten for the moment, the art of ‘reality control’, or in Newspeak, the official language, ‘doublethink’. (21)
The link Pritchett makes between the telescreen and doublethink is insightful because it reveals that the state’s ownership and control of the telescreen is responsible for the schizophrenic existence led by Oceanians.

John Strachey’s essay “A Strangled Cry” probes thought control in its being one implication of the techno-political coalescence: “Thought control is exercised by two-way television sets in every room, by means of which the ‘thought police’ can see, and listen to, as well as, if they like, be seen by every citizen at any time, day or night” (56). The idea is that Oceanians’ fear of being caught for a crimethink felony leads them to attempt to have complete self-control consisting of total thought surveillance. The illegal act of thinking criminally is not the only transgression that will cause its committer to be captured and penalized, for even a misdemeanor, a spontaneous act of brooding over unwelcome and suspicious thoughts, is considered a crimethink that is signalled instantly by the telescreen. In sum, the telescreen controls and detects citizens’ thoughts and motions. Its wide screen haunts every aspect of their lives under the totalitarian regime.

As sexuality represents a pivotal element in people’s lives, it has not escaped the party’s control. Rather, Oceanians’ sexual behaviour has become the very incarnation of the oligarchy’s despotic rule. The authors of Human Sexuality in a World of Diversity define human sexuality as being the way in which people experience eroticism, and respond to their desire for sexual pleasure (Rathus, Nevid and Rathus 5). Contrary to the instinctive needs referred to in this definition, all notions of pleasure and orgasm have been banned in Oceania. The party preaches a puritanical gospel of joyless sexual intercourse aiming solely at procreation (Booker Dystopian Literature 211). Orgasm is considered a violation of the state’s laws. Marital intercourse is not a pleasant moment of lovemaking and exchange of affection. Unlike the government of A Clockwork Orange, the party does not seek to condition rapists such as Alex. Rather, its main goal is to eradicate the sexual instinct. The role of the telescreen is to make sure that party members conform to the Oceanian rules of sexuality. Transgressors and outlaws are punished by death. Winston states that “sexual privation induced hysteria, which was desirable because it could be transformed into war fever, and leadership worship” (139). Commenting on this statement, Cass R. Sunstein assumes that totalitarian regimes
suppress sexuality in order to replace it by mass marchings and public cheerings (233). She holds that the party mobilizes sexual hysteria in its favour (241).

We can infer that sexual repression is a strategy whereby the party leads its subjects to exteriorize their libidinal tension via warfare and state devotion rather than sex (Booker 210). The telescreen intervenes in the war-based sublimation by broadcasting war tunes and news. By the same token, it intervenes in the loyalty-driven exteriorization by showing Goldstein’s and other “traitors”’ portraits during such nationalist events as Hate Week and the Two-Minutes Hate. The party could not have carried out its coercive plans regarding sexuality in the absence of such a device as the telescreen. It is this technological invasion of sexual intimacy that has led Jonathan Rose to assume that “You cannot effectively police the bedroom unless you set up telescreens over every bed” (39). The continuous eye kept on them through this device has obliged them to execute the regime’s sexual orders by performing a weekly “duty to the party”, to use Katharine’s words (70). Hence, differently from feminist scholars who have seen Orwell’s portrayal of Katharine as prejudiced against sexless and shrivelled women (Hitchens 150), I hold that the negative characterization of Katharine is not motivated by an Orwellian misogyny towards women. Nor is his negative depiction of the female sex triggered by his “difficulties with girls” (141). Negativity is, rather, driven by a desire to condemn the techno-political alliance. Indeed, such a passage as “Always the eyes watching you and the voice enveloping you. Asleep or awake, working or eating, indoors or out of doors, in the bath or in bed - no escape” (Orwell 29), incites us to read Katherine’s stiffening at the touch of Winston’s fingers as a result of the screen’s presence in and surveillance of their sexual life.

The party controls love through science because affection threatens its political security (Posner 203). The party’s tyrannical constitution bans any form of attachment, loyalty or faithfulness to any person except Big Brother. Essentially, the party has come to abolish the most noble of feelings via its reliance on the control of population provided by the telescreen. The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of love associates it with personal attachment and strong affection (“Love”). The party opposes any form of
emotional bonds between its members because of its awareness of the power of love, a power that might lead people to defy the regime by acting individually and collectively.

In discussing the love story between Winston and Julia, John Strachey claims: “Here is a private passion, uncontrolled and unregulated by the party, a passion strong enough to make people act individually and spontaneously. No wonder the party sees the necessity of stamping it out” (58). It is not surprising, then, that Winston has considered sex as an act of defiance to state power, as Robin West contends in his “Sex, Law, Power and Community” (247). It is a challenge through which Winston has thought erroneously though - that he “could cheat the telescreen” (Orwell 13). Christopher Booker assumes that Julia and Winston’s commitment to each other represents their ultimate act of rebellion against and disobedience of the “all seeing” party (The Seven Plots 500); (Pittock George Orwell 174). Booker’s use of the term “all seeing” refers us, again, to the telescreen, in that it is the technology through which the police state achieves complete supervision. In his “Catholicism and Human Sexuality”, John Haldane refers to the Anti-Sex League’s attempts at dissociating reproduction from sex, as well as neutralizing sexual ecstasy through neurophysiological technologies (271). In fact, neuroscientists’ participation in this process is revelatory of the atrocity and inhumanity of a political-scientific alliance meant to erode sexual pleasure. Neurologists’ eradication of orgasm couples with the research on artificial insemination, thus accentuating the intensity of the sexual control exerted by Oceania’s politicized neurology.

1.2. A Clockwork Orange

The evidence presented so far testifies to the fact that the screen represents one major pillar in the Orwellian “architecture of [control and] repression” (Bernstein 26). In A Clockwork Orange by Anthony Burgess, the screen also serves a techno-political coalescence oppressing the individual and sacrificing his freedom for the sake of a despotic government. As a matter of fact, if the voice droning from the telescreen haunts Oceanians continuously, the films projected on Burgess’s screen have condemned Alex
to a soulless existence of control. Compared to Winston who is scrutinized from the
beginning of the narrative till its end, Alex seems to have more liberty because he carries
on freely throughout the first part of the story. However, the subsequent chapters reveal
Alex to be totally shackled by the stony trammels of political-scientific control. Indeed,
the Ludovico films are meant to control Alex’s devastating violence by purging his brutal
desires to commit evil acts. The behaviour-controlling strategy aims to eradicate the
protagonist’s ultra-violence by confronting him with ghastly scenes of aggression (Davis
and Womack 31). The first part of the novel introduces us to a miscellany of horrific
ultra-violent assaults committed by Alex and his gangmates (Pritchard 533). These range
from beating an old man, through kicking a storekeeper, and breaking into houses, to
sadistically gang-raping a woman in front of her helpless husband. The atrocities
committed by the aggressive juvenile gang reach as far as raping under-age girls, and
killing a reclusive old woman.

Accordingly, Alex has been coerced into a screen-based treatment resting upon the
diffusion of brutal films for aversive therapeutic ends. Stanley J. Dirks’s “Aversion
Therapy: Its Limited Potential for Use in the Correctional Setting” analyzes psychology’s
development of aversion therapies designed to control divergent behaviours. Dirks makes
it clear that the condition requirement for the therapy is that the crime is triggered by a
precise stimulus. The idea is to condition the patient’s response to the stimulation via
aversion (1327). This is the case of Alex whose awful crimes are motivated by an
enthusiasm for violence. In Alex’s case, the films stand for “the aversive stimulus”
(1338) that is to be controlled in order to achieve rehabilitation and to control him.

Nonetheless, despite the savagery of Alex’s terrible crimes, the reader identifies with
the character, and even feels pity and compassion towards him (Sisk 60). A variety of
narratorial effects are responsible for creating this effect on the reader. The most
prominent device might be the point of view that is based on a first-person narrative
trying to establish a link between the “humble narrator” and his readers to whom he
refers as his “brothers” (62). John J. Stinson calls this narratorial technique a “novelistic
trick” (“The Manichee World of Anthony Burgess” 58) meant to make the reader
sympathise with Alex who shares his life with them. The symbiotic connection between
Alex and his audience bespeaks the idea that nothing can justify the state’s oppression of individuals. This inference suggests that even the most appalling and scandalous crimes or calamities cannot justify politicians’ manipulation of science. Probing this idea in her article “Women in Dystopia: Misogyny in Brave New World, Nineteen Eighty-Four and A Clockwork Orange”, Deanna Madden writes: “Burgess suggests that, compared to the state’s crimes, Alex’s crimes are small” (304). Burgess’s point in his novel, thus, runs as follows: the repulsiveness and aggressivity of crimes should not allow the authorities to impose political-scientific therapies on the offenders.

Accounting for Alex’s crimes, John J. Stinson mentions that Burgess’s recourse to the grotesque aims to portray the group’s juvenile violence, but he does not elaborate on this idea (“The Manichee World of Anthony Burgess” 56). Indeed, we could consider that the grotesque represents a cornerstone element in the construction of the story. In The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory, the grotesque “denote[s] the ridiculous, bizarre, extravagant, freakish, and unnatural; in short, aberrations from the desirable norms of harmony, balance and proportion.” In this novel, the violent merges with the aggressive and brutish, the bestial with the bizarre, the animalistic with the freakish, the destructive with the unnatural, the belligerent with the extravagant. All this fusion and intermingling are meant to diffuse a mood of horror and an atmosphere of fear generated by the group’s brutality.

Nevertheless, the state uses the violence of Alex and his mates as a pretext and a justification for the cruelty and savagery of its Ludovico technique. In other words, the men of the state try to conceal the hideousness and ferocity of their conspiracy with the men of science by amplifying the destructiveness of the gang’s acts. There can be no denying that the group’s attacks have caused much disorder, disturbance and harm. However, adjusting human beings and transforming them into model citizens can by no means be considered a valid excuse for the enforcement of coercive brainwashing experiments. The government of A Clockwork Orange is not the only dictatorship that exerizes control by aggravating certain threats. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, the party conceals its persecution of opponents by exacerbating the menace their treason poses to the Oceanian nation. Similarly, the Meccanian Superstate hides its deportation of
dissidents to mental asylums by overstating the threat linked to the spread of their lunacy. In the three dystopias the threat of dissidence is over-amplified for propagandistic purposes.

In "What's Going to Be Then, Eh?" Deciphering Adolescent Violence and Adult Corruption in A Clockwork Orange, Sam Johnson tackles Alex's brutal character from a psychological standpoint linking the protagonist's violence to his being posited within the delicate border state between childhood and adulthood, a state necessitating a search for identity and individuality (29). The author relies on a variety of psychological formulae in order to convey Alex's investment in "strategies of self-actualisation and self determination" (30) through "a self-conscious parade of physical and sexual brutalities" (34). It is William H. Pritchard's assertion that A Clockwork Orange depicts a "lawless individual [who] is at odds with a 'benevolent' state" (22). Indeed, the whole narrative of the political-scientific coalition revolves around this notion of benevolence. It is under the pretext of protecting society from the teenage Alex and his fellow droogs that the state applies its reifying and dehumanizing policy. The government attempts to make its people thankful and grateful for its genuine use of science to control Alex. As soon as Alex leaves the hospital, newspapers declare the state to be the protector of the nation because it has come to control Alex's criminal desires, hence rehabilitating him into a socially acceptable and peaceful person of service to the state.

This cure functions as an undeniable proof of the regime's good governance and strictness towards any abusers. Morris's idea is that governments spread a sense of "paranoia that will ultimately engender allegiance through fear" ("The Bitter Fruits of Freedom" 47). His assumption is that the fear the state diffuses through the insistence upon and the amplification of the threat of violence enables it to get people's approval and acceptance. Through this mechanism of fear amplification, the therapy gains legality and acceptability. David W. Sisk maintains that the government justifies itself by indicating the "social utility" (72) of conditioning Alex against committing more brutalities. Understanding this motive explains the state's presentation of the Ludovico method as part of a plan that aims at protecting the country's security. Alex's successive transgressions of law engender a security crisis. His gang's violations of the law are
presented as a threat to the country's peace. His arbitrary ultra-violence endangers all citizens' lives and well-being, hence the necessity of transforming the leader of the group into a well-behaved citizen. This task will be designed, administered, and implemented by the state as a defense of its right to "a monopoly on the legitimate use of [... ] force" (Weber Politics as a Vocation 2). It should be added that the ethos referred to in the government's propagandistic rhetoric is twofold: social and religious.

I have so far investigated the rhetorical social scenario related to brutality. As for religion, the religious precept of goodness represents one major pretext under which politics hides the hideousness of its alliance with politics. Critiquing the good versus evil argument, the prison chaplain anxiously interrogates: "What does God want. Does God want goodness, or the choice of goodness?" (96). This question brings us to the core of the controversy over choice. The legal, moral, and religious aspects of Alex's deeds are at stake here. This tripartite combination evokes the idea of the human condition in an increasingly technological world that has reified and automatized individuals. In the three dystopias with which we are dealing, choice is annihilated. In each of them the individual is doomed to obey the orders of the political-scientific alliance.

The implications of the political-scientific coalescence on humans' liberty are to be seen in terms of choice. Robert K. Morris draws attention to this cornerstone concept by linking it to the end of Burgess's The Wanting Seed where Tristram asks the war Office Major whether he thinks that people are totally good. More particularly, Morris focuses on the officer's reply that "they now have a chance to be good" (cited in "The Bitter Fruits of Freedom" 45), a reply whose refutation underlies A Clockwork Orange, to use Morris's argument. The critic underscores the chosen evil/imposed good dilemma underlying the political-scientific coalescence governing the novel's plot (44-45). He connects the selected evil/enforced good dichotomy to the "technically perfect society that has sapped our vitality for constructive choice" (45). Indeed, science has cooperated with tyrannical politics, thus giving rise to a political technicality that has stripped humans of their ability to choose. These technical politics have predestined the subjects to bear, accept and even champion the fate chosen for them by the scientific state.
Commenting on the free-will question regarding behaviour control, P.S. Greenspan states: “The process makes Alex unfree because it brings his behavior under the control of certain causes, the stimuli which give rise to conditioned responses” (228). The idea is that the agent lacks full control over his behaviour, since he does not know its motivation, which prevents him from behaving otherwise (238). In this respect, Robbie B.H. Goh assimilates the Ludovico technique to Skinnerian conditioning (264). This idea is also present in John Stinson’s *Anthony Burgess Revisited* where he sheds light upon the critical interpretation of the Ludovico technique as a critique of B.F. Skinner’s behaviourist theories (58-59). Skinner refutes the notion of “autonomous man” (24). He maintains that human behaviour is controlled by the stimuli present in an environment (17). Hence, once these stimuli are commanded, the human being can be controlled. In Alex’s case, the political-scientific application of the Skinnerian model functions through conditioning his responses to violent stimuli.

More to the point, what Charles G. Hoffmann and A.C. Hoffmann call “the Orwellian horror of Alex’s reclamation” (34), has come to represent the most prominent achievement of the state, an achievement upon which the party in power relies in its search for a second term of rule. The “Orwellian” control that has been haunting Alex has come to be considered as a glorious accomplishment worthy of praise. Charles G. Hoffman and A.C. Hoffmann are not the only critics to draw a comparison between *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and *A Clockwork Orange*. Robert K. Morris has also pointed out connections between these two works: “Like those of Orwell and Huxley, Burgess’s exaggerated portraits of the confrontation between individual and state [...] moved closer to the impasse where the problems at last overwhelm the solutions” (“The Bitter Fruits of Freedom” 39).

A.A. De Vitis draws the same parallel between *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, *A Clockwork Orange* and *Brave New World*: it is “in many ways reminiscent of Aldous Huxley’s and George Orwell’s utopian models” (104). Indeed, the supposedly utopian model is revealed to be dystopian. This novel critiques the illegal control generated by the coordination between science and politics. In *A Clockwork Orange*, predestination occurs through a whole techno-political conditioning process that cherishes stability. In *Raids on
Human Consciousness: Writing, Anarchism and Violence, Arthur Redding reveals “the manufacture of consent” to be “the predominant means of social control and regulation” (4). The governmental industry of approval enhancing sets up a whole mechanism of supervision wherefrom none can flee. By eradicating opposition, the state’s machinery of forcing acceptance ensures the continuity of the regime.

The state pretends that its use of a medical therapy is meant to treat Alex in a scientific - and not in an oppressive - way. In the introduction of his One Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse states: “Our society distinguishes itself by conquering the centrifugal social forces with technology rather than terror, on the dual basis of an overwhelming efficiency and an increasing standard of living” (x). The point is that terrorization has acquired a milder facet, because it has come to be enacted through technology. Marcuse makes it clear that the technical apparatus is not dissociable from society’s politics. His contention is that “technology serves to institute new, more effective and more pleasant forms of social control and social cohesion” (xv). The newness of “the totalitarian tendency of these controls” resides in its stemming from a non-neutrality of technology, for the technological society dominates via its manipulation of technique (xvi). The government’s use of screens, wires and “dentist’s chair[s]” (Burgess 88) typifies its monitoring of technological devices in order to effect its control over the undisciplined members. Alex’s employment of the term “dentist” in connection with the electrical wheelchair to which he is fastened is not without reference to the cooperation between science and politics.

The linguistic dimension should not escape our notice because it can offer another gate to our analysis of the control imposed by the coalescence. An investigation of Nadsat, the gang’s jargon, reveals its suggestiveness with regard to the political-scientific alliance governing the novel. In The Consolations of Ambiguity, Robert K. Morris contends that the ferocity and coarseness of Nadsat catches the violence of the novel’s episodes (57). In fact, the teenage jargon captures the harshness of the political-scientific cooperation. For instance, the term “horrorshow” denotes good (Brophy 4). Such a denotation is revelatory of Burgess’s critique of the notion of goodness as understood by the state, and as applied via its manipulation of the Ludovico technique’s “horrorshow...
technology.” Analyzing the same term, Emmanuel Vernadakis and Graham Woodroffe have pointed out that Alex’s Anglicization of the Russian khorosho that means originally “good”, or “well”, has made it mean that goodness should be linked to horror (232). Hence, Nadsat can be read as a linguistic attempt at denouncing the horrific control exerted by the political-scientific cooperation.

