THE CONSEQUENCES OF BILINGUAL AND BICULTURAL TENSIONS ON THE CANADIAN AID PROGRAMME
FROM 1968 TO 1976

John MacFarlane

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RÉSUMÉ

Dans ce mémoire nous étudierons l'aide canadienne dans la période 1968 à 1976. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à cerner de plus près les conséquences qu'ont eues les tensions entre les anglophones et les francophones de l'époque sur trois aspects du programme: l'aide canadienne vers l'Afrique francophone, les activités des organisations non gouvernementales et les tentatives de l'éducation des Canadiens en matière de développement. Nous comparons ce qui était possible avec ce qui était fait afin de déterminer dans quelle mesure le programme idéal a été modifié pour atteindre les fins politiques. Nous soutenons que la recherche politique d'impératifs culturels et linguistiques n'a pas seulement modifié et limité les objectifs développementaux du programme, mais a souvent remplacé ces objectifs.

RESUME

This thesis examines Canadian official development assistance in the period 1968 to 1976. Specifically, it seeks to highlight the consequences of Anglophone-Francophone tensions on three aspects of the programme: Canadian aid to Francophone Africa, the activities of the Non Governmental Organizations and development education attempts. What was possible will be compared with what was done in order to determine the degree to which the ideal programme was distorted for political ends. It is argued that the political search for cultural and linguistic objectives not only modified and limited development considerations in the three selected aspects of the programme, but often replaced these ostensible considerations.
à Diane
Supposedly, this paper is the result of studies at the University of Alberta and Université Laval. However, after a year of full time (and a half) studies at Edmonton I had not even had the chance to begin work on my thesis topic; instead, the University of Alberta felt it necessary that I attend "relevant seminar discussion groups." These turned out to be irrelevant monologues which contributed to the advancement of my research as much as Peter Pocklington, Dave Semenko and the West Edmonton Mall have contributed to the advancement (or initiation) of civilization in Edmonton.

I would like to thank the history department at Laval for the generous grant I received, which was appreciated. I have agreed to acknowledge the University of Alberta graduate fund for the nominal subsidy I received, which was conditional on my doing so.

I wish to thank the people at CIDA, the Privy Council Office, OXFAM-Canada and CUSO for their help and information, as well as Lewis Perinbam and François Pouliot for the interviews they granted. Above all, I would like to thank Richard Jones, Jocelyn Létourneau and Rodrigue Lavoie from the history department at Université Laval for their time, useful comments and genuine interest in the advancement of my research.
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ABBREVIATIONS

AGM........Annual General Meeting.
CIDA........Canadian International Development Agency.
CPU........Collège Polytechnique Universitaire.
CUSO........Canadian University Service Overseas.
DAPDUC......Deux Associations Parallèles Dans Une Corporation.
DEA..........Department of External Affairs.
EPT..........École Polytechnique de Thies.
ITC..........Department of Industry Trade and Commerce.
LDC..........Least Developed Country.
MAIQ.........Ministère des Affaires Intergouvernementales du Québec.
NIEO.........New International Economic Order.
NGO..........Non-governmental organization.
ODA..........Official Development Assistance.
OCDE.........Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques.
PPP..........Public Participation Programme
RUAC.........Route d'Unité et de l'Amitié Canadienne.
SUCO.........Service universitaire canadien outre-mer.
UN..........United Nations.
INTRODUCTION

Égalité ou indépendance! What does Quebec want? These two phrases symbolize the bilingual and bicultural tensions which existed in Canada during the 1960s. Within Quebec's largely Francophone population a feeling developed that existing Canadian political and economic structures presented an obstacle to French-Canadian advancement. They sought to redress this injustice with "des réformes visant à peu près tout ce qui ne bougeait pas au Québec." The reforms adopted, and the uncertainty of how far Quebec would go in the future with its quiet revolution, led to confusion, misinformed frustration and apprehension among Canada's Anglophone majority. In 1965 a commission formed to study the state of Canadian bilingual and bicultural relations concluded that Canada was "passing through the gravest crisis in its history."

A) Presentation of the Problem

These bicultural tensions, which had been simmering throughout the 1960s, boiled over in the period 1968-76. Many aspects of Canada's political, economic and social landscape were affected. However, this thesis will be concerned only with the relationship between the bilingual and bicultural strains and the Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme. Specifically, three aspects of the programme will be studied in depth.

1) The Canadian bilateral programme to Francophone Africa.
2) The activities of the Canadian non-governmental organizations.
3) The Canadian development education programme.

The Canadian ODA programme to Francophone Africa is where the influence of bilingual and bicultural tensions is most apparent. The Quebec government was claiming responsibility for all international issues which concerned its

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constitutional jurisdiction, such as education, health and culture. Direct contact was made with certain Francophone African countries. Ottawa, determined to maintain full control of all external affairs, responded by pressuring these countries to ignore the Quebec approaches. The principal instrument for this pressure was the Canadian ODA programme, which increased nine-fold in the region in the period.¹

The independence and functioning of some Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were also affected by domestic political decisions. Certain NGOs, for example, experienced the partial or complete separation of their Quebec wings. At least one NGO experienced further political difficulty: it believed that the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) ² preferred, for reasons of national unity, that Canadian organizations not divide along cultural lines. Possible reactions from CIDA, the major contributor to many NGOs, had a significant impact on NGO policy decisions. At certain moments during the period 1968-76 more time was spent at some NGO policy meetings on domestic politics than on international development issues.

The third major aspect of the programme to be affected by the bilingual and bicultural strain was the federal government's programme aimed at educating Canadians in matters of international development. Ottawa promised to inform Canadians and win their support for a more serious attempt at international development assistance. However, Ottawa's attempts in this direction appear to have been more concerned with national unity than with international development.

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¹ CIDA, Annual Reviews, Ottawa, Supply and Services, 1968 (the amount was 12$ million) and 1976 (the amount was 105$ million).

² In this thesis CIDA is often used as a synonym for Ottawa. CIDA, primarily concerned with international development, often disagreed with Ottawa's political decisions; however, the cabinet inevitably won any philosophical disagreement.
Political objectives did not exclusively determine the activities of these three aspects of the Canadian ODA programme. During the period, international development theory experienced its most profound revision ever. The 1972-3 wheat and oil crises and the 1973 famine in Africa provided clear and irrefutable evidence that past assistance attempts had been insufficient in compensating the developing countries for international economic injustices. A New International Economic Order (NIEO) was called for by southern hemisphere representatives, in order to further international economic cooperation. More coordination was also called for between governments and NGOs and the view that a necessary prerequisite for a NIEO was the education and understanding of the northern hemisphere’s population gained support. Changing international philosophies unquestionably provided the motivation for some of the activities in the three selected aspects of the Canadian ODA programme. However, domestic political tensions provided an equal or greater motivation. This affirmation can be supported by the current state of research on the topic.

Many studies on the period 1968-76 have been devoted to the themes of Francophone Africa, Canadian aid or constitutional tensions between Quebec and Ottawa. However, only four major works have combined all three themes.⁵ All four works conclude that constitutional tensions were the determining cause of the changes in the Canadian ODA programme to Francophone Africa. The examples given of these tensions include the Quiet Revolution atmosphere in Quebec, and the controversies surrounding the visit of French President Charles de Gaulle in 1967 and the Gabon Conference of 1968. It appears that the link between the increased Canadian ODA to Francophone Africa and the Ottawa-Quebec constitutional struggle has been sufficiently established.

However, because these four authors have been primarily concerned with the causes of the politicization in the Canadian ODA programme to Francophone

⁵ The four include: Michel Houndjahoué, Maurice Mbeko, John Schlegal and Louis Sabourin.
Africa, their treatment of the effects of this politicization on the recipient has been incidental. They have generally concluded that despite certain imperfections, international development was advanced by the Canadian efforts. John Schlegal claims that "no one doubts the positive benefits to African development resulting from these new Canadian initiatives." Louis Sabourin agrees that

there is no doubt... that overall these relations have developed in the right direction. One can only hope, but not predict, that this happy state of affairs will continue to be the main characteristic of 'les relations canado-africaines' in the future.

Even Claude Morin, a Quebec civil servant and principal rival of Ottawa in the constitutional struggle, praises the results of Ottawa's programme, although he gives the credit to Quebec:

nous insistons...sur le rôle irremplaçable d'aiguillon joué par le Québec dans l'avènement d'une préoccupation francophone à Ottawa dont, désormais, plusieurs pays profitaient.

This thesis will have as its primary intention to determine the impact of the politicization (resulting from the bilingual and bicultural tensions) on the Canadian ODA programme. This topic is justified not only because it will shed some light on the costs incurred by Francophone African countries, but also because it will show that the Canadian bilateral programme to Francophone Africa was not the


8 Morin, op. cit., p. 278.
only aspect of the Canadian ODA programme to be affected. The NGO and development education programmes were also affected by internal politics.

The hypothesis to be tested is that the Canadian ODA programme was distorted to such an extent in the three selected areas by internal politics that the results of the programme were not only less beneficial to international development than they might have been, but in fact they were detrimental.

B) Methodology

In order to test this hypothesis the following methodology will be adopted. First, the international theory of development which prevailed at the time will be presented in order to give an idea of what could be expected from an entirely altruistic programme. A look at Canadian official statements will illustrate the degree to which Ottawa approved of the international policy. This theory will be compared with the actual practice of the Canadian programme, and the role domestic politics played in creating the gap between theory and practice will be estimated.

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1) The Impact on the Francophone African Recipients

The sources that will be used to demonstrate the practice of Canadian development assistance to Francophone Africa will include CIDA Annual Reviews from 1968 to 1976, cabinet minutes, and the Chevrier Mission Report of 1968. This Mission to Francophone Africa, composed of politicians rather than development theorists, was responsible for the selection of the majority of the projects to the region in the period.

The gap that existed, for political reasons, between the theory and practice of Canadian aid to Francophone Africa will be identified in two areas before the consequences of this gap are estimated. First, the country selection process will be scrutinized. Charts will compare the treatment given to the seven countries visited by the politically motivated Chevrier Mission with the seven countries considered in theory to be the most in need of ODA. Second, the consequences of the gap between theory and practice on the selection of projects will be determined using five indicators: disbursement procedures, political-economic commitments, tied aid, the sacrifice of long-term development objectives and the repayment burden.

This approach has certain limitations. For example, many factors are considered when selecting countries and projects to receive Canadian funding. The assumption that the Chevrier Mission selected countries and projects exclusively for domestic political reasons somewhat oversimplifies the reality; however, domestic politics was undoubtedly the predominant concern.
2) The Impact on the Administration of the Canadian NGOs

The goals of the international theory\(^\text{10}\) will be compared with the actual administration of two NGOs: OXFAM and CUSO. Specifically, two questions will be asked. How was the internal organization and development efficiency of the NGOs affected by Canadian domestic political tensions? Were the independence and effectiveness of the NGOs compromised by any politically-inspired conditions imposed upon them by CIDA?

The sources to be used to answer these two questions will include the minutes of key Board of Director meetings of the two agencies; Annual General Meeting minutes; internal correspondence among NGO staff members; written agreements between CIDA and the NGOs and an interview with Lewis Perinbam, Director of CIDA's NGO division since 1968. Charts will be used which divide the time spent at board meetings between issues of domestic politics and development related problems.

This approach is limited by its focus on two NGOs, which were chosen because they experienced exceptional domestic political problems. Although not representative of all Canadian NGOs, these two are among the most significant of the Canadian NGOs and therefore merit exclusive study. Another limitation involves the accuracy of the divisions between political and developmental considerations at board meetings. Finally, while CIDA funding fluctuated, the reasons were never explained.

\(^{10}\) As well as the sources listed in note 9, the following will also be consulted: CIDA NGO Division, Report of Projects by Country, 1971-76; OCDE, Collaboration entre les organismes publics de coopération pour le développement et les organismes non gouvernementaux, Paris, OCDE, 1981; CIDA, Le Programme en bref, Ottawa, Imprimeur de la reine, 1978.
3) The Impact on the Development Education Programme

To identify the effect of constitutional tensions on this programme, the gap that existed between the development theory and practice will again be determined. The sources to be used to establish Ottawa's efforts at development education include: CIDA's Public Participation Programme (PPP) Annual Reviews from 1971 to 1976 and public declarations made by Ottawa. In order to determine the seriousness of these efforts, a look at the results they obtained is necessary. The following sources will be used: questions asked in the House of Commons debates, newspaper articles in the Quebec press and public opinion polls.

A series of charts will be used to determine the role of domestic political considerations in creating the gap between theory and practice. These charts will divide the public declarations of Ottawa, the questions asked in the House of Commons debates and newspaper articles (which concerned the ODA programme) according to primary intention: domestic politics or international development.

This procedure will give an idea of Ottawa's Intentions for the development education programme. However, even if Ottawa's commitment to development education can be proven to have been less than advocated in theory, and that domestic politics played a major role in Ottawa's development pronouncements, there is no way to be sure that in the absence of these domestic concerns the international commitment would have been any closer to the theory. This procedure aims only to show that domestic tensions existed and had a negative effect on the government's programme of development education in Canada.

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11 The Annual Reviews of CIDA's Public Participation Programme (PPP) Division from 1971 to 1976 will be added to the sources in note 9.
Conclusion

In addition to the limitations already mentioned, there is also the chronological restriction. The year 1968 was chosen as the beginning of the period to be studied because it was then that Pierre Trudeau, with his confrontational style and rigid views on federalism, first became Canadian Prime Minister. It was also the year in which the Canadian ODA was restructured (it was renamed CIDA, its programme to Francophone Africa increased significantly and it inaugurated an NGO division). The PPP division was also inaugurated during this period (1971). 1976 provides a convenient ending point because nine years allows the effects of the 1968 political decisions to develop. It also provides an opportunity to compare Ottawa’s reaction to the major modifications in the international development theory of 1973-5 with its reaction to the bilingual and bicultural tensions of 1968.

If there is a practical reason for studying this topic it is not so much to criticize past development policy as it is to draw lessons for the future from these experiences. It is not enough to determine that the Canadian ODA programme was affected by the influence of bilingual and bicultural tensions; in order to extract the maximum knowledge from these past events the effects, as well as the causes of the political distortions, must be discovered.
PART A: Context.

CHAPTER ONE: Rising Tensions


Notre existence comme société distincte ne peut être assurée que dans la mesure où nous maîtrisons complètement les leviers de notre vie politique.

-René Lévesque, Un gouvernement du Parti Québécois s’engage, 1973

It is not the concept of nation that is retrograde; it is the idea that the nation must necessarily be sovereign.


