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THE INSTRUMENTALISATION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE DIVERSIONARY BEHAVIOUR IN NON-CONFLICTUAL CONDITIONS:
A case study of the political discourse between the USA and China between 1979 and 2004

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Résumé

Comme la protection de l'environnement reçoit une attention croissante dans le discours politique actuel, il importe de se demander si ce phénomène représente une politique d'état bien définie ou un simple instrument stratégique. Ce mémoire cherche à répondre à cette question, en utilisant la théorie de la diversion conflictuelle. Cette théorie affirme que les chefs politiques éprouvant des problèmes internes appliquent une politique étrangère agressive contre les états non démocratiques. Ce comportement étatique est expliqué en se limitant à l'analyse des périodes de conflit, laissant ainsi un grand manque dans la recherche qui porte sur la diversion étatique pendant les périodes de non-conflit. Cette étude vise donc à déterminer si les instabilités internes peuvent être associées aux comportements de diversion étatique, et ce, en période non conflictuelle. De plus, cette recherche vise à démontrer que les valeurs écologiques sont utilisées comme instruments de politique étrangère. Pour ce faire, les discours politiques entre les États-Unis et la Chine de 1979 à 2004 sont analysés, en utilisant un modèle qualitatif et comparatif. L'hypothèse centrale prévoit que, durant les périodes de non-conflit, les États-Unis utilisent l'environnement pour attaquer la Chine. Ce comportement est surtout observé lorsque l'administration américaine souffre de troubles internes et lorsque l'opinion publique américaine est en faveur de la protection de l'environnement.
Summary

As environmental protection is receiving mounting attention in today's political discourse, one might wonder if this awareness constitutes a defined policy objective or a strategic instrument. The present study investigates this question by using the diversionary theory of conflict, which suggests that troubled state leaders choose to pursue aggressive foreign policy against non-democratic states. While diversionary theory of conflict has explained this behaviour by linking it to periods of conflict, no existing studies have accounted for state's diversionary decisions when conflicts do not occur. The aim of this project is to determine if domestic troubles could be associated with state's diversionary behaviour during non-conflictual conditions. In addition, it attempts to show that ecological values are used as an instrument of foreign policy, through diversionary behaviour. The arguments are verified by analyzing the political discourse between the United States and China during the period of 1979 and 2004, using a qualitative comparative approach. The study hypothesizes that during periods of non-conflict, the United States would highly instrumentalise the environment against China when facing increased domestic troubles and when environmental issues are salient according to the US public opinion.
Foreword

This project constitutes an attempt to empirically measure a number of political issues that were not accounted for in previous academic studies. It is the first to define dates of conflict between the United States and China between 1979 and 2004. In addition, it offers an analysis of the United States' political discourse against China, especially in relation to the environment. The task was lengthy and challenging given that the instrumentalisation of the environment is a recent phenomenon, with little empirical analysis. Moreover, the environmental discourse between the United States and China has received little academic attention.

Numerous administrative obstacles have played a role in slowing the research process. Although the research assistant team at the Library of Université Laval was supportive, the scarcity of resources has largely affected the progress. Nevertheless, completing the project has truly enriched my academic experience by improving my abilities to overcome research obstacles in the field.

My aim is to offer an innovative research model that could be used in the future to analyze the instrumentalisation of the environment, along with existing tools. It represents, therefore, an effort to increase the understanding of a contemporary phenomenon in the field of political science.

The completion of this project was possible with the valuable feedback of numerous professors at the Department of Political Science of Université Laval: Professor Jean Crête, Professor Erick Duchesne, Professor Gérard Hervouet, Professor Philippe Le Prestre, and finally my advisor, Professor Anessa Kimball who encouraged me to pursue the project until the end, regardless of the numerous challenges.
This is for my parents who have given me the tools of success, for my husband who helped me see the most beautiful reality and for my future baby (Incha-Allah).
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Introduction

The United Nations Human Development Report for 2007-2008 stated that "Climate Change is the defining human development challenge of the 21 Century" (UN HDR 2007/2008). Moreover, the world's population is alarmed to this reality when "citing pollution and environmental problems as top global threat" (PEW 2007) according to the 2007 PEW survey on Global Attitudes. The survey confirms that environmental concerns have risen in forty-seven nations. It states also that concerns have increased in Latin America and Europe, in addition to Japan and India, with the majority blaming the United States, and to a lesser extent China for environmental crises and lays the responsibility on Washington to do something about them (PEW 2007).

Initially, the Republican Administration of George W. Bush has abandoned its commitment to the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, stating that it could damage the American economy. However, following worldwide criticism for its response to environmental crises and with the urgency of these problems, the administration has offered an alternative to the Kyoto commitment in order to reduce global warming. President Bush's plan offers incentives to voluntarily reduce the US gas emissions by an estimated 4.5 percent over 10 years (CNN 2001). The saliency of environmental concerns on the global level are indirectly pressuring the US Government to alter its policies with regard to global warming, although its conservative agenda prioritizes economic prosperity over environmental protection.

While conservative governments are slowly modifying their political agenda in response to international demands, they are also echoing international concerns with regards to the negative environmental practices of the developing countries. Elizabeth Economy of the Council on Foreign Relations states that "China is one of the world's largest contributors to ozone depletion, global climate change, and biodiversity loss."
Chinese logging companies are also becoming a significant player in the illegal trade in tropical timber" (Economy 2004 a). She continues to state that the United States as an industrialized country has committed to assist China to develop environmental policies. This commitment however is limited to serving the interests and priorities of America: "there are significant opportunities for the United States to assist China's environmental protection effort in ways that serve core U.S. political and economic priorities" (Economy 2004 a). In 2007, the Assistant Administrator at the Office of International Affairs—a US Environmental Protection Agency-- has expressed concerns about the alarming growth rate of China's economy at the expense of the environment. "Since 2000, electricity generation from fossil fuels has increased by over fourteen percent annually. China's economy is becoming more, not less, energy intensive. This rapid growth, and the corresponding increase in energy consumption, has increased emissions of priority air pollutants and greenhouse gases" (US Department of State 2007). More importantly, the House of Representatives has recently passed House Resolution 925 on January 16, 2008, "Condemning the People's Republic of China for its socially unacceptable business practices, including the manufacturing and exportation of unsafe products, casual disregard for the environment, and exploitative employment practices".¹

The fact that the environment is becoming an important issue in American politics is a reality confirmed by numerous authors. Richard L. Berke, wrote in the in the *The New York Times* a few days before Earth Day 1990 that "politicians no longer dismiss the environment as a fringe cause" (Kuzmiak 1991). In addition, politicians once loyal to major corporate polluters are now taking public positions with regards to issues of hazardous waste, acid rain, and the stratospheric ozone layer. Moreover, Republicans who in the past have distanced themselves from the environment movement are now "battling Democrats for the 'green vote' threatening to seize the issue as their own" (Berke 1999, cited in Kuzmiak 1991). In fact, the Republican candidate in the latest presidential election, John McCain, expressed a commitment to decrease carbon emission by sixty six percent by 2050 (J. McCain official website). On the other hand, as a Democratic candidate, President

¹ U.S., Bill H. R. 925, A resolution condemning the People's Republic of China for its socially unacceptable
Obama pledged for an eighty percent reduction (B. Obama official website). While McCain seems less ambitious about environmental reforms in comparison with his Democratic rival, his promise for green policies confirms that Republicans are starting to include environmental promises in their platform. This strategy was nonexistent for former Republican candidates.

At a smaller scale and on the national level, a survey of The Washington Post showed "that many Americans feel guilty about their individual lifestyles" (Kuzmiak 1991). Moreover, twenty-seven percent of respondents felt that apathetic citizens are most at fault for endangering the environment. Nevertheless, conflicting interests are surfacing as environmental concerns are gaining importance. "Thousands of workers in environmentally hazardous industries, such as the coal producing state of West Virginia, are worried that the new wave of Earth protectionism will cost them their livelihood" (Kuzmiak 1991). In spite of these concerns, environmental awareness is being extended to the business industry; starting with the proposal of the double hulled oil tankers by one US petroleum giant to the banning of tuna taken in environmentally unsound nets, to ending the use of Styrofoam containers (Kuzmiak 1991). The majority of business industries are trying to tell their customers that they wish to contribute to the spread of green habits. However, Hershkowitz, a senior scientist at the Natural Resource Defence Council in a Wall Street Journal reported on April 19, 1990 that the nature of American business has not actually changed, regardless of these efforts. According to him: "the environment [is] a marketing trend to which they have to respond" in order to improve their revenues (Holusha 1990, cited in Kuzmiak 1991). Manufacturers are currently marketing environmentally friendly products such as biodegradable plastic garbage bags, 'ozone friendly' hair styling mousse and 'safe for the ozone layer' deodorant. This is because "Pollution control and environmental management will be the growth industry in 90s", according to one Wall Street analyst (cited in Kuzmiak 1991). With the popularity of environmental protection, the promotion of green practices is creating a growth industry for the business community. In other words, saving the environment and boosting industrial profit is proving to be

business practices, 110th Cong., 2008.
possible in the twenty-first century, especially when concerns about the environment are on the rise.

In fact, there are numerous opportunities for small investors interested in the environmental management industry (Watterson 1990, cited in Kuzmiak 1991). These companies need to adhere to the Valdez Principles, proposed by fourteen environmentally concerned groups and Social Investment forum. These Principles consist of ten rules or codes of behaviour with which companies must comply if they want companies to invest with them. The Valdez Principles are named after the Exxon Valdez oil spill and they constitute an attempt to legitimize the idea that corporations are responsible for their impact on the environment (Ohunuma 1990, cited in Kuzmiak 1991). Some of these principles include the encouragement of wise energy consumption, in addition to the reduction and disposal of waste. Another principle constitutes a promise to minimize and try to eliminate the release of any pollutants that may cause environmental damage to the air, water, earth or its inhabitants. Moreover, the companies promise through these principles to make sustainable use of renewable water resources, such as water, soils and forests, while also conserving nonrenewable natural resources (Kuzmiak 1991).

Green promises made by the businesses confirm that environmental concerns are gaining importance both in the political and industrial discourse. One might wonder, therefore, whether these concerns constitute policy ends or means to other ends. In other words, it is important to determine the real motivations behind these concerns, especially among politicians expressing these concerns only recently, while remaining silent a decade ago. The diversionary theory of conflict would posit leaders may use the rhetoric of environmental concerns as means to meet other, self-motivated, ends. The theory claims that troubled political leaders attempt to use an aggressive foreign policy for strategic goals. In other words, they wish to divert the attention of their population from the domestic challenges and thereby increase their electoral popularity (Levy 1989, cited in Miller 1999). This claim is developed from the observation that leaders often instrumentalise foreign
policy in order to manipulate domestic audience and win their support (Miller 1999). For instance, the 1997 dispute between the United States and Iraq over the admission of the United Nations inspection teams into potential, nuclear, chemical and biological weapon sites has been linked to the domestic problems suffered by Clinton's administration at the time (Miller 1999). Proponents of the diversionary theory affirm, therefore that Clinton initiated the conflict with Saddam Hussein purposely in order to distract the attention of its population from those troubles.

Other theorists state that although democratic leaders may be willing to get involved in diversionary behaviour, the potential adversaries anticipate this desire and limit their interaction with them (Miller 1999, cited in Leeds and Davis 1997). Smith (1996) confirms, therefore, that the likelihood of the diversionary foreign policy behaviour for democratic states is conditioned by the very fact that their political needs are visible to the potential targets. Researchers positing interdependence in the foreign policy realm is not new as the decision to go to war, avoid a war, enter into alliances are not independent of the expected behaviour of other states in the system (Signorino 1998). In fact, Kimball (2006) argues that the last two behaviours are influenced by the same variables. In other words, the decision to form alliances is endogenous to the decision to go to war.

Nevertheless, modeling these interactions is a challenge for foreign policy researchers, as confirmed by Clark (2003). This is because avoiding an interaction--such as a war--with another state constitutes an unobserved behaviour that is difficult to measure empirically. In order to account for unobserved elements, Clark (2003) utilizes a quantitative model to account for the absence of conflict. This allows him to determine whether opportunities for conflict exist or not and if they do exist, how often conflict is likely to occur. The important of Clark's study lies in its ability to determine the indirect link that exists between the state's domestic situation and its decision to engage in conflict with another state (Clark 2003).
Clearly, existing literature analyzing diversionary behaviour has provided numerous explanations for diversionary behaviour of states, while linking it to periods of conflicts only. No existing studies have attempted to utilize the theory in order to account for states' diversionary decisions when conflicts do not occur. This is because proponents of the theory affirm that ever since 1800, every war has been a result, partially at least, to efforts of state leaders to deal with domestic problems (Miller 1999). This project wishes to determine, therefore, if domestic troubles could be associated with state's diversionary behaviours during non-conflictual conditions. In addition, the study attempts to show that the environment (ecological values) is used as an instrument of foreign policy through diversionary behaviour. This is relevant in the contemporary era, given that environmental concerns are at the forefront of today's political discourse.

This research project is significant, therefore, in testing the validity of the diversionary theory during periods of non-conflict. Demonstrating that diversionary behaviour of states is associated with non-conflictual circumstances is promising as it may lead to the development of a diversionary theory of peace. In addition, this study determines whether states' declared concerns over environmental damages constitute an end in itself or means to an end. In other words, showing that state's instrumentalisation of ecological values serve diversionary purposes, means that the environment is simply an instrument of foreign policy, rather than a defined policy for states.

**Strategy of Verification**

In order to verify whether the environment is used for diversionary purposes this project has conducted a simple case study of US-China relations. This case study is relevant for this project for a number of reasons. As a developing country, trying to catch up rapidly with the developed economy, China is repeatedly criticized by the United States for the negative effects of its industrialization on the environment. In other words, the United States as a sender state has instrumentalised the environment against China, the receiving
It is significant, therefore, to verify if this instrumentalisation occurs simultaneously with domestic troubles in the US, especially when the environment is a salient issue. This conforms, therefore, the diversionary hypothesis. Moreover, the relationship between the United States and China are significant to analyze for this research project given their power asymmetry and regime type, which are two factors important to consider when using the diversionary theory and the strategic choice approach.

**Research Questions**

Specifically, this project answers the following two questions:

(1) *What are the factors that motivate states to instrumentalise environmental values?*

Studying the instrumentalisation of the environment includes studying the strategic environment (the setting) of the sending and receiving state. In other words, the project seeks to determine the conditions under which the sending state will be more likely to instrumentalise the environment against the receiver state or the target. In addition, the response of the latter state and the conditions that trigger it are examined. This project utilizes the strategic choice approach (Lake & Powell 1999) in order to define the strategic environment that influences the behaviours and the responses of the actors.

(2) *How are states instrumentalising environmental values?*

Analyzing the instrumentalisation of the environment should include a study of its forms of expression. Does it come in the form of threats? Does it require the sender state to pressure the receiver state to make certain promises? Does it express international or local environmental concerns? Determining the form of the instrumentalisation of the environment requires studying the political discourse between the United States and China between 1979 and 2004. This discourse is analyzed using a qualitative comparative method, which is detailed in chapter three.
In order to determine the nature of the actors involved, two questions should be answered:

(1) *What are the characteristics of states that are instrumentalising the environment?*

(2) *What are the characteristics of states that are being targeted in the process?*

These two questions will determine the nature of both sender states and target states. They will clarify which states are most likely to instrumentalise the environment and which are more likely to be the target of this process. In other words, states should be divided in terms of their power and regime type following the model of Clark and Nordstrom (2002). These two elements make some actors more likely to instrumentalise the environment and others more likely to be the target of it (Clark & Nordstrom 2002). Although the framework of this study follows the strategic choice approach and the diversionary theory of conflict, it did not use a quantitative model in order to examine the preliminary data. Contrary to earlier studies examining power and regime as predictors of diversionary behaviour (Clark & Nordstrom 2002), this project relied on a qualitative approach to analyze the variables and verify the hypotheses.

The answer to these questions is, therefore, explored in the next chapters. The first chapter defines the theoretical and conceptual framework of the project. It includes a brief description of the utilized theories and a definition of the main keywords. In chapter two, the main argument is introduced along with the hypotheses and assumptions of the argument. In addition, the strategy of verification is explained and justified. Chapter three consists of the operationalisation and analysis of the research question. Periods of peace are defined in this chapter and the hypotheses are examined. Chapter four contains concluding remarks about the empirical results of this project and a description of subsequent studies that could potentially expand the scope of the study in the future.

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2 The project will only examine the instrumentalisation of the environment during periods of non-conflict.
Chapter I: Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

Introduction

Conducting social science analysis requires a well-defined conceptual and theoretical framework. Terms and concepts in political science could have numerous meanings. Empirical analysis should, therefore, be preceded first by a definition of the main keywords, and then by the theoretical framework that defines the scope of the project and helps in determining the assumptions, the hypotheses and the empirical framework. This chapter will follow this order. It begins with the definitions of key terms such as 'environment', 'instrumentalisation', 'non-conflict' and 'political discourse' used throughout this study. Then, it defines the theoretical framework of the research project. The main theoretical framework is defined through the strategic choice approach (Schelling 1963; Lake & Powell 1999). Then, the nature of actors (the United States and China) is explained through the multiple hierarchy model (Lemke 2002) and the expected utility theory (Bueno de Mesquita 1981). Finally, both the theory of value change and issue attention cycle (Brown 1995; Downs 1972) and the diversionary theory of conflict (Miller 1999; Clark & Nordstrom 2002; Clark 2003; Smith 1995; Smith 1996) define the strategic Environment of the actors.

Conceptual Framework

Environment

Environmental (ecological) concerns are broad and hard to define as they include a variety of issues. They range from local problems facing states on the national level (energy sources and clean water supplies) to global challenges facing nations on the international level (global warming and ozone layer depletion). For the sake of this project, the 'environment' is defined as ecological values condemning environmental destructions and
encouraging environmental preservation practices, especially when those problems do not respect political borders (Le Prestre 2005).³

In fact, environmental concerns have gained popularity only recently on the international level. In the 1970's, a consciousness has developed among scientists and ecologists that mankind's behaviours were creating a burden upon nature's capacity. This consciousness was due to numerous environmental crisis, including the Love Canal Crisis in Nigeria in 1987 that involved the dumping of Italian toxic waste illegally; the use of chemical and biological weapons in armed conflict in Iraq, East Timor, Nicaragua and Vietnam and the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 1986 (Ezeonu & Ezeonu 2000). The development of ecological consciousness lead to the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, which was the first effort to address environmental threats. This was followed by the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), as a U.N. agency to fight environmental degradations (Ezeonu & Ezeonu 2000). In 1987, the Brundtland Report highlighted the existing link between environmental stress, political tension and armed conflicts. Most importantly, the report stated that international insecurity is caused by unsustainable development that could increase the risks and dangers of traditional conflicts (World Commission on Environment and Development 1879, cited in Le Prestre 1999).

Proposals for cooperation mechanisms have triggered a meeting for the international community under the name of the Earth's Summit in 1992. The Conference aimed at establishing a new and equitable global partnership through cooperation among states, key sectors and people (Ezeonu & Ezeonu 2000). The Rio Declarations placed the responsibility of combating environmental degradations in the hands of industrialized countries (Principle 7 of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development 1993, cited in Ezeonu & Ezeonu 2000). With this in mind, many have argued that since the

³ The term 'environment' is also mentioned in this project to mean the strategic environment that constrains the choices of the actors. Hereafter 'Environment' with a capital 'E' should refer to this type of environment, whereas 'environment' with a small 'e' should refer to the ecological environment.
initiation of modern international environmental policy in 1979, the developing countries have been demanding differentiated responsibilities. This is because they believe that equal treatment of the North and South in environmental issues could hinder their economic development\(^4\) (Simonis 2001). The industrialized countries accepted the principle of differentiation with regards to Climate Change and the 'Kyoto Protocol'. It is, therefore, enough to belong to the 'Group of 77' to get exempt from obligations of reducing greenhouse emissions, which is not the case for international economic policy.

It is clear, therefore, that developing countries, such as China and India prioritize economic growth and poverty alleviation over environmental protection. They want to leave the burden of fixing global environment problems to the industrialized countries. Nevertheless, since industrialized countries act as models vis-à-vis developing countries with regards to economic developments, they should do the same for environmental protection efforts. In other words, both the developing and the developed world should work hand in hand to solve environmental damages. Like green policies, these damages do not respect political borders. They constitute a Global Public Good (GPG) that is non-exclusive and non-rival to everyone (Sandler, 2004). As everyone benefits from environmental preservation (both the developed and the developing countries) everyone suffers from environmental damages. Cooperation between the developing and developed countries is therefore essential to achieve this collective benefit.

**Instrumentalisation**

In *Dictionnaire de science politique*, Lakehal (2005) gives a definition of 'instrumentalism' in a political context. He states that it is a method of attracting the public opinion to a fact, a theme or a problem, while diverting it against the opposing parties. In fact, the accomplishment of this strategy requires hiring communication specialists in order

\(^4\) According to the developing countries, developed countries could bear the cost of fixing environmental problems, such as global warming, by limiting economic activities that harm the environment. Committing to
to manipulate symbols, create confusions and construct meanings about certain issues (Lakehal 2005). For example, ever since the legislative elections of 1986 in France, the issue of immigration has been instrumentalised. Rather than providing scientific and convincing explanations with regards to the controversies about immigration in the country, candidates have instrumentalised the unresolved debate to win the public opinion (Lakehal 2005). This is because instrumentalisation consists of concentrating on a controversial theme, without seeking to resolve it, only because the process of manipulation is more profitable (Lakehal 2005). In sum, instrumentalisation in the political world consists of manipulating unresolved, controversial issues in order to persuade the public opinion and gain support. This is why instrumentalism is related to discourse (Bélanger 1998). It is a theory that is less interested in the factual correctness of social aspects, as opposed to their utility as means of observation. The theory, therefore, views science as a discourse that does not necessary conform to facts (Bélanger 1998).