Many critics have assimilated Nadsat with Newspeak in terms of their linguistic inventiveness and creativity (Carney 92-98). Both languages unveil the political-scientific alliance’s repercussions on freedom. In Nineteen Eighty-Four the linguistic ramifications of political-scientific control will eradicate all concepts related to liberty, dissidence and free thinking. In A Clockwork Orange Nadsat is both revelatory and condemning of the control exerted by politicians in assistance with scientists. In “Linguistics, Mechanics and Metaphysics: Anthony Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange”, Esther Petix goes as far as to see in Nadsat “the platonic form of mechanism: the cadence of a metronome and the ticking-tocking ramifications of humanity without essence” (126).

Much in this vein, Robbie B.H. Goh asserts that Alex’s linguistic performances encapsulate the work’s vision of social - and, I would add, scientific - control (264), because many Nadsat words highlight the political-scientific coalescence. In this view, Alex’s experimentation with language represents “a sort of micro-politics of the individual” (265) who exteriorizes the pressure put on him or her by the political through the linguistic. The fact that Alex not only uses Nadsat prior to his capture, but during his imprisonment and treatment period as well underlines the political-scientific-linguistic tripartite combination through which Nadsat jargon becomes a form of resistance to the coalescence that disciplines people via imposing “horrorshow goodness” on them. While the gang likes horrorshows, the political conception of what a horror show is has made Alex abhor them. In Goh’s words, Alex’s iconic neologisms, onomatopoeic words and nonlexical experimentations are revelatory of his struggle for authenticity in the governmental dystopian universe of control (275).

In “‘O My Brothers’: Reading the Anti-Ethics of the Pseudo-Family in Anthony Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange”, Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack point out Nadsat’s lack of all words denoting love, tenderness, or compassion (25). However, the
inexistence of a love diction might be understood within the framework of critiquing the mechanical control fostered by the alliance between politics and science. In other words, the absence of words related to the semantic field of affection symbolically maps Alex’s condition during the treatment. It epitomizes the harshness and pitilessness with which Alex’s therapists treat him. It is true that this lack is apparent in the Nadsat verbal system even prior to Alex’s capture and to the subsequent attempt to control him. However, the prominence of the linguistic emotional void during the aversion therapy must tell us more about the cruelty and pitilessness of the political-scientific alliance, because it mocks all governmental claims of benevolence, care, humaneness, goodness and charity. No wonder, then, that David W. Sisk stresses “the centrality of language and its relationship to individual freedom and state control” (79) in A Clockwork Orange, Nineteen Eighty-Four and Brave New World.

**1.3. Meccania: The Superstate**

*Meccania: The Superstate* represents another novel featuring politicians’ reliance on science in order to police the population. Indeed, the control exercised by politicized science and scientific politics in Meccania, starts prior to arriving in the national territory. Before being allowed entrance to the Meccanian territory, visitors must undergo a medical examination. The fact that tourists have to see doctors just after they meet Stiff, the Inspector of Foreigners, in order to be able to stay in Meccania, refers us to the cooperation between scientists and politicians. Ming, the Chinese tourist who has visited Meccania and who depicts it, wonders at the exactitude whereby the doctor pronounces his name (Gregory 9), and his remembrance that Inspector Stiff has sent the doctor a card using a pneumatic tube testifies to the state’s resolution to mechanics in order to achieve its security goals. The lamson tubes that are used to transport small objects within the building are designed by mechanics specialized in the electrical and mechanical aspects of the pipelines. The transportation of the information between scientists and doctors via a Pneumatic Tube Transport reveals the state’s command of science, particularly the
branch of mechanics in order to transfer information and observations about visitors. In fact, Winston Smith uses the same mechanically engineered tubes in order to transmit the falsified messages he writes. He also receives the messages requiring corrections via these tubes.

Thumb-print and foot-print taking represents part of the medical examination, which adds to the political dimension of the entrance medical test, and conveys the fusion of science and politics in Meccania. Automatically, after the end of the diagnosis, the doctor disappears, and comes back to announce the inspector’s readiness to see Ming again in fifteen minutes. This act leaves no doubt about the coalition between the doctors and the inspectors of foreigners who work for the state. Besides, once the medical examination ends, Ming is put in a room. While it is the doctor who has assigned Ming to stay in his room, the person who comes to see him as he eats his supper is a state official. Again, the official’s act of visiting Ming in a clinical setting brings to mind the alliance between men of science and men of the state. Before starting the tour in Meccania, Conductor Sheep says: “We shall first make a geographical survey of the town, then we shall visit the public buildings, taking note of their architectural features, and beginning first with those under local control, following on with those under the joint control, and concluding with those solely under the control of the Central Government” (19). The repetition of the term “control” in this first introduction to the city foreshadows the state’s supervision of all aspects of life in Meccania. The conductor’s subsequent remark that “everything has been carefully prescribed by the department of culture and the Department of Sociology” unveils the human sciences’ cooperation with the regime in order to achieve such surveillance.

Ming’s tour in the public buildings mirrors this alliance. To start with, the weekly quantity of animal food in the slaughter houses is determined by the department of sociology. The sociological stratification of the Meccanian society into seven distinct classes serves to establish and maintain stability. The classification itself is a form of control. Indeed, the same mechanical social stratification is found in Nineteen Eighty-Four where the population is divided into the proles and the Outer and Inner Party members. Similarly to Meccania, the classification of Oceanians along these three major
lines enables the oligarchy to perfect its control over its subjects. Dividing the nation into seven strata distinguished from each other by the colour of its uniform enables the regime to hold tight social control of the seven groups (Bleiber 301). By giving particular prerogatives to certain classes and by exempting others from some duties, the Superstate applies a well-defined and controlled society model. For instance, the fifth, sixth and seventh classes are prohibited from keeping alcohol in their houses. The weekly family budgets are scrutinized by the government: whenever the authorities find an excess in the consumption of drinks per head, the “offender” (Gregory 25) is fined and warned against any future transgression of Meccanian laws. In the event of persistence, the outlaw is banned from purchasing any drink for a period determined by the authorities. Even more, expenditures on dress are regulated according to each Meccanian’s social class.

Commenting upon the scrutiny of the family budgets, the guide praises the efficiency of Meccanian monetary regulations: “One might suppose that such regulations could be evaded; so they could in most countries, but not in Meccania. Everything is so perfectly scrutinized that no evasion seems possible” (25-26). The impossibility of fleeing state control is ensured by a coalition between state officials and sociologists. According to this coalescence, information regarding household accounts of individuals belonging to the fifth, sixth and seventh classes are exchanged between men from the Sociological department and politicians: “The facts are only known to the officials, and in any case they would be required by the Sociological Department. How else could it obtain the necessary data for its researches?” (26), says Sheep.

Not only is each wife instructed how to spend the family budget properly, but she is required to dispatch a detailed account book specifying her expenses at the end of each quarter. Explaining the Meccanian life to Ming, the guide states that the use of these family statistics by the Sociological Department “is simply indispensable.” These family figures are known and used by the Time Department that distributes them to the sections occupied with commerce and industry. In Meccania the Sociological Department replaces the telescreen in Oceania. Thanks to its continuous scrutiny of the population, the Meccanian Superstate knows everything about each individual. In The Dictionary of Imaginary Places, Graham Greenfield states that “the degree of control exercised by the
state is largely due to the efforts of the Department of Sociology and the Department of Time. The former collects statistics on everything from industrial production to domestic expenditure, in order that everything can be centrally planned” (236).

The guide's conclusion regarding the transmission of family information between the different departments is that “all our Meccanian institutions are so arranged that they serve several purposes and fit in with the whole Meccanian scheme of life” (Gregory 26-27). This sentence explains the mechanism that governs life in Meccania. The sociological categorization cannot be escaped because any attempt at wearing inappropriate uniforms or “unauthorized decoration” (28) is severely penalized. Each person must recognize and abide to the stripes, buttons, badges and colour appropriate to his social class. Indeed, the rarity of the infringements is telling about the degree of the control achieved by the state, a control whose totality threatens, daunts and deters any thoughts of defiance or criminality. The stratification sets up a societal standardization that, again, impedes any prospect of resistance. The standardization of uniforms has surpassed the seven colours and the seven clothings to the clothes manufacturing industry itself, in that each social class has its own tailors, and no tailor would dare sew clothes for members of another class. Even more, the expenditures on dress are regulated according to each Meccanian’s social class.

Boasting of the Meccanian organization of the maternity department while showing the medical attendance to Ming, the state official Sheep says: “we employ a number of women doctor nurses in this Section” (30). Sheep’s use of the plural personal pronoun “we” sheds light upon Meccanian politicians’ employment of doctors, thus uncovering the political-scientific coalescence governing the country. The fact that this statement comes from Sheep who is a state official further documents the coalescence. Sheep’s reference to the annual report issued by the Higher General Staff that is responsible to the state for the other medical sections deepens the sense of cooperation between science and politics in Meccania. It is interesting here to mention that the office of the Central Police Station is located in the building in which Ming and all other foreigners are diagnosed. The setting operates as a harbour for interconnected policing and diagnostic objectives. The building’s large size compared to that of Bridgetown coupled with the prominent
presence of officials, police officers and doctors, testifies to the depth of the political-scientific alliance. The data provided by the Sociological Department enables the state to maintain a tight control over all aspects of the subjects' lives. They even prescribe a childbirth plan determining the number of kids to be delivered during each five years.

This political-sociological surveillance has amounted to an educational control of the population, for the first and second class kids do not study in Bridgetown. The sixth and seventh class children pursue their education till the age of twelve. Fifth class pupils study till they are fifteen, and their training leads them to become skilful workmen. The Juvenile Bureau of Industry decides upon the occupations that will be given to graduates belonging to the three lowest classes. It is the rigid sevenfold classification prescribed by the Sociological Department which decides upon a student's future career rather than one's bent, talent and "inclinations" (37). Probing the educational system in Meccania, Ming states that it is "one of the institutions managed by the State and the Municipality" (35). The subsequent comparison of students to soldiers hints at the role of the educationists who prepare pupils to be in the service of the state: "The children [...] all marched in step, in twos or fours, like little soldiers" (36).

The reference to education fits into the analysis of the political-scientific coalescence because science denotes knowledge ("Science" The Oxford English Dictionary), and education represents the dissemination of knowledge. The point is that this dissemination is planned, regulated and designed by the State Inspectors who "decide what is to be taught: the local officers carry out their instructions and classify the children" (Gregory 36). The whole curriculum, the course descriptions and the books taught are all dictated by the Central Department. The Meccanian control of education might bring forth the image of the falsified history books that are assigned to students in Nineteen Eighty-Four. In Meccania, the scientific-political alliance is apparent on the level of education in a variety of ways. Chief among these is the research that has been conducted by the Meccanian psychologists on the amount of play necessary for each child. As the state finds play to be the least profitable cognitive activity, it has decided to eliminate it from both the educational system and the national culture. The target is to reduce the span of amusement to a minimum through a reliance on the experiments made by "the Meccanian
psychologists [who] had demonstrated that the amount necessary both in the case of children and in the case of adults had been grossly exaggerated in the past" (110). The passage makes it clear that “these experiments would have been impossible without the assistance of the Time Department.”

This last statement attests to the cooperation that takes place between the Time Department and the Sociological Department. The personal data of each individual is transmitted to the Meccanian psychologists whose experiments are meant to inform and help carry out the state’s plans of control and surveillance. The objective of such intimidating transmission of private information is to further the control exercised by the state, and to deny any possibility of rebellion. The psychotherapeutic experiments are not confined to the elimination of play. Rather, they aim at finding substitutes compatible with the state’s policies: “Other experiments equally valuable have been conducted in order to discover what forms of amusement are most profitable from the cultural point of view, these include experiments to improve production” (112).

The results attained by Meccanian psychologists have permitted the autocracy to replace play with work. Hence, instead of wasting time in playing inefficiently, Meccanian kids are employed to work with simple machines. Thanks to the cooperation between politicians and psychologists, Meccania has come to benefit from children’s “semi-recreative work”, and to export merchandise worth a million annually. Although all unbiased psychological studies have shown the harmful effects of child labour, Meccanian psychologists oppose all objections to children’s work by showing its beneficial side. Benefit is not limited to economy, for even the military has taken advantage of such semi-recreative work. Second-class boys are trained to become soldiers during these semi-enjoyment hours. Substitution of aimless amusement with more efficient exercises also applies to adults whose fondness of chess, aimless walks, and rambles in the country, has been changed into an interest in math.

The Superstate’s reliance on psychologists transcends the domain of play and playfulness, and touches the artistic life in Meccania. Theatre attendance is compulsory in the Superstate. Graham Greenfield notes that all plays are written “with didactic intent -by a supervised group of experts rather than by a single author” (236, emphasis added).
As theatres are owned by the state, the regime uses dramatic performances in order to inculcate its own conception of the Meccanian spirit in its subjects. The result is that Meccanian “playwrights became civil servants” (114) penning such works as *The Futility of Democracy, Obedience, The Triumph of Meccania,* and *National Self-Consciousness.* The point is that psychologists intervene in order to make the messages inherent in the play affect Meccanians’ psychology and behaviour. Explaining the work of the expert Board of Dramatic Criticism to Ming, Dr. Dodder states:

We have, of course, expert psychologists who are able to test the particular psychological effect both of each phase of the play and of the impression made by individual actors. Their experiments are of great value both to our dramatic managers and to the writers of plays. (121)

The result is that the marriage between art and the Meccanian oppressive spirit has been ensured through the state’s monopoly of psychology. When Ming declares his inability to appreciate Meccanian plays, Madame Blobber responds: “That is only because our mental environment is in advance to the rest of Europe. Physical science, including of course medical science is part of our mental furniture” (214-215). The term “in advance” evokes the sweeping technological and scientific progress. The statement reveals that the mental state is in part determined by the medical science. The idea is that medicine shapes the national psyche, because medical officers’ research is designed to make the public imbibe and assimilate the despotic Meccanian doctrines. Meccania’s success in forcing its people to absorb its tyrannical ideals is due to its reliance on a scientific staff meant to cultivate the Meccanian spirit in the artistic, familial, social and political aspects of life. This multi-faceted fusion of advanced power confirms that “the Superstate is the supreme and only ruler in Meccania” (219).

The presence and continuity of Meccanian autocratic rule depends upon “some groups of persons [who] really wielded the power of the State.” Scientists are among the most eminent and efficient of these groups whose subservience and obedience have served the regime and ensured both its stability and the durability of its hegemonic operations. Accounting for the state machinery, Count Krafft assumes that the Superstate “places everybody in such a position as enables him to render the greatest service to the State that
he is capable of rendering” (220). Such politically accurate positioning applies perfectly to scientists whose placement has allowed their involvement in all the dimensions of life. In consequence, the regime has benefitted from their research and experiments in order to control the population: “Consequently, no fault can be found by any class or section [...], because they are merely the instruments of the State itself.” Just like in *A Clockwork Orange*, in *Meccania* scientists represent the most indispensable agency for the continuity of the totalitarian apparatus. Their tests and discoveries are vital prerequisites for an abiding surveillance and discipline of the people.

It should be added that scientists’ surveillance of the artistic scene is also manifested via the science of Musical Psychology which appeared a century ago. This musical science tests the psychological effect of compositions on the people. Even more, the studies conducted by musical psychologists have enabled musicians to impact Meccanians in certain ways: “We know what they wanted to effect, and we have discovered how to get those effects” (212). Hence, the Superstate has engineered music in the same way it has manipulated theatre. In this regard, Madame Blobber declares that “there can be no art in the proper sense without a science.” The conclusion is that science has fused into art in order to serve propaganda. The political-scientific-artistic alliance is also prominent in the pictures contained in the Great Meccanian Gallery. The title of one drawing is revelatory of the coalescence. The picture is called “The Nuptials of Science and Force”. The conjugal connection established in the title between science and force mirrors the marital tie connecting scientific knowledge to despotic power. The vulnerable victim of this tie is the citizen who has been transformed into a subject.

The participation of scientists in subjugating individuals is not limited to the cultural life. Rather, scientists’ intervention has allowed the oligarchy to impose its production plans on Meccanians. Indeed, there is another rank of psychologists called industrial psychologists. They wear green uniforms, and their work is centred on factories. When Ming visits the engineering works, he sees one of them applying an instrument to one of the employees. Upon asking conductor Lickrod about the function of this psychologist, he is told “that is one of our industrial psychologists testing the psycho-physiological effect of certain operations” (150). Lickrod’s use of the term “one” reveals that there are
many psychologists in service of the autocracy. The possessive "our" suggests that psychologists are owned by the regime, which conveys that their scientific research is the exclusive property of the regime. The possessive is present in Lickrod's subsequent remark: "It is all part of our science of production." The plural pronoun "our" is tied to the word science, which accentuates the depth of the political-scientific coalition in Meccania. According to this science, each worker's fatigue level is counted daily. Whenever a worker is proven to be under-fatigued, he is obliged to compensate for the under-exhaustion offence. Underfatigue is considered a transgression requiring a punishment consisting of drudgery. The rule is that exhaustion has to be equally distributed among workers.

More to the point, the Department of Industry and Commerce has a whole section called Industrial Psychology. It is composed of psychological experts whose mission is to report the workers' abilities to the department, and to recommend reduction or addition of work hours. The suggestions and recommendations they present to the department are based upon the different experiments they conduct on the Meccanian labour force. The Strenuous Month represents a striking evidence of industrial psychologists' devotion to the state's dictates with regard to increasing the industrial output. Each year, a month is chosen as "the Strenuous Month". During these thirty days, employees have to work at top speed for an extra number of hours decided by the psychologists. Not only does the production soar during this month, but these thirty days are beneficial for the output throughout the whole year. Workmen's happiness at the end of the Strenuous Month's burden leads them to work better unconsciously during the other months (Greenfield 234).

The political-scientific coalescence during the Month of drudgery is not limited to psychologists' involvement in controlling the work force. Rather, nutritionists also take part in the process whereby the regime controls its workmen. Indeed, they prescribe a dietary system that enables employees to bear the added load of work during this particular month: "Their diet is arranged both during the time and for a month after" (Gregory 242). These diets might remind us of the diet imposed on Alex during his stay in the hospital. Doctors' inflexibility with regard to Alex's diet is not driven by a humane
care for his health. Likewise, the Meccanian dietary system is not motivated by benevolent intentions aimed at preventing workers from feeling lethargic. Rather, they should be read and understood within the matrix framework of the control exercised by political-scientific forces in order to supervise the population. In this regard, the Meccanian breeding system represents another incarnation of political control over the population. The diets that are imposed on the Meccanian families represent another form of control allowed by an alliance between politicians and scientists, particularly the nutritionists working in both the Food Department and the Department of Health who prescribe and help apply diets for the three lowest classes (Greenfield 236).