From 1960 to 1968 relations between Canada’s linguistic communities became increasingly strained. The Francophone population of Quebec, referred to hereafter as the Québécois, felt an increased need to control their own political destiny. For some Québécois this control could be assured by securing greater autonomy within confederation, for others separation was necessary. The Anglophone majority in Canada opposed the idea that one province receive any special considerations. Consequently, Québécois nationalism and Anglo-Canadian federalism collided many times. Before studying the impact of these collisions on the Canadian aid programme, this chapter will attempt to present a brief history of Québécois nationalism and of a major point of contention between Canadian federalists and Québécois nationalists: provincial activity in international affairs.
A) Québécois Nationalism

Nationalism can be defined as a sentiment of cultural, linguistic or social identification shared by a group of people within defined geographic or political boundaries. Québécois nationalism—identified with the French Canadian language and culture—did not begin in 1960. For over 200 years this sentiment had been present within Quebec’s Francophone population, and it would intensify whenever the group felt politically, economically or culturally threatened.¹²

In the 1960s, nationalism grew largely due to an increasing perception among the Québécois that their cultural and linguistic survival was threatened by existing political and economic structures.¹³ Studies in the 1960s confirmed the existence of economic inequalities: Anglophones, who composed 7% of the work force, occupied 80% of the best-paying jobs in the manufacturing industry, and unilingual Anglophones in Quebec received higher salaries than bilingual Francophones.¹⁴ In addition, census figures showed that the percentage of Francophones in Canada had dropped from 30% in 1900 to 25% in the 1960s.¹⁵ The Québécois, rather than leaving their fate in the hands of the Anglo-Canadian majority, increasingly looked towards the provincial government to ensure ‘la survivance’. Under Premiers Jean Lesage (1960-1966) and Daniel Johnson (1966-1968) the Quebec government

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¹² Certain periods when this emotion was particularly strong include: 1837, during the rebellion; 1885, in the aftermath of the Riel hanging; 1917 and 1942, during the conscription crises.


gradually adopted the position of seeking a 'special status' for Quebec within the Canadian federation.¹⁶

From 1960 to 1968 English Canadians became increasingly aware of Québécois nationalism. Very few Anglophones supported the idea of special status for Quebec. Some preferred a unilingual English Canada¹⁷ while others advocated a bilingual and bicultural Canada from sea to sea, where there would be equal opportunity and respect for each group in all parts of the country, and no special status for any province.¹⁸ This chapter will focus on the latter group. The most active proponents included Pierre Trudeau, and other French Canadian officials at Ottawa;¹⁹ however, for the purposes of this chapter the Canadian bicultural and bilingual tensions will be reduced to a confrontation between Franco-Québécois nationalists and Anglo-Canadian federalists.

Quebec separatism grew in the period as Quebec nationalism intensified. It is important to emphasize the fact that while all separatists could be called nationalists, all nationalists were certainly not separatists. Both groups sought to repudiate the "minority condition"²⁰ by refusing to accept that the Anglophone majority determine the Francophone future. The difference between nationalists and separatists was not so much the end but the means perceived as being necessary to obtain that end. For the separatist Parti Québécois, the goal of


¹⁹ Trudeau, op. cit.; C. Morin, op cit., pp. 35, 46.

²⁰ Marcel Chaput, in Jones, Community in Crisis, French-Canadian Nationalism in Perspective, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1972, p. 38.
promoting Francophone economic, social and cultural development could only be ensured if the nation was represented by "un seul gouvernement qui soit québécois et exclusivement pour nous, les Québécois." The number of Quebecers who supported separatist political parties increased from 5.5% in the 1966 provincial election to approximately 25% in 1970.

In general, English Canadian federalists do not appear to have fully appreciated the difference between Québécois nationalism and separatism during the period, as can be shown by looking at the reactions of the three federal administrations of the sixties to Québécois nationalism. From 1960 to 1963 John Diefenbaker devoted little time to the surging wave of nationalism in Quebec, at this point the movement had not yet been associated with separatism. From 1963 to 1968 Lester Pearson’s government paid more attention to the growing quiet revolution. Quebec's nationalist demands, it began to be feared, would lead to separatism. Thus a Royal Commission was established and a series of conferences held to try and find an answer to the question, "what does Quebec want?" By 1968 the Trudeau administration was associating 'special status' for Quebec "as support for separatism." One cabinet minister stated that Johnson and the Union Nationale were "oriented towards separatism" while another recommended a 1968 referendum in Quebec in order to refute the "separatist"

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22 In 1966 the major separatist party was the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN). In 1970 it was the PQ.

23 Dale Thomson, Vive le Québec libre, Montréal, Deneau, 1988, p. 105.

24 The Conference of Tomorrow, Toronto, 27 November 1967; Morin, op. cit., p. 109, describes the constitutional meetings beginning 5 February 1968 in Ottawa and ending with the Victoria conference in 1971.

government. Each successive Canadian Prime Minister devoted more of his energies to the question of Québécois nationalism than had his predecessor, as the trend began to be equated more and more with separatism.

B) Quebec Internationalism

With Canadian federalists equating Quebec nationalism and separatism, it is not surprising that they viewed Quebec's search for an international role as a certain harbinger of separatism. However, Quebec's internationalism can more accurately be described as the logical extension of nationalism. Political scientist Gérard Bergeron points out that the expression "État du Québec" was popularised not by the separatists Pierre Bourgault or René Lévesque but by the nationalists Lesage and Johnson.

Quebec nationalists favoured an active provincial international presence for French Canadians because Ottawa had not been able to provide a federal one. Paul Gérin-Lajoie, the Quebec minister of Education, argued in 1965 that Ottawa could not represent Quebec abroad because it was a more Anglophone than Francophone entity (and) in foreign policy matters, less respectful of Canadian duality than in its domestic policy, and that is saying something.

Statistics confirmed that less than 5% of the administrative work of the department of External Affairs was performed in French.

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26 Jean Marchand and Paul Hellyer respectively, Cabinet meeting, 28 November 1967.


28 Cited in Thomson, op. cit., p. 150.

29 André Patry, Le Québec dans le monde, Ottawa, Leméac, 1980, p. 78.
While Québécois nationalists advocated a more equitable Francophone presence in Canadian foreign policy-making, they simultaneously insisted on ensuring the external prolongation of internal provincial jurisdictions. The origins of this ‘doctrine’ can be traced to a speech on 12 April 1965 delivered by Gérin-Lajoie. He argued that because international affairs had increased in scope and complexity and had begun to involve all aspects of life, the provincial governments should have complete and exclusive sovereignty at home and abroad in any matters of provincial jurisdiction such as education, health and culture. He explained that:

Il n'est plus admissible que l'État fédéral puisse exercer une sorte de surveillance et de contrôle d'opportunité sur les relations internationales du Québec.\(^{30}\)

This principle, announced by Gérin-Lajoie without the authorization of the Premier or cabinet until after it was delivered,\(^{31}\) became the provincial government’s gospel in international affairs. Subsequent international activities would often be legitimized by Quebec politicians with reference to this principle.

The Gérin-Lajoie ‘doctrine’ was interpreted in Ottawa as an encroachment upon federal jurisdiction. A country, Trudeau argued,

can only speak with one voice in the matter of international affairs. Where a matter of provincial jurisdiction such as education is involved it is necessary to find formulae and devices which permit this one voice of Canada to express the feelings of the authorities in that particular matter.\(^{32}\)

\(^{30}\) Cited in Morin, op. cit., p. 29.

\(^{31}\) Ibid., p. 31; Patry, op. cit., p. 81.

\(^{32}\) Trudeau, Press Conference, 15 May 1968, in The Best of Trudeau, Toronto, Modern Canadian Library, 1972, p. 54; see also Paul Martin speeches in Morin, op. cit., p. 29.
Ottawa accused Quebec of being primarily interested in "empire" building and prestige.33

Quebec and Ottawa had differing interpretations because the Canadian constitution was not clear on the federal-provincial division of powers in international affairs. Jacques Brossard, a constitutional specialist, wrote that "le Canada est le seul État fédératif où la constitution ne remet pas expressément au gouvernement central la conduite des affaires extérieures".34 Consequently, in view of the nationalist-federalist tensions of the time, Quebec internationalism became, according to Pearson, "the single most important issue of Ottawa-Quebec relations."35 Ottawa's reaction to the major international incidents involving Quebec can best be seen by dividing them into three groupings: relations with France, participation in international conferences, and involvement in international aid.

1. Quebec-France

Quebec's international contacts from 1960 to 1968 involved several countries, but none more than France. Between 1960 and 1965 these relations developed in an ad hoc, seemingly harmless fashion. The federal interpretation of the constitution was always respected.36 After 1965 these relations grew significantly. Claude Morin, Quebec's deputy minister of Intergovernmental Affairs from 1963 to 1971, affirms that:

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33 Morin, op. cit., p. 117, quotes Jean Chrétien--then a federal minister without portfolio--who argued that Quebec ministers were mostly interested in parading "à l'étranger avec un flag sur le hood de leurs limousines."


36 Thomson, op. cit., p. 94.
avec les années, les relations internationales du Québec ont acquis une variété et une dimension que personne, au départ en tout cas, n'avait envisagées.\textsuperscript{37}

Quebec signed several cultural and educational accords with France during the presidency of de Gaulle, who was very receptive to Quebec internationalism.\textsuperscript{38} It was de Gaulle himself who was responsible for the incident which most irritated Ottawa when in July 1967 he shouted to a Montreal crowd "Vive le Québec libre!"

Federal reaction to de Gaulle's speech was immediate. Pearson, watching the speech on television, recalled: "I could hardly believe my ears"; de Gaulle had repeated the slogan of a Quebec separatist party and worse, had referred to an atmosphere of "liberation" along his route. After consultation with his cabinet, Pearson declared that de Gaulle's encouragement of a "small minority" aiming to "destroy Canada" was unacceptable. He added that Canadians were free and did not need to be liberated.\textsuperscript{39} De Gaulle cut short his visit to Canada, refusing to visit Ottawa, but the incident did not end there. In November 1967 de Gaulle delivered another controversial interpretation of Canadian history in Paris. Pearson felt that by distorting certain facts and emphasizing others, de Gaulle was "trying to stir up trouble between the founding races."\textsuperscript{40} Another federal protest was delivered. However, Ottawa's relations with Paris during the 1960s in reaction to the increasing Quebec internationalism were not totally negative: several

\begin{footnotes}
\item \textsuperscript{37} Morin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 19, describes how he became deputy minister in 1963 of a department known as Federal-Provincial Affairs, which existed from 1961 to 1967 when it became known as Intergovernmental Affairs.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid., pp. 25, 82, 89. The cultural and educational accords were signed in February 1965, September 1967, February 1968 and January 1969.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Pearson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 267; Thomson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 117, 151.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Cabinet Meeting, 28 November 1967.
\end{footnotes}
accords were signed in 1965 between the two governments, and in the same year Canadian funds for cultural relations with France were quadrupled.\textsuperscript{41}

Three distinguishing traits that would characterize Ottawa’s reaction to Quebec internationalism can be noted. First, Ottawa’s primary concern was the risk presented to Canadian federalism: efficiency in foreign policy was expendible if it compromised the goal of national unity. For example, when the cabinet discussed the possibility of publicly denouncing de Gaulle and signing the Ottawa-Paris accords, the debates centred around the idea of minimizing the impact of the increasingly direct Quebec-Paris relationship.\textsuperscript{42} Thus tense relations with France and a host of unnecessary, time-consuming, expensive accords were the cost to Canadian foreign policy for the defense of national unity. Second, because national unity took precedence over efficiency, appearance took precedence over substance. Morin, in his account of the triangular relationship, describes the race that took place between Ottawa and Quebec to sign their accord first.\textsuperscript{43} The appearance of minimizing the Quebec-Paris accords was more important than the substance of the Ottawa-Paris accords. Third, in order to appear to be defending national unity, Ottawa presented a strong reaction. A majority of Québécois judged the federal response to de Gaulle as being too harsh.\textsuperscript{44}

2. Quebec-International Conferences

Quebec had defended its cultural and educational contacts with France by insisting upon the Gérin-Lajoie ‘doctrine’ concerning provincial rights in

\textsuperscript{41} Thomson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 151. From 250,000$ to 1$ million per year.

\textsuperscript{42} Cabinet meetings, 28 November 1967; Thomson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 117, 151; Morin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 47.

\textsuperscript{43} Morin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{44} Bergeron, \textit{op. cit.}, cites one poll which showed 50.5% of Quebecers opposed the reaction; Patry, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 77, 158; Morin, \textit{op cit.}, p. 368.
international affairs. Applying the same principle, Quebec sought participation in international conferences concerning provincial matters. Thus Quebec, without consulting Ottawa, lobbied for an invitation to the conference on education to be held in February, 1968 in Libreville, Gabon. Morin visited the representative of France, not Gabon, to Canada and received the assurance that

la France, qui inspire le Gabon dans les circonstances, ferait exactement ce que nous voulions et que nous aurions une invitation directe d’ici peu.46

In January Quebec received its direct invitation to the conference which was to be held in two parts, the first in Libreville, the second in Paris in April. At each conference Quebec was received as an equal, independent state. According to Morin,

le Quebec y avait été invité par ce pays sans que ni l’un ni l’autre n’en demandent l’autorisation à Ottawa. Précédent de taille qui entraîne, pour les années ultérieures, des retombées politiques et diplomatiques considérables.47

The immediate federal reaction was severe. A protest note was sent to Gabon in which it was announced that diplomatic relations and all Canadian aid to the country were being suspended. Ottawa also publicly condemned Gabon’s interference in internal Canadian affairs.48 Pearson and Justice Minister Trudeau each promised that Ottawa would "adopt towards France precisely the same

45 Morin claims that he chose to approach the French embassy in Ottawa because Gabon was not represented in Canada, op. cit., p. 117. This explanation is unconvincing given the fact that Pearson addressed the ambassador from Gabon accredited to Canada who was posted in Washington. While Quebec was seeking greater sovereignty from Ottawa, Gabon too was seeking greater sovereignty from Paris; Morin’s oversight was an insensitive undiplomatic blunder.