Non-conflict

Non-conflict refers to the absence of war. It involves situations, where a given country, the United States for instance, does not engage in neither political nor military use of force (Clark & Regan 2003). Political use of force is defined by Blechman and Kaplan (1978) and Meernik (1994) as situations where presidents choose to use the military to get political objectives. It involves, therefore, situations where military force was short of war. For the sake of this project, dates of non-conflict or dates of peace are defined as dates were there was an absence of symbolic conflict or rivalry between the United States and China between the years 1979 and 2004.

Political Discourse

According to Schäffner (1996), given that political scientists are concerned about the effects of political decisions and actions on society, they have started to gain interest in the same obligations delays the economic progress of the developing countries, since they are not yet fully
analyzing how political realities could be constructed in and through discourse, which is a written or a spoken communication or debate. First, there are internal political communications that refer to all forms of discourse that is related to all the functioning of politics with political institutions, government bodies, parties or organizations. On the other hand, external political communications are aimed at the general public. Political discourse could include, therefore, intra-state and inter-state discourse and it may take various forms. For example, it could include bilateral treaties and multilateral treaties, speeches made during election campaigns or at a congress of a political party, a contribution of a member of parliament to parliamentary debates, editorials or commentaries in newspapers, a press conference with a political personality or politicians' memories (Schäffner 1996).
Theoretical Framework

Strategic Choice Approach

In game theory, a strategy is defined as a combination of moves or a plan designed by each player in order to deal with every possible move by the other player at every stage of the game (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Mathematics 2007). The game is in fact, any situation in which the outcomes or the payoffs are the product of the interaction of more than one rational player (The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics 2007). Being in a game involves, therefore, making decisions while being surrounded by active decision-makers whose choices interact with ours, while influencing our own thinking and actions (Dixit et al. 1993).

The strategic-choice approach defines the strategy as the path that leads actors to their ends, while considering the environment, other actors and their expected behaviour, available information and power disparities. This strategic setting forces agents to use strategies as tools to get as close to their preferences as possible (Frieden 1999). This is because actors, whether they are states, groups or individuals, need to think about ways to acquire their defined goals. Strategies are defined, therefore, as means to an end. For this reason, actors have no preference for one set of strategies over the other as long as the preferred strategy provides the best means to the desired end (Frieden 1999).

The existing literature analyzing the strategic interaction among states has shown a great interest in studying conflictual interactions. A prominent work in this field is attributed to Thomas C. Schelling (1963) *The Strategy of Conflict* where he considers conflict situations as mainly bargaining situations in a sense that the ability of one participant to gain his ends is largely dependent on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make (Schelling 1963). In other words, the "strategy of conflict" is about threats of war, or threats of anything else, since he is concerned with the use of threats, or of threats and promises, or more specifically the conditioning of one's own behaviour on
the behaviour of others. This is because Schelling's interests lie in the employment of potential force, where a given state could condition its own behaviours depending on the behaviour of another state through threats and promises (Schelling 1963).

Schelling's theory was further elaborated by other authors including Smith (1995) where he provides a game-theoretic model that endogenizes alliance reliability, the effect of alliance on the occurrence of war and alliance formation. The model demonstrates that the decisions to go to war and form alliances are strategic as states' behaviours are highly interdependent. According to Smith (1995) when the possibility of conflict exists between state A and state B, with the possibility of intervention of state C, the final outcome depends on the belief that nation C will intervene, affecting thereby the behaviour of both A and B and the final outcome of the interaction between them. For instance, if conflict occurs between A and B, C must decide what to do. The possible payoffs of C's decision are 4, 1 and 3, which corresponds to the outcome War A/B, War AC/B, and War A/BC (Smith 1995). In other words, the most preferred outcome for C is to remain neutral in the conflict between A and B. Like C, A and B organize their outcomes according to the received payoffs and according to the likely actions of the other states. For instance, when attacked, state B makes a move depending on the payoffs that it might receive and depending on the likely actions of C. B knows that C's intervention is not likely because it is not rewarding. In addition, B knows that the payoff of its retaliation (2) is lower when compared to the payoff of surrendering (3). As a result, B will surrender. Smith's model indicates, therefore, how Schelling's theory could be utilized to analyze the strategic choices of actors in numerous settings. In other words, the strategic structure is capable of constraining the behaviour of states both in conflictual and cooperative settings. This is possible even when foreseeing cooperation opportunities to solve international problems such as environmental disasters.

Schelling's theory is, therefore, nondiscriminatory between acting in a conflict and a common interest setting. It could be applied to analyze behaviours between both friends
and enemies. Nevertheless, in the area between those two extremes, the theory is 
noncommittal about the mixture of conflictual and common interests. Schelling likes to call 
it the theory of "precarious partnership or the theory of incomplete antagonism" (Schelling 
1963, p15). Accordingly, his subject is the "theory of interdependent decisions" (Schelling 
1963, p15). Interdependent decisions are usually expressed in a strategic structure, defined 
in terms of $2 \times 2$ games, composed of a description of two policy choices available for each 
actor ("cooperate" or "defect"), plus an outcome associated with each of the four 
combinations of policy choices and preferences for each actor over the four outcomes (Oye 
1986, cited in Fearon 1998). In fact, the work of Schelling has been utilized by numerous 
authors in order to enhance the understanding of strategic interactions among states, giving 
the rise thereby to the strategic choice approach and the diversionary theory of conflict 

Although the strategic-choice approach is an approach, rather than a theory, it is 
deﬁned by particular sets of assumptions about human nature (Lake & Powell 1999). First, 
the approach assumes that actors make purposive actions. They survey their strategic 
Environment and choose the strategy that best meets their subjectively deﬁned goals (Lake 
& Powell 1999). Purposive actors also pursue their goals to the best of their abilities. 
Nevertheless, the approach does not assume that actors are "human computers" performing 
complicated calculations to assess the costs and beneﬁts of all possible consequences of all 
possible choices (Lake & Powell 1999). The approach assumes also that strategic 
interaction is the unit of analysis when analyzing international politics. This is because it 
considers that international relations are composed of strategic interactions between actors 
(Lake & Powell 1999). A situation is defined as strategic if an actor's ability to further its 
ends is dependent upon the actions of the other actor (Lake & Powell 1999). Each actor 
should therefore anticipate what the other is trying to achieve. At the same time, what these 
other actors will try to do partially depends on what they believe the first actor will do. The 
set of decisions undertaken by relevant actors constitutes the strategic interaction and 
produces the observed outcome, whether it is war, crisis or cooperation (Lake & Powell 
1999).
What distinguishes the strategic-choice approach from other approaches is the fact that it divides strategic interaction into two elements: the actors and their strategic Environment. According to the approach, actors possess preferences and beliefs and act in a strategic Environment, composed of both the set of actions and the information structure available for actors. In fact, the set of action constitutes the set of possible decisions and events possibly unfolding when the actors interact. For example, the Prisoners' Dilemma produces four cells, showing all the possible outcomes of the interaction. There is a possibility, therefore, that both actors cooperate, the first can cooperate, while the second can defect and they could also defect together. Although the use of the "two-by-two games" in international relations is prevalent, where there are only possibilities of cooperation or defection for two actors, there is no limit on the number or types of actions that could be considered part of an Environment in real life situations (Lake et al. 1999).

The second attribute of the Environment is the information structure that defines what the actors can know for sure and what they can infer (when possible) from the actions of other actors (Lake & Powell 1999). In fact, the information that actors possess about each other has a great impact on their actions. For instance, history and insights could be used by actors as shortcuts in order to clarify the information that they already possess about each other. It could be used in order to determine the credibility of a threat made by another state, and therefore determine the response to it. The strategic choice approach argues that information asymmetry, signaling, credibility, determination and intent are important factors influencing strategic interactions. In general, states seek to convey information to one another regarding their intention and determination, and they try to make those signals believable. However, for a number of reasons each state receives a different amount of information regarding the other's state's intent and resolve (Clark & Reed 2005). This produces an asymmetry of information that leads to substantial variance in the decisions made by states in times of crises (Clark & Reed 2005).
In fact, Fearon (1994) argues that it is possible to determine the credibility of signals, sent by states, through regime type. For instance, more credibility is attached to democracies' threats and demands, as they tend to be more sensitive to potential audience costs. In other words, democracies will suffer more audience costs in case of bluffing. Autocratic regimes, on the other hand, are less sensitive to audience costs, and able to produce noisy information regarding their threats and demands (Fearon 1994). It becomes difficult therefore to interpret signals sent by autocratic states as bluffing could be involved. Dealing with autocracies could be more challenging due to the lack of visibility of their intents and resolve. In short, information structure is largely influenced by regime type during strategic interactions.

Bueno De Mesquita (1981) argues that states deciding to engage in conflict face different levels of uncertainty with regards to the capabilities and commitments of both the enemy and potential allies. This uncertainty is easier to resolve when thinking about national capabilities as they change slowly. It should not be challenging, therefore, to make a reasonable estimate of their value when thinking about the opponents and war allies. In other words, the military capacities of nations are visible to a certain extent and easy to measure on behalf of other states. However, national interests and commitments are difficult to predict as they can change suddenly, frequently and without warning (Bueno De Mesquita 1981). Alliances make sudden surprising changes in the international system. Although Russia had an alliance with Germany in 1939, two years later, it was invaded by this ally. This allowed Britain, France and the United States to become Stalin’s chief allies and then his opponents, four years later (Bueno De Mesquita 1981). In other words, commitment is a factor of uncertainty in the international Environment, and alliances can help increase or decrease this uncertainty depending on the situation, when making strategic decisions. Nevertheless, Keohane (1984) asserts that belonging to international institutions can make information structure more visible and predictable because it allows states to monitor each others' behaviour, sharing thereby more information about each other. Institutions can facilitate, therefore, cooperation opportunities (Lake & Powell 1999).
In addition to the Environment, the strategic interaction is composed of actors, which possess two attributes: preferences and beliefs. Preferences refer to the way the actors rank the possible outcomes defined by their Environment (Lake & Powell 1999). It refers, therefore, to the way actors evaluate the results of their strategic interactions. In fact, the actor's attributes are well illustrated in game theory, which is the branch of social science that studies strategic decision-making (Dixit et al. 1993). For example, what distinguishes Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken is the actor's preferences or the rankings of the possible outcomes. For instance, in the Prisoner's Dilemma the strategy DD is favored by each actor individually, over CD, whereas in Chicken strategies are ordered inversely as CD wins over DD for each actor (Lake & Powell 1999). The second characteristic of an actor is its prior beliefs about the preferences of the other actors. According to Schelling (1963), although each state is unsure of the risk that the other state is willing to run during a nuclear crisis or the "competition in risk taking", actors still make probabilistic assessment to determine if the other actor is risk averse or risk acceptant (Lake & Powell 1999). In other words, actors make an effort to form beliefs about the preferences of the other actor, during strategic interactions. They select their own action based on these beliefs and update them after each round of interaction.

This research project employs the strategic choice approach in order to analyze actors separately of their strategic Environment, which is shaped by their power and regime type. Accordingly, actors (the United States and China) define their moves depending on their own preferences while considering both the regime type and capabilities of the other state. The diversionary theory of conflict and the theory of the issue attention cycle define the strategic Environment of the actors.

5 The Rational institutional design research program (Koremenos et al. 2001) provides a number of conjectures to understand how the design of cooperation resolves the problem of uncertainty.
Nature of Actors

The United States and China are the actors examined in this project. Given that the strategic-choice approach assumes that the nature of actors can affect the actors’ decisions, it could be argued that power asymmetry and regime type largely affect the strategic interaction between them. In addition, the decision-making process in this interaction is guided by the maximization of their expected utility as they are rational actors in the international system. In order to explain the power asymmetry between the United States and China, Lemke’s multiple hierarchy model is employed as well as other elements from the power transition theory, introduced by Kenneth Organski in 1958. Finally, Bueno de Mesquita’s expected utility theory is used in order to define the rationality assumption of the actors.

Measuring Power and Parity

There is some agreement among scholars about how to measure the power and capabilities of nations. The commonly used measure is the Correlates of War (COW) project’s Composite Index of Capabilities (CINC) proposed by Singer, Bremer and Stuckey in 1972 (Lemke 2002). This indicator combines demographic, industrial, and military components of the material capabilities of states. Each state shares, therefore, the totality of the world’s capabilities that is measured on an annual basis (Lemke 2002). An alternate and also widely used measure of national capabilities is gross national product (GNP) or gross domestic product (GDP), suggested by Organski in 1958 (Lemke 2002). Organski proposes to measure power as population multiplied by per capita gross national product, which is simplified to GNP. In fact, national production is preferred by power transition researchers as the theory focuses on domestic and demographic factors as the basis of power (Lemke 2002).

In 1989, Stoll and Ward edited a book discussing measures of power and issues raised by the other attempts to measure power. The COW and GNP/GDP measures
emerged as the empirically most robust and intuitively most plausible. In addition, two of
the edited chapters of the Stoll and Ward’s volume showed the correlation between the
CINC and GNP/GDP (Lemke 2002). In fact, Lemke utilized the CINC and GDP measures
of power in his analyses to link the power transition theory to his research programme
(Lemke 2002). Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that national power, in itself, is not an
important variable neither in his multiple hierarchy model nor in the traditional power
transition theory. It is, rather, the relative power relationship between the dominant state
and a would-be challenger. In order to measure relative power, Lemke (2002) used the ratio
of the weaker state’s power to the stronger state’s power. Thereby, relative power can be a
variation from nearly zero to one (Lemke 2002). Contrary to Organski and Kugler’s power
transition model of 1980, Lemke (2002) defines the power parity threshold at seventy
percent. In other words, any ratio greater than seventy percent is power parity. As for
Tammen and Kugler (2006), they define the condition of power parity at eighty percent of
the capabilities of the dominant nation. These conditions cease to exist when the challenger
reaches twenty percent of the dominant nation’s capability, which is when the challenger
becomes the dominant nation.

For this research project, the national power of state is defined as domestically
derived. Therefore, the focus is on domestic, and mainly demographic, sources of national
power (Lemke 2002). Measuring the power of states is essential in defining the power
transition theory, which identifies the characteristics of the dominant power (the United
States) and the challenger (China). Lemke (2002) utilizes the power transition theory to
identify regional hierarchies and potential challengers in a number of geographical regions
all over the world.

Power Transition Theory

In 1958, Organski introduced the power transition theory where he described the
hierarchy of the international system, where states are differentiated by their power
resources. Organski used a metaphor of a pyramid in order to illustrate the existence of
many weak states in the bottom and a few strong ones on the top (Lemke 2002). The strongest of all states is called the "dominant power". It is the privileged leader of the international system, maintaining its position of influence through its victories from an earlier greater power war. Despite the absence of formal rules and enforced international law, relations within power hierarchy are not anarchical. Contrary to proponents of the realism and the balance-of-power theory, the theory of power transition describes international behaviour as falling into established patterns of international orders enforceable by the dominant power. These ordered informal patterns are called the "status quo" according to Organski (Organski 1958, p. 325, cited in Lemke 2002). This status quo consists of economic, diplomatic and military relations between states (Lemke 2002). The international status quo is controlled by the dominant power in order to further its own long term interests (Lemke 2002). Self-serving patterns of interaction are also created by the dominant power in order to secure more net gains or more value from the international interactions of this power (Kugler and Organski 1989, p.172, cited in Lemke 2000). These patterns include the international projection of the political and economic resource patterns that are employed domestically by the dominant power as argued by Kugler and Organski in 1996 (Lemke 2002).

Nevertheless, the gains from well kept status quo are not only material. A status quo that consists of "the international projection of domestic patterns of resources allocation" (Lemke 2002, p. 22) is profitable to the dominant power in a direct and indirect manner. Directly, the projection of successful policies domestically is likely to provide "a set of material benefits to the dominant power from its subsequent international interactions" (Lemke 2002, p. 22). Indirectly, the projection of successful domestic policies will most likely reinforce the legitimacy of the dominant power's governing regime, enhancing thereby domestic stability (Lemke 2002). Most importantly, the international projection will legitimize the leadership of the dominant power of the international system stabilizing, thereby most of its external relations. For instance, a dominant power that enjoys a comparative advantage in commerce with other nations will most likely establish a liberal international economic order (Lemke 2002). This order will protect its anticipated profit
from international trade, will preserve its access to international resources of financial
capital and will deny these same resources to its potential opponents (Lemke 2002). The
dominant power wishes also to extend its influences to touch other domains, including the
military and foreign policy. Once established, the dominant power will strive to preserve
the status quo in order to project it both directly and indirectly and on the long term.

As for other states in the international system, "the more [they] are similar in
domestic composition and international outlook to the dominant power, the more they too
will benefit from the established status quo" (Lemke 2002, p. 23). These benefiting states
approve the established status quo and are considered to be satisfied with it (Organski 1958,
cited in Lemke 2002). This state of satisfaction will stabilize the international system,
according to the power transition theory, as wars will be unlikely to occur (Lemke 2002).
On the other hand, the dissatisfaction with the status quo among other states increases the
probability of war. This is when some states do not share the same outlook on the status
quo with the satisfied nations, and consider that they are unlikely to benefit from it because
it does not reflect their established resources allocation patterns (Lemke 2002).

According to the theory, wars are likely to take place between great powers only
when the dissatisfied state is roughly equal in power to the dominant state. Thus, conflict
between great powers is more likely to take place when "the power transition occurs
between the dominant state and the dissatisfied challenger" (Lemke 2002, p. 25). In other
words, periods of parity of power increase the chances of war, unlike claims advanced by
the balance-of-power theory. The dominant power is, therefore, the protector of the stability
of the status quo and the maintainer of peaceful international system.

Nevertheless, the logic of "powerful-therefore-satisfied" raises a problem with the
theory. There is a concern that the process of becoming as powerful as the dominant state
makes the rising power satisfied with the status quo. In other words, being powerful and
being satisfied mean nearly the same thing (Soysa, Oneal & Park 1997; Powell 1999, cited in Lemke 2002). While Lemke and Reed (1998) admits that the criticism is plausible, they state that it is still possible for a state to rise in power, yet remain dissatisfied with the status quo because it might have established economic advancement while resisting the established status quo (Lemke 2002). The Soviet economic growth during the time of Stalin, which occurred without foreign economic assistance and foreign trade, is a good example because it was achieved while challenging the British and then American status quo (Lemke 2002). Accordingly, the problem of "powerful-therefore-satisfied" highlights a conceptual problem in the power transition theory, but does not mean that it is logically inconsistent (Lemke 2002).

The power transition theory is employed only to define the characteristics of the dominant nation and the challenger, namely the United States and China, which are the actors in the case study. The possibility of dissatisfaction and conflict between the challenger and the major power will not be explored as they are beyond the scope and focus of the project.

Local Hierarchy Model

The multiple hierarchy model conceptualizes the existence of multiple international sub-systems, or multiple power hierarchies that cumulatively form the international system (Lemke 2002). While the traditional power transition theory focuses only on the overall global system, the overall global power hierarchy and on the relations among great powers sitting on the top of the hierarchy, the multiple hierarchy model extends the focus to include multiple hierarchies of power nested within the overall international hierarchy. Within each of these local hierarchies there is a local status quo establishment that is maintained by a local dominant state (Lemke 2002). If the local power hierarchy is overturned and a dissatisfied local challenger achieves parity with the local dominant state, it is hypothesized that the probability of war will increase (Lemke 2002). In other words,
the multiple hierarchy model preserves the depiction of the international system and the traditional hypothesis about conflict among the great powers, suggested by the power transition theory. In fact, Lemke (2002) considers the multiple hierarchy model to be an extension of power transition theory into minor powers. This is because it suggests that minor powers could fight for control of the status quo of their local hierarchies.

Lemke's international sub-system is divided according to proximity and interaction (Thomson 1973a, cited in Lemke 2002). Accordingly, local hierarchies include South America, the Middle East, the Far East (East Asia) and Africa. These local hierarchies are a set of dyads possessing the ability to exercise military influence within the other's territories (Lemke 2002). Given that the case study of this research project attempts to analyze the political discourse between the United States and China—identified respectively as the dominant power and the challenger, by the power transition theory—the focus should be limited to the local hierarchy in East Asia.

East Asia

Lemke (2002) identifies four local hierarchies within East Asia6. The first local hierarchy is located in the south part of the region, with India as the dominant power over Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Pakistan. The second local hierarchy, located south east of the region, was headed by South Vietnam until 1975 and then by Vietnam (formerly North Vietnam) over Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. China heads the third local hierarchy, located east of the region. This hierarchy is composed of Japan, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea and Taiwan. An "Asian Archipelago" is composed of Malaysia and Singapore and is headed by Indonesia (Lemke 2002).7 In addition, the author identifies three dyadic relations inside the region: Afghanistan-Pakistan, Burma/Myanmar-Thailand and North Korea-South Korea. This is because each dyad includes the only reachable target for the other dyad

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6 According to the definition of Lemke (2002), the "Far East" includes twenty five states: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, North Korea, North Vietnam, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, South Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand. In order to avoid colonial connotations, associated with the "Far East", the term is replaced by "East Asia", based on the classification of de Blij and Muller (2006).
member, and has a clear history of separate interstate relations within the dyad (Lemke 2002). Although the author includes the Philippines in this region, he excludes it from the identified local hierarchies.