The evidence presented so far highlights the cooperation between nutritionists and psychologists on the one hand and politicians on the other hand. It is interesting to mention that the collaboration of scientists is not only meant to increase productivity. The involvement of the men of science has wider implications: the repercussions surpass the limits of adding work hours, thus achieving a total control of the Meccanian mode of thinking. Discussing public opinion with Ming, Lickrod argues: “Our psychologists will tell you exactly how that public opinion is formed. They made a careful study of it before we decided to replace it by something better” (183). Psychologists’ study of public opinion is, thus, directed towards the achievement of the state’s tyrannical ends. The regime uses the results reached by psychotherapists in order to manipulate public thought. Lickrod’s reference to Meccania as a “scientific government” reinforces the reader’s awareness of the political-scientific conspiracy, especially as experts are presented as the only agents who are qualified to advise the autocracy in issues related to policy taking and decision making. The most telling statement about the scientific-political cooperation is probably conductor Lickrod’s assertion that “the Meccanian culture of today is the result of education and scientific statesmanship” (187).

Statesmanship refers to public administration, or to international relations between national governments. Rather than being between two governments, the relations involved here are between science and the state. It is simply governance via science because science represents a key element in Meccanian interior policies. It enables the Superstate to supervise, feed, educate, hire and classify its subjects according to its
tyrannical wishes. Men of science work in favour of the regime since their research and discoveries are directed towards perfecting the autocracy's Superpower. In this regard, Mr. Villele asserts that "the Meccanian maxim is that the state must be strong within in order to be strong without" (229). The state's inner strength is ensured through its control of science. "The Super-strength" (230) cannot be fulfilled without complicity between scientists and politicians. Later on, Mr. Johnson says that "the state, or the Super-state is the Divinity in which society lives, and moves, and has its being. It is omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent" (239). The Big Brother-like omniscience, omnipresence and omnipotence are due to the state's ownership and monopoly of all the institutions. The role of science in creating and maintaining this monopoly is undeniable.

One of the manifestations of scientists' cooperation with the state is seen in the militaristic field. Professor Slimey shows that "all the most gifted scientists compete for places in the colleges for the training of the Military" (254). Mr. Villele asserts that the notion of pedagogical pathology has to be understood within the major framework of militarism, which makes the whole psychotherapeutic pedagogics a means meant to achieve this belligerent end. Hence, it seems that the cultivation of the Meccanian spirit is ensured thanks to the work of psychologists, sociologists, nutritionists and educators. Eventually, it is noteworthy that Gregory's characterization of the Meccanian officials and guides whom Ming meets is largely negative. It rests upon pejorative names that might hint at the ugliness of the political-scientific complicity. In fact, the name "Slimey" might refer us to the adjective "slimy" that means greasy, oily, wretched, or despicable. Similarly, the name "Villele" might refer to the adjective "vile". And the name "Sheep" evokes the image of society as livestock unable to think rationally, and in need of guidance and command from the Superstate. "Stiff" is another name that denotes one who is rigid. In these pejorative names, Gregory accentuates the atrocity of political-scientific control.
1.4. Conclusion

In their different ways, the tyrants ruling over the worlds of the three dystopias, manufacture consent, produce consensus and uproot contest. As a matter of fact, the three novels feature different political technicalities meant to control and condition the subjects by orienting them towards a future dictated by and according to the regime's will, needs, expectations and potential plans of control and hegemony. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and *A Clockwork Orange*, science and psychiatry cooperate to produce the screen mechanisms responsible for the brainwashing programs. In *Meccania*, the human sciences in their different psychological, sociological and educational manifestations influence the preconditioning strategies that champion the stable status quo over a possible free and changed environment/life. The very thought of a change towards freedom and liberty endangers the despotic authority of the superstates; hence their relentless political-scientific fight against menacing transformation. What matters for the party (*Nineteen Eighty-Four*), the government (*A Clockwork Orange*), and the Superstate (*Meccania*) is not people's autonomy and free will. Rather, their objective is to maintain an everlasting state of control and supremacy. In order to fulfill this tyrannical target, the three autocracies depend on science and the technologies generated by scientific research. The result of the political-scientific coalition is a combination of politicized science and technicized politics meant to make "each of us [...] a little clockwork orange" (Morris "The Bitter Fruits of Freedom" 45). The three novels feature the way scientific politics and politicized science provide the tyrant with instruments, tools and research meant to predestinate subjects’ minds to become Oceanians, Meccanians, and Good citizens. Morris even refers to the men of the state as "the engineers of power politics" (47). His use of the term engineers in association with politicians is not without an implicit hint at the techno-political coalescence. Nor is it without implicit references to the political-scientific conspiracy that uses scientific research and inventions in order to police the population.
Chapter 2: Punishment

The three dystopian worlds of *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, *A Clockwork Orange* and *Meccania: The Superstate* are haunted by a ubiquitous machinery of state control. Their “underworld of surveillance” (Johnson 39) is compounded by an underworld of punishment for those who dare defy the dictates of state control. The audacity of challenging or questioning the hegemonic surveillance of any of the three autocracies leads to penalizing the rebel. Hence, the question that arises at this early stage of the analysis is: what is punishment?

Punishment is designed to penalize, adjust and correct any misconduct. Misconduct is defined from the punishing agent’s perspective as a behaviour deviating from its moral or technical standards (Trevino 648). Punishment can be classified along physical and psychological lines. Yet, it is difficult to draw a dividing line between the two because the infliction of corporal penalties causes mental suffering in additional to the physical harm (Scarre 297). In the section related to the punishment of criminals in the *Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*, the purposes of punishment are rehabilitation, individual deterrence, general deterrence, incapacitation and retribution (“Punishment of Criminals”). Thus, the reasons necessitating punishment range from educating the offender, through protecting society, to deterring other potential threats (Orth 173). The two motives of penal systems are retribution and behaviour control (174). These punitive aims are achieved through promoting a propagandistic agenda calling for “general prevention” and “societal security” (177).

Hence, punishment becomes a medium for achieving the retributive objectives connected with social welfare (Greene and Cohen 1775). Indeed, the *Encarta World English Dictionary* defines punishment as “a penalty that is imposed on somebody for wrongdoing” (“Punishment”). Wrongdoing denotes transgressions of judicial law, social norms, religious rules, or cultural morality. However, under dictatorial regimes, it has come to mean political opposition or a lack of discipline. *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, *A Clockwork Orange* and *Meccania: The Superstate* are three science fiction dystopias that feature the imposition of tyrannical penalties on characters. The aim of each totalitarian
punishment is to discipline and control the rebel, and the common point between them is their reliance on science. When Hannah Arendt probes totalitarianism, she refers to the concentration and extermination camps as being the penal laboratories of the regimes (Aharony 193). Nevertheless, historical, testimonial, and - in the case of these three novels - literary evidence has shown that the laboratory aspect of totalitarian persecution is not limited to punitive concentration camps because it has reached hospitals and mental institutions.

In the three dystopian worlds of Nineteen Eighty-Four, A Clockwork Orange and Meccania: The Superstate, the clinic functions as a substitute for the penal camps wherein political opposition is suppressed and opponents are intimidated. The hospital applies the same techniques of penal aggression and intimidation. The political-scientific coalescence embellishes and legalizes its morbid deeds through the inclusion of the hospital in the penal apparatus. Embellishment occurs when the regime presents its coercive suppression of opposition as a humane enterprise of medical treatment. Legalization happens when the state stresses its benevolent intentions regarding sanity, national security and social welfare. Despots make the masses believe that “others have to be converted to the supreme values of their ideology for their well-being” (Bernholz 33).

These dictatorial claims are present in the three aforementioned dystopias, and they enable the autocracies to eliminate individuals’ legal right to dissidence. Hannah Arendt writes that “the most basic human right is ‘the right to have rights’” (cited in Aharony 199). By presenting the opponent as a lunatic, the dissident loses this right because he is placed under the paternalist custody of a benevolent party, government or Superstate meant to “cure” (Orwell 265; Burgess 94; Gregory 268) him or her. Considered as heretics, Winston, Alex and Stillman lose the ability to act, as their regimes come to act on their behalf and - in the regimes’ views - for their benefit. The cornerstone of this political retributive action is “treatment”. O’Brien tells Winston: “Shall I tell you why we have brought you here? To cure you! To make you sane” (Orwell 265, emphasis added). Similarly, Dr. Brodsky says to Alex: “You are being made sane, you are being made healthy” (Burgess 95, emphasis added). These two scenes find their parallel in Meccania
when Canting speaks about the prophylactic treatment’s ability to cure lunacy (Gregory 268).

This treatment targets the “insane” (Aharony 202) dissident elements who need to be punished because of their resistance to the oppressive regime. Studying totalitarian punitive practices, Hannah Arendt states: “The ghastly experiment of eliminating, under scientifically controlled conditions, spontaneity itself is an expression of human behaviour and transforming the human personality into a mere thing, into something that even animals are not” (cited in Aharony 204, emphasis added). An investigation of Nineteen Eighty-Four, A Clockwork Orange and Meccania: The Superstate reveals that the mental hospital has come to work in conjunction with the extermination camps as far as punitive degradation, dehumanization, objectification and elimination of uniqueness are concerned. This conjunction informs the scientific involvement in the political retributive mechanism of state terror and brute force. A focus on the plotline is basic to an understanding of the political-scientific force operating within the three stories because it throws light on the coalition’s effects on human psychology. The plots of these novels portray three solitary characters who find themselves in a direct confrontation with political-scientific tyranny and whose dissidence leads to his confinement in a clinic. The divergent thoughts and actions of each of them lie at the core of his deportation to a curative/punitive institution. In these science fiction dystopias, the order of the therapeutic deportation comes from politicians, and is executed by scientists. It is why doctors, mental hospitals and state officials are prominent in the three novels.

In the three works, politicians’ command of science has generated a penal system that tries to avoid visible tyranny through acting “in-depth” (cited in Miller 212). The in-depth action seeks to transform rebels’ “hearts”, “thoughts” and “inclinations.” The result of this disciplinary corrective/clinical process is the creation of “a system of institutional torture” (Grosz 134). As illustrated in Nineteen Eighty-Four, A Clockwork Orange and Meccania: The Superstate, the main institution in this medical retributive mechanism is the clinic which corrects through “treating” and punishes through “curing”. Science’s concealment of the ugliness of the political punishment of dissidence represents a point of intersection between Nineteen Eighty-Four, A Clockwork Orange and Meccania
because psychiatric science’s intervention in the rehabilitation process presents the penalty as an efficient cure to people’s heresies. The result is that any divergence from mainstream thoughts and behaviours necessitates a corrective treatment meant to bring individuals’ sanity back.

As a matter of fact, the grisly spectacle of torturous penalties fell into disfavour sometime around the French Revolution (Miller 219). Hence, the change of attitude towards punishment necessitated a search for “more intelligent” (Boullant 114) corrective and disciplinary tools. The goal was “not to punish less, but to punish better” (cited in Miller 219). Initially, the mental hospital was created in order to go beyond the exclusion, deportation eviction, dismissal and expulsion of the mad. Due to logocentrism, madness was defined as the opposite of reason. Insanity was equated with culpability, error, blindness and animality, and it was the invention of the mental hospital which gave the notion of madness its pathological dimension (Laing 25). However, an investigation of the alliance between science and politics in the worlds of Nineteen Eighty-Four, A Clockwork Orange and Meccania reveals that their conspiracy has widened the meaning of this concept, thus making it include all political opponents. Considered insane, political dissidents are no longer sent to jail because they have come to be regarded as lunatics needing treatment.

2.1. Nineteen Eighty-Four

The best-known of these political-scientific treatments/punishments conducted by politicians together with scientists is the one imposed upon Winston Smith in the Ministry of Love. Room 101 is the place where Winston is penalized. It is quite important for our analysis of the political-scientific coalition to mention that the Ministry of Love is surrounded by both machine guns and barbed wires. Indeed, the state’s use of an electrical fence for the department of punishment illustrates the alliance between politics and technology. The fence of the Ministry of Love is not the only place where the reader meets scientific gadgets reminiscent of the Oceanian techno-political cooperation. Indeed, the entire punishment mechanism can by no means exist in the absence of the
political-scientific conspiracy. The omnipresence of the telescreen in the punitive setting is another reminder of technology’s use in the corrective apparatus. The screen is also a key element in the retributive system of *A Clockwork Orange*. However, just like in this latter novel, the political-scientific conspiracy in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* involves more than the inventors and operators of the telescreen that scrutinizes detainees because the political-scientific alliance encapsulates psychiatrists, psychologists and nurses.

The torture scene during which Winston is threatened by rats is telling of politicians’ manipulation of the discoveries made in psychology and psychiatry, in that the knowledge provided by these two fields about phobia has served to terrorize the character. The scientific research on phobia reveals it to be an excessive and irrational fear of certain things, objects or people ("Phobia" *Encarta World Dictionary*). Due to the telescreen and to the other apparatuses of surveillance reigning in Oceania, the state must have been aware of Winston’s fear of rats. This information has enabled the regime to traumatize him through a recourse to science. The point is that the oligarchy has used all the data provided by its technology, psychology and psychiatry in order to traumatize and penalize its opponent. In Room 101, O’Brien menaces Winston by putting the cage with the rats directly before his face, and "‘remind[ing]’ him that sometimes they attack the eyes at first” (Varrichio 109), which emphasizes the party’s manipulation of Winston’s fears.

The party’s exploitation of the psychological research on and understanding of the human psyche is not limited to augmenting and exploiting Winston’s fears and phobia. Such psychology and psychiatry have shown that irritating the nerves leads to breakdown. Psychological collapse serves the party. First, it leads the detainee to confess all crimes. Second, it facilitates the remoulding of his thoughts, the refashioning of his character and the reshaping of his convictions. Hence, the party’s attempts at inducing "nervous fatigue" (Orwell 254) should be read within the framework of adopting the results of psychological studies to the disciplinary aims of the oligarchy. It is for this reason that the party uses long hours of questioning during which lights are directed at the eyes of the detainee whose ears are wrung, hair pulled and face slapped (253). Refusal of leave to urinate, orders to stand on one leg and humiliation are other techniques used for the purpose of causing chronic fatigue syndrome. The party does not
use scientists to cure this psychological disorder, but to induce a state of chronic weariness and weakness combined with various aches and pains. The sore pains caused by the supposed-to-be cure remind us of the sickness and irritation felt by Alex during his Ludovico treatment. The party wants to achieve a deliberate exhaustion of the nervous system. Psychiatry and psychology have shown that soothing and supporting the nervous system imply promoting feelings of well-being, relieving stress, invigorating the body, supporting blood circulation, improving nutrition (Somer and Williams xii), enhancing athletic performance (Biddle, Fox and Boutcher 1-9), promoting sleep and relaxation (Hamilton, Nelson, Stevens and Kitzman 149), and instilling confidence and happiness.

Instead, the party applies the very opposite of these sedative rules and laxative remedies. It weakens the body, harasses the soul and terrorizes the psyche. By flogging Winston, by preventing him from sleep, by trapping him in an endless cycle of suffering and by impairing the neuromuscular command of his bodily reactions, the party creates states of nervousness, spasm, anxiety, depression and psychological fatigue. The torture episode features various scenes illustrating Winston’s nervous exhaustion: “Sometimes he would weep half a dozen times in a single session” (Orwell 254); “His nerves were in rags after hours of questioning.” These scenes find their parallels in the punishment inflicted upon Alex in A Clockwork Orange, for Alex undergoes the same experience of pain and spasm under a political-medical staff. This evidence forges our understanding of the cruelty wherewith the political-scientific alliance punishes political opponents.

Furthermore, Stephen Spender mentions the scare generated by politicians’ ability to use machinery in order to condition human consciousness to an acceptance of despotism. Although Spender does not provide an in-depth analysis of the political-scientific coalition, he refers to the concluding scene when O’Brien electrocutes Winston in order to make him surrender. Spender also refers to the very telling detail that the dials on the torture machine are operated by O’Brien, and that it is this cooperation between the man of the state and technology that has caused Winston to submit. He notes that O’Brien is the one who causes the television to project in front of Winston’s face, thus concluding that the state subjugates the individual by directing “all the surrounding social forces” (66) against him. I would, rather, conclude that individuals’ victimization is achieved through mobilizing the medical and technological forces against them. When O’Brien
equates power with the infliction of pain and humiliation, he gives us an idea about the nature of the political power in that it is inextricable from causing agony, certainly via scientific media because the means of suffering are technological and psychological.

More to the point, the needles and injections jerked pitilessly in Winston's arm together with his enforced drugged sleep mirror how scientists cooperate with politicians in order to make prisoners sink into sleep, and to determine the length of the sleep span preceding each electric shock. The use of injections in the penal system is also seen in *A Clockwork Orange* where Alex is obliged to get a shot in the arm after every meal. More to the point, the apparatus administering the electrical blows dealt to Winston is the dial. The dial is mentioned seventeen times in the torture scene: the chair to which Winston is fastened is surrounded by dials, and the dials are controlled and operated by doctors. The numbers on the dial run up to a hundred, and each digit is related to a particular dose of pain. The lever on the dial is held by O'Brien who draws it back and forth according to his torturous wish. During the punishment episode, O'Brien is portrayed as laying his hand on the dial (261), pulling the grip (262), twisting the instrument (265), and pushing its lever up to seventy-five. When Winston insists that two and two make four, O'Brien presses the button so that he receives a stronger dose of pain (Lewis 106-107).

All these images suggest a total command of this scientific invention. Not only has this machine been developed by scientists, but its ownership and command have been attributed to politicians. Scientists' intervention is not limited to the invention of the dial, for they take part in the activation and operation of this gadget as well, which explains the presence of white-coated men during the sessions of torture. The first introduction of the term both foreshadows and underlines the role of the men of science in the punitive act: "He was strapped into a chair surrounded by the dials, under dazzling lights. *A man in a white coat* was reading the dials. There was a tramp of heavy boots outside. The door clanged open. The waxen-faced officer marched in, followed by two guards" (Orwell 255, emphasis added). The presence of officers, guards, doctors and nurses in the retributive setting and their gathering around the dial indicts the political-scientific alliance that has turned doctors into punishers who are resolute to cure detainees' heresies.
The semantic field of heresy is prevalent in the torture scene. This episode is replete with words such as “lunatic dislocation” (260), “sanity” (261), “sane” (265), “the heretic” (267), “heresy” (266), “mad” (268), “insane” (271) and “lunacy” (275). Some of these words are repeated several times throughout Winston’s punishment. These include “heretic” and “lunatic” which recur four times, “sane” which is mentioned thrice, “sanity” and “lunacy” and “mad” which are repeated twice. In addressing Winston, O’Brien uses the possessive “your” and the personal pronoun “you” for more direct expressions: “Your disease” (258), “You are mentally deranged.” All these words equate Winston’s opposition to the party with a state of mental disorder. In the party’s logic, the solution to Winston’s derangement and instability is “to cure [him]! to make [him] sane!” (265).