46 Ibid. p. 118.

47 Ibid. p. 111.

policy" if only Quebec were invited to part two of the conference; however, a note of protest and the publication of the federal position in a white paper entitled Federalism and International Conferences on Education was the only "punishment." In the longer term, Ottawa sought to prevent any future repetition of the incident. Thus for several years after the Gabon affair, countries planning international conferences in areas of Quebec's provincial jurisdiction were persuaded to invite Ottawa along with Quebec. This situation led not to federal-provincial cooperation at international conferences but to what Morin has called: "Imbroglios diplomatico-protocolo-politiques," or, "bizarreries." In preparation for the conferences, the major issues at stake included: whose flag was where—and what size it was; who was notified before whom of the conference; and whether Quebec would be listed separately or as part of the Canadian delegation in the official programme.50

The characteristics of Ottawa's reaction to Quebec internationalism were again present. Above all it was essential to preserve national unity. Pearson warned that "separatism abroad would lead to separatism at home" and he "could think of nothing more likely to lead to the disunity of the country than that this (Quebec international) conduct should be disregarded." Trudeau, who became Prime Minister during the Paris conference in April, agreed that if Ottawa were not "rigid about this kind of thing then we will be letting a vital part of Canada's sovereignty be withered away."51 Ottawa's idea of being "rigid" to defend national unity obviously had a different meaning for France than it had had for Gabon. When Ottawa suspended relations and aid to Gabon, the press, public and even federal

49 Cabinet meeting, 7 March 1968.
50 For "bizarreries" voir Morin, op. cit., pp. 120-5, 181-92; Cabinet meeting, 8 May 1968; Department of External Affairs, Federalism and International Relations, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1968, p. 11.
ministers, in cabinet, accused Ottawa of 'killing a mosquito with a sledge hammer.' Pearson justified the stance, arguing that Gabon had been warned. Paris also was warned, but for France being rigid meant appearing to be rigid. Pearson (and Trudeau) acknowledged being "more angry with France than with Gabon which would never have attempted this ploy on its own initiative." Yet a protest note to Paris and publication of a federal white paper was the extent of Ottawa's wrath. Even these measures were only imposed, according to cabinet documents, because if Ottawa did absolutely nothing, it would "appear" to be "backing down." The "bizarreness" of the Ottawa-Quebec flag wars confirmed the predominance of appearance over substance.

3. Quebec-Foreign Aid

Quebec internationalism also appeared in the form of an 'aid' programme to certain Francophone African countries. Quebec first gave aid in 1962 to Gabon in the form of medical scholarships for selected students to study in Montreal. By 1966 the aid budget had reached 300,000$. Consistent with the Gérin-Lajoie 'doctrine,' Quebec sought to increase its aid programme unilaterally in matters of provincial jurisdiction.

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52 Cabinet meetings, 12, 14 March 1968, and 17 April 1968; press opposition from Jones, op. cit., p. xvii.

53 Pearson, Mike, p. 263; Thomson, op. cit., p. 152, on Trudeau view.

54 Trudeau, Cabinet meeting, 25 April 1968, 8 May 1968.

55 Morin, op. cit., remarked that "pendant des années, ce n'est pas le Québec qui, sur la scène internationale, a ridiculisé le gouvernement central. Ottawa s'en est chargé lui-même." p. 194.

56 Schlegal, op. cit., p. 142; Patry, op. cit., p. 72; Thomson, op. cit., p. 152.

57 Thomson, op. cit., p. 168. Besides the aid that was granted, other contacts were made. Patry, op. cit., p. 118, reports that Chad and Haiti were denied aid; Thomson, op. cit., lists countries who refused aid. (see note 58.)
Ottawa's reaction, in the name of national unity and Canadian federalism, was to block all Quebec attempts at international development assistance. On at least five occasions Francophone African recipients were reluctantly persuaded not to accept badly needed development assistance from Quebec. Development efficiency was sacrificed because, as Pearson told Lesage, foreign aid must reflect the national character, objectives and Canadian place in the world. Therefore, the provinces had no part. In reality, Quebec argued, with education being a provincial matter, the teachers which Ottawa sent away and the students it brought to Canada were necessarily trained using provincial facilities and money. Thus coordination and cooperation were necessary. Finally, blocking any and all Quebec aid by using Canadian aid seems to be a punishment disproportionately harsh to the crime, and inconsistent with the advice Pearson had offered to Lesage: that aid should not be used as "an instrument of political penetration."

Conclusion

By 1968 Quebec's international activities and Ottawa's reactions had become the central focus of an increasingly bitter Canadian domestic brouhaha between Québécois nationalists and Canadian federalists. This chapter has emphasized the politicized federal reaction, characterized by the favouring of national unity over efficiency, appearance over substance and firmness over justice. It should be mentioned that the Quebec government's intentions and actions shared the same characteristics and were no less politicized. Morin admits that


59 Pearson letter to Lesage, 21 April 1965 in Federalism and International Relations.

60 Ibid.; also, Sharp to cabinet, see chapter 2, note 98.
à cause des circonstances, notre horizon était nécessairement limité, les succès du Quebec nous semblaient inversement proportionnels à la dimension de la présence d'Ottawa.\textsuperscript{61}

However, Ottawa's reaction has been emphasized because it is more relevant to this study.

When Trudeau became Prime Minister in 1968 the federalist-nationalist struggle was at the top of his political agenda. Ottawa's defensive reactions to isolated Quebec international initiatives turned to a systematic offensive attack. Trudeau felt that under Pearson Ottawa's reaction to Quebec internationalism was "pragmatic and incoherent...(Ottawa was) forever reacting to isolated incidents and had no overall strategy."\textsuperscript{62} Under Trudeau's offensive, the principle that a united foreign policy was "vital to the survival of Canada as a united country" was institutionalized; more urgency was thus given to the goal of ensuring that this foreign policy reflect the cultural and linguistic duality of the country.\textsuperscript{63} The principal target for this policy became the Ministry of External Affairs. The 1969 Official Languages Act attempted to correct the Anglophone domination of the federal bureaucracy; federal-provincial cooperation mechanisms were greatly increased\textsuperscript{64} and a wide ranging review of Canada's entire foreign policy was undertaken with the unmistakeable accent on foreign policy as a means to

\textsuperscript{61} Morin, op. cit., pp. 176, 64, quotes Lesage as having refused aid to Africa in 1960 because it was federal jurisdiction, and then justifying aid to Africa in 1965: "surtout (dans le but) de faire bouger Ottawa."

\textsuperscript{62} Cabinet meeting, 28 November 1967.

\textsuperscript{63} Federalsim and International Relations, p. 23; "Gabon in Perspective", p. 14.

"support and develop national unity." Finally, Trudeau's counter-attack promised to "tenir compte davantage de la réalité culturelle du Canada dans la répartition des fonds prévus au programme d'aide"...specifically, to Francophone Africa.\(^6^5\)

Ironically, in the period 1968-1976 much of the urgency for the Trudeau counter-offensive had disappeared. Quebec premiers Jean-Jacques Bertrand and Robert Bourassa were both less interested in international initiatives than Lesage and Johnson had been. In addition, de Gaulle was replaced in early 1969 by Georges Pompidou who was also less interested in Quebec internationalism. The international conferences on education and the inauguration of l'Agence de coopération culturelle et technique\(^6^6\) also created less tension: in 1971 a format was even agreed upon concerning the size and position of flags, invitation procedures and semantics for identifying the delegations in the souvenir programme. Nevertheless, the Trudeau system was in place, and it included fast-growing, highly politicized aid. Before studying the full impact of this politicization on the three selected aspects of the Canadian aid programme, a brief look at the programme as it existed before 1968 is necessary.

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\(^{6^5}\) Concerning the Foreign Policy Review, see Foreign Policy for Canadians; B. Thordarson, Trudeau and the Making of Foreign Policy, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 183. For the Trudeau offensive see Federalism and International Relations, p. 39.

\(^{6^6}\) The following educational conferences were held before the 1971 accord: Kinshasa, Zaire (1969); Noukchott, Mauritania (1970); Bangui, Central African Republic (1971). The ACCT conferences included: Niamey, Niger (1969) and (1970); Lomé, Togo (1971); and Ottawa (1971).
CHAPTER TWO: Growing Pains

The Canadian Aid Programme from 1950 to 1968.

Une logique naïve conduirait à croire que l'aide se dirige soit là où la misère est la plus grande, soit où elle est le mieux employée pour mettre fin à une situation intolérable. Un examen même rapide des données montre qu'il n'en est rien.

-Tibor Mende
De l'Aide à la recolonisation, 1972, p. 91.

The Canadian aid programme grew steadily throughout the period from its origin in 1950 to 1968. The programme undoubtedly contained some humanitarian intentions and did manage to obtain certain beneficial development results. However, the programme's accomplishments were severally limited by a lack of three key elements: development experience and expertise, clearly defined objectives and a Francophone presence. These three problems would amplify the consequences of the bicultural tensions on the programme in the subsequent period.

A) Development Experience and Expertise

Ottawa's Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme began in January 1950 as part of the British Commonwealth's Colombo Plan of development assistance to Asia. The programme was known as the International Economic and Technical Cooperation Division (IETCD) until 1957 when it became the Economic and Technical Assistance Branch (ETAB). During this early period aid was compared simplistically with the Marshall Plan aid to post-war Europe: it was a short-term guaranteed remedy. Any aid was considered to be beneficial, thus

humanitarian objectives could be combined with Canadian economic and political objectives. Consequently, the programme was run by three departments: International Trade and Commerce (ITC), External Affairs (DEA), and Finance, each of which was seeking to realize its own non-developmental objectives.68

TABLE I: Canadian Aid Programme Spending, 1950-1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>US$ (millions)</th>
<th>as % of GNP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-60</td>
<td>420.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>187.1</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>197.9</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>174.7</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: OECD and CIDA Annual Reviews.69

In 1960 the programme came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of External Affairs, and was renamed the External Aid Office (EAO). Then, in 1968, the programme was reorganized into its present form, under the name Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). By 1968 the approach of Canadian aid officials had evolved from misconceptions of 'quick fix' development current in the 1950s to an increased recognition that greater specialization and commitment were necessary.70 However, as Michel Houndjahoué has demonstrated, the experience and expertise gained by the federal aid body were nullified by the continuation of the organizational structure which left all

68 Ibid, pp. 11, 21.
69 In this table, as in others throughout the paper, the amount of money indicated has not been adjusted to consider the effects of inflation.
70 Ibid, p. 26. CIDA was divided into eight branches: policy, multilateral, bilateral, resources, NGOs, finance, personnel and communications.
developmental decisions in the hands of politicians.\textsuperscript{71} With the EAO (and later CIDA) being used only to implement the decisions of External Affairs or the cabinet, the old ideas persisted of using ODA to pursue political and economic objectives in the programme because aid continued to be seen simplistically, optimistically and paternalistically. An increased quantity of aid was equated with increased development assistance.\textsuperscript{72}

B) Objectives

Ottawa insisted that altruism was its principal guiding objective. According to Mitchell Sharp, Minister of External Affairs:

There is one good and sufficient reason for international aid and that is that there are less fortunate people in the world who need our help...The inspiration for what we do must be essentially humanitarian and unselfish...If it is not, if the purpose of our aid is to help ourselves, rather than to help others, we shall probably receive in return what we deserve and a good deal less than what we expect.\textsuperscript{73}

At the same time, because any ODA was deemed beneficial for the recipient, there was "no reason why aid could not complement and reinforce Canadian objectives,"\textsuperscript{74} notably the promotion of national unity. The 1968-70 foreign policy review mentioned three objectives which Ottawa sought in its ODA programme, after the "humanitarian goals."\textsuperscript{75} First, Ottawa never hid the fact that the ODA


\textsuperscript{72} See Pearson Commission, op. cit.; CIDA, President's International Consultation, Ste. Marguerite, 1975, p. 4.


\textsuperscript{74} DEA, Foreign Policy..., p. 12; Gérin-Lajoie, Developmental Administration, Ottawa, CIDA, 1972. p. 4.

\textsuperscript{75} DEA, Foreign Policy..., p. 12.
programme was used to stimulate the Canadian economy. Canadian jobs were created, Canadian products found a market while Canadian investments and international trade were encouraged. In fact, Ottawa emphasized the economic objectives, insisting that only this approach could obtain the support of Canadians for the idea of ODA. Economic objectives were so apparent that critics from both sides of the political spectrum could agree that the primary purpose of the programme was to advance the Canadian economy, despite Ottawa's insistence on humanitarianism.

Second was the objective of using ODA for international political influence, which at certain times also took precedence over altruism in the Canadian programme. The fact that the cold war objective of curtailing the spread of communism in Asia was the prime motivation for the Canadian programme in the 1950s was "well enough known," a later CIDA president admitted. Pearson defended the programme in 1950 saying that

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76 Gérin-Lajoie, Development..., p. 4.


78 Right-wing critics complained that economic objectives were not being fulfilled: R. Lebel, "Foreign Aid is Big Business", in Canadian Business, Volume 39, September 1966, pp. 96-110. Left-Wing critics suggested that the principal objective of Canadian ODA was to maintain unjust economic world structures: Carty, op. cit.

79 Gérin-Lajoie, Development..., p. 3.
If South East Asia and South Asia are not to be conquered by communism, we of the free democratic world...must demonstrate that it is we and not the Russians who stand for national liberation and economic and social progress.80

Diefenbaker agreed that 50$ million a year was "cheap insurance" to "halt communism in Asia."81 By 1968 the presence of cold war objectives had diminished but the use of aid to win friends had not. In 1966 the cabinet approved a policy to "phase out existing programmes to countries of marginal interest to Canada." Thus, 80 per cent of Canadian ODA was to be concentrated on "countries where major Canadian interests are involved."82

Third, Ottawa sought to achieve domestic political objectives. The ODA programme would be used to present the bicultural of Canada character abroad and increase "the sense of national unity and purpose."83 In Francophone Africa in 1968, these political objectives suddenly became urgent and suddenly required radical measures because of years of neglect of a Francophone presence in the Canadian aid programme.

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81 Diefenbaker cited in Spicer, op. cit., p. 23. From 1950 to 1960 India and Pakistan, for cold war reasons, received 90% of Canadian aid, see Maurice Mbeko, Analyses des fondements de la coopération bilatérale entre le Canada et les pays en voie de développement: le cas de la coopération avec les états Francophones d’Afrique: 1961-85, Mémoire de maîtrise, UQAM, 1985, pp. 71, 182.

82 Cabinet meetings, 1 April 1966; 8 December 1966; 24 October 1968.

83 DEA, Foreign Policy..., p. 12.
C) Francophone Presence

From 1950 to 1960 the Canadian ODA programme reflected at home and abroad the Anglophone dominance at Ottawa. The director of the EAO was described by André Patry, a Quebec civil servant, as being "unilingue, et peu réceptif à la sensibilité latine." No Francophone countries were considered seriously as recipients and by 1960 Canadian Francophones, in the press and parliament, began to protest. André Laurendeau, a Quebec journalist and co-president of the 1968 "B and B" commission, wrote in 1960:

> le Commonwealth n'est pas toute l'humanité...
> Il existe des pays sous-développés où la langue de communication est le français...il y a là une question d'égalité et de justice. 

A Mission was sent to Francophone Africa in 1960 to investigate new forms of cooperation; however, the Diefenbaker government found the recommendations of the Dupuy Mission too ambitious for the moment and all that resulted was a small programme of 300,000$ to Francophone Africa. 

Canadian ODA to the region grew slowly from 1960 to 1967, remaining small, sporadic and symbolic. Political scientist P. Stigger has argued that this aid was "first and foremost a political decision," aiming primarily to reduce the enormous gap between Francophone and Anglophone country programmes. Thus the

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84 Patry, op. cit., p. 72.