The Expected Utility Theory

In writing his general theory of war, Bueno de Mesquita attempted to present a theory about the foreign conflict initiation and escalation. His book *The War Trap* (1981) is aimed at building a theory about expected utility. His theory assumes that leaders are rational expected utility maximizes and that war decision making is dominant by a single, strong leader. The expected utility theory is used in this project in order to define the nature of the actors as rational utility maximisers.

The Rationality Assumption

According to Bueno De Mesquita (1981), international leaders are guided by a desire to maximize the net benefits they expect from formulating a foreign policy that is consistent with their own interests. Leaders are assumed to be rational utilitarian, interested in maximizing their own welfare. Their well-being is assumed also to be intimately tied to the overall costs and benefits imposed on the society by their foreign policy. In other words, a rational leader would not choose to initiate a war or continue to fight one when perceiving that the net expected outcome would be less than that of remaining at peace or surrendering to the adversary. This does not mean that he or she must expect their nation to always win wars. Leaders must expect to win or at least not lose more than they believed would be lost without fighting this war.

7 The nature of China as a challenger and the United States as a dominant power will be defined in length in chapter two, when defining the case study in details.
In calculating the expected utility of any action, cardinal utilities should be estimated. When formulating expected utility decision rules, Bueno de Mesquita (1981) assumes that utility values are restricted in a way that a perception of perfect agreement or harmony of interests on the relevant policy dimension is reflected in utility score of one (1), while the perception of complete disagreement is shown in a utility score of minus one (-1). A rational actor should also compare options and orders them according to his/her preferences for each. Options may be ordered to reflect one of three relations between them. Given a choice of a or b, a rational actor prefers a to b or b to a or is indifferent. For simplicity, we can make a to b an alternative, let P represents the preferences and I represent the indifference. Accordingly, aPb or bPa or aIb. A rational actor should be able to order options transitively, so that if c is the third option and aPc and bPc, the relation aPc should hold. If this is not the case, then the actor is placed in an endless cycle of preferences, liking a better than b and b better than c but c better than a. This actor would be, therefore, unable to identify the best option for him/her (Bueno De Mesquita 1981).

The actor should always choose the outcome he considers most preferable or desirable in comparison to the other considered outcomes. If aPbPc and if all other things are equal, the actor would select a. However, since “all other things” are not always equal in real life, a rational actor does not always choose the option that is by itself most preferred. In this case, the rational actor must order his preferences in function to probability and then his or her preferences (Bueno de Mesquita 1981).

For the sake of this project, the political leaders of the United States and China are considered to be rational utility maximizes. They form their preferences depending on the payoff of each strategic move and they order them according to their probability of occurrence and to their strategic goals, while also considering the preferences of the other actor. The information structure about these preferences is formed according to the power and regime type of the other actor. The ranking of preferences is influenced by these factors.
that constrain the strategic Environment of the actors. The forming and ranking of preferences are explained in detail in chapter two.

The Strategic Environment of the Actors

The strategic Environment of the United States and China is defined through both the theory of value change and issue attention cycle and the diversionary theory of conflict. The first theory clarifies the information structure of China when receiving an aggressive discourse from the United States about its environmental policy. The latter theory further defines the information structure for both actors, the set of actions available for each of them and the possible outcomes of the strategic interaction.

Theory of Value Change and Issue Attention Cycle

We can assert that the theory of value change is a subdivision of constructivism, as both theories believe that political values are variables in the political system. The latter theory asserts that there has been fundamental change in the basic value priorities among the Western population during the post-World War period. Accordingly, certain groups (postmaterialists) in Western society started to value less material and economic goals and more postmaterial, non-economic issues (Brown 1995). Accordingly, materialists and postmaterialists do not only make different political choices, but they also use different criteria while making these choices (Brown 1995). Taking economic security for granted, postmaterialists focus on the realization of higher order needs, such as belonging, self-expression, and the quality of life. As a result, the group value non-economic social and cultural issues, such as environmental protection, peace, women's rights and issues of equality. While materialists resist change and prefer the maintenance of the current level of economic security and traditional values, postmaterialists favour radical social change in the above mentioned areas (Brown 1995).
The rise of postmaterialism shifts the traditional class alignment that is predominant in Western industrial societies, where the working class and lower income groups favour parties of the left and the middle class and higher income groups align with parties on the right (Brown 1995). In fact, according to Inglehart (1971), value change happens when the middle class achieves a level of affluence. As a result, it adopts new value priorities, becoming supportive of social change and postmaterialist issues (Brown 1960). On the other hand, as the working class achieves an adequate level of prosperity, it will work to protect its gains in order to maintain the status quo. Consequently, this class becomes conservative on social and cultural issues, allowing the middle class to be liberal on these issues (Brown 1995). According to the theory of value change, therefore, the basis of political divergence in western societies is between materialists and postmaterialists, rather than between the traditional Right and traditional Left (Brown 1995).

In fact, Brown (1995) has utilized the theory of value change in order to examine presidential choices in the United States in elections of 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992. Brown's models show that non-economic issues had a significant impact on presidential choices among both materialists and postmaterialists. This means that non-economic issues, such as environmental protection, could possibly affect the vote of those who traditionally value economic security. Brown's findings (1995) provide evidence that postmaterialism is starting to become an important political force in the United States, influencing thereby presidential elections.

Downs (1972) believes that American attitudes toward environmental issues, mainly improving the quality of the environment, is an illustration of a process called "issue-attention cycle". This is because ever since 1970's, there has been mounting interests with regards to the quality of the environment, which marks a change of attitude toward ecological values. To explain this change, Downs (1972) offer a five-step process that explains the drawing attention to this issue. First there is the pre-problem stage where a highly undesirable social condition prevails, such as polluted air and extremely hot
temperature. This is followed by *alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm*, where dramatic series of events alarm the public about the evils of this problem. As a result, euphoric enthusiasm is created in order to fight this social challenge. After realizing the cost of significant progress, this enthusiasm starts to drop slowly. The gradual decline of intense public interest leads to the final stage, which is the *post-problem stage*. This is when the popular issue moves into prolonged limbo "a twilight realm of lesser attention or spasmodic recurrences of interest" (Downs 1972, p. 41). Downs (1972) believes that the attention toward environmental issues is currently in the middle stage of the process, the stage of *alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm*.

Downs suggested, therefore that American public attention rarely remains sharply focused upon any domestic issue for a long period of time, even when it involves a problem of crucial importance to society (Downs 1972, cited in Kuzmiak 1991). His suggested 'issue-attention cycle' influences both public attitudes and behaviours in the United States as any problem becomes prominent, remains so for a short time and then fades from public attention without being resolved. Although Downs claimed that this cycle explains the United States' attention cycle with regards to all issues, he believed that environmental issues may remain important longer than most other domestic issues, only because improving the environment is such a broad objective (Downs 1972, cited in Kuzmiak 1991). In addition, the public attention cycle towards the environment proves time inconsistency because public concerns about the environment are long-term concerns due to the effect of the "shadow of the future". In other words, knowing that the implementation of environmental policy is a long-term and time-consuming process, the public could repeatedly shift its attention away from environmental problems toward other concerns, such as security and health care.

At the same time, Downs predicted that issues related to improving the environment would also suffer the gradual loss of public attention that characterizes the later stages of the 'issue-attention cycle' (Downs 1972, cited in Kuzmiak 1991). This is true because it is
an issue that threatens almost everyone, not just a specific group of the population. In addition, politicians can safely pursue it without fearing adverse repercussions since attacking pollution is much safer than attacking other issues. In addition, it could generate a large private industry with strong vested interests in continued spending against pollution (Downs 1972, cited in Kuzmiak 1991).

The public attention toward environmental concerns certainly goes into a cycle of high attention versus low attention. Dunlap (1985) has examined the declines in environmental awareness during the 1970's. He concluded that while the salience of environmental problems declined considerably by the mid-seventies, "the public commitment to protecting environmental quality remained surprisingly strong throughout the decade" (Kuzmiak 1991, p. 266). According to Dunlap (1985), the continuation of the American public commitment towards environmental protection since 1970 is somewhat miraculous. He believes that this commitment

...has survived for 15 years, after the expenditure of sizable amounts of money and effort and in the face of energy crises, economic hard times and anti-regulatory climate. [This] is a strong indication that the American people have come to place a high value on environmental quality (Dunlap 1985, cited in Kuzmiak 1991, p. 267).

Despite the overall saliency of environmental issues in the United States, partisan differences on these issues are prevalent. Dunlap and Gale (1976) hypothesized that as compared to Democrats, Republicans would give significantly less support to procedures that aim to protect the quality of the environment. For instance, according to the 1968 elections, the Democratic Party has expressed more concern with regards to the conservation of natural resources and recognized quickly a broad range of environmental problems, when compared to the Republican Party (Dunlap & Allen, 1976). In a subsequent study of environmental attitudes and politics conducted among university students at the University of Oregon, Dunlap (1975) established that pro-environmental
attitudes and actions were consistently higher among Democratic and Liberal Left students than among their Republican and Conservative counterparts (Kuzmiak 1991).

On the other hand, in trying to examine the alignment of political party identification and environmental concern among the mass public, Buttel & Flinn (1978a) established that it was sociopolitical liberalism, rather than political party identification that is related strongly to environmental concerns in the United States (Kuzmiak 1991). They suggest that the contemporary US political party structure is an inappropriate means to mobilize environmental reforms (Buttel & Flinn 1975, cited in Kuzmiak 1991). This is because stratification ranking, especially in education, is correlated with environmental concern (Buttel & Flinn, cited in Kuzmiak 1991). According to numerous scholars, higher levels of education increase cognitive skills and support an awareness of public affairs. These factors give individuals a greater interest in and the ability to comprehend environmental problems (NORC General Social Survey 1994, cited in Guber 2003). In particular, high personal levels of material and symbolic resources were correlated with support of environmental changes. On the other hand, the lower class was found to be less favourable to environmental reform. It was suggested that the fear of declining life chances, associated with strict environmental policies is the potential cause for the resistance of the lower class to environmental reforms (Buttel & Flinn 1975, cited in Kuzmiak 1991). Nevertheless, in later studies Buttel & Flinn (1978b) found that the hesitation of the working class to support environmental reform is over-exaggerated in the literature. This is because they found that age and place of residence, which are added as control variables, are better predictors of both environmental awareness and support of environmental reforms, in comparison of the three major indicators of social class (education, income and occupation) that had a minor effect (Buttel and Flinn 1978 b, cited in Kuzmiak 1991). In fact Ken Van Liere and Riley Dunlap concluded that younger, "well-educated and politically liberal persons tend to be more concerned about environmental quality in comparison with their older, less educated and politically conservative counterparts" (Guber 2003).
In fact, Taylor (1989) suggests that a distinction should be made between environmental activists who possess a different environmental profile and environmentally concerned individuals (Kuzmiak 1991). He adds that activists come disproportionately from the upper middle class, whereas environmental concerns are expressed by people from all social classes (Kuzmiak 1991). After testing causal modeling of demographic and liberal ideology as co-determinants of environmental concern Samdahl and Robertson (1989) established that there is no significant interaction between education, residence or age with environmental concern in their data (Kuzmiak 1991). They state that future studies should focus more on broader belief systems such as liberal ideology, rather than socio-demographics because they present the more pervasive source that generate environmental concerns (Samdahl and Robertson 1989, cited in Kuzmiak 1991). This process is predictive when considering the factor of "issue elasticity", that makes issues and sets of issues elicit variable responses from the people in any political system (Strickland, Johnston 1968, cited in Kuzmiak).

Regardless of the opposing opinions about the distribution of the popularity of environmental priorities among party members in the United States, numerous critics have argued that environmental concerns remain firmly rooted in the left defining thereby a "deep ideological divide" that separates environmentalism from commitment to personal liberty, property rights and technological optimism" (Sagoff 1995, cited in Guber 2003). This reality is confirmed by the fact that environmental regulation is often opposed by conservatives who oppose financial costs and the expansion of government interference in the market economy. In addition, many of them are hesitant toward the expansions of federal and state bureaucracy that oversee and complicate private land-use decisions or that create additional layers of "red tape" (Guber 2003). On the other hand, a Democratic government is often associated with a big government and more government regulations. This is why numerous researchers suggest that environmental reforms are closely associated with liberal Democratic views (Guber 2003).
A Democratic administrative approach to global environmental challenges is, therefore, different in comparison with a Republican approach. These internal constraints could influence the strategic Environment of the United States, while criticizing China. The credibility of this criticism could be verified by the target state depending on the government in power. For instance, a criticism or a threat over environmental practices made by a Democratic government is given more credibility, in comparison with a criticism or a threat made by a Republican government. Nevertheless, the latter administration may actually follow up the threat with a military attack. The Environment of the strategic interaction is, therefore, influenced by domestic conditions inside the United States. The visibility of the democratic system makes these conditions visible to China, which allows it to enjoy a well defined information structure. It could determine, therefore, when Washington is facing domestic troubles, when environmental concerns are salient and the level of seriousness of these concerns to Republicans and Democrats. The diversionary theory of conflict further defines the Environment of the strategic interaction for both the United States and China.

**The Diversionary Theory of Conflict**

Analyzing actors separately from their Environment has been effective in explaining the diversionary theory of conflict. Supporters of this theory suggest conflicts are triggered between states in order to divert the public attention from domestic troubles (Levy 1989, cited in Miller 1999). This idea is extended from the fact that leaders often instrumentalise foreign policy in order to manipulate domestic audiences and win their support (Miller 1999). According to Clark (2003), the manipulation of foreign policy can be triggered by domestic political processes, such as scandals, economic distress or displacement, and sinking approval rates. In other words, the diversionary theory of war claims that these internal domestic troubles, rather than international conditions, may affect decisions to use force as well (Baker 2004). In response to these conditions, democratic leaders can trigger conflict abroad in order to divert the attention from these domestic troubles. Foreign policy is therefore used as means to enhance domestic support when the popularity of the
government in place is dropping. This is because the presence of an external enemy can help overcome divisions internally (Simmel 1964, cited in Clark & Nordstrom 2002). Conflict can create a "rally around the flag" effect on the short term during elections, where troubled leader's support increases during times of military conflict (Mueller 1973, cited in Clark & Nordstrom 2002). Accordingly, political leaders should favour foreign conflict in order to elicit a rally and increase their public approval when their personal popularity is low (Baker 2004)\(^8\). In other words, creating a conflict with an external enemy can unify the domestic population, divert their attention from domestic challenges, and improve electoral success for troubled leaders (Smith 1996). This is because decisive actions in foreign policy convey leadership and competence and competent leaders are more likely to get elected.

The diversionary theory of conflict suggests also that although democratic leaders may be willing to get involved in diversionary strategies, the potential adversaries anticipate this desire and limit their interaction with them (Leeds and Davis 1997, cited in Miller 1999). This is because domestic problems in democratic states alert foreign leaders that they could become targets of aggressive policies, which cause them to behave in a pacific manner (Smith 1996, 1998, cited in Clark & Nordstrom 2002). Smith (1996, 1998) confirms, therefore, that the likelihood of the diversionary foreign policy behaviour for democratic states is conditioned by the very fact that their political needs are visible to the potential targets. In other words, although democratic leaders suffering from electoral problems would want to use force abroad in order to improve their electoral chances, the target states know that these states are vulnerable and seek to avoid becoming their targets. This is because foreign states can access information easily about the domestic conditions of democracies due to the transparency of the democratic systems (Smith 1996, 1998, cited in Clark & Nordstrom 2002). This makes democratic leaders more vulnerable when facing strategic interaction opportunities, as compared to autocracies (Miller 1999). It is more difficult for democracies to foresee the domestic politics, decisions, and reactions of autocracies because their regimes depend on the support of smaller ruling coalition to

\(^8\) For more on presidential approval and the use of force, see Ostrom and Job (1986) and James and Oneal (1991)
maintain their authority. Observing such support system is challenging (Miller 1999) due to the lack of visibility of domestic conditions.

In addition, threats made by democratic states against non-democratic states are believed to be more credible as leaders caught bluffing will be punished. Autocracies know that these threats are believable because democracies cannot bluff, given their sensitivity to audience costs as mentioned previously (Fearon 1994). Therefore, the need of democracies to find diversionary opportunity is simultaneous to the efforts to reduce this opportunity on the part of potential targets. This is because the diversionary attempt of the troubled state places its victim state in a strategic environment where actions and expectations of the aggressor are dependent upon the actions and expectations of the target. The decisions to go to war, avoid a war, and/or enter into alliances are not independent of the expected behaviour of other states in the system (Signorino 1998). In fact, Kimball (2006) argues that the last two behaviours are influenced by the same variables, namely regime type and power. In other words, the decision to form alliances is endogenous to the decision to go to war. Bueno De Mesquita (1981) also suggests that alliances can influence the decision to go to war as they influence the uncertainty about future behaviours.

Attempts to test the diversionary hypothesis have produced mixed results, regardless of the intuitive nature of the theory and extensive subjective evidence (Clark & Nordstrom 2002). This is because it has been challenging to establish an empirical relationship between the observed process, which is the need to divert on behalf of the troubled democracies and the unobserved process, which is the lost opportunity due to the pacific response on behalf of the receiver state. Avoiding an interaction—such as a war—with another state constitutes an unobserved behaviour that is difficult to measure empirically. Clark (2000) used the Zero-Inflated Poisson (ZIP) model in order to observe this unobserved process. Zero represents, therefore, the absence of an event, such as war, in a

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9 This is true because in democracies, the winning coalition is the group of voters who elect the leader. In non-democratic systems it is the set of people who sufficiently control other instruments of power to keep the leader in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
given time period. The ZIP determined whether conflict opportunities were present or not and if opportunities for conflict exist, how often conflict is likely to occur. In fact, this was necessary to determine the indirect relation between state's domestic situation and its decision to engage in conflict, which is defined as the inability of a state to trigger a conflict with another state due to the attentiveness of the latter (Clark 2000). In fact, Clark (2000) revised the strategic behaviour model while examining American foreign policy. Through this empirical technique, he accounted for both the direct and indirect (strategic) effect of domestic factors on the likelihood of diversion. He concludes that the same factors that could result in diversionary tactics on behalf of American leaders can suppress the number of opportunities for this behaviour by causing potential scapegoats to act in a non-controversial manner, seeking to avoid being targeted by the United States.

Existing models that analyzed the diversionary behaviour have extensively used the United States as a case study in their models. This limitation of scope of diversionary hypothesis (Levy 1989, cited in Fordham 2005) is due to the fact that consistent diversionary hypothesis comes from the analysis of relatively small-scale use of force by the United States in the postwar era, which makes it challenging to generalize consistent diversion to include other members of the international system (Fordham 2005). Using this country to test the strategic conflict avoidance hypothesis has, therefore, provided useful tests for the argument because of its military capabilities and institutional structure that allows it to use force abroad. In other words, other major powers, such as the Germany and Japan could not be used to explain diversionary behaviour hypothesis because they lack the capacity to use military force except under very limited circumstances (Fordham 2005).

Nevertheless, few similar studies have been conducted on cases other than the United States. Russett (1990b) studies the relationship between economic decline and dispute involvement in Great Britain, France, German Russia and Japan without finding a consistent pattern (Leeds & Davis 1997). Russett and Barzilai (1992) analyze the
relationship between economic decline, electoral pressures, and military aggressiveness for the case of Israel between 1950 and 1988 (Leeds & Davis 1997). Their findings indicate that it is likely for this state to initiate a militarized international conflict shortly before an election, but unlike the United States, neither of their economic variables (change in per capita GDP or the inflation rate) is statistically significant (Leeds & Davis 1997). In other words, for Israel, economic conditions do not appear to influence aggressive foreign policy (Leeds & Davis 1997).

Models of diversionary behaviour have focused on the United States or industrialized democracies due to Smith's argument that industrialized democracies are most at risk of diversionary behaviour (Clark & Nordstrom 2002). The model assumes that democracies tend to target non-democracies, knowing that it is unlikely that democracies will go to war with each other (Russett 1993, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, cited in Clark & Regan 2003). Nevertheless, Clark and Regan (2003) argue it is uncertain whether these states failed to fight because of their democratic regimes, or because they simply lack the chance or opportunity to fight. The resulting peace between democracies which is an observable process could be, therefore, a result of unobservable process, which is the lack of opportunity to fight. This is why Clark and Regan (2003) offer a model that accounts for the unobservable split in the population in order to predict both the opportunity and willingness to fight. The model permits them to examine the effect of structural and strategic factors, such as geographic proximity and power, that measure the opportunity on the chances that a pair of states remains at peace because of their willingness to do so, or because they lack the opportunity to do otherwise. In fact, willingness is a much broader factor that could be measured through regime type, alliances, and expectations regarding the probability of success. Their model demonstrates that both the willingness and opportunity to engage in militarized interstate conflict is shaped by both the level and ratio of states' capabilities.

According to Fordham (2005), exceptions include Leeds & Davis (1997); Russett (1990), Ward and Widmaier (1982), in addition to Ireland and Gartner (2001); Chiozza and Goemans (2004).