In O’Brien’s words, the party does not punish. It treats and cures. It restores people’s sanity, and never leaves them uncured. The cure enables the regime to avoid and abolish martyrdom because it refashions the offender/victim instead of killing him or her: “We do not destroy the heretic. [...] We convert him, we capture his inner mind, we reshape him. We burn all evil and all illusion out of him. We bring him over to our side, not in appearance, but genuinely, heart and soul” (267). This conversion avoids the horrendous aspects of retribution because it transforms the dissident instead of massacring him/her. The result is evident in O’Brien’s statement: “We do not allow the dead to rise up against us. You must stop imagining that posterity will vindicate you, Winston. Posterity will never hear of you” (266). Success in concealing the atrocity of harassing political dissidents has been ensured through a reliance on new scientific methods of traumatizing dissidents. The party’s punishment maxim is that “one must not make martyrs.” In the hands of doctors, martyrdom has been transformed into sickness.

Much in this vein, Lionel Trilling’s review of Nineteen Eighty-Four reckons it as a “parody on psychotherapy” (26) whose aim is to bring Winston back to sanity and health by making him believe that two plus two equals five. Isaac Deutscher focuses on the party’s conception of torture as a cure meant to free the rebels from their abnormal thoughts. In so doing, Deutscher draws a parallel between Nineteen Eighty-Four and Zamyatin’s We where the authorities link disorders to an illness called imagination. This
perturbing disease must be treated using x-ray treatments. Deutscher argues that Orwell has quoted certain scenes of torture from Zamyatin (32). One common point between the two dystopias is, hence, their depiction of a political perception of difference and opposition as insanity that needs to be cured by politicians assisted by white-coated men: "He remembered [...] business-like, unsympathetic men in white coats feeling his pulse, tapping his reflexes, turning up his eyelids, running harsh fingers over him in search of broken bones and shooting needles in his arm to make him sleep" (Orwell 253). In his review of Nineteen Eighty-Four, Philip Rahv writes that the interesting characters are the conditioners, and not the conditioned (cited in Lyons and Orwell 45).

This declaration is insightful with regard to our study of the political-scientific conspiracy because it throws light on the punishers and their conspirators. Two negative adjectives are attributed to the white-coated men: "unsympathetic" and "harsh". These premodifiers subvert the commonplace image of caring doctors and sympathetic nurses trying to relieve the patient's pain. Under the political-scientific alliance, medicine has ceased to be a profession meant to appease aches as it has become an efficient medium of inflicting pain on political dissidents. The phrase "the man in the white coat" recurs nine times in both its singular and plural forms during the torture scene. Its recurrence suggests the prominence of doctors in the penal apparatus. Whenever white-coated men are mentioned, they are portrayed as effecting or introducing some new and essential parts in the retributive process: they are either reading the dials, or diagnosing Winston's body. Illustrations of the coalescence include such statements as "He [O'Brien] paused and signed to the man in the white coat" (Orwell 269); "'Three thousand', he said, speaking over Winston's head to the man in the white coat"; and "He raised a finger to the man in the white coat" (273). It is noteworthy that the semiotic gestures exchanged between the doctor and O'Brien communicate the harmony, symbiosis and agreement governing the link between politicians and white-coated scientists.

Just like the therapy inflicted upon Alex in A Clockwork Orange, the treatment done for Winston is not meant to appease the tormented body. Rather, it functions as another reminder of a political-scientific conspiracy meant to traumatize the individual. The
following statement is revelatory of the ugliness of the collaboration between science and politics:

O’Brien motioned with his hand to the man in the white coat, who had stood immobile throughout the proceedings. The man in the white coat bent down and looked closely into Winston’s eyes, felt his pulse, laid an ear against his chest, tapped here and there, then he nodded to O’Brien. The pain flowed into Winston’s body. The needle must be at seventy, seventy-five. (263)

The two verbal phrases “motioned with his head to the man in the white coat” and “nodded to O’Brien” attest that doctors are the servants of the regime. The treatment made by the doctor does not aim at treating the wounded and prostrated body. On the contrary, he wants to check whether the tormented Winston is able to bear a more agonizing dose of pain. In all the scenes in which white-coated men are present they are featured as receiving orders from O’Brien, as applying his instructions, or as helping him conduct his punitive experiment.

### 2.2. *A Clockwork Orange*

The trope of the white coat figures prominently in the punitive system imposed upon Alex in Burgess’s novel. The terms “white coat” and “white coated” vecks or men are repeated sixteen times during the implementation of the Ludovico punishment. In *A Clockwork Orange* the political enterprise is carried out by “white-coated” (Burgess 88) nurses and doctors, which emphasizes the scientific involvement in politics. This term cooperates with a recurrent diction related to the semantic field of medicine - “Dr. Brodsky”, “Dr. Branom”, “nurse”, “veck”, “injection”, “vitamin”, “sick”, “ill” - thus reinforcing the coalescence between the health sciences and politics. The similarities between the two punishments depicted in *A Clockwork Orange* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* are not restricted to the presence of white-coated scientists serving the state. Indeed, Robert K. Morris draws an interesting comparison between *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and *A*
Clockwork Orange, arguing that both protagonists die when they lose their ability to love. The comparison links the agency responsible for Winston’s mental and emotional death to the one leading to Alex’s suicide, in that while the former happens at the hands of the party, the latter is induced by the government (48).

The comparison between the two denouements poignantly attests to the hideous techno-political alliance that sacrifices human feelings in order to benefit and to maintain the tyrannical rule of a domineering elite. When Winston declares his love for Big Brother, he loses his love for Julia. The loss in Alex’s case is connected with his love of classical music under the Ludovico treatment. Hence, the state’s transformation of Alex’s attitude towards classical music represents another penalty inflicted on this character. Dr. Branom himself admits the punitive aspect of the conditioning against music when he says: “Each man kills the thing he loves, as the poet-prisoner said. Here is the punishment element perhaps” (Burgess 99).

It should be added that the name of the conditioning method imposed on Alex might be drawn from the name of the composer of the Ninth symphony (De Vitis 108). Not only are the sonorous similarities between both names striking, but the conditioning movies include classical melodies. Beethoven’s Ninth composition is prominent in these films of horror. The “ecstasy” (Craik 8) and thrill that music used to induce have turned into a nausea-inducing agony. Early in the novel we read: “Then, I pulled the lovely Ninth out of its sleeve so that Ludwig Van was not nagoy too and I set the needle hissing on the last movement which was all bliss (Burgess 40). After Alex’s programmation, we read:

It all came over me. The start of pain and the sickness, and I began to groan deep down in my keeshkas. And then there I was me who loved music so much crawling off the bed and going oh oh oh to myself, and then bang bang banging on the wall creeching ‘Stop, stop it, turn it off?’ But it went on and it seemed to be like louder. So, I crashed at the wall till my knuckles were all red red krovvy and torn skin, creeching and creeching. (145)
The juxtaposition of these two moments makes the novel’s structure reflective of Burgess’s condemnation of the political-scientific coalescence that has transformed the “joyful, and then the lovely blissful tune” (40) into a painful and torturing melody. Alex’s nauseous response to music leads him to indict doctors and politicians, thus saying: “It’s a sin. [...] Using Ludwig Van like that. He did no harm to anyone. Beethoven just wrote music” (99).

The political-technical coalescence has transformed the fancy unearthly piano movement through which Alex used to fly in the sky of imagination, into a ghastly and deadly experience of vomit and disgust: “Now here was lovely Mozart made horrible” (123). The charming beauty of Ludvig Beethoven’s creation has been reversed into a morbid experience of pain and torture. The musical setting of the Ninth symphony is not the only element affecting readers’ reception of and reaction to the modification enforced by the government, for the lyrics of the choral symphony deepen readers’ understanding of the implications of the science-state cooperation. Indeed, Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony’s incorporation of a part of Friedrich Schiller’s poem “Ode to Joy”² intensifies and exacerbates the atrocity of the political-scientific coalescence. The hopeful lines and pleasant atmosphere of this poem are marred by Alex’s agony when he hears the music. The delightful atmosphere diffused by the poem’s reference to joy, flowers, heaven, stars, eternal nature and smiles, has been altered in Burgess’s novel into a state of dreariness and pain.

Moreover, the fact that Opus 125 “Choral” - another name for the Ninth Symphony - represents one of the finest musical compositions of the western classical repertoire, further condemns the political-scientific coalescence responsible for Alex’s sickness whenever he listens to this masterpiece. Indeed, the reader juxtaposes the beauty of the tune with the ugliness of Alex’s illness. This juxtaposition brings him to indict the political-scientific coalition that has distorted the beauty of art in order to punish Alex. Geoffrey Aggeler goes as far as to claim the existence of a divine component associated with Alex’s fondness of classical music. In Aggeler’s perception, music ties Alex to

² For more information on “Ode to Joy” see: “Notes on the Words of Beethoven’s Choral Symphony”. The Musical Times and Singing Class Circular 42.703 (Sep 1901): 590-592.
divinity, thus making him feel “Godlike” (89 Portraits of the Artist). He also points out Beethoven’s “triumphant assertions of self” (90) in his symphonies. This idea serves to exacerbate the atrocity of the punishment inflicted by the government. Not only does the Ludovico treatment cause Alex to abhor Beethoven, but it also subverts and mocks the message inherent in his music.

Burgess’s employment of the musical component as a device to probe the political-scientific collaboration might find its roots in Burgess’s personal fondness of music. In “The Post-Modernist Always Swings Nice”, Paul Schuyler Phillips stresses Burgess’s admiration of Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Wagner and Elgar (80-81). Being himself an admirer of musical classics deepens our understanding of music’s function within the story because it exacerbates the horror of the techno-political alliance that has distorted the attractiveness and the beauty of the charming melodies. In her essay “From Mann to Modernity: Anthony Burgess and the Intersection of Music and Literature”, Christine Lee Gengaro delves into the abundance of music in Burgess’s prose, an abundance manifested in both his sensitivity to sounds and his creation of musical characters (96-98). In A Clockwork Orange, Burgess melds political-scientific transgressions of human freedom with musicality. More to the point, his employment of such a universally popular symphony as Beethoven’s Ninth might aim at universalizing the plight caused by the political-behaviourist coalition, not to mention that being a universal language, music comes to translate the distortion caused by the political-scientific coalition better than language.

As a matter of fact, nauseating agony is not limited to the aftermath of the behaviourist therapy, for the Ludovico punishment has proven horrendous from its outset. From the beginning we are told that the injections Alex takes contain a substance that causes him to vomit. The nausea we witness is proof of the horror of the political-scientific alliance, which makes Alex’s first-person narrative a testimony of the complicity between science and politics. In the government’s view, the wisdom behind the Ludovico technique resides in treating Alex’s violence. Paradoxically, the scenes of pain and nausea make it evident that sickening people has become a method to “cure” them. The diction employed highlights this fact. During the application of the Ludovico
therapy, the adjective “sick” recurs nineteen times. In the chapters devoted to the
depiction of the treatment, the adjective “ill” is repeated nine times, the noun “sickness”
is mentioned ten times and the word “pain” is used eleven times. None of these words
suggesting agony is mentioned in the chapters preceding the infliction of the punishment.

Delving into the punishment inflicted upon Alex, A.A. De Vitis states: “Alex is the
‘clockwork orange’ of the title: he is produced by a system and he exemplifies in his
actions the implications of it. He is punished by that same system when his individuality,
his love for music, can no longer be ignored by it” (107). According to De Vitis, Alex’s
peculiarity has owed him a penalty meant to standardize his behaviour according to the
prevalent societal and political norms. Alex is punished not only because he deviates
from the rule. His punishment comes as a part of a whole domineering technological
experiment meant to prevent dissidence. De Vitis compares the process designed by the
state in order to condition human responses to Pavlov’s experiments with dogs (108). The
state’s Pavlovian experimentation with films consists of a rehabilitative process that is
said to restore Alex to good conduct and respectable life via therapy. It is a dehumanizing
reintegrative programme based on a cognitive operation aimed at restoring Alex to the
disciplined society.

The Ludovico therapy is similar to a laboratory experiment on rats (Waterman 33).
Monitored completely by doctors, Alex becomes a rat captivated in the laboratory of the
clinic/prison because he is treated as a mere thing on which new behaviourist research
data is tested. The reference to Pavlov’s dog is also made by Hannah Arendt in her study
of totalitarianism’s degradation of the governed. She writes that totalitarian regimes aim
to denigrate and annihilate the human character by turning humans into creatures similar
to Pavlov’s dog (204). Alex’s anxious and pitiful inquiry towards the end of the novel:
“Me, me, me. How about me? Where do I come into all this? Am I like just some animal
or dog [...] am I just to be like a clockwork orange?” (Burgess 110) mirrors his awareness
of both his objectification and the dehumanizing consequences of the behaviour
modification treatment. Alex’s reference to the dog divulges his bitter awareness of the
monstrous Pavlovian control to which he has been subjected. The programmation of Alex
leaves him totally helpless and unable even to defend himself against any assault. The
beatings and the terror imposed on him by his avenging victims, together with people's
deaftness to his begging for forgiveness, make the reader sympathise with this character,
and further indicts the political-scientific alliance that has put the Ludovico torture into
motion.

Just like in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and *Meccania: The Superstate*, the institution in
which the punitive experiment has been conducted is the mental hospital. It is probably
due to this setting that David Waterman has titled the first chapter of his *Le Miroir De La
Société “A Clockwork Orange! Anthony Burgess: L'Hôpital Psychiatrique et la Fin de
L’Esprit Humain.”* Such a title illustrates the link between the institution of the hospital
and a governmental penalty consisting of crushing the human spirit and ending its
freedom. Waterman writes: “Dans *A Clockwork Orange* Burgess nous montre la
transition en ces temps modernes de la prison en tant qu’institution d’isolation et de
châtiment à l’hôpital/prison qui fonctionne plutôt comme institution de ‘guérison’ pour
reprendre l’esprit des criminels” (33). In “A Clockwork Orange - Or just A Lemon”,
Peter Steinfels writes that the prison’s reliance on psychotechnology such as
psychotherapy and aversive conditioning has made it combine the use of psychiatrists and
criminologists in order to inflict punishment (11-12).

Although the setting changes, thus moving Alex from the dirt and filth of the jail to
the cleanliness and hygiene of the clinic, the mechanism of punishment is the same. The
link between prison as a political institution and the clinic as a scientific one colours the
whole text. When Dr. Brodsky responds to the prison chaplin’s protest at stripping Alex
of moral choice, they state: “we are not concerned with motive, with the higher ethics.
We are concerned only with cutting down crime” (Burgess 109). The Minister confirms
this statement in the following sentence as he declares the exclusive interest in “relieving
the ghastly congestion in our prisons.” The recurrent use of the collective pronoun “we”
and of the plural possessive pronoun “our” underlines the political-scientific conspiracy
against Alex. The response itself leaves no doubt about the pragmatism tainting the
political behaviourist enterprise. The reference to prison and to the dire need to decrease
the number of prisoners evokes the idea that the mental hospital functions as a substitute
for the jail, an idea that is exposed by Foucault in his *Discipline and Punishment* where he considers the hospital as an alternative to prison (Boullant 113).

As a prisoner, Alex is referred to as 6655321. Ironically enough, while hoping to escape this numeric naming by undergoing the Ludovico treatment, the operation undertaken in the hospital has validated his status and identity as a mere 6655321 that can by no means transcend the confines imposed by the administrators of the prison/hospital. It has stripped away his identity because it does not even give him a name. Sam Johnson accounts for Alex’s loss of his “civil, physical and psychological liberties” (38), concluding that “the underworld of the technocrats financed by the publicity machines of politicians, abrogate all laws established in defence of civil and human rights, clinically de-subjectivising Alex and rendering him a mere simulacrum of his previous self” (39).

Even more, the aggressive films come successively “without any break at all” (Burgess 90): “You’ve nothing to worry about. Next film coming up” (92) says Dr. Brodsky to Alex. To this, Alex notes his hideous headache, thirst and pains, which leads him to cry vehemently: “Stop the film!” Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the doctor’s name Brodsky is pronounced the same as broad sky. The sonorous similarity is suggestive of freedom. Ironically and critically enough, this freedom-based name turns to captivate and imprison Alex within the trammels of a punitive Watsonian behaviourism. Probing Kubrik’s film, Kate McQuinston describes Alex as “the pawn in the battle between the church and the state for the soul” (105). A similar metaphor is used by P.J. Gehrke in her commentary on the movie, for she describes Alex as “just a wind-up toy” (149). Indeed, these passive metaphors of the film’s protagonist apply perfectly to the novel where Alex figures on the chessboard of the political-behaviourist alliance as a mere pawn moved by doctors in favour of politicians.

However, even those members of the opposition who condemn the penal behaviourist therapy have proven to be politicians searching to benefit from science through underlining the failure of their political rivals’ reliance on therapeutic behaviourism. F. Alexander ensures Alex’s cooperation with an opposition party that aims to unseat the current government. He wants to expose the morbid Ludovico punishment in order to sabotage the government’s electoral campaign, and not in order to sympathise with
Alex's suffering during and after the behaviourist penalty. In the end, Alex becomes aware that he has been exploited by both parties, neither of which is preoccupied with his moral emasculation (De Vitis 109). Hence, it seems that the welcoming and the application of scientific experimentation on people is not the only evidence of scientific-political conspiracies against the individual, for even the opposition to such a political application of science is politicized. My conclusion is that science has become, by all means, in the service of politics and politicians whether in office or aspiring to it.