86 Thomson, op. cit., p. 111.


political decision to spend was more important than the humanitarian, or influential, action of spending. In fact, more than half the allotted aid to Francophone Africa in the period was not spent.\textsuperscript{89}

In 1968, when it became urgent to correct the linguistic imbalance in the programme, the proportion of French-speaking personnel at CIDA rose from about three percent in 1967 to almost fifty percent in 1978\textsuperscript{90}. Among the new Francophone recruits was the originator of the Quebec 'doctrine,' Paul Gérin-Lajoie, who served as CIDA president from 1970 to 1976.

Abroad, the linguistic-cultural tensions also made the objective of an equitable French-English presence in Africa more urgent. At the same time, in order to block Quebec's international initiatives, Canada sought to win friends in the region. (This preoccupation meant that allotted aid had to be spent quickly.) Consequently, two further Canadian missions were sent to Francophone Africa. The Trudeau Mission of 1967 had as its specific raison d'être to "inform the Francophone Africans on the nature of the Canadian constitution and to explain to them the Canadian personality."\textsuperscript{91} The 1968 Chevrier mission had similar goals.

When Mitchell Sharp presented the objectives of the Mission confidentially to cabinet, philanthropy was no longer a sufficient—or even contributing—consideration.

\textsuperscript{89} Allotted-disbursed spending in Thomson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 152.

\textsuperscript{90} R. Ricard, (a CIDA consultant during the period) in film "le Québec international".

\textsuperscript{91} Paul Martin, in Schlegal, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 250; Thomson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 267; Houndjahoué, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 52.
It is the government's policy to increase significantly and quickly Canada's assistance to countries in Francophone Africa. This policy is a reflection of Canada's bilingual and bicultural character; in addition, it aims, and here the matter is a pressing one, at dissuading the Francophone states of Africa from dealing directly with the Province of Quebec.92

The Trudeau Mission was the less significant of the two because it was only authorized to make recommendations. In contrast, the Chevrier Mission had unprecedented spending authority. In order to "increase significantly and quickly" Canadian ODA in the region, this political mission was authorized to spend up to 40$ million. The significance of this amount can best be appreciated with a look at previous spending in Table II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>$ (millions)</th>
<th>as % of total Canadian bilateral ODA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-65</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>10.68</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>12.10</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The NGOs

The Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) experienced similar problems in the early years of their existence, as will be demonstrated by a brief look at one. The Canadian University Students Overseas (CUSO) organization, first funded by Ottawa in 1965, shared the idea of a quick fix concerning the role of aid.93 Its

92 Sharp memo presented at Cabinet meeting, 24 October 1968.

93 CUSO originated, under that name, in 1963 and became the first Canadian NGO to be funded in April 1965. (They received 500,000$.) In 1964 RCAF flights had also assisted CUSO in its work. See I. Smillie, The Land of Lost Content: A History of CUSO, Toronto, Deneau, 1985, p. 254; B. McWhinney and D. Godfrey, Man Deserves
almost exclusive use of young, inexperienced volunteers reflects the philosophy that any aid was considered to be good aid. Despite sharing similar misconceptions concerning the role of aid, CUSO’s inexperience was not as problematic as Ottawa’s because before 1968 few doubted that altruism was their primary goal.

Political objectives, however, could never be totally absent. As one CUSO director remarked:

Volunteer agencies like CUSO are based on altruism rather than politics, but practical action for human development—especially in the Third World—means that difficult choices have to be made; and such choices are inescapably political.94

Therefore, clearly-defined objectives were essential in order to minimize political distortions. Prior to 1968 CUSO had never clarified whether the top objective of the organization was to help train overseas people, or to train Canadian people in overseas problems.95 In the period 1968 to 1976 the absence of a clear humanitarian objective created problems—which sparked political rather than developmental debates.

However, it was the lack of a Francophone presence in the organization which was most responsible for the subsequent political problems in the agency. The structures which emerged to accommodate the cultural and linguistic diversity of CUSO, inevitably dominated by Anglophones, became less and less acceptable to the Quebec wing. Complicating the situation was the fact that CUSO programmes

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Man, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1968, pp. 6-18.

94 Smillie, op. cit., p. 126.

95 McWhinney, op. cit., p. 29; Smillie, op. cit., p. 124.
in Francophone countries, which lagged far behind the number in Anglophone countries, were more expensive to operate.\textsuperscript{96}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Before 1968 problems of limited experience, unclear objectives and Anglophone domination (at home and abroad) were present in the aid programmes of both CUSO and Ottawa. These problems, combined with the cultural and linguistic situation in the following years, would favour the politicization of Ottawa’s ODA programme from 1968 to 1976. Lack of experience led Canadian decision-makers to believe that any aid was useful to the recipient’s development. Consequently, political and economic objectives could be mixed with altruism. Thus to correct the problems of a lack of Canadian presence in Francophone Africa, all that was needed was to raise "quickly and significantly" Canadian ODA to the region.

The predominance of national unity considerations in the Canadian aid programme to Francophone Africa appears unquestionable. When Sharp presented Canadian motivations for aiding the region to cabinet, humanitarian—and even economic—objectives received scant attention.\textsuperscript{97}

(\textit{The}) strictly domestic consideration is undoubtedly the most urgent and compelling one; it is essential, in the present context of federal-provincial relations that Canada should reflect in its external programme the bicultural character of the country. Such a policy is a necessary demonstration of the government’s conviction that it has both the capability and the will to provide the full and effective expression in Canadian activities abroad of both the two main cultural groups of this country. This is undoubtedly the most effective manner in which to circumscribe any possible attempts by

\textsuperscript{96} Smillie, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 283-6. These findings were reported by a 1965 CUSO Mission led by Louis Bérubé, the Vice Chairman of the Board, to Francophone Africa.

\textsuperscript{97} The opportunity for Canada "to gain significant influence" in the region received more attention.
provincial governments to undertake independent programmes in the field of foreign aid.\textsuperscript{98}

In 1974 Sharp argued that because Ottawa obtained the political influence it sought, it had been "quite right" to "move with such haste" in the region. Several observers add that the rapid increase in Canadian aid was "sought, welcomed and warmly appreciated by Africans," who greatly benefited while Canadian domestic political objectives were achieved.\textsuperscript{99} However, a closer look at the impact on the Francophone African recipients of this politicized aid is necessary before concluding whether Ottawa was "quite right" to proceed with such haste.

\textsuperscript{98} Sharp memo presented to cabinet, 24 October 1968.

\textsuperscript{99} Quote is from Sabourin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 159; Similar views in Schlegal, \textit{op. cit.}, pp.28, 371-98.
PART B


CHAPTER THREE: Reckless Spending


We were so anxious to establish a foothold in this area that there was some reckless spending and needless waste.


The Canadian government’s motivation to increase significantly and quickly its aid to Francophone Africa in 1968 was undoubtedly inspired by internal political considerations. Ottawa insisted that national unity objectives could be attained without negating or even limiting the development goals. This chapter will attempt to determine how politicized aid affected Francophone Africa’s development. First, it is useful to estimate how the programme might have existed had political intentions not come into play.

A) International and Canadian Theory

International development policy experienced radical changes from 1968 to 1976. Previously held assumptions by northern hemisphere donors were altered in three clear directions. First, the paternalistic idea of benevolently offering charity was replaced by a recognition that the North and South were dependent on each other. Second, the focus on aid was replaced by the awareness that North-South trade and monetary structures were more important to the South’s development. And third, the optimism that accompanied traditional development plans changed to pessimism concerning the probability of realizing the necessary North-South...
cooperation. Each of these trends reflects the growing recognition that the recipient was to become involved.

1. Selection of Recipients

International policy clearly favoured the least developed countries (LDCs). A list was published of 25 LDCs which were to receive special consideration, including the greatest amount of ODA. CIDA policy certainly supported this philosophy and promised that the LDCs would receive top priority and "unprecedented commitments." In addition, ODA would be concentrated on those countries in order to increase its effectiveness by avoiding its being dissipated in too many places.

2. Selection of Projects

All international specialists agreed that planning, coordination, and cooperation among donors and recipients were essential elements of successful projects. Consequently, they favoured multilateral ODA, or ODA provided by a number of countries acting together, over bilateral (country to country) ODA. Multilateral assistance had the double advantage of coordinating northern policy and favouring an equal voice for the South in development decisions. CIDA

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shared these views and priority was given to increasing multilateral aid to at least 25% of total Canadian assistance.\textsuperscript{104}

In bilateral relations, the international specialists condemned the use of aid as a means to obtain political and economic commitments. The political sovereignty and economic advancement of the recipient was to be paramount.\textsuperscript{105} The Canadian policy agreed that development assistance implied political and economic sacrifice, not benefit. CIDA President Gérin-Lajoie suggested that

Canadian Trade Commissioners (who are, of course, trained with the aim of promoting Canadian exports) should look upon their job much more as a two-way street and spend perhaps as much effort in helping exporters in the less favoured countries where they are posted find markets for their products in Canada.\textsuperscript{106}

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, a House of Commons sub-committee, and even the Minister of Industry Trade and Commerce (ITC) supported this idea by drawing attention to the fact that export earnings from trade for the developing countries were on average ten times bigger than their revenue from aid.\textsuperscript{107}

Tied aid was another serious limitation to efficient development projects. Aid that was tied meant that part or all of the equipment and supplies was to be purchased in the donor country at the donor’s price. International specialists were


\textsuperscript{105} PNUD, \textit{Annual Report}, New York, United Nations, 1975, p. 84; Pearson Commission, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 4, 16.

\textsuperscript{106} Gérin-Lajoie, \textit{Developmental...}, p. 12.

unanimous: "l'aide publique au développement ne devrait pas être liée." CIDA supported the untying of aid which would increase jobs and manufacturing contracts in the recipient countries and surrounding regions. It was also pointed out that tied aid can restrict the choice of goods open to a low income country and maybe costly in other ways—delays, problems over spare parts and shipping expenses. 

Further, to ensure southern participation, ODA was to be provided according to the recipient’s long-term plans. A UN study revealed that 

plus de 50 p.100 des rapports relatifs aux projets jugés satisfaisants indiquent que l’appui énergique du gouvernement a été l’un des facteurs essentiels de la réussite du projet...l’échec de près de 50 p. 100 des projets jugés non satisfaisants a été attribué principalement à un manque d’intérêt de la part du gouvernement.

CIDA agreed that the recipient’s plans were to prevail over those of the donor. Gérin-Lajoie explained that 

whatever preconceived ideas we or others in Canada may have about the developmental needs of these countries, our ideas must be reshaped to fit the plans articulated by them if our cooperation is to be suitable and 

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109 DEA, Strategy..., p. 13; DEA, Foreign Policy..., p. 11; Gérin-Lajoie, in CIDA Annual Review 1970-1, p. 10; Gérin-Lajoie, developmental..., p. 6; Gérin-Lajoie, Le chemin à parcourir, Ottawa, 1971, p. 10; CIDA, President’s Consultation, 1972, p. 27; CIDA, Consultation 75, p. 18; P. Martin in Statements and Speeches, speech to Columbia University, 28 April 1967.

110 PNUD, 75, p. 77; UN, Stratégie pour la 3ième décennie..., p. 11; UN, Stratégie pour la 2ième décennie..., p. 2; Pearson Commission, op. cit., p. 16; Cabinet meeting, 24 October 1968.
welcome.\textsuperscript{111}

The potentially devastating debt burden was another issue that increasingly occupied international development specialists. What they recommended above all was the "création de conditions favorables aux transferts de ressources financières aux pays en voie de développement."\textsuperscript{112} CIDA agreed that if easier terms of financing and better terms of trade were not found, there was serious risk for the debt problem to get quickly out of hand. The Agency recognized that debt servicing charges could wipe out the entire ODA benefits of recipients.\textsuperscript{113}

In short, the international development philosophy of the 1970s was centred around the goal of providing greater southern participation in the world's future. The UN's call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) epitomized the period's message that innovation was essential in all aspects of North-South relations.\textsuperscript{114} Ottawa's approval is illustrated by Gérin-Lajoie's warning that Canada will not be able to claim to contribuer de façon réelle [au développement des pays en voie de développement si nous n'utilisons pas les rencontres internationales pour rappeler aux pays nantis et consommateurs cet urgent besoin de l'établissement de prix stables et justes pour les produits de base dont un si grande nombre de pays parmi les plus nécessiteux


\textsuperscript{113} DEA, \textit{Strategy...}, pp. 2, 8; \textit{Foreign Policy...}, p. 11; Gérin-Lajoie, \textit{Le Chemin...}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{114} Especially, monetary structures, commodity prices and multinational activities; see Nations Unies, \textit{Stratégie pour la 3ième décennie...}, p. 4.
B) Canadian Practice of International Development Assistance

According to Pierre Trudeau, the intellectual looks for absolute truths, while the politician must water them down to suit reality: "his assessment is of the possible and not of the ideal, which means that one is looking very often for second and third best solutions, I make no apologies for that." Obviously, CIDA's humanitarian ODA policy was not adopted by Canada from 1968 to 1976. The four major studies of Canadian aid to Francophone Africa concluded that the idea persisted that any aid was good aid, and thus the programme continued to be pulled in three or four different directions at the same time. External Affairs saw aid as a véhicule to "support and form part of the general conduct of external relations." ITC saw ODA as "a device, a tool, to get into a market—a toehold." And CIDA had no power in cabinet to defend the case of efficient development. Gérin-Lajoie remarked that "until there is a more general acceptance of the broader CIDA role the viewpoints of aid officials are unlikely to prevail over those of other agencies with differing perspectives." Thus growing Canadian aid (table III) is not a reflection of a growing Canadian altruism.


118 Gérin-Lajoie, Standing Committee of External Affairs, 29th parliament, No. 38, p. 19; ITC quotes in Carty, op. cit., p. 43; DEA quotes in Foreign Policy..., p. 9. See also CIDA, Consultation, 1972, pp. 12, 16; Bruneau, op. cit., p. 37.
Table III: Canadian Aid Programme Spending, 1968-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>$(in million, US) as a % GNP</th>
<th>$(millions, Cdn) as % bilateral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>174.7 .26</td>
<td>12.10 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>245.0 .33</td>
<td>14.43 9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>346.0 .42</td>
<td>21.66 10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>390.4 .42</td>
<td>29.70 10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>490.8 .47</td>
<td>45.13 15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>514.9 .43</td>
<td>59.08 17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>712.2 .49</td>
<td>66.65 18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>878.5 .54</td>
<td>98.54 19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>887.0 .46</td>
<td>104.99 20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: OECD Annual Reports.