Most and Starr (1989) and Siverson and Starr (1990) argue that borders and proximity are indicators of interaction opportunity because they are related to both the amount of interaction possible and the probability of various types of interaction, including war (Clark and Regan 2003).
Regardless of the claim that all potential targets should undertake unobservable actions in order to avoid being the target of the initiator state, Clark and Nordstrom (2002), argue that another possibility exists. Although some states perceive domestic challenges as threats, others might consider them as opportunities for aggressive behaviour. This happens when state leaders turn their eyes away from the international scene in order to solve domestic troubles, which allows foreign states to take advantage of the weaker internally focused adversary. Blainey (1973) calls this scenario "deathwatch" behaviour (Clark & Nordstrom 2002). In fact, Clark and Nordstrom (2002) suggest the manner in which states respond to strategic signals is partially endogenous to the characteristics of these states and the way different signals evoke different responses. For instance, American Presidents suffering from weak economy and falling approval rates send a strategic signal that is different from that when they are in the middle of race riots, like the ones in 1967. The findings of the authors allowed them to argue that stronger autocratic states tend to be more aggressive and exploitive toward the United States, than weak autocracies. In addition, the authors found that political and economic troubles, such as presidential approval and unemployment induce foreign states to behave less aggressively toward the US as they seek to avoid becoming scapegoats. Moreover, dramatic political events such as riots and demonstrations lead foreign states, especially strong autocracies to employ a more exploitative strategy against the US, in order to take advantage of their distraction (Clark & Nordstrom 2002). In other words, strong autocracies will perceive economic and political challenges in the United States as threats, while they see dramatic political events as opportunities. Weak autocracies mostly perceive all domestic troubles in the United States as threats.

Clark and Nordstrom’s arguments could be analyzed in light of the strategic choice approach. In fact, the nature of actors (their power asymmetry and regime type) influences the set of actions available to them. As a strong non-democratic state receiving harsh criticism about its environmental policy from the US, China should perceive minor domestic troubles, such as economic hardships, sagging approval rates as threats and try to
avoid confrontation with the US. On the other hand, it should perceive major domestic troubles, such as riots and demonstrations, as an opportunity to pursue an aggressive policy against the US.

This chapter has defined the conceptual and theoretical framework of the project. The research problem is studied through the strategic choice approach that separates the actors from their strategic Environment. The nature of actors has been defined through the local hierarchy model and the expected utility theory. According to these theories, the United States is the superpower on the international level challenged by China in East Asia. Both states act rationally and intend to maximize the utility of their actions. Theories of value change and issue attention cycle and the diversionary theory of conflict clarify further the strategic Environment. The saliency of the environment clarifies the information structure available to China when dealing with the US. The set of actions and the possible outcomes of the strategic interaction are defined through the diversionary theory of conflict. The next chapter will define these elements further through the construction of a crisis game between the United States and China.
Chapter II: Research Problem and Case Study

Introduction

Employing the terms defined previously, this chapter explains how the instrumentalisation of the environment could become a strategic tool in foreign policy. Assumptions and hypotheses will be presented along with an explanation of the single case study, which examines the political discourse between the United States and China between 1979 and 2004.

Research Problem

In January 2008, British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown warned that India's expanding economy and growing population will have harmful effects on the environment. He said: "As India's population and economy grow, its demand for energy will increase and Britain is committed to working closely with India in a way which contributes as little carbon as possible to the atmosphere" (AFP, 2008). In 1996, President Clinton also warned from the effects of China's industrialization. He explicitly linked the global environmental crisis to international security during a summit meeting with China's President, Jiang Zemin (Le Prestre 2005). Clinton told the Chinese President that:

The greatest threat to our security that you present is that all of you people will want to get rich in exactly the same way we got rich...There is just so many more of you than there is of us, and if you behave exactly the same way we do, you will do irrevocable damage to our global environment (NYT 1996).

Statements by Prime Minister Brown and President Clinton reveal that environmental challenges could have an important influence on states' interactions. This is because they can trigger conflicts, foster cooperation, and even create alliance opportunities (Le Prestre 2005). More importantly, environmental crises could be used as an instrument of foreign policy, creating thereby an opportunity for powerful states to intervene in the domestic issues of peripheral states in order to fulfill strategic goals. While on the surface, remarks
by Brown and Clinton reflect a concern over the global environment, they could be triggered by strategic incentives. In other words, they can serve to divert the attention of the American population from domestic troubles. Expressed concerns toward ecological values can boost the popularity of the government during elections, especially when this issue is highly popular in Britain and the USA and when leaders are facing domestic troubles, such as high misery index or low approval rating\(^1\). In fact, in 2008, Britain's misery index hit 9.8, its highest point in twelve years (Stevenson 2008). At 8.3, the US misery index showed that the American economy was still recovering from the recession of the 1990's. While Brown was not facing elections, Clinton was preparing for the 1996 Presidential elections.\(^\)\(^1\)

Analyzing Clinton's statement in light of the diversionary theory of conflict puts the United States and China in a situation of strategic interaction. China, which is a strong non-democratic state, can respond to the United States' instrumentalisation in different ways depending on the type of domestic troubles that are restraining the latter (Clark & Nordstrom 2002). If the American administration is suffering from economic or political difficulties, such as inflation and lack of presidential support, then China will perceive those difficulties as internal threats and it may respond by pursuing a non-conflictual foreign policy toward the United States in order to avoid being a scapegoat. However, if internal difficulties are politically severe, involving protests and demonstrations, then China will perceive them as opportunities and it may attempt to exploit them to pursue an aggressive policy against the United States. The democratic regime at the United States permits China to determine the nature of domestic troubles. Its regional dominance in East Asia allows it to pursue the different responses against the international superpower. Diversionary attempts of democracies are conditioned, therefore, by their target's power and regime type.

\(^1\) Misery Index is an indicator of economic troubles and is calculated by adding the unemployment rate to the inflation rate.

\(^1\) US Misery index online :<http://www.miseryindex.us/customindexbymonth.asp>.
The research problem could be presented as a crisis game adopted in Figure 1, taken from Smith (1995). It is a crisis game between two states: State A and State B. State A (the United States) is the aggressor and State B (China) is the target. The diagram shows the possible outcomes from a strategic interaction between these two countries. State A is a democracy suffering domestic challenges, and State B is a non-democracy with negative environmental policies and regional supremacy. On the surface, State A initiates the strategic interaction by criticizing B's environmental practices in order to convince both its population and the world's population that it wishes to preserve ecological values. On the unobserved level, A is acting strategically by instrumentalising the environment against B in order to divert the attention of its own citizens from domestic troubles. Both actions at the observed and unobserved levels occur simultaneously.

Knowing that state A is suffering from domestic troubles; state B reacts strategically and responds pacifically to A's aggressive discourse. The outcome is neutral relations (NR), or pacific relations (PR), as shown in Figure 1. Therefore, there is an inverse relationship between the need of State A to divert and the opportunity to do so due to B's response. In fact, the absence of empirical relationship between the two (the need and the opportunity) makes this process unobserved (Clark 2003). This unobserved reaction takes place when B is a strong, non-democratic country responding to A's threats, and when the latter is suffering from political or economic troubles such as sagging approval rates, high unemployment or inflation (Clark & Nordstrom 2002). On the other hand, when A suffers from dramatic political troubles, such as demonstrations and civil unrest, a strong and undemocratic B will pursue an exploitive policy against it, which could result in conflictual relations (CR) (Clark & Nordstrom 2002). No interactions between them will result in a status quo (SQ), similar in value to the (NR) outcome. Again, the outcomes of the crisis game are determined by the power and regime type of the two actors.

Given that A and B are rational actors; they should attribute a utility to each outcome of the strategic interaction. Tables 1 and 2 represent the utility of outcomes
attributed by each actor, depending on the power and regime type of each side and the nature of domestic troubles suffered by A. For our case study, A is always democratic superpower on the international level, and B is a non-democracy and a regional power challenging A’s influence in that region. According to Table 1, if A is suffering minor domestic troubles such as political disapprovals and economic challenges, it will value conflictual relations the most, giving it a utility of (2) because it will permit it to divert the attention of its population from its domestic challenges. This is will permit it to gain electoral support through the “rally around the flag” effect, achieving thereby its strategic goal for a short period, during the times of election. As a democracy, A’s domestic troubles become visible to B, who perceives them as threats. B should favour conflictual relations (CR) the least, giving it a value of (-1) and the status quo (SQ) the most, giving it a value (2). On the other hand, State A gives the status quo a value of (1). It constitutes an opportunity for it to gain the highest utility. State A gives neutral relations (NR) a value of (0), given that this outcome does not bring any gains or losses for it. This outcome is more valuable for B (1) because it prevents it from engaging in conflict with A with no cost. Pacifying the relations (PR) brings the least outcome for A (-1), because it will prevent it from achieving its strategic goal after an attempt to do so. B gives PR a value of (0) because it saves it from a potential conflict with A with some cost. This gives the following preference ordering for A (USA) and B (China) with minor domestic troubles:

USA: CR>SQ>NR>PR
China: SQ>NR>PR>CR

Table 2 represents the value attributed for each outcome when A is suffering from major domestic troubles, such as civil unrests. In this case, A would favour B’s preferences in the previous scenario while B would favour A’s preferences. A should value conflictual relations the least (-1) and the status quo (2) the most. It prefers concentrating its resources on solving its domestic insecurities. On the other hand, B will perceive these challenges as an opportunity to pursue an aggressive foreign policy against A, favouring thereby CR the most (2) and PR the least (-1). The status quo represents a chance for B to pursue its strategic objectives, with a value of (1). Under major domestic troubles, A gives PR a value
of (0) since it prevents it from engaging in a potential conflict with B with some cost. NR has a value of (1) for the A and (0) for B. As mentioned earlier, this outcome prevents the US from engaging in conflict with China with no cost. For China, however, this outcome does not bring any gains or loss. Therefore, preference ordering for the United States and China, under major domestic troubles, is as follows:

USA: SQ>NR>PR>CR
China: CR>SQ>NR>PR

If this is true, the United States should make its minor domestic troubles seem major to China in order to reach the same preference ordering, and realize its diversionary strategic goal. If the United States' attempt is successful, conflictual relations should be the most favoured outcome for both actors. This is because the USA's preference ordering under minor troubles: CR>SQ>NR>PR would equal CR>SQ>NR>PR, which are China's preference ordering under major domestic troubles. However, since both actors are rational, they should try to avoid the costly outcome of CR. They should opt for the second preference, which is the maintenance of the status quo. In order to have a preference ordering similar to China under major domestic troubles, the US would want to make these troubles look minor to China. This would lead to the maintenance of the status quo and the avoidance of conflict. A successful US attempt would result, therefore, in a status quo as the most favoured outcome for both actors. This is because USA's preference ordering under major domestic troubles: SQ>NR>PR>CR would equal China's preference ordering under minor domestic troubles: SQ>NR>PR>CR. In other words, the status quo should always be the most favoured outcome for the two rational actors under both major and minor domestic troubles. A cost-benefit analysis would reveal that environmental policy is not worth a military conflict between a major power and regional challenger.

The crisis game is a representation of the research problem in abstract and general terms; a single case study is used in order to represent it in concrete terms while verifying the proposed hypotheses.
Assumptions and Hypotheses

The theoretical framework mentioned in the previous chapter leads to certain assumptions about the actors of the case study. In fact, numerous authors have confirmed the unipolarity of the United States in the international system (Wohlfarth 1999, Nye 1991) and the regional supremacy of China in East Asia (Lemke 2002).

Assumption 1 (a): The USA is a dominant power in the international system

Assumption 2(a): China is a regional power in East Asia challenging the American influence in the region.

Applying the strategic choice approach and the diversionary theory of conflict to the case study leads to the assumption that the United States and China are purposive, rational actors interacting in a strategic Environment. Both countries observe their respective Environment and behave in ways that help them reach their subjectively defined goals. Each one of them possesses both preferences with regards to its own actions, and beliefs about the other actors' preference; their decisions are influenced by these preferences and beliefs. The United States is the sender state, initiating strategic interaction and China is the receiver state, receiving the interaction.

Assumption 1(b): The USA is a sender state, initiating diversionary behaviour against China.

Assumption 2(b): China is the receiver state, responding strategically to the strategic signals of the USA.

Accordingly, China acts strategically as a receiver state. It may respond aggressively to the United States escalating, thereby, the situation, or it could respond passively by ignoring the US signals, deescalating, thereby the situation. As a result, the
information structure that characterizes the Environment of the strategic interaction should be well defined. China could determine the severity of domestic troubles suffered by the United States due to the visibility of the democratic regime. In addition, the receiver state has complete information about the saliency of environmental concerns in the United States, given that this information becomes public through polls and surveys in a democratic state. Nevertheless, China remains uncertain about the United States' level of sensitivity toward environmental problems. Regardless, China knows that Democrats are more sensitive, in comparison with Republicans to these problems because Democrats are known to have a "pro-environmental" ideology, more so than Republicans (Dunlap & Allen 1976).

Knowing that the United States is a democratic dominant power in the international system, it should favour an aggressive foreign policy against its non-democratic challenger, China, especially when facing economic and political troubles, in order to divert the attention of the American population from those domestic troubles and increase electoral chances in the upcoming election. The instrumentalisation of the environment against China should increase during these circumstances.

Assumption 3: China's environmental policies create the opportunity for the USA to instrumentalise the environment against it. This instrumentalisation depends, however, on the willingness of the USA, which is affected by domestic politics.

Hypothesis 1(a): As economic and political troubles increase and environmental issues become more salient, the USA will be more willing to instrumentalise the environment against China.

On the other hand, dramatic political troubles should turn the eyes of the United States away from the international scene in order to solve internal unrests, such as protests and demonstrations. Under these conditions, the United States will be less willing to
instrumentalise the environment against China, even if environmental concerns become salient.

_Hypothesis 1(b): As dramatic political troubles increase, the USA will be less likely to instrumentalise the environment against China, regardless of its saliency._

Having complete information about United States' domestic conditions, the receiver state, China should perceive minor domestic troubles as threats and avoid conflictual relations with the USA and it should see major domestic troubles as an opportunity to pursue an aggressive policy against the United States.

_Hypothesis 2(a): Economic and political troubles in the United States should induce China to pursue a pacific discourse toward the USA to avoid being a scapegoat._

_Hypothesis 2(b): Dramatic political troubles (riots and demonstrations) in the United States should induce China to pursue an aggressive discourse against the USA in order to take advantage of its domestic distractions._

Given that the Democrats in the United States tend to overemphasize the need of environmental protection during their election campaigns (Dunlap & Allen 1976), the instrumentalisation of the environment should be stronger on behalf of Democrats, when compared with Republicans.

_Hypothesis 3: A troubled Democratic government in the United States should use the environment against China more frequently, when compared with a troubled Republican government, when the environment is salient._

**Strategy of verification**

In order to verify the proposed hypotheses and analyze the instrumentalisation of the environment in non-conflictual conditions, a single case study of the political discourse
between the United States and China between 1979 and 2004, during periods of non-conflict is proposed.\textsuperscript{14} Studying the instrumentalisation of the environment between the United States and China during this time period is extremely relevant given that 1979 marks the year where the first diplomatic relations have been established between the two countries (Schaller 1990; Garrison 2005). In addition, it was the year where modern international environmental policy has been established. Starting from this year, environmental degradations began to gain importance on the international level due to the efforts of international organizations, such as the United Nations Development Program. More importantly, bilateral relations between the two countries, especially with respect to environmental policies are representative of strategic interactions between a dominant power and a regional challenger.

\textbf{US-China Relations, Historical Overview}

Before explaining the role of environmental concerns in the US-China relations, it is necessary to provide a historical overview of US-China politics between 1979 and 2004. Starting from January 1, 1979, the United States and the People's Republic of China reached an agreement, through the 1979 communiqué, to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations (Schaller 1990; Garrison 2005). As of this date, relations have been normalized between the two countries (Shambaugh 1994) after mutual compromises from both sides (Schaller 1990), with respect to the issue of Taiwan. Carter announced that the US defense treaty with Taiwan will be cancelled after a required one year period while maintaining unofficial business, cultural and political ties with the island (Schaller 1990; Garrison 2005). Although the US promised to stop arms sales to Taiwan for at least one year, it reserved the right to continue defensive arms sales to it after moratorium (Schaller 1990). China stated that, although it did not consider these sales legitimate, it would not permit the issue to stand in the way of full Sino-American relations (Schaller 1990; Garrison 2005).

\textsuperscript{14} Periods of non-conflict are defined in the next chapter.
This period was soon followed by disagreements over a number of issues. First, China realized that the United States is unable to “offer the economic aid and capital investment that was hoped for” (Hummel Jr. 1991 p. 165). The Carter administration at the time had to adhere to the Department of Defense’s wishes, denying China, therefore, the promised liberal export controls. Moreover, the heated bilateral relations between the two countries were influenced by their competing interests. As the United States started to strengthen its ties with Taiwan (Taiwan Relation Act of 1979), China realized that the first is unwilling to cease its attempts to influence the regional order in East Asia, as a dominant international power (Hummel Jr. 1991).

During the Reagan administration, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was alarmed following campaign rhetoric regarding renewing relations with Taiwan. Reagan considered the Taiwan Relations Act the basis for US China policy, rather than the 1978 communiqué (Garrison 2005). Despite the reassuring visit of George H. W. Bush—the U.S. vice-presidential candidate at the time—to China, Beijing remained concerned, especially when the White House officials announced massive upgrading of arms sales to Taiwan (Hummel Jr. 1991). As a result, in 1981, China issued an ultimatum stating that “the United States must set a date for terminating all arms sales to Taiwan or diplomatic relations would be downgraded” (Hummel Jr. 1991, p. 165). As a result, a joint communiqué has been issued on August 17, 1982 where the US promised gradual reduction of arms sales to Taiwan, only if a peaceful situation in the Taiwan Strait was reached (Hummel Jr. 1991; Schaller 1990). President Reagan claimed that this agreement forced China to accept US arms sales to Taiwan as long as it was judged necessary by Washington (Schaller 1990). China, on the other hand, regarded this as a pledge to gradually end arms sales to the island (Schaller 1990).

By the mid-1980’s relations between the two countries developed to multiple interactions that made the US the third largest trading partner of China, after Japan and Hong Kong (Garrison 2005). Nevertheless, the United States was increasingly disappointed
vis-à-vis China's policies. First, there was a frustration due to China's demands for special treatment. In addition, China's votes in the Security Council expressed its disapproval of the United States' foreign policy in the Middle East and Central America (Hummel Jr. 1991, p. 167). Moreover, there was concern with regards to China's human rights practices due to the one-party ruling system, the treatment of political prisoners, the citizens of Tibet and the reported forced abortions in the family-planning program (Hummel Jr. 1991; Schaller 1990). Nevertheless, the United States valued China as an economic force as indicated by the economic ties that continued to grow between the two countries. Furthermore, the United States' role as a stabilizing force in the Pacific region is highly regarded by China (Hummel Jr. 1991). Therefore, relations between the two countries had numerous ups and downs. The United States had an obligation to express its dissatisfaction with the violation of human rights committed in China. Yet, it was unable to commit itself to a harsh policy toward China due to trade relations.

In 1989 and following the suppression of the protestors in the Tiananmen Square in China, the United States openly criticized the government of China for its human rights abuses. President George H. W. Bush condemned the actions and imposed a series of sanctions against China (Garrison 2005). The public opinion, felt however that the President was too soft on Beijing as the Congress did not withhold the most favored nation status (MFN) from China, in keeping with the wishes of the Bush administration (Nakayama 2006; Garrison 2005). As a candidate in the elections of 1992, Bill Clinton criticized Bush's foreign policy toward China and mentioned that he was "coddling tyrants in Beijing" (Suettinger 2003, cited in Nakayama 2006). As a President, Clinton's first move was to link trade rights to improvements in human rights as the main element of US policy toward China, believing that if a state does not protect the rights of its citizens and respect the rule of law, then it could not be trusted in commercial relations (Garrison 2005). This marked a policy shift from Clinton's predecessors since he changed the focus of the US foreign policy with China from traditional security issues to commercial relations (Garrison 2005).
However, on May 26, 1994, Clinton announced delinking MFN status from human rights, stating that human rights efforts would be pushed through new steps with the business community (Nakayama 2006; Garrison 2005). Many believed this decision was triggered by the organized and active lobbying of the economic and business community in the United States. It was a result of the widespread conception then, that it was necessary to establish a major presence in the Chinese market in order to maintain the position of a major global player in the business sphere (William Warick, Chairman of AT&T in China, cited in Nakayama 2006). After agreeing on the terms for China to join the World Trade Organization in November 1999, Clinton's administration submitted a legislation to grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) in January 2000. The legislation passed in both the House and the Senate, regardless of opposition from key Democrats in both houses (Garrison 2005). The United States had to secure access to the Chinese market in order to ensure economic growth, peace and prosperity (Garrison 2005).