The government's decision to undo the punishment in order to evade opponents' accusations represents another punishment forced on Alex. Alex's suicide attempt has led to his deprogrammation. After depriving Alex of self-defence, the state realizes that deconditioning Alex against all brutality endangers its electoral campaign. Again, the only way to save political ambitions is to rely on science. The state's selfish exigencies have transformed Alex into a puppet on the government's electoral stage. Deprogramming also occurs in the hospital, which accentuates the scientific intervention in the corrective apparatus. Doctors' removal of the Ludovico conditioning doubles the punishment imposed on Alex because it makes him a mere "marionette" (Davis and Womack 28). Geoffrey Aggeler argues that "science in the form of behavioural technology becomes a lackey of the state and when the state is threatened by rebellious champions of freedom and dignity it readily undoes what it had accomplished by imposing goodness on Alex" (Portraits of the Artist 91). Commenting on Alex's second cure, Vincent O'Keffe writes that "Doctors' deep hypnopaedia [...] cures him of the Ludovico behaviourism" (41). Reading this statement, one infers that Alex is sick before he is deprogrammed. Yet, readers are told that the Ludovico treatment has been inflicted upon Alex in order to cure him. The reclamation treatment has proven to inflict another sickness that also needs to be cured. The political-medical diagnosis stating that Alex is sick, and needs a second cure, comes from politicians. These medical-political instructions are applied by doctors.

It is noteworthy that, unlike the two other novels with which we are dealing, A Clockwork Orange has both twenty and twenty-one chapter versions. The twenty-chapter version ends with the deprogramming of Alex. This is the American edition that appeared
in 1962 after the publisher Eric Swenson had removed the twenty-first chapter because he thought that the tragic end would better suit the American readership (32). The novel was later published in 1986, in an edition that included the twenty-first chapter in which Alex grows towards maturity and gets integrated in mainstream society. The addition of this final chapter has led critics to consider the novel a buildungsroman depicting Alex's human development (32). A complex critical debate has compared and contrasted the two endings with divergent opinions regarding the implications and messages of each one. In my view, both denouements condemn the punishments inflicted upon the undisciplined by the political-scientific alliance. In the first edition, deprogramming imprisons Alex within the vicious circle of dehumanization. Similarly, the human growth towards maturity and, in consequence, towards conformity, reveals that Alex’s violence is a transient phase generated by his teenagehood, Sam Johnson pointing out the conflict between institutionality and individuality that tears Alex’s adolescent personality (38). Johnson’s assumption of an adolescent crisis conveys that the threat Alex imposes has been amplified by the authorities in order to serve their political agenda. While Alex’s brutality represents a momentary phase of adolescent crisis, the government depicts his violence as a sweeping threat endangering the stability of the whole country. The government has built its electoral programme on the promise of treating/penalizing the national terrorist by imposing a behaviourist therapy on him. The therapeutic enterprise of ending violence reveals science’s involvement in the political punitive system. The involvement aims to force Alex back to normality.

However, by featuring Alex as a good citizen, the twenty-first chapter indicts a political-scientific conspiracy that dehumanizes Alex in order to bring him to a state that he will reach after a few years. This fact suggests that the government could have tried to stop Alex’s violence through other means: dialogue, logical argumentation, imprisonment, emotional persuasion via arousal of compassion towards his victims, to mention but a few. In this regard, Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack argue that the twenty-first chapter should not be misinterpreted as a naive merry denouement (33). The evidence presented so far testifies that the ending should be read as a narratorial strategic denouement meant to further condemn the political-scientific cooperation. Both endings condemn a political-scientific conspiracy that exploits scientific research and medical
institutions in order to punish divergent behaviours. The monstrosity of the penalty inflicted upon Alex exacerbates the horror created by the clinic’s transformation into a retributive apparatus.

2.3. **Meccania: The Superstate**

Owen Gregory’s *Meccania: The Superstate* features another incarnation of the hospital’s shift from a curing to a retributive institution penalizing rebellious members. One of these political rebels is Stillman “who has been a prisoner in an asylum for the mentally afflicted for the last fifteen years” (263). The employment of the term “prisoner” in connection with the word “asylum” exposes the political dimension of the detention. In so doing, it summarizes the whole transformation of the hospital into a punitive institution. The detained political opponent is first introduced through the setting in which he lives. It is a small room located at “the end of a long corridor” (269), which suggests exclusion. Stillman explains to Ming that “except to Mr. Kwang, the officials and the doctors, he had not spoken to anyone for five years” (270). Knowing the importance of the interaction with people in the healing process makes it clear that Stillman’s stay in the hospital is not meant to treat, but to confine and penalize. The term “officials” accentuates the presence of the political element in the hospital, which makes the detainees “fellow prisoners-patients”, to use Stillman’s words. The alternation between prisoners and patients is evoked again in Stillman’s reference to the asylum as “one of the largest hospitals or prisons” (271).

As a matter of fact, visits are not allowed on the basis of the happiness, improvement and well-being to which they will lead on the part of the “patient”. The privilege of visiting “the heretic” is won through patriotism and loyalty to the party. Hence, it is not Stillman’s family and friends who visit him. Rather, the only persons who have this prerogative are converts, and proponents of the Superstate. It is why only the Meccanian missionary Kwang, who has written such patriotic and propagandistic works as *Triumphs of Meccanian Culture* and *Meccania’s World Mission*, has access to Stillman and other
detainees. When Ming asks whether the deprivation of conversation aggravates patients' instability, Stillman tells him that the Superstate's wisdom behind this rule is that "communication with our [their] fellow-patients would hinder our recovery" (emphasis added). Again, the political discourse is replete with a lexis linked to sickness. Just like in Nineteen Eighty-Four and A Clockwork Orange, dissidence is regarded as insanity. When Ming asks Stillman about his illness, the latter responds that he suffers from "a mental disease known only to the government of Meccania." He does not say that his disease is known to the doctors or psychiatrists or psychologists. His response shows that in Meccania the government becomes the agency responsible for detecting illnesses, mainly political "heresy".

The Meccanian state's reliance on psychologists has made it see and define political opposition as a pathology needing treatment. Ming's discussions with Meccanian guides and officials have led him to the following conclusion: "I noticed that the Meccanians were represented as heroes, and their enemies as brutalized hordes of semi-lunatics" (131). In Meccania, political opposition is considered a "brain disease" (188). A name has even been given to this "mental disease" by the psycho-physical staff who have classified it as a chronic illness, thus calling it "Chronic Tendency to Dissent." During Ming's discussion with Prigge, this latter consents to "putting people in lunatic asylums, if they did not accept the authority of the Superstate." Any opposition to Meccanian power is countered by a deportation to a mental institution. Conductor Lickrod proudly brings to Ming's attention "the remarkable strides that have been made by our medical scientists in Meccania during the last fifty years." The plural possessive pronoun makes all the medical agents together with their research and discoveries a property of the Superstate. In the next two sentences, the plural possessive pronoun is repeated twice in connection with the scientific words "our specialists" and "our experts." The strides boasted of by Lickrod are best illustrated in his statement "the pathological side of psychology has received great attention, with the consequence that our specialists are able to detect mental disease in cases where it would not be suspected by less skilled doctors. I believe I am right in saying that our experts detected the disease now widely recognised as Znednettlapseiwz (Chronic Tendency to Dissent)" (emphasis added).
Psychological research has shown that political dissent is caused by a microbe. The fact that the full description of this microbe figures in the Report of The Special Medical Board shows scientists' concern with eradicating-treating political dissidence-sickness. Political dissidence is considered an abnormal attitude necessitating a “disciplinary normalization” (Foucault Discipline and Punishment 296) applied in a mental asylum. Any view that counters or differs from the official one is considered a symptom of abnormal Znednettlapseiwz. Before the new advancement in scientific research, the differing or opposite opinions used to be considered “as just mental perversity” (Gregory 189) manifesting itself through irrational “hallucinations.” Yet, thanks to the strenuous efforts and to the multiple experiments made by Doctor Sikofantis-Sangwin who has kept dissenters under close observation for some years, the Znednettlapseiwz disease has been discovered. Doctor Sikofantis-Sangwin’s work has enabled him to elaborate his theory of the Chronic Tendency to Dissent, a theory whose application has culminated in both a discovery of “the bacillus” and a virtual disappearance of the disease.

The evidence presented so far testifies to the fact that punishment of dissidence is presented as a treatment of madness. In the case of political opposition, the clinical setting in which “the insane” are confined functions as a substitute for the jail. Conductor Prigge tells Ming: “we require very few lunatic asylums, just as we require few prisons” (71). Assimilating mental hospitals to jails exacerbates the tyrannical conception of dissidence as a mental disease needing “curative” deportation to a clinical institution. It is noteworthy that the deportative and eliminatory practices have not disappeared with “the birth of the clinic”, to use Michel Foucault’s words. A focus on the setting in which the Meccanian mental asylum to which anti-Meccanians are deported, is telling of the punitive ejection of political rebels. The distance separating the asylum from the main cities is reminiscent of the expulsion and ejection of the mad described in Foucault’s History of Madness. To start with, the asylum is located about forty miles outside of Mecco. Ming and Kwang use a motor-car to get there. The institution stands alone in a forlorn setting totally dislocated and disconnected from any other buildings: “We approached the asylum, which stood upon a lonely moorland, far away from any village. The gates were guarded by a single sentinel” (266). The term “guarded” evokes the idea of the punitive surveillance to which detainees are subjected. Nevertheless, the placement
of the insane in mental asylums involves more than guardianship. In fact, the imposed deportation of “the heretic” to such far, dreary, isolated and deserted places as this desolate asylum evokes the image of the exile imposed by Germans on the mad during the Middle Ages (Cousins and Hussain 107). It aims at “shut[ting them] off from the rest of the world, and their only chance of returning to it is for them to renounce, formally and absolutely, all the errors of which they have been guilty” (Gregory 266). This expulsion is also reminiscent of the fifteenth-century Rhenish towns’ practice of putting the fools in ships and setting them afloat in the ocean (Midelfort 31). The Meccanian asylum shows that the only difference between classical and modern evictions is that the heretics of the past were ejected because of their mental troubles, whereas the mad of the twentieth-century are deported because of their opposite stances.

Ming’s conversation with Meccanian officials has made him realize that “the Special Medical Board uses its discretionary power to incarcerate persons whose opinions or convictions make it impossible for them to embrace what [he] may call the Meccanian ideals of life” (188). The political connotation of the term “power” cooperates with the punitive and judicial meanings associated with both the verb “incarcerate” and the adjective “discretionary”, thus accentuating the role of the Special Medical Board in the political penal system. As is suggested by the verb “incarcerate”, the scientific body meant to treat and appease the pain is endowed with the political-judicial prerogative of imprisoning and confining non-conformist individuals. Nonetheless, despite all the evidence testifying to the scientific-political coalescence, Lickrod considers the claim that the Special Medical Board is an Inquisition as a mere “calumny” (189). Attempting to eliminate the political element from the cure, he maintains that “each case - and cases are becoming very rare indeed - is investigated on strictly psycho-physical lines.” Instead of refuting the coalescence argument, Lickrod’s statement reinforces it, thus unintentionally underlining its politico-psycho-physical facets.

The men detained in asylums are seen by Count Krafft as difficult cases. Count Krafft defines them as those who “are to be found in every modern state [...] [and] act as a focus

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3 It is necessary to mention that some researchers have critiqued Foucault’s reference to the ship of fools, stating that it has never existed (Midelfort 35).
for all opposition. They cling obstinately to certain ethical and political doctrines quite out of harmony with those of the Superstate and profess to regard Bureaucracy and Militarism as inconsistent with liberty” (265). The adjective “modern” cooperates with the adverb “obstinately”, hence revealing a new facet of scientific modernity in which political opponents are confined in mental institutions. Similar to Nineteen Eighty-Four’s party and A Clockwork Orange’s government, Meccania’s Superstate considers political opposition a “disease” (267). Kwang states that the authorities’ prospect is “that in a few years the disease will have disappeared entirely.”

Moreover, the office of the Hospital-Governor Canting is revelatory of the political-scientific alliance. Not only is it furnished in a very characteristic Meccanian style, but portraits of notable Meccanian leaders abound in this locale: “There were the usual large portraits of the Emperor and Empress and busts of Prince Mechow and Prince Bludiron.” The decoration of this punitive-treating space is suggestive of the intertwining of the political and the scientific spheres; this is accentuated by Governor Canting’s appearance. The reader might expect the administer of the hospital to wear a white coat. Unexpectedly, he wears the green uniform of the fourth class in the hospital. Besides, his conformity and compliance to the regime is suggested by his manners: “He greeted Kwang almost effusively, and bowed to me, with the usual Meccanian attitude.” Canting’s modern way of greeting is to be contrasted to Stillman’s old-fashioned manner (270). Indeed, greeting might seem a purely social or cultural thing. However, even this cultural act is politicized in Meccania because Meccanians are “so well-brought up” (33) that they conform to all the rules regulating their lives. Nothing in Governor Canting shows dissidence, rebellion, or even difference from the Meccanian norm. Most importantly, he is presented as the governor and not the director of the hospital. This political title underlines the political presence in the punitive asylum. The first words he utters are: “So, you have brought your friend to see our system of treatment” (267). Again, the plural possessive pronoun refers us to a cooperation between politics and psychiatry in order to treat the political opposition “disease” (268). Political opponents are regarded as “patients”. Governor Canting asserts that the Superstate has a moral responsibility vis-à-vis these sick people. He boasts of the fact that “the disease […] can be counteracted in its early stages by prophylactic treatment.” Words related to the
diction of medicine abound in Canting's speech: "prevention", "malady", "cure", "prophylactic system", "disease" and "prophylactic treatment" (268-9).

More to the point, just like in *A Clockwork Orange*, scientists' involvement in the treatment/punishment process includes determining the exact amount of food required by patients/prisoners. Their intrusion in the penal system leads them also to decide the temperature needed to keep detainees/heretics warm. Ironically and critically enough, Stillman tells Ming that he feels cold in winter: "I want to be warmer than the experts think is necessary" (272). The term "experts" emphasizes the scientific involvement in the penal system. Its plural form hints at the diversity of the services presented by scientists and medical specialists to politicians, thus indicating the spread of the political-scientific collaboration throughout the Meccanian territory. All these corrective atrocities make the penal deportation of dissidents to asylums a hideous experience of mental and psychological torture.

Moreover, the name attributed to the detained political opponent is telling of the hideousness of a political-scientific complicity indicting political rebels of mental insanity. In fact, humans' defining characteristic is reason. By naming the dissident character "Stillman", Gregory implies that this political opponent retains his mental and thinking capacities despite the imprisonment in a mental asylum. He might also convey that, in spite of the political-scientific accusation of madness, Stillman is the only free and thinking man in Meccania. This solitary status might explain why Stillman is resolute to remain in the mental asylum despite the monstrosity of the punishment. He says: "I stay here because I am only a prisoner - outside I should be a slave" (274). Indeed, Stillman's defiant attitude differs from Alex's and Winston's responses to the penalties inflicted upon them. While the latter two surrender before the political-scientific alliance, Stillman's confinement does not lead to any change in his opinions or behaviour. When Stillman advises Ming to leave Meccania as soon as possible, he mentions that the rulers represent a "caste of super-criminals who have turned crime into a science" (275). The crime of punishing innocent individuals whose only offence is political dissidence, has been transformed into a science that treats patients-prisoners in mental asylums-jails. Politicians' reliance on science has transformed their punitive repressive crimes into
"legalized crime[s]." Legalization stems from the fact that penalty has come to be presented as a cure because confinement and isolation have come to be seen as a political benevolence towards and care for the patients.

In so doing, the Superstate has prevented the people from the possibility of acting freely and spontaneously. Stillman complains about this, saying:

They have robbed us of everything, we have nothing of our own. They feed us, weigh us, doctor us, instruct us, drill us, breed from us, experiment on us, protect us, pension us and bury us. Nay. That is not the end, they dissect us and analyze us and use our carcasses for the benefit of Science and the Superstate. (275-276)

The actions of feeding, measuring, weighing, doctoring, breeding, experimenting, protecting, analyzing and dissecting are all conducted by nutritionists, doctors, or medical specialists to the advantage of the Superstate that uses the results of scientific research to perfect its regulatory and punitive hold over the population. Stillman's combination of science with politics in his statement "for the benefit of Science and the Superstate" together with his capitalization of words referring to these two conspirators adds semiotic and structural layers of meaning to the political-scientific coalescence that controls and punishes the uncontrolled. The surveillance and punishment exercised by the Superstate are so interlaced that one leads to the other.

2.4. Conclusion

In the three science fiction dystopias, punishment results from the will to control, but control is itself a form of punishment. Science serves the three oligarchical prospects of regulatory surveillance. Through its physical and human branches, it allows the totalitarian regimes of Nineteen Eighty-Four, A Clockwork Orange and Meccania to supervise, control and discipline. Those rebels who cannot be controlled are punished, again, through a reliance on science. The penalties inflicted upon the undisciplined are meant to perfect the three regimes' hegemonic control over individual opponents, and,
hence, to deter any potential uprising among their tyrannized populations. The figure of
the tyrant in its form of an Oceanian party, or a Meccanian Superstate, or a government
seeking re-election, depends on science to fulfill its despotic and dehumanizing agenda.
The way out of the political-scientific tragedy of control and punishment leading back to
control might lie in writing. Writing, particularly in the dystopian genre, can represent an
exit strategy.
Chapter 3: The Role of Writing in Warning against the Political-Scientific Coalition

In the case of the three dystopias discussed, writing can be seen as an imaginative act of tyrannicide, a literary attempt at killing the tyrant in order to end his conspiracy with and manipulation of science. The three future societies that are presented in Nineteen Eighty-Four, A Clockwork Orange and Meccania: The Superstate warn us against an increasingly political-scientific world. By offering visions of the future, the three dystopias go beyond the set bounds of time in order to alert the reader to the hazards emanating from the coalition between science and politics. Journeying into the future has enabled the three writers to overemphasize the repercussions of current alliances between scientists and politicians. By exploring the time to come, each dystopia underlines the alarming threat of politicized science. In fact, in the works that consider the future a consequence of the present day, the future does not stand on its own terms. On the contrary, it will be very much similar to our own time. The only difference is that the future will be “worse” than the current time (Lundwall 58). This comparison suggests the urgency of the situation and the necessity of warning against its worsening.

In order to achieve this effect, the three imaginary worlds of these dystopias are made believable by a logically constructed alternation between familiarization and defamiliarization. Thinking of familiar societies and political figures while reading the narratives enables the reader to make connections between what he reads and what he experiences in real life. It makes him/her feel that the continuity and the aggravation of the current tendencies might allow the fictional political-scientific totalitarianism to plausibly come into being. Moreover, by including these recognizable elements, the three writers avoid being too far removed from present reality and too irrelevant to the pace of political-scientific progress.