The political recommendations of the Chevrier Mission, observers have agreed, were more accurate guidelines for Canadian actions in Francophone Africa than was the official development policy. The goal of the Mission was to select suitable countries and projects that could further Canadian domestic political objectives—as well as aiding the Canadian economy. Politically, the Mission was declared a success. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia would "undoubtedly and scrupulously respect the Canadian government's point of view." The other four countries were sympathetic, but less definite in their support of Ottawa because of the pressure France could put on them. These results, Ottawa insisted, were obtained along with altruistic goals. A look at the consequences of the political

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121 Chevrier Report, pp. 5, 12, 16, 18. The mission claimed success based on 1) the political results and 2) the money spent.
selection of countries and projects in Francophone Africa will determine the actual extent to which the optimal humanitarian theory was sacrificed.

1. Selection of Recipients

A brief look at the countries chosen by the Chevrier Mission as recipients of Canadian assistance is sufficient to conclude that the two principles of concentration and priority for the LDCs were turned upside down as a result of political considerations (see Tables V and VI). The seven selected countries included the six most influential and richest in terms of absolute GNP in the region, and the politically influential Niger. These seven were by far the largest recipients, but all 27 Francophone nations received some aid in the period, destroying the policy of concentrating efforts exclusively on a few countries.

CIDA reported that "the whole of Francophone Africa is now regarded in principle as an area of concentration without distinction between countries." When certain countries were phased out of CIDA's programme, to improve development efficiency,

none of the French-speaking African countries were included in this category because of the desirability, in the light of present domestic and foreign policy consideration, to give the greatest possible scope for the development of this programme."¹²⁻³³

¹² The Director of CIDA's Sahel programme from 1973 to 1976, François Pouliot, maintains that Canadian inexperience was primarily responsible for the curious country selections. LDCs less known in Canada—for example, vaccinations were marked "Niamey, Nigeria" by CIDA workers in Ottawa who were unfamiliar with Niamey, Niger—received less aid. (Interview: March 1989).

Table V: CIDA’s Country selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>PNB(\text{habitant})</th>
<th>* Among 25 LDCs (1971)</th>
<th>@ Among 39 LDCs (1979)</th>
<th>Chevrier Mission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Mali</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>*@</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Burundi</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>*@</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Rwanda</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>*@</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Burkina Faso</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>*@</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Chad</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>*@</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Zaire</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Guinea</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>*@</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Niger</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>*@</td>
<td></td>
<td>$$$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Benin</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>*@</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Madagaskar</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Comoros</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Gambia</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>*@</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Togo</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Cent Afr Rep</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>*@</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Mauritania</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Cape Verde</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Cameroon</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td>$$$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Equat Guinea</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Senegal</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td>$$$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Congo</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td>$$$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Morocco</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td>$$$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Tunisia</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td>$$$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Ivory Coast</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td>$$$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Algeria</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td>$$$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Sao Tome-Pri</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Gabon</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*@ LDCs were chosen based on: a) per capita domestic product b) manufacturing under 10% of GDP c) literate population below 20%

source: World Bank Atlas, 1975 and OECD Annual Reports.
Table VI: CIDA Aid to LDCs and Chevrier Mission Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>68</th>
<th>69</th>
<th>70</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LDCs</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>3135</td>
<td>6664</td>
<td></td>
<td>3974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>1464</td>
<td>1662</td>
<td>1547</td>
<td>3685</td>
<td></td>
<td>4074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burk-Fa</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>1513</td>
<td>4018</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>7972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>3424</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>5880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>1078</td>
<td>3539</td>
<td>6326</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>total</strong></td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>2250</td>
<td>2798</td>
<td>3759</td>
<td>4869</td>
<td>10911</td>
<td>24765</td>
<td>13348</td>
<td>66039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                |      |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |       |
| **Chevrier Mission countries** |      |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |       |
| Morocco        | 1648 | 231| 500| 4769|4450|4311|5553|4859|3452|29773  |
| Algeria        | 363  | 3296|3915|4009|4238|4964|5060|9215|10700|45760  |
| Tunisia        | 2026 |3793|7237|5490|5932|13587|13061|11717|16421|79264  |
| Cameroon       | 1071 |1418|2287|3265|4509|4580|3911|4759|11050|36670  |
| Ivo Cst        | 432  | 661|1108|1390|2888|6543|4234|4245|4831|26332  |
| Niger          | 57   |1610|1108|2465|7191|8590|8401|16838|17378|63638  |
| Senegal        | 697  |1040|1981|3182|5381|4846|5966|5775|5336|34204  |
| **total**      | 6294 |12049|18136|24570|34589|47421|46186|57228|69168|315641 |

source: CIDA files.

CIDA was placed in the unenviable position of trying to make Ottawa's political selections correspond with its developmental criterion. One annual review claimed that instead of concentrating aid to LDCs in Francophone Africa, "CIDA is giving increased assistance to countries about to experience economic growth... and to another country, Niger, where Canadian resources...can be of considerable help." On at least one occasion CIDA attempted to correct the political distortions of the development philosophy but they were prevented by External Affairs. In November 1974 Gérin-Lajoie announced that direct capital assistance to oil-rich Algeria would be phased out; this policy was denied at an impromptu

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news conference "hours later" by Sharp ostensibly because Algeria was still developing.125

The dilution of the principles of concentration and LDC focus led to "unequal development" in the region, which accentuated the gap between the rich nations and the LDCs.126 In addition, an opportunity was missed: the LDCs in the region could have been greatly helped if CIDA's policy had been followed. If Ottawa estimated that the LDCs were not equipped to handle more aid, which is unlikely given the small amount they received, then multilateral agencies could have used more. Looking back, in the light of the consequences of the politicized project selection, it was perhaps a blessing in disguise for the LDCs not to be chosen.

2. Selection of Projects
Ottawa preferred funding specific projects rather than general programmes of cooperation because this allowed greater control to guarantee Canadian objectives. The Chevrier Mission reported that "almost all" its 40 million dollars had been devoted to projects

qui impliquent d'une part une participation canadienne à des travaux de construction, d'équipement ou d'aménagement, en second lieu, la fourniture des services de coopérateurs canadiens requis pour la mise en marche et le fonctionnement de projects donnés, et enfin, la formation sur place ou au Canada des cadres locaux appelés à remplacer éventuellement le personnel canadien.127

125 "Government, CIDA differ on foreign aid plan," Ottawa Citizen, 30 November 1974. Indonesia and Nigeria were also included.

126 See Table VI, and Chevrier Report, p. 16.

127 Ibid., p. 10. 90% of Canadian aid to the region was for projects according to Houndjahoué, op. cit., pp. 178, 183. For project preference see cabinet meeting, 1 April 1969.
The focus on Canadian considerations is absolute. Two or three exceptions were allowed as "concessions" to the recipient, but were justified for "political reasons" according to the Chevrier Report.

Table VII: Major Canadian Projects to Francophone Africa.
Comparison of cost and duration estimates (in brackets) with actual cost and duration for implementing projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Canadian Contribution in millions</th>
<th>Local Contribution in millions</th>
<th>Duration Loans in years</th>
<th>Tied %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Centre de Formation Hôtelière. (1974. Abidjan, Ivory Coast.)</td>
<td>(3.5)</td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Collège Polytechnique Universitaire (CPU). (1972. Benin.)</td>
<td>(6.3)</td>
<td>(1.9)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II</td>
<td>(7.7)</td>
<td>(?)</td>
<td>(?</td>
<td>(?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase III</td>
<td>(19.2)</td>
<td>(?)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase IV</td>
<td>(12.3)</td>
<td>(?)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>(8.3)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management</td>
<td>(50.0)</td>
<td>(?)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: CIDA files.

This chapter will highlight four projects, three of which were in Chevrier Mission countries. These were chosen because they were the most expensive projects of the period in the region.\(^{128}\) To determine whether all Canadian projects in the period experienced similar delays and overspending is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, such defects were probable given the political nature of their selection.

Nihil Kappagoda has identified five consequences of faulty aid as being most harmful to the recipients. These include: flawed disbursement procedures among donors; political and economic commitments forced on the recipient; most notably, tied aid; the sacrifice of long term development planning; and a growing debt burden. Francophone African projects suffered all these consequences.

a) Flawed disbursement procedures

With politics being the key consideration, Canada viewed its relations with other donors not as one of mutual cooperation, but of competition. First was France. Canada could not compete with the size of the French programme. Indeed, Canadian aid made up on average only 9% of total aid received by each Chevrier Mission country. Thus the competition focussed on the terms and conditions of the aid, and at times France and Canada even intentionally impeded each other's projects.

Second was Quebec. A Senegalese ambassador acknowledged that because of French resistance,

pour le moment, c'est un peu difficile pour le Canada de placer trop loin cette intervention en Afrique francophone, mais ce serait beaucoup plus facile pour le Québec (qui peut collaborer) avec la France, et il me semble que ce ne serait pas du tout une mauvaise chose. Là, il y a des possibilités je crois.

129 Kappagoda, op. cit.


131 Houndjahoué, op. cit., p. 204; North-South Institute, In the Canadian Interest?, Ottawa, North-South, 1980, p. 7.

132 G. d'Arboussier, Senegal's ambassador to West Germany in 1969, in Le Québec face aux vrais problèmes des pays en voie de développement, Université Laval, March, 1969, p. 283.
However, for political reasons, Ottawa feared making External Affairs dependent on Quebec's Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs (MAIQ). Chevrier specifically recommended that Ottawa take "toutes les précautions qui s'imposent afin d'assurer qu'une action provinciale possible s'insère dans un cadre constitutionel qui lui soit acceptable." Consequently, the necessary complement of Quebec experts—which Premier Johnson was eager to offer—to Ottawa's capital intensive projects was often minimal. In one project where CIDA and MAIQ were involved—Benin's CPU—a major cause of the delays and confusion appeared to be the lack of a clear authority and the failure of the two committees to work together. 

Ottawa did cooperate with international agencies; multilateral aid was increased, particularly in 1970 (Table VIII). However, the Canadian commitment was not dependable (as 1971 shows). Ottawa's multilateral aid was sporadic because it was used largely to disburse money that could not be spent on the preferred bilateral projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bilateral %</th>
<th>Multilateral %</th>
<th>Food Aid %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: CIDA’s Annual Reviews.

Aid dollars were allotted on the basis of Ottawa's political needs, whether or not CIDA had identified suitable projects. During the period CIDA had a serious

133 Chevrier Report, p. 33.

134 CIDA, evaluation of CPU project, (CIDA files). Johnson's cooperation suggestions can be found in Thomson, op. cit., p. 283.

135 Chevrier Report; Gaudefroy Report, p. 7; A. Berry, For A Common Future: A Study of Canada's Relations with Developing Countries, Ottawa, EEC, 1978, p. 97; Bruneau, op. cit., p. 15.
manpower shortage which led to pressure to spend—anywhere, anyway. "Your career depends on how you spend," a former CIDA official admitted. "It's not how well you spend your money, but can you spend the budget allotted to you? That's what counts." To disburse one's allotment, another employee added, "was proof of a job well done, while failure to come close to this target could mean removal from the position." In Francophone Africa, where the pressure was greatest to disburse large sums rapidly, the assigned budget had never been spent from 1961 through to 1970. This situation prompted Sharp's comment that

> It is essential to obtain agreement as soon as possible with the governments of the independent French-speaking African states, concerning the initiation of additional worthwhile projects and thus reduce the backlog of uncommitted funds."

Inevitably, unworthy projects were accepted. For example, capital-intensive, large infrastructure projects were favoured, despite their being less useful to the population, which was 80% rural. One CIDA report conceded that "often worthy, small projects are simply not entertained."

b) Political and Economic Commitments

Politically, the ideal of respecting and encouraging the sovereignty of the recipient was sacrificed; Ottawa insisted upon support for the federal government's constitutional position. For President Ahidjo of the Cameroun, a federally structured state, supporting Ottawa's position was relatively painless:

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138 Sharp memo to cabinet, 12 July 1968.
Without pretending to make a judgement concerning internal Canadian affairs, we are totally opposed to any outcome that might risk the well-being of the federation.¹⁴⁰

For President Diori of Niger, host of two upcoming Francophone conferences, the pressure was more intense. Both France and Canada tried to influence his decision of whether or not to invite Quebec. France had promised to reimburse Niger up to 10 million francs for any loss of Canadian aid.¹⁴¹ Canada had discussed the expensive Route de l'Unité (RUAC) project with Niger but approval was not given until just after the conferences. These conferences had pleased Trudeau.¹⁴² Obviously, much time, energy and money was spent by Niger to formulate its response to the Canadian domestic political problem.

Economically, the developing country's interests were to be promoted, but the Minister of ITC added one condition:

Needless to say, Canada has to consider its own interests, (in helping developing country exports) Canada could not be expected to leave its established industry (textiles) unreasonably exposed.¹⁴³

According to another ITC official, any development "do gooder" who did not understand "the need to create jobs in Canada and so on" was a naive "bleeding heart."¹⁴⁴ More influenced by these people than by the development do gooders, Chevrier expected that "l'orientation donnée au programme... ne peut avoir qu'un

¹⁴⁰ Ahidjo cited in Schlegal, op. cit., p. 281. Senegal's Léopold Senghor delivered similar speeches; see Patry, op. cit., p. 92.

¹⁴¹ Morin, op. cit., p. 183.

¹⁴² François Pouliot, Interview, March 1989; Houndjahoué, op. cit., p. 193 claims the project was imposed on Niger without consultation.

¹⁴³ Pepin, Statements and Speeches, speech on 6 Nov. 1970.

¹⁴⁴ James Whiteside, cited in Carty, op. cit., p. 43.
heureux effet sur les échanges commerciaux entre le Canada et ces différents pays." Sharp agreed that "new markets being opened for Canadian goods, the need to replace spare parts and the desire to buy more regularly were happy consequences" of the Canadian projects. Publicly officials pretended that Canadian relations in Francophone Africa were comprised "almost exclusively" of aid; in reality, Canadian aid was not only less than trade, but it was also less than the Canadian trade surplus with these countries.

145 Chevrier Report, p. 13; Sharp memo to cabinet, 12 July 1968.

146 See Tables IX and VI. Quote cited in CIDA, Canadian Development Assistance to Francophone Africa., p. 2. See also Sharp in CIDA, Annual Review, 1970-1, p. 3. That economic rewards were anticipated is demonstrated by the justification for continuing funding to the Ivory Coast hotellery project: "notre programme en Côte d'Ivoire s'oriente vers des projets à intérêt mutuel. [Canadian banks are involved]. Dans un contexte aussi prometteur, il nous apparaît souhaitable de terminer solidairement avec les autorités ivoiriennes les réalisations déjà entreprises dans le cadre de ce projet." M. Massé to Treasury Board, 27 June 1980, CIDA Files.
Table IX: Canadian Trade in Francophone Africa 1968-1976 $millions
Imports to Canada (top) and Exports from Canada (bottom)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1968</th>
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<th>70</th>
<th>71</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>73</th>
<th>74</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>76</th>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>27.8</td>
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<td>13.5</td>
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<td>19.9</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
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Total imports 1.6 5.2 9.4 3.7 4.9 7.5 15.4 10.5 81.2 139.4
exports 14.7 9.4 33.9 46.2 46.3 50.8 172.7 139.9 128.7 642.6

Canadian Trade Surplus:
13.1 4.2 24.5 42.5 41.4 43.3 157.3 129.4 47.5 503.2

source: CIDA Annual Reviews.