When President George W. Bush entered office in January 2001, observers predicted that the "China threat" group will take charge of the US foreign policy (Nakayama 2006; Garrison 2005). This prediction was supported by Bush's campaign rhetoric that considered China as a "strategic competitor" rather than a "strategic partner" (Nakayama 2006; Garrison 2005). However, the war on terror in response to the events of September 11 forced the US to consider China as a "friend" in the strategic struggle against terrorism (Renshon 2003, cited in Garrison 2005). Like President Reagan, George W. Bush had to focus on new priorities according to "the geostrategic equation and pragmatic recognition of the costs of disrupting close economic interdependence between the two economies" (Garrison 2005, p.181). This was demonstrated through numerous events, such as finalizing China's entry into the WTO, maintaining high level contacts about Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the resumption of military-to-military exchanges (Garrison 200). In other words, the "vicious political divide" that was prevalent during the previous administrations continued to characterize the political culture in Washington during the administration of Bush Jr. (Nakayama 2007, p. 2). The split was between those
who consider China as “potential security threat” and others who see it as a potential market (Nakayama 2006, p. 19).

The lack of precision in the American-Chinese relations is justified when considering the factors of power asymmetry and regime type. These two factors play a major role in defining the strategic interactions between the two countries. Although the United States is a major power in the international system, it is challenged by regional hierarchies, such as China in East Asia.

**Unipolarity of the United States**

Scholars who believe in the stability of the unipolar world argue that the current system is unipolar, with the United States as a dominant power. After the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the only surviving power (Wohlforth 1999). It is argued also that that the current system is unipolar as the US is the first leading state in modern international history with preponderance in all the underlying components of power including economic, military, technological and geopolitical (Wohlforth 1999). Nye and Nau in 1990, conducted numerous studies on the US position in world politics stating, like Russett (1980), that it is a uniquely powerful hegemonic actor with much more complete collection of capabilities than Britain ever had (Wohlforth 1999). Nye (1991) also confirms the power supremacy of the United States when responding to claims concerning the decline of the United States by stating that it is inaccurate to apply historical cases of imperial decline to forecast the decline of the USA because the concept of power has changed in the 20th century (Nye 1991).

The theory of unipolar stability claims that power supremacy by the US leads to a peaceful system given that there is no hegemonic rivalry over the leadership of the international system (Wohlforth 1999). Moreover, as the US possesses the means to keep the current security institutions in order to avoid local conflicts and prevent expensive
competition among other major powers, the system becomes more stable. The unipolar system is durable as well given the size of the US power, as compared to other states. Consequently, any counterbalancing change must be strong and sustainable enough to change the structure and challenge the American super power (Wohlforth 1999). Although the United States is currently the dominant power in the international system in terms of its military and economic capabilities, it does not constitute a hegemonic power. This is due to its inability to exercise political influence in all parts of the world, where regional powers exist.

As a "dominant power" or a "dominant state", sitting on the top of the pyramid of power in the hierarchical international system defined by Organski (1958) (Lemke 2002), the US aims to maintain the international status quo in order to further its own long-term interests by creating self-serving patterns of interaction (Lemke, 2002). These patterns, as stated earlier, consist of the international projection of the political and economic resource patterns, employed locally. As a dominant power, the United States’ leadership over the last half century has promoted a global regime that encourages democracy, human rights, free press and open economic practices in the rest of the world (Tammen & Kugler 2006). The US believes the projection of what is successful domestically reinforces its legitimacy and governing regime, improving, thereby, domestic stability and providing a peaceful international system (Lemke 2002). The US seeks to maintain the status quo because it is profitable both on the domestic and international levels (Lemke 2002). In fact, these institutional conditions are favoured by the US because they prevent tyranny by a majority or a minority, regardless of the ideological preferences. In addition, the US liberal economic and political leadership is structured in a way that utilizes incentives (economic, financial or political) and often sanctions in order to alter the interests of other nations and make them parallel with its own interests (Tammen & Kugler 2006).

As stated by the power transition theory, nations that are satisfied with the established status quo accept the dominance of the dominant power since they share the
stability, prosperity and peace created by this order. Nevertheless, some nations remain outside this coalition when they challenge and reject the existing norms or the status quo (Tammen & Kugler 2006). For instance, when China rejects and openly challenges the status quo maintained by the US, conflict between the two states becomes possible, especially when China reaches power parity, which is a condition that is predicted by Tammen and Kugler (2006). In other words, the theory of power transition concurs with the theory of unipolar stability about the conditions of stability in a unipolar system. It consists of the satisfaction of the nearest challenger with the current status quo.

Regional Supremacy of China

Although the United States is maintaining supremacy in the military level, it is not a global hegemon since its unipolar structure of capability is not matched by a unipolar structure of influence (Wohlfarth 1999). This is true because there are also regional powers, possessing regional dominance, supervising regional relations and establishing and striving to preserve the regional status quo (Lemke 2002). They are local/regional systems or sub-hierarchies of the international system or of the overall international power hierarchy (Lemke 2002). In East Asia, China presides as the dominant regional power (Lemke 2002). As a result, a great challenge for the US lies in the long-term collision of interests with the emerging and powerful China (Tammen & Kugler 2006). As both countries remain trapped in a long-lasting competition for economic dominance, China (the smaller challenger) will always be a threat to the unipolarity of the United States (Tammen & Kugler 2006; Chan 2008). It is growing at a much faster rate, compared to the more mature economic engine of the US. It is anticipated, therefore, that China will overtake the US in the future between 2025 and 2035. According to the power transition theory, China is being placed in a zone of parity and potential transition (Tammen & Kugler 2006; Chan 2008) that will take place in next twenty five years.

According to Tammen and Kugler 2006, China possesses the capacity to surpass the United States in terms of GDP, unlike the USSR during the Cold War. In fact, it is argued
that China's expanding industrial growth over the past two decades, along with its huge population (1.3 billion people) could become equal in economic power to that of the United States, which could turn into military superiority (Tammen & Kugler 2006). In addition, Figure 2 of Tammen and Kugler (2006) indicates that when China grows to its full potential, it could become the leading nation in the international system by 2075. Figure 2 is a representation of the relative power and income of the main international competitors when compared with the United States from 1950 until 2070. According to the authors, the conditions of parity are met when the challenger gets eighty percent of the capabilities of the dominant nation and cease to exist when the challenger exceeds the dominant nation's capability by twenty percent, which is when the challenger replaces the dominant power. China will soon meet these conditions as Figure 2 indicates.

Following the power parity predicted by the theory of power transition, the challenger needs to be dissatisfied with the status quo for a confrontation to happen. In other words, a dominant future China has two options: 1) to openly challenge the existing international regimes or 2) to join and lead the pre-existing international community (Tammen & Kugler 2006). Although the United States overtook Britain in terms of power, the leadership of the international system was transferred peacefully to the United States in the early twentieth century and cooperation was maintained between the two nations ever since. However, this peaceful transition did not take place between the United Kingdom and Germany. The UK got involved in two World Wars in order to decide world dominance. The source of stability of the international system lies, therefore, in the satisfaction of the challenger with the status quo (Tammen & Kugler 2006; Lemke 2002).

According to Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler (2006), the United States' challenge is not limited to fighting terrorism in the post September 11th events. Rather, it is vested in the longer-term collision of interests with powerful China. As a result, crises in South and East Asia and even in the Middle East should be reanalyzed by policy makers from a different strategic perspective. This is true because they will demonstrate important
aspects about American leadership in the upcoming contest, as Asia is becoming the focal point in world politics (Tammen & Kugler 2006). In addition, United States understands that China's economic growth rate risks of making it a dominant power on the regional level, challenging thereby the current world order and its ability to remain a superpower on the international level.

These conditions explain the difficulty in defining a clear foreign policy with China. When its economic dominance threatens the international supremacy of the United States, it becomes necessary to challenge its expansion. Nevertheless, over-challenging China runs the risk of excluding the United States from the expanding Chinese market. In fact, economic interdependence is on the rise between the two countries as China is becoming "the third largest trading partner of the United States" (Tammen & Kugler 2006, p. 50; Chan 2008).

As the US preeminence is declining in relative terms, the US is lacking a long-range strategy to bring important nations and stakeholders, such as China, into a US led coalition of satisfied nations (Tammen & Kugler 2006). With China reaching power parity, the United States should decrease the chances of collision with it in order to ensure global peace (Tammen & Kugler 2006). The US strategy should focus, therefore, on creating a selective ruling class in China that is satisfied with the international order and corresponding sets of patterns governing this order (Tammen & Kugler 2006). This satisfaction is achieved when the Chinese ruling class profits from the established status quo through economic interdependence.

**Power Asymmetry**

Power asymmetry exists, therefore, between the United States and China. While the United States is a major power on the international level, China is still considered a regional power in East Asia. China's growing economy and military power could make it a
challenger to the United States even on the international level. The United States' criticism of China's environmental policies is profitable, therefore, in the competition for power. It is also legitimate for the powerful state to criticize a smaller challenger for environmental policies in order to echo international norms and ideals, even when it refuses to set the example in terms of its own environmental policies. This reflects the asymmetric relation between the United States and China, even in environmental discourse.

**Regime Type**

As a democratic dominant power, the United States attempts to criticize the undemocratic practices of China, especially with respect to human rights violations. This is part of projecting its domestic resource patterns on the international level in order to maintain the stability of the international status quo. As a result, the United States does not favour undemocratic patterns in China, such as the one-party ruling system, the treatment of political prisoners, the maltreatment of the citizens of Tibet and the reported forced abortions in the family-planning program (Nakayama 2006).

For instance, in 1985, the US Government acted under the pressure of a coalition of conservative Republicans along with 'right-to-life' advocates against forced abortions and sterilizations in China. It decided, therefore, to withhold financial contributions to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) because it provided funds to China's national population program (Nakayama 2006). Moreover, in 1989, the House of Representative in its 105th session passed nine anti-China bills, expressing dissatisfaction with China's policies on human rights and nonproliferation (Nakayama 2006). More recently, when China was preparing to host the Olympic games of 2008, its government has received numerous criticisms due to its treatment of the citizens of Tibet and because of a highly polluted capital region.
Regime type influences the relations between a dominant international power and a regional challenger. More importantly, it determines the strategic interaction between them because it affects the accountability to the ruling coalition. The theory of political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) explains the characteristics of ruling coalition in a democracy and a non-democracy. The theory asserts that holding office is essential to accomplish any sets of goals for political leaders. In order to remain in power, political leaders respond to the needs of the group that retains them in power, this group is called the “winning coalition” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, p.7). It holds control over the essential features that constitute political power in the system. In democracies, the winning coalition constitutes the group of voters who elect the leader. In other non-democratic systems, it could be a group of people who sufficiently control the other instruments of power to keep the leader in office. When the leader loses the loyalty of a sufficient number of members of the winning coalition, a challenger can more easily replace him or her in office by attracting the support of those disaffected members.

In addition, in order to remain in power, political leaders need to make important decisions, namely about the distribution of public and private goods among citizens. Members of the winning coalition are the only group that benefits from private goods. The value of these benefits decrease to the individual group members as its size increases (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). When the size of the coalition increases, political leaders are expected to modify their efforts in order to provide public goods that benefit all of the society (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).

Coalition members are usually selected from a bigger group called the selectorate (Shirk 1993, cited in Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, p.38). Democracies are characterized by a large selectorate and large winning coalitions. On the other hand, non-democratic systems have a small winning coalition and a large selectorate. This, in fact, makes supporters of the leader highly loyal because the cost of defection and exclusion are extremely high if a challenger threatens to overturn the ruling power. On the other hand, the
bonds of special privileges between the leader and the supporters are particularly weak in
democratic systems due to the large size of the coalition. This makes the cost of defection
relatively low in comparison to the non-democratic system, which makes democratic
leaders more accountable to their ruling coalition, especially while forming foreign policy.
This makes them more sensitive to audience costs when implementing foreign policy as
discussed earlier (Fearon 1994).

Regime type determines, therefore, the information structure governing the strategic
interaction between a democratic state and a non-democratic state such as the United States
and China. China knows the US is unwilling to bluff. American threats are, therefore,
credible because of the accountability to the ruling coalition. China could also determine
the importance of environmental concerns to voters when the United States criticizes it
publicly for its environmental practices. Moreover, the visibility of domestic conditions in
democratic systems makes foreign states prone to avoid conflictual interactions with the
troubled state. When faced with an aggressive foreign policy from the United States, China
could prepare its response depending on domestic conditions. On the other hand, the United
States is less privileged when dealing with undemocratic China as it is unable to clearly
interpret the Chinese signals. China is less sensitive to audience costs. It could easily resort
to bluffing while making commitments or threats to the United States.

It is clear, therefore that power asymmetry and regime type are the two factors
defining the strategic interaction between the United States and China, making the two
countries suitable to use for the case study. The environmental discourse between the
United States and China is highly relevant to study considering the increased environmental
concerns both on the international and national level.

Environmental Concerns

It has been confirmed by the United Nations Population Fund (1960), that in only
forty years, the earth’s population has expanded from three billion in 1960 to six billion in
This expansion places a pressure on the earth’s soils, forests, water supplies, fisheries, oceans and atmosphere (Sandler 2004). It is triggered by the urge of satisfying the endless human needs (clothing, sustaining and nourishing) forcing, thereby, the ecosystems over its “carrying capacity” (Sandler 2004). This capacity or threshold permits the ecosystem to endure numerous pollutants without noticeable damages for a limited amount of time. However, once this threshold is being surpassed, continuous strains on the ecosystem is capable of causing permanent degradations (Sandler 2004). These damages do not respect political borders (Sandler 2004). Pollutants could, in fact, be transported in the air and water far from their sources and across the globe (Sandler 2004). In other words, armies and artilleries are incapable of securing national borders against the threat of pollutants (Sandler 2004). Satellites are showing that “transboundary pollutants” are omnipresent and increasing continuously (Sandler 2004).

Local environmental problems could easily become international local concerns or (public good) problems (Sandler 2004), triggering thereby different collective action scenarios. For instance, Sandler (2004) calls the efforts to challenge international environmental crises, such as global warming and ozone depletion, global public goods (GPGs) because they are non-rival and non-exclusive. Challenging these environmental problems produces benefits that are purely public (GPG). In addition, these benefits are governed by a summation aggregator technology. For instance, cutting back greenhouse gases (GHGs) produces benefits that are nonrival among nations and nonexcludable on the international level (Sandler 2004). Everyone on earth benefits from clean air and a safe ozone layer with no rivalry. More importantly, as each nation makes an effort to reduce its emission of GHGs, the total atmospheric concentration of GHGs becomes reduced as mixing occurs in the atmosphere. In other words, everyone gains from individual efforts to curb both global warming and ozone depletion.

This project should focus mainly on global warming, given the urgency of this problem and the worldwide attention that it has triggered. In fact, the problem of
greenhouse gas is attracting global concern today as the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change stated in its February 2007 report that “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal” (Kluger 2007). Although many have denied the responsibility of humans in contributing to global warming, the report confirmed that there is “very high confidence” that human activities ever since 1750 have played a significant role by surcharging the atmosphere with carbon dioxide and therefore, retaining solar heat that should otherwise radiate away (Kluger 2007). In addition, the report concluded that long-term solution should be to reduce the levels of CO2 in the atmosphere (Kluger 2007).

The problem of global warming is generated by greenhouse effect. The warming happens when trapped gazes in the earth’s atmosphere allows the sunlight through, yet absorb infrared radiation, thus raising the atmospheric mean temperature (Sandler 2004). These trapped gases are called greenhouse gases (GHGs) and include carbon dioxide (CO2) along with other gases such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). CO2 is generated due to the burning of fossil fuels and deforestation. In fact, the continuous rise of GHGs can raise the earth’s mean temperature from 2 degrees to 5 degrees (Sandler 2004). Global warming is counted among the most challenging international problems. This is because GHGs continue to rise, regardless of the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 where certain nations pledged to limit its emission of GHGs. In fact, the United States is regarded as a key polluter among the major international polluters, with almost a quarter of CO2 emission. The US insists on refusing to sign the Kyoto Protocol, unless the developing countries, such as China and India, are demanded to curb their emissions (Sandler 2004). In spite of the United States’ deficiency in solving environmental crisis such as climate change (Sandler, 2004); its authorities have repeatedly criticized China’s environmental practices: "China is one of the world’s largest contributors to ozone depletion, global climate change, and biodiversity loss. Chinese logging companies are also becoming a significant player in the illegal trade in tropical timber" (Economy 2004 a). This is reflective of asymmetric relation between the United States and China as a major power and challenger. It is a "Do as I say, not as I do" policy, similar to parent-child relationship.
In fact, it has been suggested that regardless of the global efforts to reduce global warming, the major responsibility is in the hands of coal-fired economies, such as China and India (Kluger 2007). This is because between 1990 and 2004, energy consumption rose by 53 percent in China. Coal-fired power plants are being built in Beijing at an alarming rate, almost one every week. In comparison to the world's technologically advanced coal plants that operate at 45 percent, China's top efficiency rate stands at 33 percent only (Kluger 2007). Currently, the United States' per capita emission of carbon dioxide is about 21.75 tons. In China, it is only 4.03 tons. This is predicted to change, however, in the next ten years as the Chinese economy is growing at a rate of ten percent a year, expected thereby to exceed the United States in total greenhouse emissions even before 2010 (Kluger 2007). This is because it is confirmed that unless countries with the most rapid rates of carbon dioxide emission (China, India, South Korea, Mexico, Brazil, Iran and Indonesia) commit to an effort to challenge global warming quickly, environmental preservation efforts of the developed countries will be counterbalanced quickly (Sandler 2004). With the exception of Mexico, these countries did not commit to any CO₂ cutbacks. In other words, the "collective" nature of the issue legitimizes the United States' expressed concerns over China's environmental policy (Sandler 2004).

The focus of this project is on China, given that its environmental policies, especially with respect to global warming reflect a deep commitment towards economic growth at the expense of environmental protection. This analysis allows us to uncover the domestic constrains that are preventing China from making serious commitments with respect to climate change in spite of the continuous pressure of the international community.
China’s Environmental Policies

In 1992, China was facing widespread pollution and environmental degradation due to its rapid industrialization during its reform period after 1949, where China focused mainly on achieving economic growth (Economy 1997). China’s environmental problems are related to the over dependence on coal and the improper implementation of pollution and efficiency technologies (Economy 1997). For instance, pollutants in China affected eighty-six percent of the river water flowing inside urban areas. This pollution made river water inappropriate for drinking or fishing. In addition, it is has negatively affected air quality in China (Economy 1997). Moreover, acid rain reached one-third of China’s populated territory and produced destructive impacts on agricultural lands in many provinces (Economy 1997). Before 1972, there were no environmental laws, permitting the factories to use rivers as drainage systems. In fact, environmental degradation has a cost of fifteen percent of China’s annual GNP according to one estimate (Economy 1997).

China’s domestic pollution problems are, therefore, preventing it from participating in solving global problems, such as climate change. At the end of 1980s, China became the third largest consumer and producer of energy in the world, producing seventy five percent of its energy from coal (Economy 1997). As a result, between 1950 and 1990, China’s CO₂ emission rose from 1.3 percent of the world total to 10.5 percent. This is due mainly to its rapid industrial development that relies extensively on coal. In fact, experts believe that by 2020, China will surpass the United States as the leading producer of CO₂ (Chandler et al. 1990, cited in Economy 1997) because of rapid industrialization.

However, in 1972, three events took place simultaneously and triggered a new Chinese approach to the environment. It was when the beach at Dalian Bay became black from polluted shells; tainted fish were brought to the Beijing market from the Guanting Reservoir, and the United Nations Conference on Human Environment was held in Stockholm (Economy 1997). Although China sent a delegation to the conference, the participants were looked at as highly disruptive and unconstructive (Economy 1997). The
report of the Chinese delegation encouraged the China’s Premier Zhou Enlai to organize a national conference on environmental protection in June 1973 in order to review China’s environmental situation and analyze environmental challenges (Economy 1997). Consequently, in 1979, a draft of national level environmental protection law was endorsed and formally publicized in 1989 (Economy 1997). It established principles to protect the environment and encourage the establishment of a legal network for environmental protection (Economy 1997).

Regardless of these legal achievements in the environmental field, the commitment to these regulations was weak and ineffective. This is because Chinese leaders were hesitant to implement environmental regulations out of fear that economic development would be slowed down (Economy 1997). Although fines were established to prevent pollution, they were ineffective to act as an incentive because they were too low (Economy 1997). In addition, the investment in environmental protection remained below the necessary level of stabilizing or even improving the state of the environment in China (Economy 1997).

Between 1988 and 1990, the United Nations held its first scientific discussions with the sponsorship of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Then, formal political negotiations were held through the International Negotiating Committee (INC). They consisted of scientific discussions to assess the potential changes that might occur in the planet and the possible responses (Economy 1997). Regardless of its attendance, the Chinese delegation was once again aggressive and opposed to binding convention on climate change. During the negotiations, they expressed their commitment only to a general convention that was free of any commitments for the signatories; especially with respect to cutting back on the CO2 emissions. The Chinese delegation was convinced that any action that hindered economic growth should be funded by the international community (Economy 1997). More importantly, the delegation was successful in rallying a united front
for bargaining in support of their position, composed of the advanced industrialized countries (Economy 1997).

It has been suggested that the conservative position of key players in the international community had affected China’s response to global warming (Economy 1997). During the process of international negotiation, minor pressure was placed on China in order to alter its position vis-à-vis environmental crisis by its closest allies who shared mutual interests, namely the United States, Japan and Southeast Asia (Economy 1997). None of these influential actors pressured the Chinese delegation to adopt a clear CO₂ emission targets or any preventive policies (Economy 1997).