There can be no denying that Orwell, Burgess and Gregory have written strong warnings against political-scientific conspiracies. Their works certainly underline the writer’s important role in bringing the attention of his or her readers to such threats.
However, what is interesting about these three dystopias is that they contain authorial figures whose writings challenge political oppression. Winston Smith defies the party by writing his critique of its totalitarianism in his diary. The opposition member F. Alexander uses the form of the novel to pen his disapproval of the government’s tyranny. Ming records the Meccanian dictatorial excesses and abuses in his journal. We also notice the presence of a diction related to writing, as well as the moments during which the characters actually write in their books, transcripts or diaries. In each of the three dystopias, the act of writing channels a critique of, and a warning against, the alliance between science and politics. In *A Clockwork Orange*, it indicts the government’s command of psychotherapy and behaviourist science. In *Meccania: The Superstate*, it denounces politics’ containment of sociology, education, psychology, medicine, eugenics and nutrition. And in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Winston’s diary condemns the oligarchy’s manipulation of weaponry, the telescreen, psychology and neuroscience.

### 3.1. *Nineteen Eighty-Four*

The persistence of the political-scientific conspiracy in the dystopian world of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* might lead us to assume that the novel was written in order to alert the reader to such threats as totalitarianism, coercion and the complicity between science and the state. In his “The Prevention of Literature”, Orwell denies the existence of an apolitical literature (65). The same idea is repeated in “Why I Write”, where he asserts that “no book is genuinely free from political bias” (5). As a matter of fact, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* incarnates the intertwinment of politics and writing. V.S. Pritchett’s review of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* makes it clear that Winston’s doubts vis-à-vis the credibility, the reliability and the trustworthiness of the state drove him to an intellectual action consisting of writing. The doubts start when the character discovers evidence of political lying. The scepticism triggered by the discovery has led him to buy a notebook and to start jotting down notes in a diary (21).
Much in this vein, T.A. Shippey sheds light upon the symbolic importance of purchasing the diary at the beginning of the novel. She assumes that the diary proves that the past had really occurred (175). For this reason, she assimilates it to the glass paper weight and the photograph of Jones, Aaronson and Ruthford because the three of them represent “little chunk[s] of history that they’ve forgotten to alter” (cited in Shippey 175). Pritchett mentions the hopeful fact that the diary is one piece of writing that is not directed by the state, but he does not probe this idea. In fact, elaborating more on this argument leads us to acknowledge the importance of writing in opposing the state. It is crucial to know that writing represents the first rebellious act, and that it signals the beginning of Winston’s revolution. The fact that the first information he writes down is about Doublethink and its ramifications divulges the intellectual aspect of the rebellion. It is a rebellion against the acceptance of lies, the approval of illogicality, the satisfaction with contradictions, and, above all, the support of a stupidity-based happiness inflicted upon the ignorant people. Such being the case, writing becomes a powerful form of resistance. The writer, thus, becomes a “rebel” (Sisk 39) expressing bravely and freely a view that differs from the official one.

Bravery entails risk. Indeed, the suspense of Winston’s first act of opening the diary in the very first chapter conveys the dangers related to his audacity. The depiction of the defiant act of opening a diary is preceded by two paragraphs arousing suspense. The first of these describes Winston’s attempt to find a spot out of the range of the telescreen. The second paragraph describes the oldness of the yellowed book, and how Winston has come to buy this “compromising possession” (Orwell 8). The third paragraph begins: “The thing that he was about to do was to open a diary.” This sentence exacerbates the sense of danger generated by Winston’s hazardous act. The imminence is even more amplified by the reference to a death penalty, or a twenty-year forced-labour punishment emanating from this act.

The risks linked to holding and opening the diary bespeak the threats resulting from writing. The party’s opposition to writing mirrors its fear of the revolutionary potential of this act. For this reason, the party strives to abolish free critical writing. The fact that “the pen was an archaic instrument, seldom used even for signatures” attests to the political
will to erase writing. Winston has been able to procure a pen “furtively and with some
difficulty.” The placement of this description at the very beginning of the narrative
reflects the regime’s attempt to eradicate writing. It also foreshadows the horrendous
punishment that will be inflicted upon Winston because of his audacity.

The party’s awareness of the role of writing in shaping the popular mindset has led it
to control all written historical records. Winston’s job as a pro-party rewriter of history
exemplifies its tendency to dominate the written word. Winston falsifies all the historical
documents once Oceania changes alliances. He rewrites the past according to the present
vision of it. His work in the Records Department of the Ministry of Truth consists of
evading, twisting, and misrepresenting reality. The memory hole in which he throws truth
accounts epitomizes his involvement in the writing and dissemination of lies. The result
is that these falsifications have blurred the truth:

People of my age don’t really know anything about those times. We can
only read about them in books. And what it says in the books may not be
true. I should like your opinion on that. The history books say that life
before the Revolution was completely different from what it is now. There
was the most terrible oppression, injustice, poverty - worse than anything
we can imagine. Here, in London, the great mass of the people never had
enough to eat from birth to death. Half of them hadn’t even boots on their
feet. (93)

Casting doubt in the books’ portrayal of capitalists, Winston inquires: “is it fact, for
instance, that you had to call them “Sir”, and take off your cap when you passed them”
(94, emphasis added). He continues asking: “I’m only quoting what I’ve read in history
books - Was it usual for these people and their servants to push you off the pavement into
the gutter?” (95). The power of writing is emphasized because the party’s preoccupation
with altering the political, social and economic information of books reveals its
conviction that those who govern the word need to command the mind. As Winston
comes to understand, “when memory failed, and written records were falsified - when
that happened, the claim of the party to have improved the conditions of human life had
got to be accepted because there did not exist, and never again could exist any standard against which it could be tested" (97).

Much in this vein, it might be interesting to probe Julia’s work, particularly the scenes in which she tells Winston about the different steps of writing novels and pamphlets: just like Meccania, where plays are written under the supervision of the Superstate, the writing process in Oceania is directed and controlled by political committees that allow for one of six standard plots: “she could describe the whole process of composing a novel, from the general directive issued by the planning committee to the final touching-up by the Rewrite Squad. [...] Books were just a commodity that had to be produced, like jam or bootlaces” (136). The party’s resoluteness to commodify writing, and to remove creativity and thoughtfulness from it attests, again, to the political fear before its ability to enlighten and sensitize the masses. Once more, the multiplicity of departments and sections devoted to writing mirrors the oligarchy’s will to control writers and what they write. This control asserts the role of writing in advancing critical thinking and democratic rule.

Accordingly, the autocracy’s struggle to make all written records eulogize its totalitarian ideology makes writing a threatening act that requires audacity. This audacity is reflected in what Winston writes when he dips the pen into the ink just before starting to jot down his ideas: “To mark the paper was the decisive act” (9). The first thought that comes through Winston’s mind after making this determinant decision is: “For whom [...] was he writing this diary? For the future, for the unborn.” At this very moment, Winston remembers the Newspeak word “Doublethink”. The remembrance of this particular word in this instant underlines the role of the writer in countering such hegemonic regulatory linguistic and intellectual categories as Newspeak. It alerts the reader to the horror of the doublethink schizophrenia. Differing from the critics who have considered Winston’s love for Big Brother as the climax of the novel, T.A. Shippey argues that the true collapse is to be associated with “the spectacle of Winston, the diarist[‘s]” (173) quest for truth. In Shippey’s statement, the word “diarist” is positioned directly after the character’s name and, so, defines his role in the novel, and as an accentuation of the importance of the writing act. Winston has made up his mind to “communicate with the future” via writing. It is from this connection with the future that the warning premise arises. The idea of
similarity between “what is” and “what will be” suggests that the future will emanate from the continuity of current trends and tendencies. The capitalized letters in which Winston unconsciously writes his rebellious thoughts might be understood as being driven by a desire to alert the reader to the spread of totalitarianism:

DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER
DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER
DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER
DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER
DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER
DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER. (20)

Winston’s deliberate repetition and capitalization of all the letters are meant to stick in the reader’s visual memory. Again, a twinge of panic is felt because of the writing of these “dangerous” words. A temptation has even lured him to abandon the whole enterprise by tearing out the page he has just written. This is not the only instance in which Winston’s opposition to manipulation manifests itself through writing. Indeed, his certainty in the indispensability of truth translates itself as follows: “he wrote: Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four. If that is granted, all else follows” (84, emphasis in original). The fact that Winston writes, rather than says, that two and two make four divulges the importance of the writing act, in that it stresses the liberatory potential it holds. By penning this equation Winston underlines writing’s ability to unveil the truth, and to distinguish it from falsehood. In so doing, he asserts its ability to emancipate the wretched of Oceania from the shackles of political-scientific tyranny.

The emancipatory function of writing is not seen only in terms of recording and historicizing tyrannical rule. Rather, writing holds a revolutionary potential that can lead the oppressed to rebel against their oppressors. In this regard, it might be insightful to note that writing has paved the way for Julia and Winston’s sexual resistance to the regime: when Julia meets Winston in the long corridor, she slips something in his hand. Winston is paralyzed by fear, thinking that “whatever was written on the paper, it must have some kind of political meaning” (113). This statement foreshadows the insurgence
to which the written word will lead the characters. After surmounting his panic, Winston flattens the scrap of paper, and reads the following: “on it was written, in a large unformed handwriting: I love you” (emphasis in original). The love note excites Winston, inciting fantasies about Julia’s youthful naked body. Thus, writing has aroused the instinct the party wants to kill, and unleashed a revolution against the asexuality imposed by the autocracy. The following citation illustrates how writing has fuelled Winston’s rebellion: “the first step had been a secret, involuntary thought, the second has been the opening of the diary. He had moved from thoughts to words, and now from words to actions” (166), actions that find their roots in his fury at the party’s hegemonic control of people and falsification of facts.

The falsification of archives, the erasure of history, the omission of records and the creation of new ones tailored according to the regime’s needs can happen only through a manipulation of the language. Language is the medium of both speech and writing. Once monitored, the priorities, objectives, alliances, wars and events that have marked the state can be rewritten. In this regard, T.A. Shippey asserts that “the connecting thread of Nineteen Eighty-Four is the abolition of the past and of memory.” In his view, “the explanation lies in the deliberate assault on language” (183). By destroying language, writing becomes a tool similar to the telescreen. First, rewriters of history and data provide the information that will be diffused on the telescreen. Then, in the same way the telescreen bruises Oceanians’ ears with statistics, writers brainwash the students’ minds by falsifying the history books assigned to them.

Much in this vein, Florence Lewis and Peter Moss maintain that the inhabitants of Oceania “are created by the ruling group” (44, emphasis in original). In the light of what has been said, the deliberate italicization of the verb “created” might lead us to acknowledge the role of writing in the formation and creation of the Oceanian mindset. By deleting historical evidence, ancestral heritage and personal recollections, writing functions as a monitoring device capable of perfecting thought control (44). The authors assume that the party deprives the people of memory by depriving them of words: “memories die when they go unrehearsed in words”. For this reason, they perceive Newspeak as “mind arrest” (51). If we hold this idea as true, it follows logically that Newwriting denotes thought negation and identity annihilation. The conclusion of Lewis
and Moss’s study of language is insightful with regards to the role of language and, hence, writing in warning against political-scientific excesses: “that is why we must pause in our reading of Nineteen Eighty-Four: first, to examine language, the language of our television shows, the language of advertising, the language of Pentagonese” (57). In connection with these, we can add the language of delivered and written political speeches, reports on economic growth, accusations of treason, educational books and accounts of wars.

The rewriting of language and history together with the warning aim cannot be studied separately from the appendix that is included in the end of the novel. Indeed, the appendix’s warning message might be inferred from its reference to time:

In 1984 when Oldspeak was the normal means of communication, the danger theoretically existed that in using Newspeak words, one might remember their original meanings. In practice it was not difficult for any person well grounded in Doublethink to avoid doing this, but within a couple of generations even the possibility of such lapse would have vanished. (324)

It is noteworthy that the appendix is set in the years following 1984. By comparing the past (the time in which the events of the novel unfold) to the present (post-1984), the work alerts its reader to the hazards that might emanate from the continuity of the current political-scientific tendencies.

The warning is even more exacerbated via the emphasis laid upon temporality. The repetition of time references asserts the alert inherent in the novel: “and it was to be foreseen that with the passage of time the distinguishing characteristics of Newspeak would become more foreseen and more pronounced.” The verb “foresee” accentuates the novel’s “drastic predictions” (Gibson 16). The verb’s belonging to the semantic field of foretelling explains why critics have considered Nineteen Eighty-Four a prophecy. Since the predicted message can be either positive or negative, such ominous visions as Nineteen Eighty-Four might be read as a warning against the proliferation of political-scientific excesses. The employment of the past perfect deepens the role of time in the novel: “when Oldspeak had been once for all superseded, the last link with the past would
have been severed.” Again, the mention of the term “past” reinforces timeliness. Indeed, the appendix is replete with words that alternate between the past and the future: “the literature of the past”; “in the future, such fragments even if they chanced to survive, would be unintelligible and untranslatable”; “no book written before 1960 could be translated as a whole”; “pré-revolutionary literature”; “a good deal of the literature of the past”; “all else that survived of the literature of the past” (Orwell 324). The point of intersection between all these time references is their connection with writing because all of them figure links between the past on the one hand, and literature, books, words, or fragments of words on the other hand.

It is interesting that the appendix itself contains multiple references to science, particularly neurological psychiatry. Much in accordance with the party’s dictates, the appendix associates heresy with dissidence: “it was intended that when Newspeak had been adopted once and for all and Oldspeak forgotten, a heretical thought - that is, a thought diverging from the principles of Ingsoc - should be literally unthinkable” (312). This final section of the novel makes it clear that the divergent aspect has necessitated “the suppression of definitely heretical words” (313). However, some of the terms “which had once born a heretical meaning” (318) are kept provided that the undesirable connotation is removed from them. The appendix cites some of these words. What are referred to as mad terms are such concepts as “honour, justice, morality, internationalism, democracy, science and religion.” The fact that the appendix positions the word “science” just after the political concept of “democracy” in the list of abolished words might hint at the intrinsic link between them, thus suggesting the role of words, and, hence, writing in hiding the political-scientific coalition.

The appended principles explain the Newspeak linguistics. Under this new linguistic logic, words are divided into three categories: A, B and C. The range of diction “A” is to be restricted to an apolitical vocabulary consisting of a combination of adjectives formed through adding prefixes such as “un”, “plus”, “doubleplus”, “ante”, “post”, “up”, “down”. The result of this process of affixation is the formation of such words as uncold, pluscold and doublecold. The largest part of the “A” Newspeak lexis describes the acts of everyday life, acts such as sleeping, eating, working, sitting, cleaning, washing, and the
like. However, not all the Newspeak words are apolitical. Group B comprises a set of Newspeak terms that encompass a multiplicity of Oldspeak concepts. A good illustration of this encapsulation is the word "crimethink" under which the notions of liberty and equality are contained. The third group of Newspeak words is the C vocabulary. This category might be the most interesting one in relation to the theme of the political-scientific alliance because it consists of scientific and technical words only. Probing the C vocabulary, the appendix reveals how "the usual care was taken to define them rigidly, and strip them of undesirable meanings" (322).

This statement shows that not only science, but even the scientific and technical terms have been censored and tailored according to the party's wish. What is more appalling is that "there was no vocabulary expressing the function of Science as a habit of mind, or a method of thought" (323). Indeed, under the ongoing political-scientific coalition, there can be no wonder that such lexis no longer exists. Under Big Brother's regime, science ceases to be the realm of creative and improvement-driven experimentation, for it becomes a mere lackey for the state. This evidence reinforces the idea that "there was, indeed, no word for 'Science', any meaning that it could possibly bear being already sufficiently covered by the word Ingsoc." In equating science with English socialism, this statement leaves no doubt about the depth of the political-scientific alliance.

Moreover, the lack of terms defining scientific research as an intellectual effort in the Newspeak edition of English exposes the autocracy's fear of the spoken and, particularly, the written word. Indeed, once written, the anti-government ideas will unveil the atrocities and violations committed under the political-scientific alliance. For this reason, the party has decided to eradicate divergent and critical writing from its roots. By erasing the words through which it can be condemned, the regime guarantees that nothing can be written against its totalitarian policies. As the appendix makes clear: "because the necessary words were not available[,] ideas inimical to Ingsoc could only be entertained in a vague wordless form, and could only be named in very broad terms which lumped together, and condemned whole groups of heresies without defining them in doing so." Commenting on Newspeak's connection to lunacy, the appendix states: "In Newspeak, it
was seldom possible to follow a heretical thought further than the perception that it was heretical: beyond that point the necessary words are nonexistent” (319).

This statement communicates how language is used to indict the alleged insanity without specifying the reasons for language’s inability to explain why a particular thought is considered heretical and signals its complicity in the camouflage of truth. Animosity becomes the key to perpetuate totalitarian hegemony. As long as non-conformist, insurgent and revolutionary thoughts are nameless, they can neither be uttered, nor imagined. When words lose their ability to express free thinking, writing fails to preserve its potential to call for liberty, and to resist its negation and annihilation. The idea of liberty gains more stress as the appendix quotes from the Declaration of Independence:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government. (325, emphasis in original)

The appendix reveals that the best translation of the first article of the declaration would be the single word “crimethink”. The employment of the constitutional act warns against the potential disappearance of the rights guaranteed in the article. The placement of the passage that is taken from the Declaration of Independence at the end of both the appendix and the novel underlines the importance of these rights, thus highlighting the threat of losing them.

The appendix’s warning against this hazard is reinforced via its mention of futurist dates. Indeed, the appendix features two forward references to the year 2050. The first is placed in its opening paragraph: “it was expected that Newspeak would have finally superseded Oldspeak (or standard English, as we should call it) by about the year 2050” (312). The second is positioned in its last sentence of the novel: “the final adoption of
Newspeak had been fixed for so late a date as 2050” (326). Both the inclusion and the positioning of these future points in time accentuate the message of warning that underlies Orwell’s dystopia. Indeed, when Syme talks to Winston about the definitive edition of the Newspeak dictionary, he mentions this same year three times: “the eleventh edition won’t contain a single word that will become obsolete before the year 2050” (54); “by the year 2050, at the very latest, not a single human being will be alive who could understand such a conversation as we are having now” (55); “By 2050 - earlier, probably - all real knowledge of Oldspeak will have disappeared” (56). The repetitive mention of this futurist date deepens the message of warning, and incites the reader to think about the outcome of the current political-scientific totalitarianism.