An official acknowledged that "Canada, on balance, was the greater beneficiary in her economic relations with these aid partners."147

A further economic commitment imposed on the recipient was the obligation to finance almost all local costs of the Canadian projects, notably transportation and labour. Cabinet authorized CIDA to exceed the 25% limit of local cost financing for five Chevrier Mission projects148 for two reasons. First, if Canada had refused, "much of the favourable political impact and good will created by the

147 Cited in Carty, op. cit., p. 167; Houndjahoué, op. cit., p. 208 makes the point that the trade was more important to Africa than to Canada.

148 Four of these projects were in Niger, one in Senegal. See cabinet meeting of 24 October 1968 and Sharp memo to cabinet, 12 July 1968.
Chevrier Mission [would be] lost;" second, "the countries concerned can only accept, in the final analysis, the aid which they can afford." Because Ottawa kept such financing to a minimum, large urban projects were again favoured. Also, when the recipient could not afford to pay, delays and even higher local costs for the recipient resulted. The RUAC project provides a good example: after spending over a million dollars more than anticipated, Niger could no longer support the costly maintenance.

c) Tied Aid

The consequences of one economic commitment demanded by Ottawa merit special attention: the practice of tying aid to the purchase of Canadian products. Instead of "untying immediately" all Canadian aid, Chevrier's selections were to be limited to "projects which have an 80% Canadian content. This is established as a firm policy." The firm policy was obviously guided by Canadian economic considerations without concern for the negative effects on the recipient. Sharp warned that without tied aid

the Canadian economy would suffer considerable strain both in terms of markets and in terms of jobs. (And, some suppliers would) find it difficult if not impossible to remain economically viable.

The Canadian public, CIDA and at times even External Affairs supported the untying of aid, but the lobby for the promotion of inefficient business carried more weight in cabinet. The North-South Institute reported that

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149 Ibid.

150 Pouliot interview, March 1989; see also CIDA Files.

151 Martin letter to Chevrier, 31 January 1968. Martin added that the possibility existed of lowering the limit to 70%, but the Africans were not to be told. Untying qoutes from DEA, Strategy 75-80, pp. 12, 32.

absolutely no progress had been made on Ottawa's untying policy: the dependence of a few firms on this heavy subsidy, and the persistence of old myths among industrial lobbies, have deterred two governments from even publishing official studies on this question, let alone moving ahead.\textsuperscript{153}

Promoting national unity was a possible contributing factor to keeping aid tied. In 1976 Quebec, with 27\% of the Canadian population, received 46\% of CIDA's tied aid contracts.\textsuperscript{154} For whatever reasons aid remained tied, and the consequences were as costly as CIDA's policy predicted they would be.

Inappropriate techniques and equipment with difficult-to-replace spare parts—the characteristics of tied aid—led directly to time delays and cost overruns. For the Hotelery project in Abidjan, three CIDA presidents requested budget increases from cabinet for similar reasons. In 1976 Gérin-Lajoie identified problems of "l'adaptation de l'équipement aux conditions locales et de l'insertion du concept architectural dans le schéma d'aménagement de cette zone." In 1984 Margaret Catley-Carlson was still requesting more money to finance the tied aid policy:

\begin{quote}
Certains appareils électro-mécaniques étaient incompatibles avec les sources locales d'alimentation et nécessitaient des modifications pour un rendement acceptable...de plus, la mise en place du programme d'entretien comportera pour les années futures certains liens avec l'entreprise canadienne afin d'assurer un approvisionnement continu en pièces de rechange et l'accès à des services techniques spécialisés.\textsuperscript{155}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{153} N-S institute, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 14 and p. 56.
\textsuperscript{155} M. Catley-Carlson, letter to Treasury Board, 27 June 1980. Gérin-Lajoie's remarks are also from a note to the Treasury Board requesting funds for the project, 5 October 1976. M. Massé also wrote a similar note to the Treasury Board, 27 June 1980.
\end{flushleft}
The CPU project at Benin, tied at 78%, experienced similar difficulties. An evaluation reported that "le choix des équipements n'était pas toujours approprié aux besoins de formation." The EPT project in Senegal was tied on average at 91% for the four phases, which led to similar time and budget problems for this project. A CIDA official who led the RUAC project supported Ottawa's philosophy of "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours" but acknowledged that the Canadian tied aid requirements were "hard nosed" and limited development efficiency.  

Tied aid inevitably increased the time and cost needed for projects by insisting on less appropriate technology and difficult-to-replace equipment. Studies have estimated the effect of tied aid as inflating the cost of a project by 25%. In addition, the natural development of internal African markets was discouraged by the obligation to buy at monopoly prices. Certain opportunities were also missed. The most suitable small-scale rural development projects could not be considered because they required local material, local labour and simple techniques. Instead, the Chevrier Mission sought infrastructure projects with high foreign costs. The director of CIDA's Francophone African division recommended in 1968 that the tied aid requirement be lowered to 70% for the region so several projects could be considered, "which cannot be now".

d) Sacrifice of Long-Term Development Objectives

The ability to plan future policies as far in advance as possible is a crucial element in a country's development. This ability was seriously limited for the

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156 Pouliot interview, March 1989.

157 K. Hay, Tied Aid, Ottawa, EEC, 1978; M. Strong, in Wyse, op. cit., p. 8. Both estimate the cost increase at 25%; the Pearson Commission said 20%.

Francophone African recipients as a result of tied aid, unpredictable local costs, and three further constraints imposed by Ottawa.

First, food aid used to serve Canadian interests often limited the recipient's planning ability. Ottawa claimed that food aid was a necessary element of Canadian ODA, "essentially to relieve famine" in emergencies. Another use was to aid the recipient in its balance of payments. But Chevrier never mentioned the recipient's need when recommending food aid, and judging by the following cabinet memo extract, Sharp was not interested:

For 1967-8 an allocation of 1$ million of food aid was provided for the countries of French-speaking Africa although it was not known at that time what the actual requirements would be.

Thus, as Table X shows, Canadian food aid went where the potential markets were, not where the need existed (until this policy was corrected in 1975-6). Consequently, the countries not needing food aid suddenly had a surplus of free food; the devastating effect on local farmers trying to sell their product has been confirmed in several studies.

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159 DEA, Strategy 75-80, p. 33; DEA, Foreign Policy..., p. 16; Pouliot Interview, March 1989.

160 Chevrier Report, pp. 13, 23; Sharp memo to cabinet, 12 July 1968.

Table X: Canadian Food Aid to Francophone Africa, 1968-1976

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<tr>
<td>total</td>
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<td>8.5</td>
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<td>9.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>88.6</td>
</tr>
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</table>

source: CIDA annual reviews.

Second, Canadian projects were largely imposed on the recipients. In 1976 one CIDA official estimated that of all the agencies' projects, 40% originated in Canada with ITC, DEA or private Canadian corporations and another 30% arose from recipient requests, modified to suit Canadian political and economic objectives. Only 30% were initiatives from the recipient country.162

In all four major projects, the unpredictable costs of Canadian imposed projects hampered the recipient's planning capabilities. Senegal's Minister of Education expressed concern that Canadian goals were distorting the original intentions and budget of the CPU project.163 An Ottawa bureaucrat admitted that the additional costs which Canada decided the recipient would pay imposed "un


163 Meeting 12 July 1971, between Canadian and Senegalese officials concerning administration of the project, (CIDA Files).
poids financier trop élevé pour le Ministère de l’Éducation du Sénégal compte tenu des besoins actuels de ce pays.” 164 When the Ivory Coast hotelery, built according to Canadian plans, went over budget in 1976 it was arranged that the responsabilité de la construction du centre devenait celle de la Côte d’Ivoire qui devait en assurer la conduite en accord avec les plans et devis canadiens déjà élaborés. 165

Effectively, Ottawa transferred financial responsibility to Abidjan—yet continued to insist on the provenly flawed Canadian plans. When completed, Abidjan had paid 24.4$ million for a Canadian-led project it had been told would cost 0.5$ million. The costs for the construction of the RUAC, imposed on Niger, also went well over budget, costing Niger 18$ million more than anticipated. 166

Third, Canada sought projects that were visible. A CIDA director remarked that
every effort is made to support aid programs which will assume a continuous and conspicuous presence abroad. Nobody will quarrel with the principle. 167

The effects on recipient plans of projects chosen to provide a visible Canadian presence are best illustrated by the CPU project. Canadian control and the site selection were of paramount importance. In fact, Canada and France—a co-sponsor—fought for two years over whose building would be closest to the entrance of the college. 168 Consulting the recipient was less important as the Benin civil servants involved have confirmed. Evaluation was also unimportant:

164 Houndjahoué, op. cit., p. 212.
165 See note 155, above.
166 See Table VII above.
167 Gaufrev Report, p. 22; Sharp added that “every effort would continue to be made to seek projects involving a high Canadian content with a well defined Canadian identity.” in 12 July 1968 memo.
168 Houndjahoué, op. cit., p. 159.
one CIDA report noted that "le projet n'avait jamais été évalué en cours de réalisation; une évaluation d'étape aurait permis de corriger certaines lacunes plus tôt." Consequently, problems arose and the project cost four times more than anticipated—one half of which Benin was to pay. One study estimated that maintaining the project would absorb more than one third the annual budget for Benin's Ministry of Education. In this context the remarks of Benin's President Mathieu Kéréou at the inauguration of the project in 1977 are easily understandable: "ce cadeau est difficile à prendre tout seul." 

The recipients would not have paid full price for the projects selected by, led by and built by Canadians for Canadian political objectives. The projects were accepted at an agreed-to bargain price; when the prices skyrocketed and the recipients were left with the bill, their long-term plans inevitably had to be modified.

e) Debt Burden

A large debt, in itself is not necessarily a devastating problem if the money borrowed is used to increase the recipient's capacity to repay. Problems arise when a country needs to borrow more just in order to maintain the status quo. This was the case for the majority of Francophone African recipients in the period 1968 to 1976. Prices for southern products were decreasing in proportion to those of northern products; exchange rates favoured northern currencies and northern interest rate hikes all led to the situation in which the South needed to augment its borrowing to pay for the same imports. In 1971 three of the five most

169 Ibid., p. 220; A CIDA progress report acknowledged that after five years the council established for consulting Benin "n'a jamais siégé".

170 Ibid., p. 211.

171 Kappagoda, op. cit., p. 4.
indebted nations were Chevrier Mission countries and the Mission's preference for loans over grants exacerbated the debt problem of these countries.\footnote{172}{Chevrier Report, p. 10. 21$ million of the 39.6$ million was loaned.}

Three of the four major projects involved the obligation to repay large loans. These were provided on relatively soft terms but they nevertheless increased the recipient's debt. Worse still, these countries—as a result of Canadian miscalculations—were forced to repay at least double the amount originally agreed to. For Benin's CPU, Canadian loans increased from the initial 4$ million to about 12$ million. The reasons given for the three separate increases all concerned Canadian misjudgments.\footnote{173}{The reasons given for the increased costs:
- "suite à une identification plus précise des besoins," (1976);
- "dû à une hausse des frais de réalisation du collège," (1980);
- "suite à l'inflation des coûts des matériaux et du transport," (1984).}
Niger's loans skyrocketed from the anticipated 13.2$ million to 32.1$ million for the RUAC. While for the EPT project, Canadian miscalculations led to an unforseen 9$ million being added to Senegal's debt burden.\footnote{174}{Ottawa gave as its reasons for adding this debt the need to "defrayer le coût de nouvelles constructions," (CIDA Files).}

With the contribution of Canadian loans, the consequences of runaway debt on Francophone Africa were exactly what the theory warned they would be. The proportion of the national budget devoted to debt servicing increased, as did the amount of debt. In fact, in 1974, debt servicing exceeded all aid to southern countries.\footnote{175}{Bruneau, op. cit., p. 16; Carty, op. cit., p. 168. In 1980 debt servicing absorbed 15% of southern export revenues, by 1983 the figure was 25% and in 1985 it was 35%, OXFAM, Third World Debt, Ottawa, OXFAM, 1988, p. 3.} By 1985 the flow of resources from South to North was estimated at 25$ billion, while the flow from North to South was only 3$ billion. Even during
the famine in sub-Saharan Africa the 29 poorest countries (many in Francophone Africa) paid to the West twice what they received.\footnote{176 OXFAM-Canada, "Third World Debt," Ottawa, 1988, p. 3.} Other consequences included the imposition of International Monetary Fund conditions.\footnote{177 Ibid., p. 5, These conditions included: reorientation of economic policies toward earning foreign exchange, deficit cutting through education, health and wage reductions and limiting imports (such as seeds and equipment).} Canadian domestic tensions did not cause the southern debt problem; but Chevrier Mission and subsequent loans to Francophone Africa did contribute to the aggravation of the situation. Canada had the opportunity to ease the problem somewhat with more grants, or by supervising Canadian banking activities.\footnote{178 In 1976 7.5\% of southern debt was owed to Canadian banks (13.3$ billion), which received 1$ billion a year in interest. Carty, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 168; Kappagoda, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 4.} Instead, Ottawa insisted on repayment for Canadian projects, including the Canadian errors.

3. Missed Opportunities

The consequences mentioned above have included the missed opportunities to assist Francophone African development because Ottawa's programme was interested primarily in achieving Canadian domestic political objectives. It cannot be said that in the absence of all political considerations the only possible alternative was a Canadian ODA programme based entirely on the ideal development policy; however, the occasion to implement, or consider implementing the ideal theory was seriously compromised by the existence of the political objectives in the programme. The urgency given to the political objectives magnified the distortion. Needless to say, the chance to improve the international economic system was also forfeited. In fact, Canada, with above average tariffs, a "hardline refusal" to discuss special drawing rights for the South at the world bank, and a negative attitude towards producer cartels (except for the Canadian
export of wheat) was among the most uncooperative and obstructive during the negotiations for the implementation of the NIEO.\textsuperscript{179}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The costs to the Francophone African recipients of the highly politisized Canadian selection of countries and projects included certain direct "active" consequences. The selection of the richest countries intensified the disparities in the region. When selecting and implementing projects, Ottawa's disbursement procedures encouraged inefficiency. A lack of coordination with Quebec and France inspired time delays and budget excesses, while Ottawa's resistance to hiring sufficient CIDA staff favoured the selection of large urban projects.\textsuperscript{180}

Political and economic commitments (such as paying local costs, accepting Canadian exports and tied aid) demanded by Ottawa also invited an urban preference, caused costly time delays as well as a reduction of the recipient's sovereignty. The economic consequences would have existed without the politisisation, but the national unity strains amplified their importance because of the reckless speed at which projects were selected. Finally, projects imposed by Canada with the goal of ensuring a visible presence were naturally placed in urban sites, where once again Canadian plans were delayed and over budget. In short, large urban infrastructure projects were heavily favoured over small rural operations; This distortion was responsible for lengthy delays with rising costs. The recipient's development plans and debt burden were inevitable casualties.