Nevertheless, there was a close cooperation on the policy-making level between the concerned scientific and environmental communities in China and their counterparts in the international community (Economy 1997). The scientific community firmly believed in the disastrous effects of global warming and made an effort to equip specialized communities in China with the information, technologies and funds needed in order to get a better understanding of climate change and the range of responses needed to address the problem. It was hoped that scientific data would transform the thinking of Chinese officials in order to adopt a serious response to the environmental problem (Economy 1997). However, China’s final position during international negotiation did not value the scientific position on the issue of global warming. Although the Chinese environmental community tried to present the problem in clear scientific terms to the Chinese leadership, the importance of economic development and the weakness of environmental bureaucracy prevented them from succeeding in their mission. This is because economic modernization and the disagreement over whom among the international community should be held ‘responsible’ for global climate change were more important to discuss than the scientific debate over global warming (Economy 1997). The sensitiveness of the Chinese scientific community to environmental protection is different from the American one because they lack the needed
resources to justify their case in strong terms and they are disempowered by the environmental bureaucracy in China.

For instance, during the United Nations Conference on Environmental and Development in June 1992, “the problem of global climate change was linked inextricably to the issue of the pace of economic development by virtue of the importance of energy to both issues and China’s overwhelming reliance on coal” (Economy 1997, p. 23). During the scientific and political negotiations, China’s stance over the issue of climate change reflected an internal policy that valued rapid economic development more than anything else.

Although, there were some efforts inside of China to address and solve the problem of climate change through the funding of international organizations, and international forums outside of China, both scientific and environmental ministries were forced to reflect a conservative position of the planning and foreign ministry bureaucracies, especially with regards to the issue of China’s responsibility vis-à-vis climate change. During the second World Climate Conference, officials of the Chinese delegation articulated strongly the responsibility of the developed world (Economy 1997). In fact, they suggested that these countries bore a "special responsibility" for the problem of global warming. The developing states could not afford to think about this problem because they have a burden of eliminating poverty, in addition to developing their economies and improve the livelihoods. These goals have been already achieved by developed countries. As a result, they demanded that the industrialized countries provide the needed funds in order to assist in their development. China argued that this is the only way to save them from following the disastrous road, previously taken by developed countries. They have suggested the transfer of modern technologies to them under non-commercial conditions (Economy 1997).
While the United States has pledged to help China in overcoming its environmental challenges, the US Administration has been criticized by numerous European countries and even from environmentalists within the American community for adopting a relaxed position toward the question of global climate change (Cooper 1992). It has been suggested that the United States has been hesitant toward adopting radical new policies, or even encouraging other countries to adopt policies, that could considerably modify an economic and social order that has produced an unparalleled level of prosperity and security for the average resident of the United States and Western Europe (Cooper 1992). In other words, the international status quo set by the United States, as a dominant power, could be shaken if ambitious commitments were made to curb global warming. This is true because it involves altering economic policies responsible for American prosperity.

In fact, according to Cooper (1992) the present social and economic order (arrangements) has formed a personal greed and guided it into socially constructed channels among industrialized countries. In addition, the search for personal gains under competitive conditions in a present social and political system adaptive to new technologies “has over the decades increased leisure, lengthened life, increased tolerance of diversity, and created more possibilities for realization of human potential than any other arrangements known” (Cooper 1992, p. 291). Due to the success of the established economic order, “a heavy burden of proof should be made by proposals for radical alterations” in order to make radical changes (Cooper 1992, p. 291). Evidence should show that negative environmental practices and the current habits of gain-motivated individuals would on the long-term decrease human welfare, rather than increase it (Cooper 1992).

Although the United States continues to criticize non-developed countries for their environmental practices, it has not yet made any radical changes to its own CO₂ emission. It has become easier and less costly to criticize the challenger for negative environmental policy, rather than to commit to serious obligations that could save the environment. This is part of the United States projection of power as a dominant nation. It is indirectly pressured
to express a commitment to environmental norms due to their saliency both on the international level and domestic level. This commitment could be fulfilled cheaply when criticizing less developed nations, especially when their expansion of power challenges its international dominance. Criticizing China's environmental practices could possibly become a self-serving policy for the United States, rather than a global concern. The next chapter examines this assertion further.
Chapter III: Methodology, Analysis and Discussion of Results

Introduction

This chapter includes the operationalisation process. Before verifying the hypotheses, it is essential to define periods of peace between 1979 and 2004 between the United States and China, given that the main objective of this project is to verify if diversionary behaviour takes place during non-conflictual conditions. Periods of peace were defined by examining the Security Council voting records. Although this methodology seems disconnected from the rest of the operationalisation process, it remains an integral part of the verification process since the instrumentalisation of the environment is most likely to occur when the United States and China are not in conflict. Security Council voting records were used for a specific purpose, which is determining periods of peace between the two countries. While it would be meaningful to further analyze the implication of the voting records at the Security Council between the United States and China, this analysis is beyond the scope of this project.

Defining Dates of Peace

Although the diversionary theory of conflict applies only to times of crisis, this project wishes to adopt the theory to highlight diversionary behaviours in times of peace. This is because the analysis involves two rational actors that are unlikely to initiate a conflict over an issue of low politics, such as the environment. In other words, conducting a cost-benefit analysis should lead both states to avoid conflictual interactions over

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15 The voting record of the Security Council was collected from the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISnet).
environmental concerns. The crisis game, previously discussed, showed also that both actors favour the status quo in their strategic interaction about the environment.

Non-conflict refers to the absence of war. It involves situations where a given country does not engage in neither political nor military use of force (Clark & Regan 2003). Political use of force is defined by Meernik (1994) as situations where presidents choose to use the military to get political objectives. It involves, therefore, situations where military force was short of war. In order to measures periods of conflict and non-conflict (cooperation) between the United States and its rivals, existing studies of the diversionary behaviour, such as Leeds and Davis (1997), have relied extensively on Militarized Interstate Disputes data (MID). Fordham and Sarver (2001) data provides an update of the Blechman and Kaplan series that ends in 1976 in order to account for the "political use of force" specifically for the United States. However, this data could not be used to determine periods of peace between the United States and China between the years of 1979 and 2004 because as of 1975, the United States did not use force against China (Fordham and Sarver 2001). Fordham (2005) utilized both the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) (1948-78) and the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) (1966-1992) in order to generate summary measures of conflict and cooperation between the United States and its rivals, including China, by aggregating events over certain periods of time. The COPDAB or the WEIS data sets were also not suitable to use for this analysis as they do not go beyond 1978 and 1992 respectively. Therefore, the data sets that have been traditionally used to explore the diversionary policy of the United States could not provide us with a systematic analysis of periods of non conflict between the United States and China between 1979 and 2004. The absence of political or military use of force between the two countries for this period could be explained by the rationality of both actors. They consider that a conflict between an international super power and a regional power with superior military capabilities is a very costly process that should be avoided, especially over an issue of a global concern such as environmental degradation. This has been shown earlier in the strategic game, where the status quo was the most preferred outcome for both actors.
In order to establish dates of peace between these two countries, an analysis of the Security Council voting records was conducted using the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET). This analysis is relevant given that both the United States and China are permanent members of the UN Security Council. The voting mechanism at the UN forces Council members to take positions on every issue brought to a vote. Member countries are, therefore, asked to express their positions through vote on the same issues and at the same time. More importantly, the analysis of voting behaviour in the Security Council permits the identification of basic voting alignments and trends in the Security Council politics (Todd 1969). A negative vote (veto) by a permanent member constitutes an effort to prevent a draft resolution from passing. Alternatively, voluntarily abstentions express a strongly negative attitude to a particular draft resolution, without intending to make its adoption impossible. It’s therefore a symbolic action that is used to express a disapproval vis-à-vis the content of the draft resolution (Bailey 1969).

The analysis included both roll-call vote and recorded vote on both adopted and draft resolutions between 1979 and 2004 in the Security Council. In other words, we did not neglect negative votes of permanent members at public meetings of the Council (vetoes), which involved non-adopted draft resolutions. Including vetoes offered a realistic analysis of the US-China relations in the Security Council as shown in Figure 3, when comparing the percentage of conflictual days that includes veto records and the same results when excluding these records. For instance, when counting only adopted resolutions, the graph leads us to believe that there were no days of conflict between the United States and China in 2001 and 2002 when in fact there were a total of six days of conflict.

When the voting record of the United States and China on the same resolution was in agreement—both voting in favour for instance—the voting date was recorded as a peaceful day between the two countries. On the other hand, contradictory voting record means a conflictual day between them. This consisted of one side voting in favour of a
resolution and the other side voting against it, or even abstaining from voting. Table 3 represents the dates of conflict between the United States and China between 1979 and 2004. For each year, the percentage of conflicting votes for both countries was calculated over the total of drafted and adopted resolutions for this year. Dates of peace include all the dates between 1979 and 2003 that are not included in Table 3. In fact, calculating the percentage of the total days of conflict by year and the percentage of these days for the whole time period (1979-2004), shows that relations between the United States and China became more peaceful after the Cold War. Figure 4 clarifies this further. The line representing the percentage of the total days of conflict by year shows that conflictual periods between the United States and China were below average as of 1992.

A Qualitative Comparative Model with a Boolean Approach

A qualitative comparative model was used to analyze a number of political discourses pronounced by members of the US Congress (Representatives and Senators) and US Presidents about China concerning its environmental practices during the defined periods of peace. The occurrence of these discourses was analyzed along with the independent variables which include US economic troubles, US presidential approval, riots and demonstrations in the US and the saliency of the environment according to the US public opinion. This set of data was analyzed using a Boolean comparative approach.

The sample of political discourse between the United States and China is collected following a comparative methodology as shown in Table 4. Given the aim of the project in analyzing the aggressive discourse of the United States against China with regards to environmental practices between 1979 and 2004, the sample respected this time period and the defined periods of peace. In addition, it was selected using two criterions: the aggressiveness or not of the discourse, (represented in the rows of the Table), and the subject matter of the discourse, (represented in the columns). The rows divide examples of
aggressive or non-aggressive discourse against China, and the columns separate discourse relating to either environmental or non-environmental issues. This was necessary in order to avoid selection bias in the sample. The combination of the two criterions gives four cases in total. Case 1 includes aggressive US discourse against China, about the environment; case 2 represents aggressive US discourse against China, not concerning the environment; case 3 consists of non-aggressive US discourse about the environment; and finally case 4 is a sample of non-aggressive US discourse, not relating to the environment.

Discourses selected for each case were collected from the State of the Union addresses made by US Presidents between 1979 and 2004 and discourses pronounced by Representatives in the House of Representatives and Senators in the US Senate during the defined time period. Presidential libraries were used to collect State of the Union addresses, whereas Lexis-Nexis was used to collect speeches from the American Congress. Cases 1, 2 and 4 included fourteen sample discourses. For case 3, we were able to find only three discourses. This, in fact, suggests that most discourses pronounced by the United States versus China are aggressive. The total forty five sample discourses were all pronounced during dates of peace and they represent the dependent variable, which is the instrumentalisation of the environment. The collected cases (and non-cases) of the instrumentalisation of the environment are represented as a dummy variable, using 1 for cases when the environment was instrumentalised and 0 for cases when the environment was not instrumentalised. In other words, 1 was given to the discourses of case 1, and 0 was given to the discourses of cases 2, 3 and 4. The hypotheses are verified by testing the occurrence of the political discourses with the independent variables, using a Boolean algebraic approach.
Operationalisation Process

Independent Variables

Independent variables consist of US domestic troubles (economic troubles, political troubles, dramatic political troubles) and the saliency of the environment. Misery index is the indicator of economic troubles, presidential approval is the indicator of political troubles, riots and demonstration are indicators of dramatic political troubles. Polls measuring the attitudes of the American population toward environmental problems are indicators of the saliency of the environment.

Misery Index

Misery index was created first by economist A. Okun who was an adviser to President Lyndon Johnson during the 1960's. It is produced by adding the unemployment rate to the inflation rate. The index considers that rising inflation and higher unemployment reflects a worsening American economy and therefore a rise in the misery index. The misery index was obtained from the official web site on a monthly basis, between December 1978 and December 2004. The data was then averaged to generate dummy variables of 1 for standard deviations above average, and 0 for standard deviations below average for the entire time period. In other words, 1 means that the executive power was suffering from economic troubles and was likely to use the diversionary behaviour, whereas 0 indicates that it does not need to divert because it was not suffering from economic difficulties. The misery index was lagged one month relative to the occurrence of the analyzed discourse. This is to respect the logic of causality that indicates that X has to occur before Y in order to generate Y. In other words, the state of the economy cannot have an immediate effect on the diversionary behaviour of the state. It is assumed that reactions to economic troubles occur one month after their occurrence.

Presidential Approval

US presidential approval refers to the average proportion of American public stating they approve of the performance of the American President (Clark & Nordstrom 2002). The approval rating was collected for US Presidents between January 1979 and December 2004 for President Jimmy Carter, President Ronald Reagan, President George H. W. Bush, President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush. The data were collected on a yearly basis from the PEW Research Centre for the People and the Press and the Gallup Polls given that presidential approval is measured on a monthly basis by these polling centres. The same method was used to generate dummy variables for presidential approval. 1 was used to indicate that the US President was suffering lack of approval and therefore likely to use the diversionary behaviour; whereas 0 indicates that he was not suffering and no diversionary policy is needed. Presidential popularity was lagged one month prior to the occurrence of the analyzed discourse to respect the logic of causality. Presidents react to their approval rating through diversionary behaviour one month later.

Riots and Demonstrations

Riots and demonstrations data are collected from the Banks and Cross National Times Series Data. According to this Data, riots are defined as violent clashes involving more than one hundred people and involving the use of force, whereas demonstrations consist of peaceful gatherings of more than 100 people to protest government policies or authority (Clark & Nordstrom 2002). Stata was used to generate dummy variables of riots and demonstrations in the US between 1979 and 1998. US Riots and demonstrations were compared with the same events occurring in Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, United Kingdom, USA, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Denmark, and Iceland. These countries are the initial NATO members and they were chosen because they have the capacity to engage

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17 Although the Banks' Data are available between 1979 and the present time, the data was unreachable for the years between 1990 and 2004 as the Library of Université Laval is not subscribed to the Cross National Times-Series Data Archive (CNTS). Professor A. Kimball provided the data between 1815 and 1989.
in diversionary behaviour, given their military power and democratic regime, following the argument of Fordham (2005).

Saliency of the Environment

According to Dunlap (1992) measuring trends in public opinion for environmental quality is a difficult task because there are no data sets that have continuously monitored the public opinion on environmental issues over a continuous time period. In addition, judging whether environmental quality is salient as an issue is difficult, according to numerous analysts (Dunlap 1992). Many public opinion analysts have argued that volunteered response to most important problem (MIP) questions, which are open-ended questions asking respondents what they see as country's most important problem or problems, are the best way to measure the salience of an issue (Peters & Hogwood 1985, cited in Dunlap 1992). MIP questions are stringent measures of salience for economic concerns and issues of foreign affairs, such as national security (Smith 1985, cited in Dunlap 1992). However the MIP studies reporting results for environmental problems are rare to find (Dunlap 1992). According to Guber (2003), to study aggregate stability of public opinion, two elements must be present. First, trends in identically worded questions asked by major polling organizations must be identified and compiled. This is important to ensure that change in attitude is only measured and not some lesser variation in question format, such as wording or design' (Guber 2003). Second, an accompanying theory of change must be defined and tested against the evidence, such as the Downs (1972) theory of issue attention cycle.

Given that no single study exists to measure salience of the environment between 1979 and 2004, we relied on three academic studies that have analyzed this trend in the period between 1979 and 1989 for some of the NATO countries. The missing data was unrecovered from other sources. The CNTS is the only available data set that account for riots and demonstrations both for the United States and for the initial NATO member countries.

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18 The generated dummy variables on riots and demonstrations contained numerous missing data for the period between 1979 and 1989 for some of the NATO countries. The missing data was unrecovered from other sources. The CNTS is the only available data set that account for riots and demonstrations both for the United States and for the initial NATO member countries.
American public opinion. In order to determine the saliency of the environment between 1979 and 1991, the Dunlap study (1992) was used. For the period between 1992 and 1998, Guber’s (2003) analysis was used. Finally, it was necessary to rely on the public opinion polls of the Gallup and PEW polling centers to measure the change in public opinion with respect to the environment between 1999 and 2004.

The Dunlap study (1992) is important to use in measuring the saliency of the environment between 1979 and 1991. The author pieced together several sets of relevant longitudinal data, covering the late 1960s, early 1970s, mid to late 1970s, and the 1980s. This study measures trends in public concerns for environmental quality over a quarter of a century (Dunlap 1992). Dunlap’s study tested Downs’ five-stage-cycle (1972) towards the environment, as explained earlier. In fact, Dunlap’s analysis of surveys between 1965 and 1970 indicates that public opinion pollsters in early 1960’s indicated low level of public attention to environmental quality, confirming thereby that the environmental quality was still at the pre-problem stage of Downs’ theory (1972). On Earth Day 1970, environmental quality had moved from pre-problem stage into the alarmed discovery stage described by Down’s (1972) where the public clearly acknowledges the seriousness of a problem and enthusiastically supports efforts to solve it. Trends in public opinion in the 1970 about environmental problems lead public opinion analysts to believe that "A miracle in public opinion has been the unprecedented speed and urgency with which ecological issues have burst into American consciousness" (Erskine 1972, cited in Dunlap 1992). However, by the early 1970's, the high level of environmental activism that started on Earth Day began to decline in 1972 confirming, thereby, Downs' (1972) theory that the stage of alarmed discovery and enthusiastic support will turn into a somber realization of the costs of environmental protection. This is due in part to the decline of the media attention to environmental problems after 1970. In addition, these problems disappeared from the public attention due to the energy crisis that took place between 1973 and 1974, and became the main concern of the public agenda (Schoenfeld et al. 1979, cited in Dunlap 1992).
By the late 1970's, environmental concerns were even lower in comparison to the beginning of the decade, yet still higher than in the mid 1960's (Dunalp 1992). This confirms again that attention towards environmental quality had moved into Downs' fourth stage, where there are less intense public interests about the environment. Nevertheless, public support to the environment did not disappear completely from the public agenda and continued to be a concern, although not a salient one in comparison to the other public issues (Dunlap 1992).

In summary, public concerns about environmental quality grew rapidly in the late 1960's, reached a peak in 1970 following Earth Day, experienced a fairly sharp decline in the early part of the 1970's and declined gradually throughout the decade (Dunlap 1992). Environmental quality has moved into the post-problem stage defined by Downs (1972) because the environment had disappeared from the list of the two or three most frequent responses to the MIP questions (Dunlap 1992). This is where "an issue that has been placed at the center of public concern moves into a prolonged limbo" (Downs 1972, p.40, cited in Dunlap 1992).

The situation completely changed, however, when Ronald Reagan took office in 1980. This is because President Reagan was known to emphasize deregulation and had a tendency of viewing environmental protection as damaging to the economy (Dunlap 1992). In fact, his administration exceeded the expectations of environmentalists when it dismantled the Council on Environmental Quality and severely cut the budget of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (Dunlap 1992). Reagan's anti-environmental position increased the public's pro-environmental position out of concern about environmental quality. After a moderate decline in the 1970's, public support for environmental protection began to rise shortly after Reagan took office, grew steadily throughout the Reagan years and then took a very large jump in 198919 and held ground in

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19 This is because at that time, there was a growing concern among the public about international environmental problems, such as ozone depletion and global warming. In fact, in 1989, fully three-fourths of the public had come to see the greenhouse effect as somewhat serious (Dunalp 1992).
1990 (Dunlap 1992). Data analyzed by Dunlap (1992) suggest that between 1980 and 1990, environmental protection has again become a consensual issue getting support from an overwhelming majority of the public and eliciting opposition from only a very small minority. Therefore, environmental issues have reversed the natural decline, expected from all social problems (Downs 1972), and moved from the post-problem stage to gain strong public support again in the 1990, stronger than it was in 1970 (Dunlap 1992). This is because the public was aware of the administration's poor environmental record and believed that the government had the obligation to assume responsibility for environmental protection (Dunlap 1989, cited in Dunlap 1992).

The issue attention cycle with regards to the environment could be reversed therefore given that environmental problems are seen increasingly as threatening to the world at large. Their effects are ambiguous as well as ominous (Dunlap 1992). This makes the disappearance of environmental issues from the public's attention almost impossible (Downs 1972, cited in Dunlap 1992). In the long run, environmental protection could always be regarded as a concern to the American public. In the short term, however, protecting the environment will fluctuate in the public opinion among the top ten priority issues, depending on the political situation and issues of priority to the public. This is because in times of crisis, the public tends to pay attention to immediate threats such as economic recession, and national security. There is a high probability; therefore, that in the upcoming years the environment will regain saliency, especially if the economy is prosperous and national security is maintained. According to Gallup's 2006 Pulse of Democracy on the environment, 14% mention the environment as a priority issue in America when asked to look forward 25 years.

Dunlap's conclusions are in fact confirmed by Guber (2003) where she uses long-term trends in five survey questions, all composed of at least ten observations each between 1973 and 1999. Despite differences in question wording and intent, those five trends all confirm the same results. Support for environmental protection declined or remained
stagnant after Earth Day (1970) throughout the decade. Then, it started to rise in the 1980s until it reached a record between 1987 and 1991, and then descended again in the years that followed confirming the work of many authors in the field including Dunlap (1992) (Guber 2003).