In order for this political-scientific totalitarianism to continue, the oligarchy has attempted to perpetuate its hegemony over all the aspects of Oceanian life. This hegemony cannot continue in the presence of outspoken writers who unveil political-scientific atrocities. For this reason, the party has attempted to usurp language’s, and, hence, writing’s ability to say the truth. Much in this vein, Bernard Crick argues that “the principal message of George Orwell’s novel was ‘about the use and abuse of language for political purposes’” (cited in Shippey 172). This statement conveys the centrality of language and, by implication, writing in the novel. Indeed, the concept of Newspeak automatically entails Newwriting, which, in its turn, entails camouflage and silence before atrocities, particularly political-scientific calamities. What applies to Newspeak applies to Doublethink. Consequently, Doublethink is prone to generate Doublewriting, a type of writing that hides reality by accepting contradictory beliefs. It is the writing style that pro-party “language manipulator[s]” (Chilton 33) exercise in order to police the population by “define[ing] and redefin[ing] reality” (41) for them.

Furthermore, Newspeak is part of a process of identification and “alienation” (Dodd 51) that Orwell has employed in order to bring the reader’s attention to the totalitarian excesses. The intertwined notions of identification and separation serve the warning incentive that governs dystopian writing, in that the reader’s identification with the characters and circumstances he reads about makes him or her fear a possible occurrence of such atrocities in his or her society. Lynette Hunter maintains that “the narrator
presents the utopia in a probable context; he leads the reader to believe in the character’s delusion, and thereby denies that the fantasy is obvious and safe” (192). The probability wrapping the whole experience of reading dystopias stems from the similarities the reader finds between the real and the unreal, the imagined and the existent. The reader’s awareness of these affinities enables him or her to make connections between his or her existence and the dystopias he or she reads about. The similarities between the world lived in and the universe described are likely to alert the reader to a possible transformation of the fictional into the factual. The mixture between the fantastic and the natural in Orwell’s dystopian writing (Hunter 192) might account for the warning message that drives the novel. The real components suggest that the despotism and coercion reigning in the societies of the novels may also occur in real life and would be created, applied, maintained and strengthened through a coalition between science and the state. In this coalition, the Superstate would control the scientists, as well as their scientific research and inventions. The warning strategy of this novel rests upon a series of resounding images that are capable of “othering postwar modern industrial society as dystopia” (Ahlback 116).

Orwell is not the only writer to have used components reminiscent of the actual world, for even Burgess and Gregory have had recourse to this technique. The three writers employ these familiar elements in the service of their novels’ warning aims because they help establish links between the fictional and the factual. The elements of assimilation whereupon the three dystopias rest make the stories connote, rather than denote. These connotations are based on a cognitive framework, made up of memories from the reader’s world. These links enrich the semantic fields of the novels because they enlarge the scope of the possible meanings that might apply for the three texts. This net of links gives rise to a multiplicity of assimilations, but also suggests reasons for the most common meanings. Through this set of assimilations the texts depart from the literal denotations to achieve a special warning effect. According to Hunter, the identification/separation alternation is driven by a process of familiarization and defamiliarization (193). Defamiliarization is defined in The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory as being “a translation of the Russian ostranenie ‘making strange’. To defamiliarize is to make fresh, new, strange, different what is familiar and known” (214).
Hence, defamiliarization represents the artistic technique of compelling the reader to see usual things in unusual, unfamiliar and odd ways, with the ultimate aim of suggesting deduction of and connection with the familiar.

3.2. *A Clockwork Orange*

The same familiarizing/defamiliarizing technique has been used by Anthony Burgess in *A Clockwork Orange* in order to write against the political-scientific conspiracy. Like Orwell, Burgess has employed a variety of familiar and unfamiliar images and components. While defamiliarization is meant to show what the political-scientific complicity will amount to in the future, the goal of familiarization is to avoid alienating the reader from the depicted world, and to preserve an atmosphere of plausibility. Jean Kennrad contends that Burgess maintains a balance between the novel’s fantastic universe and the world in which we live: “Burgess keeps us constantly aware of the similarities between the horrors of the fantasy and those of our own world. His aim is not the alienation of the reader” (66). The novel is based upon an alternation of commonplace and novel elements. The films themselves are familiar, but newness resides in their conditioning effect which represents the novum. “I was forced to viddy a most nasty film about Japanese torture. It was the 1939-1945 war” (Burgess 92), says Alex. The Second World War together with the Japanese troops function as well-known elements familiarizing the reader with the new Ludovico therapy. The weapons, swords, soldiers, fire and blood included in this scene further acquaint the reader with the content of the Ludovico films.

On the second day of the cure Alex is forced to watch another war movie:

What it was now was the starry 1939-45 war again. [...] It opened with German eagles and Nazi flag with that like crooked cross that all malchicks at school love to draw and then there were very haughty and nadmenny like German officers
walking through streets that were all dust and bomb-holes and broken buildings.

(98)

The Second World War, the German eagles, the swastika, the German officers, the bombings and the devastation, are all well-known to the initial American and British readers. Indeed, though the Ludovico therapy might initially seem strange, the presence of these elements familiarizes the readership with it. The institution of the hospital is itself a familiar element because clinics are meant to be places offering treatment. However, it is the name, the type and the purpose of the Reclamation Treatment which constitute the novelty in *A Clockwork Orange*. Besides, knowing that the novel was first published in the U.S., the 1960s phenomenon of teenage violence represents a point of identification, especially for the American reader. Another recognizable element is the behaviour modification therapies that boomed during the 1960s and 70s (Gehrke 146).

By penning this dystopia, Burgess has emphasized the role of writing in warning against political-scientific conspiracies. However, the importance of the writing act is not manifest through the actual writing of this novel only. Rather, the novel itself includes instances of writing that serve to counter political-scientific alliances. The most notable figure in this regard might be that of the writer F. Alexander whose writings are directed against the government. The fact that F. Alexander is described by the minister as “a writer of subversive literature” (Burgess 153-154) shows the writing act’s potential in exposing their power abuses. The characterization technique used to portray F. Alexander emphasizes his role as a writer: he is first introduced through the mention of papers: “on the table was a typewriter and a lot of like tumbled papers, and I remembered that this vreck was a writer. *A Clockwork Orange*, that had been it” (134). It is interesting that F. Alexander’s book is referred to as soon as he is introduced to the scene - the post-Ludovico scene - because he has appeared before during the rape episode. Indeed, there are multiple references to Alexander’s work in the last part of the novel: “I had a ped round in my nagoyngas looking for *A Clockwork Orange*, which would be bound to have his eemyain, he being the author” (138); “I thought there must be a copy of *A Clockwork Orange*, and on the back of the book, like on the spine, was the author’s eemya - F. Alexander”; “I said: ‘I have heard of *A Clockwork Orange*. I have not read it,
but I have heard of it'. ‘Ah’ he said, and his litso shone like the sun in its flaming glory” (135). Almost whenever the novel is cited, it is mentioned in connection with its author. In the first two instances they are linked via the signature: in the third, they are tied via the author’s happy reaction to Alex’s mention of his work. It is obvious that this title lends itself to Burgess’s novel. Its rich connotations warn against political-scientific conspiracies. The proof of this warning potential is F. Alexander himself uses the clockwork trope in order to condemn the political-scientific repressiveness that has been imposed upon him: “to turn a decent young man into a piece of clockwork should not, surely, be seen as any triumph for any government, save one that boasts of its repressiveness” (137).

A character can also be portrayed through the setting in which he lives. The most prominent element in F. Alexander’s room is books, particularly A Clockwork Orange. As Alex steps inside Alexander’s office, he sees a copy of it. He perceives it as follows:

It seems written in a very bezoomy like style, full of Ah and Oh and that cal, but what seemed to come out of it was that all lewdies nowadays were being turned into machines and that they were really - you and me and him kiss-my-sharries - more like a natural growth like a fruit. F. Alexander seemed to think that we all like grow on what he called the world-tree in the world orchard that like Bog or God planted, and we were there because Bog or God had need of us to quench his thirsty love, or some such cal. (138)

This passage shows that F. Alexander’s work denounces the mechanization of individuals. The term “machine” accentuates the writer’s opposition to robotization and automatization. The reference to divinity raises the issue of choice that has been raised by the chasso. In so doing, it might call for a conception of humanity as creatures made by God, not as robots conditioned by political-scientific behaviourism. F. Alexander’s opposition to the political-scientific dehumanizing practices has led him to write a scathing critique of the atrocity committed: “I’ve written an article’, he said, ‘this morning, while you were sleeping. That will be out in a day or so, together with your unhappy picture. You shall sign it, poor boy, a record of what they have done to you” (140). F. Alexander’s statement stresses writing’s potential to expose excesses, misuses
and abuses of political-scientific power. Besides, the term “record” underscores writing’s ability to preserve and keep track of the regime’s illegal actions that the party in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and the government in *A Clockwork Orange* seek to erase.

In response to F. Alexander’s mention of his article, Alex asks him about the benefit he gets from his writing. Outraged, the author shouts: “Some of us have to fight. There are great traditions of liberty to defend. I am no partisan man. Where I see the infamy I seek to erase it. Party names mean nothing. The tradition of liberty means all.” The semantic field of freedom that pervades F. Alexander’s answer sheds light upon the role of the writer in the struggle for emancipation from the trammels of totalitarianism. The recurrence of the concept of liberty defines the author’s function as a fighter for, and defender of, autonomy. This mission is even more stressed in what follows: “the common people will let it go, oh yes. They will sell liberty for a quieter life. That is why they must be prodded, *prodded*” (emphasis in the original). By referring to the common people F. Alexander establishes a sharp binary opposition between the writer and the masses. In his opinion, the terms of this dichotomy charge the writer with the responsibility of enlightening and informing the population. The repetition of the passive voice of the verb “prod” together with the italicization of the second mention of this word emphasize this role.

F. Alexander thinks non intellectuals are not likely to rebel against the government. They prefer an easy and calm life even if it costs the loss of their right to freedom. It is the writer who comes to shake common people’s satisfaction with totalitarian stability by bringing their attention to lies, corruption and exploitation. After saying this, F. Alexander “picked up a fork, and stuck its two or three razzes into the wall, so that it all got bent. Then, he threw it on the floor.” Although this theatrical gesture might seem naive and hackneyed on the surface, it incarnates the fight for which F. Alexander calls. More to the point, the diction related to the lexical field of writing abounds in the last sections of the novel: “literature” (136); “leave me to my writing” (137); “two or three shelves of books”; “on the back of the book”; “the author” (138); “writing another book” (139); “article”; “record” (140); “a very long, and very weepy piece of writing”; “the book and the article about how I had suffered” (141); “newspaper” (142); “ink” (144);
"headlines"; "read" (149); "the papers" (150); "men from gazettas with notebooks and pencils" (153); "literature" (154).

Most importantly, the verb "write" recurs in almost all its forms: the infinitive "to write" (147), the past participle "written" (138), the gerund "writing" (139), the present perfect "I’ve written" (140, 141), the past perfect "had written" (141) and the noun "writer" (134, 153). These words refer to the Ludovico treatment, and their repetition accentuates writers’s responsibility in exposing abuses. It is interesting to note that when Alex decides to commit suicide, he goes to the library in order to search for suicide reference books. The choice of this particular place just before Alex’s decision to end his life accentuates the role of books and, hence, of writers in preventing or assisting such acts.

More to the point, suicide is generated by Beethoven’s haunting music. Yet, the prominence of a booklet having an open window on the cover, with a note suggesting: “open the Window to fresh air, fresh ideas, a new way of living”, together with the presence of a “DEATH TO THE GOVERNMENT” pamphlet, incite the suicide attempt (146). Just after reading the message on the booklet’s cover, Alex says “and so, I knew that was like telling me to finish it all by jumping out”, thus attesting to the power of the written word. The fact that Alex’s suicide is not only caused by the torturous classical music, but by the books available in the room communicates the power of writing. Burgess suggests to his reader that this power should be devoted to fighting the political-scientific conspiracy. Otherwise, the complicity between men of politics and men of science might extend to an alliance between politicians and intellectuals in general.

Writing can also serve politicians, as is the case of the gazette in which Alex sees his picture followed by a note: “The first graduate from the new State Institute for Reclamation of Criminal Types cured of his criminal instincts in a fortnight only, now a good law-fearing citizen” (116). This boastful article about this Ludovico’s technique and how clever the government was and reveals that writers are also prone to conspire with the state. Besides, when F. Alexander writes an article recording and condemning the Ludovico technique, he does not do it out of compassion for Alex. Rather, he is motivated by a political ambition to take power through publicizing the current
government's failure: "What a superb device he can be, this boy. If anything, of course, he could for preference look even iller and more zombyish that he does. Anything for the cause. No doubt he can think of something" (142); "you can be a very potent weapon you see, in ensuring that this present and wicked government is not returned in the forthcoming election" (139). Even worse, F. Alexander wants Alex to sign an article that he has written, and to present it for publication, as if it were his own: "come, and see what I've written for it's going into The Weekly Trumpet under your name" (141).

Writing's transformation into tools serving political ambitions does not end with these acts. When members of the opposition party discuss the public gathering during which they will present Alex to the public, D.B. Da Silva tells Alex: "to exhibit you at public meetings will be a tremendous help. And, of course the newspaper angle is all tied up" (142). The certainty with which Da Silva talks about the tabloid's coverage of the event reveals the role articles have in directing public opinion. In addition, Da Silva does not mention the presence of radio or television channels. The absence of these visual and auditory media and the exclusive presence of written journalism prove the importance the written word has in unveiling truth and convicting perpetrators. The power of the written word is seen in the shocking headlines of the gazette that has been issued after Alex's suicide attempt: "BOY VICTIM OF CRIMINAL REFORM SCHEME" and "GOVERNMENT AS MURDER" (149). These headlines have captured readers' attention. After reading them, even Alex's parents have realized the Ludovico trauma that Alex has undergone, and have asked him ashamedly to come back home. Even more, the public's reaction to the appalling articles has led the government to deprogramme Alex. This evidence reveals that authors are capable of saving humanity from succumbing to the horrors of politics' command of other disciplines, if they critique the political-scientific coalescence in their writings.

In consequence, while Robert O. Evans holds that A Clockwork Orange "does not warn us to be careful to follow a certain political course" (261), I maintain that the idea of warning against a politicized science of behaviourism underlies Burgess's whole enterprise of writing the novel. The chief chasso's statement regarding penal practices assumes that criminals "can best be dealt with on a purely curative basis. Kill the criminal
reflex, that's all. Full implementation in a year's time" (Burgess 81). The term “reflex” encapsulates the ghastliness of a politicized behaviourism that reduces human beings to animality. Indeed, behaviourism confines humans to a stimulus/response equation nullifying all feelings and emotions. Burgess's dystopia alerts the reader to the dehumanizing consequences of the political applications of behaviourist science. The chasso's mention of a timely plan for the implementation of the Ludovico treatments throws light upon the objectifying repercussions of this reclamation therapy. Man is not a rat in a laboratory. His reactions cannot be calculated, predicted, and then killed during a pre-set span of time.

On the public demonstration day, Dr. Brodsky introduces “the subject himself” (107) to the public. Alex's dystopia warns against the political-scientific treatment of humans as a mere “subject”, not as a thinking, active human being. The term “subject” is used three times in the public demonstration episode. Besides, the human behaviour and psyche involve more than arousal by a sexy woman, or excitement at the sight of violence. The public demonstration episode reveals that the doctors have attempted to stop Alex's response to these stimuli, rather than to understand Alex's feelings and reactions. When Alex complains about the inclusion of Beethoven in the conditioning process, Dr. Branom merely says that “it can’t be helped”, and adds that “the Governor ought to be pleased” (99). By revealing the harmonious collaboration between scientists and politicians, this remark alerts us to the intensity of the political-scientific threat. Moreover, Alex's poignant declaration that “I viddied that there would be no escaping from any of all this” (97) is insightful about Man's condition under a haunting political-scientific conspiracy meant to tame and discipline him scientifically in order to govern him more effectively. Most importantly, Burgess's dystopia warns against the tutelary right held by the political-scientific alliance to the detriment of the human being. “My boy, you must leave it all to us” (101) says Dr. Brodsky to Alex. The narrative warns against the threats of being in the custody of politicians and scientists. The paternalist and benevolent tone under which the political-scientific enterprise of disciplining Alex is undertaken conceals the hideousness of a hegemonic political-scientific apparatus controlling, punishing and disciplining the masses through subtle means. The writing act is charged with the mission of warning against such political-scientific conspiracies. Both
Burgess's novel and the work written by F. Alexander indict the manipulation of science by politicians.

3.3. **Meccania: The Supertstate**

*Meccania: The Supertstate* incarnates another manifestation of writing's ability to oppose the marriage between politics and science. In fact, the introductory chapter is replete with words related to the diction of writing. The semantic field of writing dominates the opening of the novel: "volumes", "impartial", "credible", "knowledge", "language", "expression", "views", "publishing", "a bulky manuscript", "literature", "read", "translation", "the literary critics", "fiction", "literary device", "description", "a faithful account", "imagination", "satire", "the phrase", "the book of observations", "subject", "reading", "circle of readers", "notes", "a word", "work" (Gregory ix-xvii). The term "book" recurs six times in the introduction, the term "journal" is repeated fourteen times, and the note that precedes Ming’s book mentions the latter for a fifteenth time. It is also noteworthy that the importance of the writing act might be inferred from the opening sentence of the novel: "this book is little more than a transcript of a document originally in the form of a journal" (Gregory ix). What makes the novel more than a transcript is its warning message.

The importance of the writing act has made the Meccanian Superstate control, censor and direct it. This command is established from the beginning of the narrative. Just after the entrance test, an official tells Ming that there are "various gazettes issued by the different departments of the government" (12). When Ming asks for a newspaper in order to read the news, the official tells him: "until you have entered upon your authorized tour of observation, I should have no authority to supply you with any of these." Indeed, not only is written journalism controlled and owned by the state, but even the right to read the state-sponsored newspapers is granted, or denied by the regime. Once more, the interest paid to the written word is not confined to journalism, for the Superstate has promoted a variety of books meant to maintain its authority. Among these is a work
entitled Law in Relation to Foreign Observers. The book’s title suggests that it stipulates the regulations according to which tours are organized in Meccania. Only such works are accessible without authorization.