\textsuperscript{179} Lyon, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. xviii-xx; Helleiner, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 397. The 1970 \textit{Foreign Policy...}, p. 19, remarked that "the progress of the developing countries can be affected through every aspect of their relationships with the more developed countries. Tariffs and other trade restrictions, immigration, fluctuations in world commodity prices. All these subjects touch upon issues whose primary considerations lie outside the Canadian development assistance programme."

\textsuperscript{180} Canadian projects were over 50% infrastructure oriented while only 9.6% were small, specifically rural projects, Mbeko, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 204.
Just as costly to the recipient were the indirect "static" consequences: the neglected opportunities to benefit from the significant advances made in the international development theory. LDCs could have been assisted instead of being left further and further behind. Projects could have been selected in cooperation with other donors instead of costly competitions. Economic conditions could have been set to correct instead of to exploit the recipient's economic disadvantage. The long-term plans of the recipient could have been encouraged instead of sacrificed, food aid could have benefited countries struck by famine instead of flooding the markets of Canadian trading partners, and the growing debt burden could have been eased instead of amplified. The ideal of southern input was ignored. Most helpful would have been an innovative Canadian encouragement of the NIEO, instead of the hardline refusal to even consider it.

Ottawa's politicians, more than CIDA's development workers, were pleased with Canadian aid to Francophone Africa.\textsuperscript{181} Because "the spirit and form in which aid is managed are as important to development as its economic content,"\textsuperscript{182} the Canadian projects had a good chance to reach their objectives of promoting bilingualism and biculturalism, and an even better chance to be not only of limited use to the recipient's development, but in fact an obstruction.

\begin{footnotes}
181 Bruneau, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 1, 33. One CIDA employee claimed that only 65 of the 400-odd projects "received any degree of serious attention" because of personnel shortages.

\end{footnotes}
CHAPTER FOUR: NGOs and the Two Solitudes

The Impact on Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations.

The original pressures within CUSO-SUCO which led to a gradual separation of the Anglophone-Francophone programmes had their roots not in any particular difference in programme objectives, but in the more general issues which are documented in the B and B Commission Reports.

-C.M. Williams
Chairman of CUSO-SUCO

The presence of domestic political considerations in Canadian development assistance attempts were not limited to Ottawa's programme in Francophone Africa. Several Canadian Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were also affected by the "general issues which are documented in the B and B Commission Reports." Among Canada-wide NGOs, it can be generalized that Anglophones favoured a united centralized administration while Francophones favoured an autonomous, decentralized administration in which they would not have to submit to Anglophone majority decisions. Two groups in particular, OXFAM and CUSO, were significantly affected. In order to determine the impact of these internal considerations on the efficiency and independence of the NGOs, it is first necessary to establish the function and independence which were recommended by the international specialists for the NGOs.

A) Canadian and International Theory
1. NGO Efficiency

International development specialists believed the NGOs to be more efficient than public development organizations for three principal reasons. Above all, NGOs
were perceived as orienting their efforts to ensuring basic human needs. One OECD publication praised NGOs for

la longue expérience que bon nombre de ces organismes possèdent de certains secteurs et méthodes d'action
qui sont en rapport avec les besoins essentiels de l'être humain et l'aide aux groupes les plus défavorisés.

NGOs were also willing to confront politically delicate situations (such as aid to liberation movements) which public agencies would not touch. Second, many NGOs had a long history of development work and their techniques and experiences were often useful to the government agencies. Finally, NGOs could more easily innovate and adapt their programmes to appropriate trends in development policy. A World Bank spokesman described the NGOs as "les canaux les plus efficaces d'accès au développement."

Ottawa recognized the value of the NGOs for the same reasons. Gérin-Lajoie commented that "lorsque l'on voudra atteindre des populations démunies qui restent inaccessibles par les formes usuelles de coopération internationale, les ONG sont devenues le canal normal par lequel passait l'aide." Ottawa's policy was never to deal directly with individuals or any group other than the recognized government. By

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184 OCDE, op. cit., p. 6.
186 Paul Gérin-Lajoie, quoted in Gabrielle LaChance, "De l'aide au développement: les organismes non gouvernementaux de développement et de coopération internationale au Québec," mémoire de maîtrise, Université Laval, 1978, p. 76.
187 CIDA, CIDA and the NGOs, Ottawa, 1974, p. 8; CIDA, NGO Division: Introduction and Guide, Ottawa, CIDA, 1986, p. 17; DEA, Foreign Policy..., p. 20; DEA, Strategy..., p.35.
subsidizing NGO projects, Ottawa could aid non-governmental groups indirectly. Ottawa could also learn from the NGOs' development experience and advanced innovation techniques. The most significant innovation in development theory during the period was the emphasis placed on the education of the Canadian public in the problems of development, which was seen as necessary in order to bring about the NIEO. Without a NIEO, it was believed, development efforts would remain insignificant.

2. NGO Independence Required

The organization and goals of the NGOs were different from those of the government agencies, thus preserving the independence of the NGOs was vital to ensure that government funding did not become government control and weaken the efficiency of the organizations. The international policy recommended, as an ideal, that when governments finance NGOs—and inevitably ask for some accountability—NGO freedom not be sacrificed. This condition was especially important, and particularly difficult to practice, concerning funding of development education activities, which were inevitably critical of northern governments.

Ottawa also emphasized the importance of encouraging the independence of the NGOs. In 1965 when Paul Martin became the first Canadian Minister to subsidize a Canadian NGO he warned that

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188 P. Gérin-Lajoie, Developmental..., p. 5; Smillie, op. cit., p. 271.

189 Lewis Perinbam, Commonwealth Governments and Voluntary Organizations, Ottawa, CIDA, 1988, p. 7; CIDA, CIDA and the NGOs, p. 3; Canadian Development Assistance to Francophone Africa, Ottawa, 1979, p. 4; CIDA Annual Review 1975-6, p. 83. For references to importance of development education, see Brodhead and Herbert-Copley, op. cit., pp. 7, 104; LaChance, op. cit., p. 78; CIDA, President's Consultation, 1975, p. 33.

190 OCDE, op. cit., pp. 10, 17.

191 Ibid., p. 16.
it is from its voluntary and non governmental character that CUSO gets its spirit and impetus, and we must do everything to make sure that this spirit and this impetus remain undiminished.192

In 1988 Lewis Perinbam, director of CIDA's NGO division, added that

While we require accountability for the use of public funds, we avoid any attempt to control or to dominate NGOs. We respect their independence, integrity and personality. We consider these qualities to be as vital to our interests as to theirs.193

Therefore the only prerogative CIDA reserved was to accept or refuse funding, on a matching grant basis; no further constraints would be placed on the NGOs. CIDA preferred long term approval in order to provide maximum independence for the NGOs.194

B) Canadian Practice

1. CIDA's NGO Division: 1968-76

The organization responsible for coordinating government funding of these organizations was the NGO division of CIDA, created in 1968. Ottawa's financial subsidies to NGOs had begun three years earlier with a grant to CUSO.195 Maurice Strong, then CIDA president, saw the NGO division as a good opportunity to

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193 Perinbam, Commonwealth..., p. 4. Also ACDI, L'ACDI et les ONGs, pp. 3, 10.

194 Perinbam interview, February 1989. Also ACDI, L'ACDI et les ONGs, p. 5; Smillie, op. cit., p. 267.

195 Smillie, op. cit., p. 253. Lewis Perinbam was the first NGO member to approach Ottawa seeking funding, as the General Secretary of World University Services Canada (WUSC), in 1955.
encourage Canadian NGOs, to exploit new resources and to invite innovative approaches to international development.  

When seeking government funds, an NGO would submit its proposal, which would then pass through several stages of analysis at CIDA's NGO division. Larger, or politically sensitive projects would also need cabinet approval. If a project was accepted, CIDA would send an agreement to be signed by the NGO, imposing certain conditions in exchange for the funding. The amount CIDA spent on such agreements from 1968 to 1976 is shown in table XI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968-70</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>284.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>94.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>33%</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.23</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.52</strong></td>
<td><strong>34%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CIDA NGO Division, Reports of Projects by Country, 1968-75.

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198 CIDA NGO Division, letters of agreement between CIDA and certain NGOs, 1972-1976. It was requested that a copy of the agreement be sent to the recipient country involved; that regular reports on the progress of the project be filed; that the bank drafts be made available upon request; and that the letter be acknowledged.
Projects in Francophone Africa received approximately the same grant percentage as elsewhere, and as table XII shows, the distribution between LDCs and Chevrier Mission countries was more equal than it was in the bilateral programme (see table XI).

**TABLE XII: CIDA Subsidies to Canadian NGOs in Francophone Africa, 1968-75.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Cost of funded projects</th>
<th>Amount of CIDA Subsidy</th>
<th>% Paid by CIDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LDCs:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.437</td>
<td>2.647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chevrier Mission Countries:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7.627</td>
<td>2.913</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As well, CIDA had no direct impact on these projects in the recipient countries and thus the problems of Ottawa’s bilateral programme do not apply here. Thus NGO efficiency benefited from CIDA funds despite the fact that the organizations would have liked more help—particularly concerning their innovative development education programmes.

Where the division did experience problems was in the practice of ensuring NGO independence. Large or politically sensitive projects were dealt with by politicians, based on single paragraph descriptions instead of the 100 or more page report submitted by the NGO.\(^{199}\) Canadian politics thus became a more important consideration than the NGO’s plans. Also, the theory of matching grants was not practised; when CIDA funded a project the subsidy was on average about one-third of the total cost.\(^{200}\) Other conditions included the requirement that administrative

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\(^{199}\) Smillie, _op. cit._, p. 266. Perinbam argued that such cases were very rare. February 1989 interview.

\(^{200}\) See table XI; Brodhead and Herbert-Copley, _op. cit._, p. 15.
costs not exceed 10% (which was 3% below the average and unreasonable given the high administrative costs for rural projects);\textsuperscript{201} that money not be too largely concentrated in one country, and that Canadian enterprises be encouraged.\textsuperscript{202} The North-South Institute considered it a curious paradox that le gouvernement fédéral est ainsi depuis la fin des années 1960 le principal protagoniste sur la scène non gouvernementale. Ses subventions, ses politiques et ses méthodes ont déterminé plus que tout autre facteur le profil de l'activité de nos ONG. Cette influence, dans l'ensemble non coercitive et plutôt salutaire, n'est cependant pas allée sans créer de conflits.\textsuperscript{203}

Whether CIDA political influence hampered the development efforts of OXFAM and CUSO during their linguistic disputes will be studied.

2 OXFAM-Canada: 1973

The international organization OXFAM was created in 1942 by an English group from Oxford University interested in sending aid to famine areas. OXFAM-Canada began in 1963 as a member of the international association. About 1970 the Quebec segment of OXFAM-Canada became increasingly distinct and independent.\textsuperscript{204} On 29 September 1973 a motion was presented by the Quebec wing and accepted by the national branch for the creation of OXFAM-Québec.

a) The Split

The separation was agreed to primarily for cultural and linguistic reasons. OXFAM-Québec prepared a brief 25-page presentation outlining its reasons for

\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., p. 109; also, OCDE, op. cit., p. 29.

\textsuperscript{202} CIDA, CIDA and the NGOs, p. 11. The reference for the questioning of all money going to the same place is the Perinbam February 1989 interview.

\textsuperscript{203} Brodhead and Herbert-Copley, op. cit., p. 4.

\textsuperscript{204} OXFAM-Québec, "Formation of OXFAM-Québec," Ottawa, OXFAM-Canada, 1973, p. 3. From OXFAM-Canada Files. (05 500 6-74).
requesting separation. Above all, it felt that total autonomy was necessary for the organization to adapt adequately to changing Quebec society.\textsuperscript{205} OXFAM-Québec argued that only it possessed sufficient knowledge of the distinct political and social aspirations based on the history and language of the Québécois to ensure that OXFAM's aims were implemented. To do this, OXFAM-Québec needed absolute authority. The group feared long, costly delays if it had to explain away behaviour, or to justify such or such action to a group which does not understand the Quebec way...Red tape starts the moment we begin investing more time and energy to explain why, when there is a need to concentrate on the hows, and use the available time to execute different programmes.\textsuperscript{206}

The OXFAM-Canada Board agreed to the following motion by a vote of 14 to 3 with 3 abstentions: it was requested

\begin{quote}
that the General Meeting of OXFAM-Canada accept the establishment in Quebec of OXFAM-Québec, by granting it the same rights, duties and decisive powers and negotiating powers as the other members of the international OXFAM family, bearing in mind the aims of the organizations throughout the world.\textsuperscript{207}
\end{quote}

The discussions over the motion were reported as being "conducted in a cordial manner," and the representatives "agreed easily to a division of assets of the parent organization in view of the establishment of the new organization." Also, continued collaboration was agreed to in the future, with the chairman of each organization occupying a place on the Board of the other's organization.\textsuperscript{208}

\textsuperscript{205} Ibid., pp. 6, 7.

\textsuperscript{206} Ibid., p.8.

\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., p. 6. The vote was reported by John Shea, OXFAM-Canada's Executive Director in a 1973 one-page announcement. OXFAM-Canada Files.

\textsuperscript{208} Ibid.
Meeting (AGM) of OXFAM- Canada, held immediately after, supported the proposal by a vote of 25 to 4, with one abstention.

b) OXFAM’s Efficiency

The dispute inevitably had some effects on the efficient functioning of OXFAM. When the organization split into two, coordinating mutual activities became more difficult. Also, during 1973, questions concerning the organization’s structure absorbed a significant amount of time at almost all Board of Director meetings and the Annual General Meeting. At one Board meeting this question was described as the "primary objective" of the meeting. However, through the year developmental problems were not forgotten. The time devoted to the organization’s structure question at Board meetings and the AGM can be estimated at somewhere between 10 and 20 percent of the total time.