In order to determine the saliency of the environment between 1999 and 2004, public opinions polls of the Gallup and PEW were used, which confirmed that currently the environment is not at high salience for Americans and it is placed at the low top-of-mind when the public is asked about government priorities (Gallup 2008). However, in 1999 and 2000, environmental concerns were high due to economic prosperity and low energy concerns prior to the events of September 11th, 2001. Since 9/11, the environment has been overshadowed by anti-terrorism concerns, the war on Iraq, a struggling economy and rising gas prices (Gallup 200). In addition, while there is a general increase in the American concerns over the environmental quality and global warming, "the willingness to compromise economic growth or energy production in the furtherance of environmental quality has not grown" (Gallup 2008).

Based on the information given in the above mentioned studies, dummy variables were generated for the saliency of the environment on a yearly basis between 1979 and 2004, giving 1 for each year when the environment was salient and 0 for the year when the environment was not salient. For each case, the saliency of the environment was lagged also one year, given that politicians usually react to the polls of the previous year.

Boolean Approach

The project uses a Qualitative Comparative (or Boolean) Analysis using a crisp-set analysis (Ragin 1987, 2000). “Boolean analysis, unlike standard regression, is not handicapped by a small number of cases…it provides a way of testing all relevant causal combinations, and by way of logical deduction, eliminates irrelevant factors…perhaps the
most important advantage of the Boolean approach is that it addresses explicitly the idea that there can be multiple causes producing the same outcome” (Chan 2003, p. 58, cited in Kimball & Alatassi 2009). Crisp-set records data in a binary manner according to Boolean algebra, indicating the presence or absence of causal conditions (independent variables) and the presence or absence of the related outcome (dependent variable). According to this mathematical approach, there are two conditions or states: true (or present), represented in the value of 1 and false (or absent) represented in the value of 0. In the Boolean analysis of social data, dependent and independent variables must be represented in nominal-scale measures (Ragin 1987). Although this may result in some loss of information, the loss is typically not great (Ragin 1987). In addition, in many comparative studies, this restriction does not pose a major obstacle because many issues of interests to comparativists, both the causes and outcomes, are already nominal-scale measures. They are, therefore, qualitative phenomena, such as the presence or absence of events, which are processes and structures that are difficult to measure on interval scales (Ragin 1987).

Boolean algebra could be used as a technique of qualitative comparison through the construction of truth table with raw data matrix (Ragin 2008). After recording the data into nominal-scale variables and representing it in binary form as 1’s and 0’s, the data should be sorted, then, into different combinations of values on the independent variables (Ragin 2008). Each logical combination of values on the independent variables is represented as one row of the truth table (Ragin 2008). Then, each row is assigned an output value (a score of 1 or 0 on the dependent value) based on the score of the cases which share that combination of independent variables. Therefore, both the different combinations of independent variables and their associated dependent variables are summarized in the truth table.

In fact, the rows of the truth table represent the logically possible combinations of values on the causal variables (Ragin 2008). For instance, three binary independent variables give eight rows according to the following formula \(2^3 = 8\), one for each logically
possible combination of three presence/absence independent variables. Table 5 is a hypothetical truth table showing three causes of regime failure as the independent variables and regime failure as the dependent variable, with 1 for present and 0 for absent. The table has eight rows. It contains, therefore, all the possible combinations of the presence/absence of the three independent variables. A statistician may examine the table and argue that a different independent variable should be used, such as the number of deaths associated with the collapse of each regime, which is a convenient interval scale dependent variable (Ragin 1987). This, however, constitutes a different kind of analysis and a different research question. This would determine the bloodiness of regime changes, and not the conditions that prompted the collapse of military regimes (Ragin 1987).

According to Boolean algebra, if \(A + B = Z\) and \(A = 1\) and \(B = 1\), then \(Z = 1\). This means that \(1 + 1 = 1\). If any of the additive terms is satisfied or present, the outcome is then true. Addition in Boolean algebra is equivalent to logical operator OR. The statement \(A + B = Z\) becomes: if \(A\) equals \(1\) OR \(B\) equals \(1\), then \(Z\) equals \(1\). In other words, in order for the outcome to be present, it is not necessary that both conditions be present. As for Boolean multiplication, it is different from normal multiplication. It is relevant to social science analysis because it concerns the process of simplifying expressions known as "sums of products" (Ragin 1987). A product is the specific combination of causal conditions. The uppercase letters indicate the presence of the causal condition, while the lower case letters indicate its absence. The data summarized in Table 5 about the collapse of military regime could be presented in "primitive" (unreduced) sums-of-products form as follows:

\[ F = AbC + aBc + AbC + ABc + AbC + aBC + ABC \]

The equation shows the different primitive combinations of conditions that are associated with the collapse of military regime. Like Boolean addition, Boolean multiplication is not arithmetic. \(AbC\) does not mean that the value of \(A\) (1) is multiplied by \(b\) (0) and by the value of \(C\) (0) to produce the value of 0. It means that the presence of \(A\) is combined with an absence of \(B\) and an absence of \(C\). Therefore, in Boolean algebra, addition presents logical OR and multiplication indicates logical AND.
The three causes are ANDed together in different ways to indicate different empirical configurations. These intersections are ORed together to form unreduced, sums of products equation describing the different combinations of the three causes linked to regime failure (Ragin 1987, p. 92).

Accordingly, a truth table could be represented with the hypothetical causes (independent variables) as columns, labeled (A, B, C, D, etc) with the last column as the outcome (Y) or the dependent variable. Here, the outcome of interest is the instrumentalisation of the environment determined through the analysis of discourses pronounced by Senators or Representatives during Congress sessions or by US Presidents during State of the Union addresses. The rows of the table represent the studied cases. Here, it is the occurrence of the discourses with the corresponding independent variables. Each case is assigned 1 if the condition is present and 0 if the condition is absent (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, cited in Kimball and Alatassi 2009). Table 6 presents summary results of the number of cases that coincide with the various causal combinations for this project. (A) refers to the US Misery Index, (B) to low presidential approval, (C) to the saliency of the Environment, D and E refers to riots and demonstrations respectively. Y represents the expected outcome, which is the instrumentalisation of the environment. The “simplified” Boolean equation is:

The instrumentalisation of the environment = economic hardship + unpopularity of US President + the saliency of the environment + riots + demonstrations

The first column in the table is a summary of the possible combinations. The upper case letters refer to the presence of the condition, whereas lower case letters refer to the absence of the condition. The symbol (-) refers to missing variables, which are neither absent nor present and are referred to by Ragin (2008) as "unknown variables". The causal combination (abcde1) is a case where the US instrumentalised the environment against China when the environment is not salient and the administration is not suffering from any domestic troubles, be it minor or major.
When examining Table 6, one could notice two main problems. In 21 cases (46%) of the causal pathways presented in the Table, there were missing data about riots and demonstrations. Values on riots and demonstrations were missing from the data for a few NATO members for the years in question. In addition, the Table contains only 15 combinations (rows), which is inferior to the required combination of values for five causal variables, determined through Ragin’s (1987) formula \(2^5 = 32\). The missing data and the lack of sufficient combinations create uncertainty about the causal pathways, which required the model to be reduced to only three independent variables (A, B and C). Table 7 represents the reduced truth table with these variables and the dependent variable. The Table includes 8 rows, fulfilling thereby Ragin’s formula \(2^3 = 8\).

Two causal pathways could be identified as associated with the instrumentalisation of the environment. In the first causal pathway (abc1), the instrumentalisation of the environment takes place when the American administration does not seem to be suffering neither from economic troubles nor from presidential approval with the environment also being less salient. In other words, there seems to be no causal relations between domestic conditions, environmentalism and the saliency of the environment. This causal combination was found in 20% of the cases. In the second causal pathway (abC1), however which represents 11% of the cases, the instrumentalisation of the environment occurs when the environment is salient with the American administration enjoying economic stability and the American President being popular. The relationship among the causal combinations must be tested further using the crisp-set analysis algorithm in the fs/QCA programme in order to understand the meaning of the causal combinations (Ragin 2000). In fact, the programme was unable to process the data, leading to an “empty matrix” after several trials. Although the model in Table 7 included all the possible combinations (8 rows); there was not enough variations in the combinations. This seems to be related to the way the sample of discourses was selected from the Congress and the addressees to include two specific key-terms: the ‘environment’ and ‘China’. This form of selection had possibly biased the sample, and created a lack of variation. In addition, this qualitative methodology seemed to
be unsuitable to verify diversionary hypotheses, which are traditionally, verified quantitatively (Clark 2003). Given that the hypotheses were unverifiable through the qualitative comparative analysis approach, structured focused comparison is used as an alternative methodology in order to further analyze the link between domestic conditions and the instrumentalisation of the environment against China.

**Alternative Methodology: Structured Focused Comparison**

The method of structured focused comparison was designed to study historical experience in ways that would generate useful generic conclusions about important foreign policy problems (George & Bennett 2004). It compares two or more cases in a "focused" way by dealing selectively with the aspects of the case that are relevant to the study (George 1979, 1982; George & McKeown 1985; George & Smoke 1974, cited in Haney 1997). It is "structured" since it controls comparison in which the research "formulates theoretically relevant general questions to guide the examination of each case" (George & McKeown 1985, p.41-42, cited in Haney 1997). This approach involves four important steps. First, the research design is constructed and the research problem is specified. Research questions are developed for each case study in order to specify the elements to be studied (Haney 1997). The second step that consists of examining case materials is followed by developing theoretical implications from each case study. Finally, results across cases are compared in order to draw conclusions based on theoretical and empirical evidence (George & McKeown 1985, cited in Haney 1997). This approach is, therefore, "structured" because the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and guide and standardize data collection (George & Bennett 2004). It is "focused" because it deals only with specific aspects of the cases examined.

This approach was used as an alternative methodology for this research project in order to verify hypothesis 1(a) and 1(b). Two sets of causal pathways with identical combinations of independent variables and different outcomes were compared. The comparison was structured because it analyzed discourses that are relevant to the case study and the main research question. The discourses were pronounced at the American Congress
between 1979 and 2004 and were either praising or criticizing China for its environmental policy. Moreover, the comparison was focused because it concentrated on comparing two sets of causal pathways. Causal pathway (abcO) with the absence of domestic troubles and the lack of saliency of the environment not leading to the instrumentalisation of the environment was compared with another causal pathway of the same conditions leading to the instrumentalisation of the environment (abc1). In addition, causal pathway (abC0) with the absence of domestic troubles and the saliency of the environment not leading to the instrumentalisation of the environment was compared with a different causal pathway with similar conditions leading to the instrumentalisation of the environment (abC1). The discourses associated with each causal pathway were compared to determine if domestic conditions, other than domestic troubles and the saliency of the environment could lead to a diversionary policy. The compared cases included debates in the American Congress regarding resolutions touching either domestic policy issues or foreign policy issues. The cases were, therefore, analyzed while looking into the party of the speaker, the party of president in office, the party of the representative or senator sponsoring the resolution, and the effect of the resolution on the United States policy with China.

Discourses were selected from comparative model in Table 4. Discourse 3.3 with the causal pathway (abc0) was compared with discourse 1.3 with the causal pathway (abc1) as shown in Table 8; and discourse 3.2 with the causal pathway (abC0) was compared with discourse 1.8 with the causal pathway (abC1) as shown in Table 9. Discourses are first numbered according to the case number of the comparative model in Table 4. The second number refers to the order of the discourse in the sample. Discourses 1.3 and 3.3, for instance, respectively represent the first and third discourses in case 3 where the comments were non-aggressive about China’s environmental practices. On the other hand, discourses 1.3 and 1.8 refer respectively to the third and eighth discourses in case 1, where the sample included aggressive remarks about China’s environmental practices. Therefore, the alternative model compared two sets of discourses from cases 1 and 3 of the original comparative model presented in Table 4.
Analysis and Discussion of Results

Discourse 3.3 is delivered by Democratic Representative Mark Udall, from Colorado, on November 20, 2003 in the House of Representative while debating bill H.R. 6 or Energy Policy Act of 2003 which aims “To enhance energy conservation and research and development”\textsuperscript{20}. Representative Udall was speaking against the bill believing that it fails to reduce the nation’s dependency on oil and does not control the demand for it. Although the legislation was intended to solve a domestic policy issue related to energy conservation in the United States, Representative Udall instrumentalised environmental practices of China to make his case against the resolution. He was applauding China’s environmental practices while criticizing that of the United States. Representative Udall said:

By contrast, just today we learned that China is preparing to impose minimum fuel economy standards on new cars for the first time, rules that will be significantly more stringent than those in this country. This is great news for the world, but what an embarrassing proof that we won’t even do as much for our own national security and the environment.\textsuperscript{21}

Speaking against the bill, Representative Udall stated that China, which is known for harmful environmental policies, had surpassed the United States with respect to green practices by imposing minimum fuel economy standards on new cars. As a result, the proposed piece of legislation put the United States in an embarrassing position vis-à-vis China as it does not represent an effort to reduce the nation’s dependency on oil.

Although the bill was introduced by Republican Representative Tauzin of Los Angeles under the Republican Administration of George W. Bush, it had received a good amount of support from Democratic Senators with 35 yeas to 11 no’s. As for the House, it did not receive substantial support amongst Democrats with 40 yeas and 157 nays.\textsuperscript{22} The Republicans mostly supported the bill with some opposition in both the House and the Senate. The bill passed in both Houses and is currently waiting to be discussed in

\textsuperscript{20} U.S., Bill H. R. 6, A bill to enhance energy conservation and research and development, 10\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 2003.
\textsuperscript{22} Voting records on bills in the House of Representatives and the Senate were obtained from <http://www.govtrack.us>
Conference Committee to work on differences between the versions of the House and the Senate. The voting records show, therefore, that not all Democrats shared Udall’s position with regards to the bill and there was some division amongst them, both in the House and the Senate. At the same time, Democrats and Republicans were divided in their support for the legislation at the House of Representative with the majority of Republicans voting in favour of it (207 yeas) and the majority of Democrats voting against it (157 nays). In other words, voting records for H.R. 6 reflects a division within the Democratic Party, between the two parties and against Bush’s administration. Udall’s instrumentalisation of China’s environmental practices was intended both against members of his own party and against Republicans. His comments were not aimed directly toward China. In fact, he utilized China’s environmental policy to win a domestic argument in the American Congress.

Discourse 1.3 represents Senator Byrd’s comments on October 29, 1999 in the Senate in support of Senate bill 1833 or Energy Security Tax Act of 1999 that “amends the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide tax incentives to encourage the production and use of efficient energy sources, and for other purposes”\textsuperscript{23}. Democratic Senator Byrd of West Virginia supported a Resolution that was sponsored by Democratic Senator Daschle, of South Dakota, under the Democratic Administration of Bill Clinton. All cosponsors of the bill were from the Democratic Party as well. The Senator from West Virginia believed that it would encourage the reliance on local renewable energy such as ethanol and biomass and decrease the reliance on oil. According to Senator Byrd, these practices should be introduced to top polluting countries, such as China that relies on old technology of burning coal in order to produce energy. He said that:

Clean coal technology also provides a very important key to the problem of global warming. I hope that we can interest other countries, such as China. China is in the process of constructing many new powerplants. They are new in the sense that they are newly constructed. But they are old in the sense that they use the old technology, if I may use that word. They depend on the burning of coal in ways that contribute to the deterioration of the environment.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{23} U.S., Bill S. 1833, A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 106\textsuperscript{th} Cong., 1999.
Senator Byrd instrumentalised the environment against China in order to support a domestic energy bill that contributes to solving the problem of global warming. His comments were intended to win an argument inside the Senate. However it is not clear against whom Senator Byrd was arguing. The bill was never submitted to vote neither in the Senate nor in the House of Representatives. Since the bill was introduced in previous sessions, no further actions will occur on it. Debates at the Senate do not reflect the Republican’s position on the Bill. Most Senators who spoke about it were from the Democratic Party and were in support of it. Moreover, the bill’s cosponsors were all Democrats. It could be concluded therefore that the majority of the Democrats in the Senate were in favour of the bill, while the Republicans had no clear position on it.

Although Congress debates about Energy Policy Act of 2003 and Energy Security Tax Act of 1999 were mainly concerned with domestic energy policy, members of Congress instrumentalised China’s environmental practices in both debates in order to support their positions either against or in support of the proposed legislations. For discourse 3.3, Democratic Representative Udall applauded China’s environmental policy in order to make his case against Energy Policy Act (2003). In Discourse 1.3, Democratic Senator Byrd criticized China’s environmental policy in order to make his case in support of Energy Act (1999). In the first discourse, there was an instrumentalisation of the environment within the Democratic Party and against the Republican Party. In the second discourse, it was not clear against which party members the instrumentalisation of the environment was intended. Nevertheless, China’s environmental policy was used to win an internal debate in both cases. Although theses energy resolutions have no effect on the United States foreign policy with China, they demonstrate how China’s ecological practices could be instrumentalised even when discussing domestic issues, such as energy policy, in the American Congress. In other words, discourses 3.3 and 1.3 about China’s environmental policy represent a domestic strategy, rather than a foreign one.
Discourse 3.2 was delivered on September 7, 2000, by Senator Byrd as well. He proposes amendment 4115 to require the United States to "support the transfer of United States clean energy technology as part of assistance programs with respect to China's energy sector, and for other purposes"\(^{25}\). The amendment is intended to improve H.R.4444, which is a bill introduced by Republican Representative Archer of Texas, in order to authorize the extension of non-discriminatory trade relations with the People's Republic of China. Contrary to his previous remarks, the Senator from West Virginia applauded China's attempts to improve the environment and public health standards and believed that such efforts make it deserving of clean energy technology. Senator Byrd was, therefore, still concerned about introducing clean energy technology to China in parallel with his remarks in discourse 1.3. He said that: "China has been recently attempting to strengthen public health standards, protect natural resources, improve water and air quality, reduce greenhouse gas emissions levels while striving to expand its economy."\(^{26}\)

Although Senator Byrd spoke positively about China's environmental practices, he was against establishing nondiscriminatory trade relations with it due to its lack of compliance with the World Trade Organization subsidy obligations, which could hurt the working force in the United States. In fact, Senator Byrd proposed two other amendments requiring China to disclose certain information relating to future compliance with WTO subsidy obligations. Both amendments were not agreed to in the Senate. Upon voting on the bill in the Senate, the Senator of West Virginia was amongst the minority of Democrats who voted against it. The bill passed in both Houses and it became a law. Although the bill was introduced by a Republican Representative, it supported the argument put forward by Clinton and the US business lobby that the bill will open numerous business opportunities for Americans in the Chinese market and results in Asian-Pacific region stability (NYT 1993). The division was therefore between those who are against having free trade agreement with China, such as Byrd and those who are in support of it. The division was beyond party lines.


Byrd’s position represented, therefore, an opposition toward Clinton’s policies. It was a division both within the Democratic Party and between a group of Democrats and Republicans. As for Senator Byrd, he is regarded amongst the longest serving Senators known to be an opponent of Clinton’s policies (NYT 1993). For instance, on October 14, 1993, he rose in the Senate to introduce a resolution proposing to limit military operations in Somalia and securing the flow of relief supplies from the United States (NYT 1993). Byrd’s resolution created “one of the oddest alliances on Capital Hill” as two of Clinton’s strongest critics: Bob Dole, the Republican Leader, and Sam Nunn, the Democrat of Georgia, sided with him to defeat Byrd’s opposition (NYT 1993). In the case of discourse 3.2, Byrd wished to create another opposition against Clinton’s free trade policy by instrumentalising China’s positive environmental practices against supporters of resolution. His opposition was, however, not strong enough to defeat the overwhelming majority that was in support of the bill.

Discourse 1.8 is pronounced by Democratic Representative Tauscher of California on 19th July 2001 while debating H.J. Res. 50, sponsored by Republican Representative Rohrabacher of California. The bill proposes the disapproval of normal trade relations with the People’s Republic of China”. 27 Representative Tauscher said:

Has China improved over the last year and have they become the kind of nation that we would believe would be the perfect trade partner for us? Have they shared our values of democracy and human rights? Have they worked toward improving the environment? No, they have not. But at the same time, I believe that former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was correct when she said that engagement with China is not endorsement. And having an opportunity to work with China that is opening its markets, that is one that is part of the World Trade Organization, that is opportunistically working to open its markets with us and is also able to be subject to the adjudication of the World Trade Organization is somebody that I think is necessarily part of the world market. 28

Contrary to Senator Byrd’s remarks in discourse 3.2, the Representative of California spoke negatively about China’s environmental practices, but was against depriving it of normal trade relations. Representative Tauscher believed that although undemocratic China is not doing much to improve the environment, having unrestricted trade relations with it is a necessity of today’s world market. She believed that such relations would allow the US to assist China in improving its human rights record and environmental policies. Most importantly, the Representative believed that such policy would open employment opportunities for families in her district. Again, this represents an instrumentalisation of China’s environmental policies within the American Congress. It is an instrumentalisation against the Republican Party as the bill was introduced by a Republican Representative. In addition, it is an instrumentalisation within the Democratic Party because it reflected a division of opinion amongst the Democrats. Democratic Representative Pascrell of New Jersey, for instance, voted in favour of the bill and spoke before Representative Tauscher against granting China normal trade relations due to its undemocratic policies and poor environmental record. This reflects the division that exists in the Congress with regards to granting China normal trade relations. Similar to H.R.4444, the group supporting nondiscriminatory trade relations with China proved to be more powerful as the bill was rejected both in the House and the Senate.