Controlling the writing act reaches as far as obliging every Meccanian over ten years of age to fill in a weekly diary-form detailing the time spent daily on each task. The diary requires each “diarist” to write down the total number of minutes spent each week on such activities as sleeping, eating, studying, reading, talking, working and letter-writing. Eventually, the information provided by these diaries is “scrutinized and worked up into elaborate reports and statistics for the benefit of the Sociological Department, the Police Department, the Department of Trade and Industry and so forth” (50). These instances might suggest that the Superstate’s awareness of the power of the writing act has made it discipline it by directing it towards perpetuating the control over Meccanians. Even tourists are required to send their diaries to the Time Department. There are “writing room[s]” (51) in which they can record their activities. Upon entry to Meccania, they are given a two hundred-page notebook in which they have to write four pages every day. Any delay in presenting the weekly account will result in the tourist receiving a ten-shilling fine. In light of these facts, it becomes evident that Gregory’s dystopia warns against this totalitarian conception of writing. It alerts its reader to the threats of being obliged to fill up weekly diaries unveiling his or her privacy and invading the secrecy of his or her life.

Prior to Ming’s admission to a tour of Meccanian institutions, the conductor of foreign observers named Prigge brings him to the police office. Upon arrival to this office, Ming has been first taken to the “police doctor” (61). The title “police doctor” that is given to Doctor Pincher tells of a political-scientific alliance hiring medical men to serve the state. It is against this coalition that Gregory’s dystopia warns. As we read, we learn that the police physician called Doctor Pincher is, actually, an expert anthropologist. He has taken samples of Ming’s hair, blood, perspiration and even skin. He has tested Ming’s eyesight, hearing, smell, muscles, as well as responses to different stimuli. Again, the fact that all the stages of the diagnosis are undertaken in the police office sends a message of warning against the political-scientific collaboration.
To warn readers in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* and *A Clockwork Orange* Orwell and Burgess include elements of familiarization and defamiliarization. Similarly, Gregory also uses this strategy. Indeed, by stating that the Meccanian Post office is “very much like any other post office” (49), the writer familiarizes the reader with Meccanian life. However, an element of novelty is introduced: it is the Censor’s Department in which all letters are read and scrutinized by clerks. The political justification of censorship links it to the good of the nation: “the state could not, with due regard to the interests of the community, allow all letters to go uncensored.” In the Superstate’s view, the community’s interests lie in saving time through abstaining from writing. This abstinence results from Meccanians’ knowledge that all letters are censored, which spares them the time of “indulg[ing] in unnecessary letter-writing.”

When Mr. Ming discovers his addressee’s unawareness of the existence of Meccania at the beginning of the book, he replies: “‘Probably no’. [...] ‘But it exists’” (xi). This answer comes as a warning. Not hearing or knowing about this political-scientific Superstate does not mean that it does not exist. Indeed, the effect of defamiliarization created by the employment of elements of novelty might dissociate the reader from the Meccanian regime. However, this introductory reply comes to counter such possibilities, thus inciting the reader to interpret what he or she reads not as a piece of imaginary fantasy, but as a political journal on a country whose features exist somewhere in western Europe. These initial clues are asserted in the first-person narrator’s claim that “it was obvious what country was meant” (xii-xiii).

The connection between fiction and reality is reinforced again: “As to the date 1970, I soon came to the conclusion that this was another literary device to enable him to describe with greater freedom what he considered to be the probable, or as he should be inclined to say, the inevitable development of the tendencies he had observed in that country” (xiii). The link between the year 1970 and the term “literary device” refers us to the dystopian genre that uses futurist settings in order to alert the reader to the potential repercussions of a particular phenomenon. The adjectives “probable” and “inevitable” underline the message of warning, and assert the possibility of a potential spread of Meccanian ethics and ideals to other countries.
Elements of familiarization and defamiliarization abound in the novel because they serve the warning aim. In the second paragraph of the novel, a phrase refers to Meccania as "a country with which Englishmen are still insufficiently acquainted" (ix). Englishmen’s deficient knowledge foreshadows the process of defamiliarization that will mark the novel’s next pages. Indeed, the elements of verisimilitude and familiarization are established from the beginning of the novel: to start with, the term “Englishmen” evokes the familiar image of the English people. In addition, the characterization technique wherewith Mr. Ming’s portrait is drawn introduces him through referring to his mobility. Mobility is highlighted by his visits to England, France, Italy and America (x). These countries function as other elements of familiarization. Two sentences after the reference to these countries, there is a mention of “the Chinese delegation” and the “British constitutions” and “European politics” (xi). These three existing political references deepen the reader’s familiarity with the novel. It is the discussion of the recognition element of European politics which leads to the first introduction of the new place Meccania which is located in western Europe. The first-person reply, “I have never heard of such a country”, echoes the reader’s estranged reaction at hearing the name of the country. Estrangement is deepened by the futurist setting wherein Meccania is placed, a setting that estranges even the first person narrator relating the main story:

“I spent some five months there in 1970, and I kept a journal of my experiences.”

“You mean 1870,” I said.

“No, 1970,” he replied.

This futurist date might serve the underlying warning message because it is prone to bring the reader’s attention to the future of the political-scientific alliance. The warning covers different aspects of Meccania: sociology, scientific progress, eugenics, education. Indeed, Ming’s writing has probed all these facets of Meccanian tyranny. In so doing, it is a warning against politics’ intrusion in and manipulation of each one of them. The most prominent of these might be sociology. In effect, this human science represents a seminal part of Gregory’s warning project, for the sociological involvement in politics should be
understood within the wider framework of “the policing of social identities” (Geyer and Fitzpatrick 235). Besides, the description of the scrutiny imposed by the Department of Sociology can be read as an alarm against scientists’ conspiracy with politicians who want to know more in order to govern more despotically: “By means of our Sociological Department, our Industrial Department, our Time Department and the various sections of our department of culture, we know perfectly how to adjust our industries to the end determined by the State” (Gregory 154).

Another threat that Ming’s diary warns against is that of scientific advancement. Indeed, the term “advanced” recurs throughout the novel: “our mental environment is in advance of the rest of Europe” (214-215); “we are simply in advance of other nations, that is all” (218); “we are simply more advanced in our development than other states, that is all” (221); and “Meccanians are only doing a little in advance of other peoples, what they will all do sooner or later” (232). The idea of an inevitable transformation of the other peoples communicates a warning against the repercussions of such a politicized conception of scientific advancement. The mention of advance is in conjunction with the reference to modernity. Instances containing the word “modern” pervade the narrative: “modern life is necessarily complex” (218); “the modern state” (222); “modern machinery” (231); and “the modern world” (232). When Ming asks whether the Sixth and Seventh classes reclaim their right to a fair share of the national product, the economist Sauer mocks him: “You remind me of a story I used to hear when I was a boy, of a man who had slept in some cave or den for fifty years, or was it a century, and woke up to find a different world” (246). This statement suggests that Meccania is ahead of other countries by fifty to a hundred years and that this advance has resulted in an annihilation of protest and a spread of obedience to the oligarchy.

A hazardous menace that emanates from scientific progress is warfare. Kwang tells Ming that the upcoming war will be a chemical one. He reveals the governmental experimentation in armaments: “they have been experimenting for thirty years and more, and they think they have discovered what they want. It may take them several years to perfect their arrangements; it will certainly take them a year or two, and may take six or seven” (261). The reference to the three days’ war against the state of Lugubria is
insightful with regards to the political-scientific alliance. It reveals Meccania’s dispatch of “a small fleet of air-vessels planted about a dozen chemical ‘Distributors’ as they are euphemistically called” (261). The term “euphemistically” reveals the horror of the political-scientific conspiracy. Indeed, euphemism denotes a substitution for a word or an expression that might hurt or offend (The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory 292). This denotation shows that the term used by Meccania does not accurately account for the horror of its political exploitation of chemical research, which deepens the hideousness of the conspiracy between science and politics.

A further political-scientific threat against which Ming’s book warns is that of politicians’ use of eugenics. The great Meccanian prince Mechow introduced eugenic reform. For around thirty years before Prince Mechow’s rule, “Meccanians got eugenics in the brain” (Gregory 199). Even more, the novel makes it clear that “Mechow himself was a eugenist of the most brutal type.” What further accentuates the link between science and politics is Mr. Johnson’s statement that “in the hands of a patriotic medical staff, the system can be so worked that every woman who is ‘approved’ can be provided with a ‘eugenic’ mate from an approved panel, drawn chiefly from the Military Class” (201). Knowing the jingoism reigning in Meccania, the notion of patriotism takes on more radical meanings. It no longer refers to a doctor who loves his motherland. Rather, it means a whole body of scientists who serve the regime competently and efficiently. The faithful and confident tone in which Mr. Johnson says his idea is further revelatory of scientists’ acquiescence to the state. The subsequent reference to eugenics heightens Meccania’s warning against the cooperation between science and politics.

Moreover, the danger of politics’ coalition with medicine is underlined in Ming’s book: explaining the model dietaries to Ming, the guide says that each Meccanian is required to take a yearly medical examination. He states that “the medical officer” (27) conducting the diagnosis may prescribe a diet for the examined person: “the medical officer might prescribe a dietary for the individual, and lastly if a person were positively ill, it would be the duty of the medical officer in charge of the case to prescribe a dietary.” In fact, the very title of the medical officer alerts us to the threat of a coalition between medicine and politics. The juxtaposition of the clinical adjective “medical” with
the political noun “officer” underlines the role of science in enhancing and spreading political control. The best warning against the coalition is probably that of the Medical Board. As a matter of fact, the doctors constituting this council are “municipal officials” (30) and the persons undertaking the medical test do not have the right to choose the doctor that will conduct the examination.

Finally, it is worth-revealing that all these political-scientific threats and excesses have been captured and displayed by Ming’s journal. Ming’s work has disclosed the Panoptican control exercised by the Superstate. By divulging the sociological, psychological, educational and nutritionist involvement in the supervisory mechanism, the journal casts light upon the dehumanizing repercussions of political-scientific cooperation. In describing the exclusionary punitive apparatus that considers political opponents heretics that need to be treated, the diary unveils how scientists collaborate with politicians in order to discipline the population. By displaying the clinical oppression of dissidents, Ming condemns the conspiracy between science and politics. The medium that has allowed Ming to document the political-scientific abuses is his journal. Writing the journal has enabled him to transmit a truthful image of the atrocities concealed by the dictatorship. It has incited the reader to make connections with his or her own world, thus bringing his or her attention to the political-scientific threats that might menace him or her. All these facts testify to writing’s ability to warn against the marriage between science and the state.

3.4. Conclusion:

In Meccania, Mr. Ming records his critique of the Superstate in his notebook. Similarly, in A Clockwork Orange, F. Alexander describes Alex’s torture in his article. By the same token, in Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston Smith records the atrocities committed by the regime in his diary. The significance of writing gains more stress as it becomes a record of political-scientific atrocities, and a warning against potential oppression: “it was important to write” (Orwell 107), says Winston as he opens his diary
to register the party’s excesses. The same applies to Ming whose awareness of the risks he runs has not deterred him from penning his critical thoughts. The determination to disclose the totalitarianism of the Superstate has led him to search for ways through which he can take his work out of the Meccanian territory. Similarly, the resoluteness to expose the failure of the Ludovico therapy has incited F. Alexander to publish a newspaper article that condemns the government. All these works have the potential to alert their contemporary readers, as well as posterity to the dehumanization and enslavement emanating from the marriage between science and the state. Only writing can oppose the totalitarian falsification of figures and the alteration of statistics because nothing can be certain in the absence of a written record of the past.
Conclusion

The examination of Nineteen Eighty-Four, A Clockwork Orange and Meccania has shown that scientific research and inventions have become the lifeblood of totalitarian regimes. This study of the three works has conveyed that the manipulation of science has become a basic prerequisite for political dominance. The three autocracies have initiated and supported a political-scientific cooperation that has ensured the continuity of their rule. They have integrated science into their mechanism of control and punishment in very targeted ways. The basic target is to train the populations to acquiesce to the despots. Hegemony and domination have, thus, brought science and politics into an inextricable connection because the command of science has become the key to maintain absolutist rule.

The rulers of these three fictional worlds do not subsidize research in order to achieve national prosperity and progress. Nor do they encourage invention so that they improve public health and life expectancy. Instead of enhancing health care, improving people’s quality of life, and achieving sustainable development, scientists have collaborated with politicians in order to develop the most effective disciplinary techniques. Scientists’ conspiracy with politicians has resulted in the institutionalization of an embellished totalitarianism. The embellishment is created by the psychological, psychiatric, sociological, behaviourist, educational, nutritionist and technical intrusion of science in people’s lives.

In Nineteen Eighty-Four, science is manipulated by the dictatorship: the air-plane has become a tool for spy detection; the telescreen is a scientific invention that controls people’s movements; military research is conducted by scientists in order to benefit the coercive machinery of the party; and the technical achievements in the field of armaments are used to make people believe that they are in a perpetual state of war. In A Clockwork Orange, we witness the same manipulation of scientific research: the government uses science as a crime-stopping technique; it pretends that the Ludovico
therapy is an investment in the security of all citizens and law enforcement authorities have convinced the electorate of the reliability of the treatment. A team of behaviourists is mobilized in order to devise a technique which eradicates violence from Alex, thus ensuring a successful electoral campaign for the government. In Meccania, psychology and psychiatry are used to force individuals to act as good Meccanians who obey the Superstate, and sociology is used to invade people’s privacy, and to disclose their intimate concerns to the authorities.

In the three dystopias, science is used to penalize political opponents who dare resist the regimes’ oppressive policies. Most importantly, the punishment of the dissident characters of the three works requires a psychiatric treatment. The three novels draw an image of an inextricable tie between the mental hospital and the punishment administered by the government in which psychiatrists are mobilized to serve the dictatorial agendas. The retributions occur in the clinic that turns out to be a punitive institution. The alternations of hospital/prison, clinic/jail are revelatory of the inextricable tie between control and punishment in Nineteen Eighty-Four, A Clockwork Orange and Meccania. Jail is a place of punishment, but it is also a place of control. The clinic, as described in the novel, is a place where Winston, Alex and Stillman are supervised, but it is also the locale where they are penalized.

The intermingling of the themes of control and punishment throughout the three dystopias attests to the complexity of the political-scientific coalescence: control is surveillance, and it also implies punishment. Punishment is penalty and it in turn represents a form of control. Having a clear-cut division between these two interlaced political facets can by no means be achieved because the dynamics feeding the one impact the other. The result of the intertwinement between science, control and punishment is the creation of a “one-dimensional man.” Instead of using science’s capabilities to improve the human condition, scientific and technical progress has extended to a whole system of domination and coordination (Marcuse xii). The noble goal of ameliorating human life has turned into a ghastly reality of alliance between politics and science.
Indeed, the issue of the political-scientific coalescence might be understood within the wider framework of the alliance between politicians and the intelligentsia. This coalition has transformed intellectuals into servants for politicians. Nowadays, oligarchies need men of science, letters and arts to govern, and to hide the horrendous aspects of their tyranny. In this regard, Orwell assumes that the future oligarchical revolution will be made by the new [intellectual] aristocracy [...] of bureaucrats, scientists, trade union organizers, publicity experts, sociologists, teachers, journalists and professional politicians” (cited in Trilling 28). Orwell is not the only author who has expressed his rage at the coalition between political and intellectual minds. Burgess, Gregory and many others have used their pens in order to disclose politicians’ manipulation of the educated elite. Writing holds the capacity to unveil the political engulfment of the erudite. The literati can expose dictators’ resoluteness to equip their military armies with flotillas composed of well-learned researchers and investigators.

The significance of writing gains more stress as it becomes a record of political-scientific atrocities, and a warning against potential oppression: “it was important to write” (Orwell 107), says Winston as he opens his diary in order to register the party’s excesses. This statement suggests that nothing is certain in the absence of a written record of the past. Only writing can oppose the totalitarian falsification of figures and the alteration of statistics. Since the party’s “stability” (222) rests upon a set of lies, writing has the power to subvert its dictatorial system by exposing the nullified base upon which the oligarchy is built. The same applies to the Superstate because its indictment cannot happen in the absence of a written archive relating its abuses. It is for this reason that Ming’s awareness of the risks he runs has not deterred him from penning his critical thoughts. The determination to disclose the totalitarianism of the Superstate has led him to search for ways through which he can take his work out of the Meccanian territory. Similarly, the failure of the Ludovico therapy could not have been disclosed to the electorate without a written condemnation of this treatment. F. Alexander’s resoluteness to unveil this political-scientific fiasco has made him publish a newspaper article that criminalizes the government. The three dystopias have the potential to alert their contemporary readers as well as posterity to the dehumanization and enslavement emanating from the marriage between science and the state.
It is shrewd of Orwell, Burgess and Gregory to use the dystopian genre, and to employ the techniques of familiarization and defamiliarization in order to direct their critique against the political-scientific conspiracy. Indeed, the imaginative potential that is available to writers of dystopias has enabled them to exaggerate certain tendencies and practices of their increasingly technological societies. This exaggeration has allowed them to channel messages of warning against a political-scientific alliance denying humans freedom and humanity, and aiming at transforming them into soulless and thoughtless subjects serving the superstates docilely and happily. The novels are the spectacles of a rising technopolitical coalescence. They represent three different cries from the abyss of the scare vis-à-vis the ramifications of the political-scientific alliance on the human soul and mind. Through writing the novelists envision what the present alliance can do to human life. Their writing can, thus, be understood as an intellectual and artistic resistance. The extreme societies that are depicted in the three novels give us a graphic future vision of the repercussions of the coalition. Hence, the intellectual imperative to fight political-scientific excesses arises from the desire to save humanity from the swamp of dehumanization and automatization. Fighting political-scientific collaborations requires a burst of intellectual activity interrogating and countering the coalition between scientists and politicians. The three writers’ futurist observations of the ideological consequences of the remarkable marriage between science and politics prove that writing has the potential to alert the reader to the political-scientific threats menacing his or her rights and liberties.

Finally, speculating on the political-scientific alliance might lead us to question the future of science under the current political hegemony. Science has created new modes of communication. It has advanced logistics. It has discovered treatments and vaccinations. It has enabled humanity to reach other planets. It has designed alternative energy resources. When weighed against the political-scientific atrocities depicted in the three dystopias, these merits show that science is a double-edged weapon. It can be used for the progress and prosperity of humanity as much as it can be used for its robotization and enslavement.
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