Bills H.R. 4444 and H. J. Res. 50 contained provisions about granting and then depriving China of normal trade relations. Contrary to the previous resolutions discussed in discourse 3.3 and 1.3, the two bills directly discussed foreign policy issues affecting the United States’ relations with China. Although the environmental protection was not explicitly included in the Articles of the resolutions, it was utilized during Congress debates both in the Senate and the House in order to support their positions on the legislations. Senator Byrd, spoke positively about China's efforts to improve the environment while making his case against granting it normal trade relations. Representative Tauscher criticized China's progress to repair environmental damages, but thought that opening trade relations with it would help Beijing improve in this respect. Debates on both resolutions reflected the division that exists inside the Congress with regards to the United States' trade
relations with China. It is an ongoing division that does not respect party membership, even when the proposed legislation reflects an executive policy, as noted in H.R.4444.

Analysis of discourses 3.3, 1.3, 3.2 and 1.8 demonstrate, therefore, that the instrumentalisation of the environment is not triggered by diversionary behaviour since the instrumentalisation occurs even during the absence of domestic troubles and the lack of the saliency of the environment. This instrumentalisation is a domestic strategy, rather than a foreign one, used in the two Houses of Congress to win political debates when discussing both domestic policy issues and foreign policy issues. In other words, the instrumentalisation of the environment is a strategic game that does not occur between the United States and China, as predicted in the strategic game in Figure 1. Rather, it is a domestic game taking place inside the American Congress, between Senates and Representatives. Moreover, bills issued by the United States Congress about China seem to favour cooperative relations with China, rather than conflictual ones, regardless of criticisms over its environmental and human rights policies. Figure 1 was accurate in predicting the status quo as the most favoured outcome between the two states. In other words, the discourse of a few Congress members might be occasionally aggressive against China, but the policy is far from aggressive.

China's Response

The strategic response of the receiver state, China, predicted in hypotheses 2(a) and 2(b) was unverifiable. The hypotheses argued that economic and political troubles in the USA should induce China to pursue a pacific discourse towards the USA in order to avoid being a scapegoat, whereas dramatic political troubles such as riots and demonstrations in the USA should induce China to pursue an aggressive discourse against the USA in order to take advantage of its domestic distractions. The hypotheses were unverifiable because as a non-democratic state, China's government does not have a systematic and public response to criticisms coming from the USA, with regards to the environment. China's undemocratic system deprives it from possessing a body of response that holds it accountable for its
political behaviours. In other words, China does not suffer from audience costs (Fearon 1994), even when its lacks the response to United States’ discourse. This is also because as a non-democracy, China relies on a small ruling coalition and large selectorate to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). This makes supporters of China's political leaders highly loyal as the cost of defection and exclusion are extremely high if a challenger threatens to remove the ruling power. The absence of audience costs and the strong control over the ruling coalition makes the leadership not accountable for its political actions. There is, therefore, a lack of visibility in terms of foreign policy positions that makes it impossible to have access to Chinese public discourse toward the United States in specific periods of time.

Nevertheless, China's response to international criticism with regards to its environmental policy is clear and remains unchanged ever since the United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) in 1972 until the present. In fact, China's rhetoric in these events reflected always its traditional values that included the protection of sovereignty over natural resources, free transfer of technology from the more to the less advanced industrial countries and the responsibility of the advanced industrialized countries to bear the cost of addressing the global environmental problems to which it contributed so heavily (Economy 2004 b, p. 312).

In other words, China's traditional response to the international criticism over its negative environmental practices has put the blame on the more advanced and industrial countries and held them responsible in order to assist it in overcoming its environmental challenges. In fact, China's efforts to invite international investment for environmental protection have been truly effective. According to an estimate, fully eighty percent of China's environmental protection budget is derived from foreign countries. In addition, China is the largest recipient of environmental aid from the World Bank and Global Environmental Facility and has received continuous assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in addition to other countries such as Japan and the United States (Economy 2004 b).
Comparing the two Parties and the two levels of Government

Although domestic troubles are found to be unrelated to the instrumentalisation of the environment both on behalf of Democrats and Republicans, it is necessary to compare the instrumentalisation done by each Party member in the sample. When accounting for the party of the speakers of each discourse in case 1 of Figure 4, only 43% of the speakers are from the Democratic Party, which indicates that Republicans are more likely to criticize China for its environmental practices, although this criticism is not regarded as a diversionary policy. In case 2, both Democrats and Republicans have equal share (50%) in criticizing China for its non-environmental practices, such as human rights abuses and undemocratic policies. Interestingly, Democrats were more likely to praise China for its positive environmental policies, even minor ones according to case 3. Moreover, case 4 confirms that Democrats, especially Democratic Presidents (79%) are more likely to favour cooperative discourse with China when it comes to non-environmental issues, in order to normalize and appease relations between the two countries. This is contrary to the prediction in hypothesis 3.

Moreover, when comparing discourses made by the legislative body (in the US House of Representative and the Senate) and those made by US Presidents on the executive level in all four cases, it could be concluded that the executive branch tends to have a more cooperative discourse toward China, especially when it comes to non-aggressive discourse about non-environmental issues, such as trade policy. For instance, almost all the sample discourses in this case 4 (the sample with non-aggressive rhetoric) were taken from State of the Union addresses. In addition, in case 1 where aggressive discourse is used against China about the environment, all discourses were mentioned either at the Senate or the House of Representatives and none by US Presidents. In case 2 where China is criticized for non-environmental issues, such as non-democratic policies, freedom of the press and Tibet policy, only one is mentioned by President Clinton in his State of the Union address
in 1994. In case 3, where discourses are praising China for their environmental efforts, all are pronounced in the House and the Senate.

This does not mean, however, that the instrumentalisation of the environment is non-existent in the analyzed State of the Union addresses. In fact, President Bush first used the term 'environmental terrorism' to refer to Saddam's burning of oil fields during the Gulf War (1990-1991) in his State of the Union on 29 January 1991. At the same time, in the analyzed sample between 1979 and 2004, Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton and G. W. Bush did not use the environment to criticize China in their State of the Union address.

It should be mentioned however, that President Clinton is the only president who mentioned global environmental crisis in his State of the Union addresses, making specific references to "climate change" in the Address of 1998 and "global warming" in the Address of 2000. As a Democrat, President Clinton was known to have an ambitious environmental policy, in comparison with the other US Presidents both on the international and national levels, especially since his Vice President, Al Gore, is known to be a strong environmental advocate. These factors make President Clinton a good case to practice the instrumentalisation of the environment against China, especially since he criticized Beijing for its environmental practices during his visit in 1996: "There is just so many more of you than there is of us, and if you behave exactly the same way we do, you will do irrevocable damage to our global environment" (NYT 1996). However, President Clinton's remarks could not be qualified as a diversionary policy in the context of this project. This is because the misery index was relatively low, Clinton's job performance as President was gaining approval and the environment was not among the priority issues for Americans. More importantly, Clinton decided to pursue a cooperative policy with China to help it overcome its environmental challenges. This was demonstrated when including environmental issues on the global and domestic levels in the agenda of leaders' summit in 1998 between President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton (Economy 2004 b). In fact, since then, the United States provides extensive policy advice and environmental/technical training
opportunities to China through numerous NGOs (Economy 2004 b). In addition, President Clinton was in favour of nondiscriminatory trade relations with China as discussed above in discourse 3.2.

Summary of Results

Empirical results are found to contradict the proposed hypotheses. The instrumentalisation of the environment against China is not triggered by diversionary needs of US Presidents as it is not related to domestic troubles. This instrumentalisation is found to serve domestic needs inside the American Congress as Senators and Representatives utilize China's positive and negative environmental practices while settling debates in the Congress even when the economy is in good shape, the president is popular and the environment is not salient. The instrumentalisation of the environment is not a foreign policy. It is rather a strategy used by members of Congress to win political debates even against colleagues from the same party. Although legislative discourses are found to be more aggressive against China in comparison with the executive ones, the majority of the Congress believes in the importance of establishing nondiscriminatory trade policy with China in order to help it move into democratization. In other words, during periods of peace between the United States and China, cooperative policy is, favoured by the executive level and the majority of the American Congress. With a cooperative policy, maintaining the status quo is favoured by both actors, under minor and major domestic troubles, as previously explained in Figure 1. Rationally speaking, it would be too costly to employ an aggressive foreign policy against Beijing especially that its trade business is contributing to the economic prosperity of the United States. Economic interdependence between the two countries imposes a policy of soft balancing, inspired by a vision of liberal and realist optimism.
Chapter IV: Conclusion

This project intended to demonstrate how the United States' instrumentalisation of the environment against China is a diversionary policy prompted by domestic troubles and the saliency of the environment and provoked by the actors' power asymmetry and regime type. Conversely, empirical analysis demonstrated that the United States' environmental discourse against China is a domestic strategy used by American politicians inside the Congress, reflecting thereby ideological disputes within the same party and between different parties. The great division that exists in the Congress is between those in favour of granting China normal trade relations and those who oppose such policy. Empirical analysis revealed that the former group is capable of imposing its preferences due to its majority amongst Democrats and Republicans in both Houses. The cooperative discourse and policy are also present in the State of the Union addresses. Periods of peace between the United States and China reflect a supportive discourse by US Presidents that wish to lend a helping hand to the PRC in order to improve its human rights and environmental policies.

This policy, in fact, begs the following question: if China poses a strategic threat to the United States as a rising power in East Asia with its growing economic potential and mounting military capacity, what are the factors that explain the United States cooperative policy with China? In response to this question, liberal optimists would say that the future of US-China relations is directed by a pacifying power of three interrelated causal mechanisms: economic interdependence, international institutions and democratization (Doyle 1997, cited in Friedberg 2005). This is because liberals believe that "bilateral economic exchange creates shared interests in good relations between states" (Friedberg 2005). The greater the volume of trade and investment flowing between the two countries, the more groups will be likely to avoid conflict and preserve peace. In fact, liberal optimists
argue that economic exchange between the United States and China has increased considerably since the beginning of economic reforms in China in the late 1970s. Starting with the reform in 1978 until the end of the twentieth century, the value of trade circulating between them grew by more than two orders of magnitude, from $1 billion to almost $120 billion annually (U.S.-China Review Commission, *The National Security Implications of Economic Relations between the United States and China* 2002, cited in Friedberg 2005). This figure has doubled in 2004 to a reported total of $245 billion (U.S.-China Business Council, "U.S.-China Trade Statistics and China's World Trade Statistics" 2005, cited in Friedberg 2005). The flow of capital between the two trade partners has also grown due to major annual US investments into China (Friedberg 2005). The entrance of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) opened its markets even wider to foreign goods and capital that increased commercial linkage between the United States and the PRC even more (Friedberg 2005). Most liberal analysts believe that excluding some major disruption, economic forces should continue to draw the two countries together, limiting and decreasing thereby any tendencies towards conflict (Richardson 1994, cited in Friedberg 2005).

Liberal optimists believe also that international institutions could improve the communications between states, reduce uncertainty and increase the capacity of governments to make credible, binding commitments to one another (Friedberg 2005). This could help ease the effects of international anarchy in order to create more cooperation and trust that would be non-attainable through other means (Keohane 1984, cited in Friedberg 2005). This is what actually happened with regards to US-China relations. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a proliferation of regional institutions in East Asia. Institutions include APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum); ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian National Regional forum); ASEAN + 3; the East Asian Summit; an expanding network of bilateral military-to-military talks; and an even wider array of quasi official track-2 security dialogues with the participation of scholarly analysts, and bureaucracies from countries in the region. In addition, China has been admitted to the
WTO in 2001 and it has joined the nuclear proliferation regime in 1996. Moreover, it has started to play a more active role in the United Nations.

The web of ties established through China’s and the United States’ increased participation in Asia’s international institutions promoted contact, communication, mutual understanding, greater trust, and a reduced possibility of gross misperception (Friedberg 2005). More importantly, China’s increased participation in international institutions should give it a bigger stake in the continuity and stability of existing global order. As China’s leaders form a desire to continue to profit from the benefits of membership in that order, they should be less likely to undertake steps that would threaten the established status quo. In other words, China will not act in ways that would put it in conflict with the United States, which is the main architect, defender and beneficiary of the contemporary international system (Oksenberg & Economy 1999; Blair & Hanley 2001, cited in Friedberg 2005).

Liberal optimists believe that because of accelerated economic development and open trade that are taking place in the PRC, democratization is in the process of being formed there. The rise of middle class, driven by the rise of per capita income, would allow this group to be involved in democratizing China as it happened in North American and Europe (Rowen 1996, cited in Friedberg 2005). More importantly, sustained economic growth requires the flow of free information, which means that regimes that seek to restrict free speech and control communications would be highly unpopular. Accordingly, liberal optimists believe that if China wishes to be as industrialized as its democratic counterparts, it has no choice but to introduce a democratic regime. As China enters into the democratic "zone of peace", liberal optimists believe that its relations with the United States will stabilize (Friedberg 2005; Russet & Oneal 2001). Although this democratization seems to be a time consuming process, it should not be too long to see open conflict between the United States and the PRC as unlikely as war among members of the European Union seems to be today (Friedberg 2005).
This, in fact, confirms our analysis of US rhetoric with China, especially on the executive level. It is a rhetoric that has started to appear in mid 1990s with links between trade, growth, democracy and peace (Friedberg 2005). President Clinton started to make these arguments after abandoning his initial tendency of linking China's access to the US market to its performance on human rights issues (Mann 1999, cited in Friedberg 2005). Although Republican President George W. Bush has initially criticized Clinton's policy with the PRC calling it a policy of "engagement", he later adopted the logic that trade promotes democracy and ultimately peace as a candidate and as President. In his 1999 campaign speech, he argued that "economic freedom creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectation of democracy....Trade freely with China, and time is on our side." (Governor George W. Bush, "A distinctly American Internationalism" 1999, cited in Friedberg 2005).

This logic is in contrast with realist pessimism that argues that peace is short-lived and conflict is the norm due to international anarchy, material and military strengths that shape relations among international actors (Friedberg 2005). According to them, trade fosters interstate disagreements over distribution of gains and over measures of protecting domestic industries. Increased interaction could foster more conflict because there would be more issues over which to fight (Waltz 1979, cited in McCarthy 2004). Moreover, because of China's rising power and expanding aims, conflict is inevitable between the United States and China due to the security dilemma. Realist optimists believe, however, that China's power is not increasing as rapidly as claimed by pessimists and its rising ambitions are likely to remain limited. Moreover, the effects of the security dilemma are softened by a number of factors (Friedberg 2005). Most importantly, the bipolar East Asian system that emerged after the Cold War stabilizes the region with the United States and the PRC as the two leading regional powers. Due to the huge gap that exists between the two poles and other states in the system, the shift of the balance of power is improbable (Friedberg 2005).
In fact, realism is not completely absent from the United States' foreign policy with China. Although it is highly influenced by liberal thinking when it comes to fostering free trade agreements with it, encouraging its integration in the international community in order to become a non threatening status quo power in the international system is inspired by realist balancing or soft balancing, which is a rational state behaviour shaped by power disparity and economic dependence among states. Soft balancing aims at undermining the relative power of the strong and threatening state through bilateral and multilateral coordination among other states (He & Feng 2008). The United States should, in fact, continue with this policy as economic engagement increases its economic dependence on China in order to undermine its relative power through diplomatic coordination and institutional constraints. However, if increased economic interaction facilitates China's economic and military rise, the US will face more relative-power pressure to conduct hard balancing oriented strategy from a realist perspective (He & Feng 2008). This strategy aims at "increasing the relative power of a state against a powerful and threatening state through domestic military buildups and external alignments" (He & Feng 2008, p. 365).

After the Cold War, the United States constantly used soft-balancing with China because the power gap between the two countries was constant and significant regardless of China's economic progress. The US was not forced, therefore, to use hard balancing at the time because economic dependency increased the cost of such policy, forcing the US to use soft balancing against China even over the issue of Taiwan and weapon proliferation (He & Feng 2008). Nevertheless, the United States pressed China within the international non-proliferation regimes to limit its sales of weapons and transfer of technology to its enemies. At the same time, the United States increased its military cooperation and arms sales to Taiwan in order to reduce China's military advantages and capabilities across the Taiwan Strait (He & Feng 2008).

29Relative power refers to the comparison of power status among states in the system...the more power a state has, the more security it possess...[t]he state also poses more threats to other states" in the system (He & Feng 2008, p. 371).
In fact, the United States' future relations with China depend on two factors: the decline of US power and the economic interdependence between the two states. If China's rise is not dependent on US decline, military antagonism based on hard balancing strategy should be less probable. Soft balancing will become the major strategic interaction pattern between them (He and Feng 2008). If China's rise is accompanied by US decline, both states may choose hard balancing against each other. Increased economic ties, however, may soften strategic tensions between the two states. Although China may not rise peacefully, its impact could be softened by the deepening economic interdependent between it and the rest of the world.

In other words, power disparity and economic dependence lead states' choice of balancing. High power disparity and increased economic dependence foster a soft balancing strategy against adversaries due to the ineffectiveness of hard balancing and the increased economic costs (He & Feng 2008). On the other hand, with low power disparity and decreased economic dependence, hard balancing becomes preferable because military balancing is effective in narrowing the power gap between the two states and less costly given low economic ties between the two states (He & Feng 2008). Huge power gaps and low economic dependence makes soft balancing more preferable because the huge power gap prevents hard balancing or makes it unnecessary (He & Feng 2008). Low power disparity and high economic dependence makes hard balancing possible. However, economic dependence may limit military hostility and confrontation between states.

Relative power and economic dependence, rather than the diversionary theory of conflict, provide a better explanation for the United States' instrumentalisation of the environment. These two factors clarify the United States' cooperative discourse toward China, especially by the executive branch. In addition, it explains favouring free trade policy with China by the majority of the American Congress. Beijing's environmental practices are mainly instrumentalised by Congress members in order to win political debates about domestic and foreign policies. This instrumentalisation reflects a division
that exists in the Congress between those who believe that open trade brings democratization to China and others who discredit this policy. It is a division that is present within the Democratic and Republican Party and between the two Parties.

Recognizing that the diversionary theory is not a credible explanation for the instrumentalisation of the environment by the United States against China, it could be argued that the process is explained opportunistically. Congress members consider China's environmental practices as an argument that always exists to win political debates in the Congress. Future studies that wish to investigate the instrumentalisation of the environment by the United States could further analyze debates in the US Congress to determine if such practice differs when criticizing China as opposed to other rising economies that do not respect environmental norms, such as India, Brazil, Mexico and South Korea. Such comparison should further clarify the effect of relative power and economic dependence on normalizing the relations with challenging states.

As the environment becomes more salient in the USA, this study should have more promising results in the future. At the moment, environmental issues barely shape individual voting choices for Americans as determined by Guber (1999). This is mainly due to three reasons: low issue salience, small perceived differences and the tendency of environmental concerns to cut across traditional and more powerful cleavage including partisan differences. However, according to the Gallup polls of 2008, the environment should start to gain more saliency in the American public opinion in the next fourteen years. As environmental protection becomes more influential to the voting process in the USA, its chances of becoming an instrument of foreign policy might increase. Assuming the economy will stabilize in the upcoming fourteen years and security will become a minor concern for Americans with the end of war on terrorism; the environment might highly influence American voting process in the future, especially if global warming starts to have clear visible effects on the livelihood of American citizens.
This project was an attempt to explain the United States' instrumentalisation of the environment against China through the diversionary theory of conflict. Although the qualitative comparative model was unable to establish links between the instrumentalisation of the environment, domestic troubles and the saliency of the environment, the comparative analysis of two sets of discourses pronounced at the American Congress established that criticizing or applauding China's environmental practices is mainly a domestic game. It is an opportunistic strategy used only to score political debates. Theories of liberal optimism and soft balancing justify the United States' cooperative rhetoric and pacifying policy with China through forces of relative power and economic dependence. Although the project's empirical results contradict its initial predictions, it has provided an important contribution to the analysis of US-China relations. It was the first to determine dates of peace between the United States and China through the analysis of voting records at the Security Council between 1979 and 2004. This was important to demonstrate that rational actors favour to maintain the status quo when interacting about issues of low politics, such as the environment. More importantly, this study offered a convincing explanation for the instrumentalisation of the environment between the two states; an explanation that is up to date with today's economic realities and changing world order.
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Table 1 Utility of Outcomes with Minor Domestic Troubles

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Table 3 Dates of Conflict (Total of 152 days)
### Table 4 Comparative Model (N of Cases = 45)

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- **conflict** = Conflict between older and younger military officers
- **death** = Death of a powerful dictator
- **cia** = CIA dissatisfaction with the regime

### Table 5 Hypothetical Truth Table showing Three Causes of Regime Failure (Ragin 2006)
### Table 6 Truth Table of Domestic Conditions and the Instrumentalisation of the Environment in US-China Discourse

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Combo</th>
<th>A</th>
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<th>D</th>
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Total of Cases: 45

### Table 7 Reduced Truth Table of Domestic Conditions and the Instrumentalisation of the Environment in US-China Discourse

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<th>N of Cases</th>
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Total of Cases: 45

Table 7 Reduced Truth Table of Domestic Conditions and the Instrumentalisation of the Environment in US-China Discourse
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Table 8 Alternative Comparative Model 1.1 for discourses 3.3 and 1.3

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Table 9 Alternative Comparative Model 1.2 for discourses 3.2 and 1.8