Negative repercussions on development efficiency seem to have been minimal as both groups continued their development programmes. Jacques Jobin, the Executive Director of OXFAM-Canada in 1974, remarked:

such a string of events might heavily tax the ability of any voluntary group to efficiently administer its

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209 During a CUSO Operations Committee meeting, 19 June 1974. CUSO Files, BOARDOC 106, one member remarked: dividing CUSO into two bodies would make collaboration impossible, "as is exemplified by OXFAM."

210 OXFAM-Canada, Board of Directors’ Meeting, 13 May 1973. OXFAM-Canada Files.

211 This rough estimate is based on the priority given to the issue in the recorded minutes of each meeting (27-28 January, 10 April, 12-13 May, 29 September, 27 October and 7 December). OXFAM-Canada Files. It should be noted that the number of pages devoted to any issue in the official minutes did not necessarily represent the amount of time spent discussing the issue; it does provide, however, a rough indication.

212 OXFAM-Québec, Vivre autrement, mieux, Montréal, OXFAM-Québec, 1979, pp. 12, 71.
ongoing programme. We, however, were fortunately able not only to maintain our previous performance, but to develop and strengthen our activities in several areas as well.\textsuperscript{213}

This lack of diversions can be explained in part by the fact that OXFAM-Québec had made up its mind and presented OXFAM-Canada with a fait accompli. OXFAM-Québec's "discussion paper" contained the warning that

the fact that certain members of OXFAM-Canada (who have no confidence in the Quebec personnel) refuse this request by dragging out the discussions for months and months, could seem to be a radical change in attitude in comparison to our past relations.\textsuperscript{214}

For whatever reasons, development programmes were affected only minimally during the separation procedure.

c) OXFAM Independence

Neither of the Canadian OXFAM branches felt any obligation towards CIDA, or towards Ottawa's national unity philosophy. OXFAM-Québec took pride in the fact that two-thirds of its funding came from the Quebec population, which was its "garantie d'autonomie," because the organization's existence "ne dépend(ait) pas des subventions de gouvernements, de compagnies, etc."\textsuperscript{215} OXFAM-Canada had similar funding and the Vice Chairman at the time, Meyer Brownstone, testifies to the fact that CIDA in no way tried to influence the OXFAM domestic dispute.\textsuperscript{216} Neither group


\textsuperscript{214} OXFAM-Québec, "Formation," p. 5.

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., p. 20; also Vivre autrement, p. 80; OXFAM-Québec, OXFAM-Québec, vol. 1, no 2, December, 1977, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{216} Meyer Brownstone, from a March 1989 telephone conversation.
perceived any CIDA threat, and CIDA never openly imposed conditions relating to OXFAM'S internal problem; however, there are possible traces of interference.

There was a significant reduction in the percentage of total OXFAM costs, on acceptable projects, which CIDA was prepared to subsidize during the debate. The "matching grants" declined from a 30 percent average to a mere 12 percent. (See Table XIII). Since no clear explanation was given, Ottawa's intentions can only be estimated. On one occasion the reduction in funds was referred to:

the decision has been taken to match with CIDA funds only the cash contribution OXFAM-Canada has made to the programme and not the administration costs referred to in your submission.

No further explanation was given for what was an apparent departure from the CIDA policy of matching funds. One possibility is that Ottawa's politicians (not the CIDA NGO development workers) were warning OXFAM on the issue of its political development education programme. In 1978 Ottawa threatened that if OXFAM did not "cease indulging in political activities" its charitable status (and right to issue tax deduction receipts) would be taken away. If the Trudeau government was willing to take such a step in 1978 it is entirely possible that it was ready to reduce matching grant funds in 1973. However, one can only speculate on the reasons for the CIDA cuts, and the preference of Ottawa for harmonious French-English relations constitutes a plausible hypothesis in explaining the reductions.

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217 Perinbam says that whether OXFAM split or not made no difference to CIDA, which recognized that the two organizations had two distinct personalities (the Quebec branch being more dynamic and the Anglophone sections more focussed on certain aspects of the overseas programme). Interview, February 1989.

218 Roméo Maione to Paul Mably, "CIDA Reply concerning OXFAM Canada's request for funds for the Guatemalan Emergency Relief project," 17 March 1976. CIDA Files.

TABLE XIII: CIDA Subsidies to OXFAM Canada, 1968-75 (in millions)$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Cost of Funded Projects</th>
<th>Amount of CIDA Subsidy</th>
<th>% Paid by CIDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968-73</td>
<td>1.533224</td>
<td>.452300</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>2.130967</td>
<td>.253900</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>.917010</td>
<td>.384600</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76 (partial)</td>
<td>.251420</td>
<td>.111500</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>4.832621</td>
<td>1.202300</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Canadian University Service Overseas Organization (CUSO) experienced problems in 1974 similar to those of OXFAM in 1973: the Francophone Quebec wing (referred to hereafter as SUCO)\(^{220}\) demanded greater autonomy from the majoritarily Anglophone organization. In contrast with the OXFAM situation, however, SUCO sought autonomy within the organization rather than separation.

The roots of the 1974 conflict can be traced to the organization’s origins. CUSO began in 1961 as an Anglophone organization sending volunteers overseas to Commonwealth countries. When its programme expanded to include Francophone Africa in 1965, Anglophones had to accept not only greater costs in the region but also the potential linguistic tensions within the organization.\(^{221}\) In 1969 a constitutional change created a separate Francophone body, but the majority Anglophone Board of Directors maintained its veto over SUCO’s decisions. By 1972 H. Siré, hired to study the increasingly tense situation, observed that

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\(^{220}\) SUCO: Service universitaire canadien outre-mer, the literal translation of CUSO, came to be identified uniquely with the Quebec wing. CUSO will refer in this chapter only to the non Quebec section.

\(^{221}\) Louis Berubé, *Berubé Report*, 1965. CUSO Files. The major reason for the increased cost was the competition with free French volunteers, meaning that local expenses would not be paid by the recipient country.
The subordinate position of Francophones and their insufficient control over their own programmes and future have provoked a structural malaise in SUCO...This malaise is manifested by a strong will for autonomy. Francophones want to escape from a guardianship which they consider to be false and unrealistic...People are concerned about autarky and autonomy for Third World countries, and yet they seem to have little interest for the same type of social justice within their own association.\textsuperscript{222}

His report suggested two possible solutions to the constitutional problems: total separation, or the "DAPDUC" (Deux Associations Parallèles dans une Corporation) model.\textsuperscript{223} In general, SUCO favoured DAPDUC while CUSO was divided between those espousing the status quo and those leaning to total separation.\textsuperscript{224}

In addition to the cultural and linguistic differences, the 1974 dispute was further complicated by philosophical differences, specifically, development education. SUCO believed that it was essential

to go beyond the restrictive framework of traditional cooperation by developing a "second front" which consists in informing the Quebec population of the incoherence of our attitude vis à vis the Third World in order to excercise pressure on government authorities to modify Canada's trade policy towards exploited countries.\textsuperscript{225}

\textsuperscript{222} Henri Siré, quoted in Smillie, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 288.

\textsuperscript{223} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{224} The SUCO Committee accepted the proposal at their 7 July 1973 meeting. CUSO's Anglophones unanimously rejected the idea at their 6 September 1973 meeting, and at a 22 September 1973 meeting.

CUSO also recognized the importance of development education, but felt it should be smaller, less political, and have no references to Quebec separatism.\textsuperscript{226} SUCO had published a statement encouraging

solidarity between exploited people here and exploited people of (southern) countries...between Quebec liberation movements and Third World liberation movements.\textsuperscript{227}

CUSO felt that the whole organization looked like a "radical fringe group."\textsuperscript{228} Thus by 1974 the two groups were on a constitutional collision course. Concerned with credibility, CUSO insisted on a low political profile with emphasis on continued funding from CIDA and the public. SUCO insisted on politized development education and the ability to decide its own programme independent of CUSO or CIDA: in short, it wanted autonomy.\textsuperscript{229}

\textbf{a) The Crisis}

The question of development education triggered the CUSO-SUCO controversy of 1974, but every altercation was clearly devoted to the structural issue of autonomy. At the December 1973 CUSO-SUCO AGM, the starting point of the year-long battle, development education received minor attention. The focus was on the resolution

\textsuperscript{226} Smillie, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 114; McWhinney and Godfrey, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 29; CUSO Operations Committee meeting, 19 June 1974. All describe CUSO as favouring development education, but never clarifying the objectives.

\textsuperscript{227} SUCO \textit{et al.}, "Joint Statement." See also Smillie, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 292. Other controversial development education cases included a poster with maps of Angola and Quebec joined by the word "libre," and the expulsion of all SUCO workers from Malagasy for political reasons.


\textsuperscript{229} J. Fournier, "What does SUCO want?" CUSO Files, BOARDOC 159, 13 September 1974. And 12 September 1974 Constitutional Review Committee Meeting. (Summary of major points of contention). CUSO Files.
concerning the adoption of the DAPDUC model. Ultimately, it was "resolved that the DAPDUC model for CUSO-SUCO legislation procedure be adopted in principle." A committee was formed to study during the year the exact form this would take. In general DAPDUC was agreed to mean equal functions, structures and roles for each Board, and a common Board—with equal representation—to study issues of common concern.

In January a crisis broke out in CUSO-SUCO relations concerning the SUCO budget estimates for the year. The SUCO Board proposed to spend 20% on development education, but the CUSO Board announced that no more than 4% could be accepted or CIDA would refuse the whole budget (which included the CUSO portion). SUCO insisted on its budget and in March the CUSO-SUCO Board of Directors vetoed the proposed budget. The Board, majoritarily Anglophone, divided almost exactly along linguistic lines. The sole exception was SUCO Executive Director Ronald Léger, who voted with the Anglophone Board. CUSO felt uncomfortable; one member remarked that "Anglophones are now required to adjudicate a Francophone problem—an invidious situation." SUCO, even less pleased by the events, published a press release entitled "Les Anglophones provoquent la crise au SU CO;" the main theme was "l'intrusion des anglophones dans

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230 CUSO-SUCO AGM minutes, 1973, and Juanita Poole report describing a regional CUSO meeting in Vancouver, November 13 1973. CUSO Files. According to Poole, "voting for DAPDUC gives recognition and acceptance of SU CO's policies of concentrating more on development education in Canada and moving away from the sending of personnel overseas."

231 The Constitutional Review Committee met on the following dates in 1974: 12 and 16 January, 16 February, 2 March, 19 June and 12 September. For the AGM resolutions, see CUSO Files.

232 Ibid.

233 SUCO, "Sequence of Events," 22 March 1974. In CUSO Files, BOARDOC 56. SUCO was aware of the CIDA rejection probability but refused to distort its own priorities.

234 CUSO-SUCO Board of Directors' meeting, 2 March 1974.
le secteur francophone.” Léger’s position overshadowed even the budget crisis—which was eventually solved unilaterally by CUSO’s acceptance of an alternate SUCO budget prepared by Léger. Shortly after, Léger resigned, but the lingering aftertaste of these crises was bitter.

In September, CUSO-SUCO experienced another constitutional crisis. The CUSO Board took the decision to expel SUCO from the association. When the motion was adopted the Francophones had left the table. Executive Director Murray Thomson described CUSO’s actions not as an expulsion of SUCO, but a release for SUCO to be free to expend its energies on development questions, “free of any majority decisions by linguistic groups.” The action was also to free CUSO to spend its time on development questions:

We have grappled with this issue during a substantial part of all (1974) meetings. We have agreed today that we will shelve all the rest of our business in order to continue to grapple with this.

Some of the topics Thomson identified as being shelved included new initiatives in Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, and defining policy and criteria for overseas projects

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236 The minutes of the 16 March 1974 Board of Directors’ meeting note that "these budgets were approved in a hurry at the end of the meeting which had been spent discussing the Francophone Committee’s vote of non confidence in Ronald Léger." When CUSO refused to act, SUCO unilaterally appointed a new Executive Director on 18 March; CUSO countered by saying the action was illegal and refused to acknowledge it.

237 CUSO-SUCO Board of Directors’ meeting, 14 September 1974.

and the upcoming AGM. Table XIV shows the extent to which development questions were sacrificed by the time and energy spent on the constitutional question. Thomson estimated that 60% of the Board's 1974 time had been devoted to the question; over 30% of the time was spent on routine administrative and financial reports and "less than 10% was spent discussing development issues and policy." 

Table XIV:
Division of CUSO-SUCO Board of Directors' time Jan-Sept 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>% of time on constit.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01\01</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02\03</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16\03</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31\03</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25\05</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27\07</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14\09</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


At the December 1974 AGM the crisis reached its peak. Members were to vote on the motion of separation proposed by the Board in September. This meant that a second consecutive AGM was spent focussing on the question of CUSO-SUCO structures. The question of development education was mentioned but received little attention. Eventually a last minute change of heart by Thomson helped avoid a split; the motion was defeated by a total of 50 for and 132 against. CUSO and SUCO stayed together under the DAPDUC model but two AGMs, Board meetings and

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239 Ibid.

240 Ibid. Also, from August 1972 to September 1974 over 215 hours (plus 3 months for the Siré report discussions) were spent on the constitutional question, and only 15 minutes on development education.

241 See Minutes of 13th CUSO AGM, December 6-8, 1974, at the University of Ottawa, p. 9. CUSO Files. All agreed that more development education was necessary. See also Smillie, op. cit., p. 304.

242 Ibid.
ad hoc committees had spent most of their time and energy on the question for an entire year.

b) CUSO-SUCO Efficiency

The main point of contention between CUSO and SUCO was clearly the division of authority. As one CUSO Director remarked,

Ideology is only a very minor factor in this whole issue. The major question is control over your own affairs. 243

This view was confirmed by the March SUCO press release which stated that the impasse illustrated clearly not different development philosophies but "la profonde difficulté de fonctionner des organismes pan-canadiens où—démographie oblige—les francophones sont d’éternels minoritaires." 244 The Constitutional Review Committee confirmed this view. 245

Because the constitutional crisis was inspired by linguistic and cultural differences, all consequences of the crisis can be directly attributed to these internal Canadian considerations. The time and energy of CUSO and SUCO were deflected from their development goals. The overseas programmes received less attention, innovation (development education) was either not attempted, or identified negatively with the Anglophone-Francophone dispute, and cooperation with CIDA received a


244 SUCO, "Les Anglophones provoquent la crise au SUCO." 22 March 1974.

245 C.M. Williams, Chairman of Board, Constitutional Review Committee. A confidential report of progress, 26 June 1974, in CUSO Files.
negative image (see below). Murray Thomson summed up the CUSO frustration during the September expulsion motion:

We want to get on with the work...Please, friends on the Francophone side, believe me, we don't want to expel you, we want you to release us, and to release yourselves, to do the jobs that we must do. The doomsday clock on the cover of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists is set at 7 minutes to midnight. We are aware of that in a whole variety of ways. Let us get on with the jobs we are given to do!246

c) CUSO-SUCO Independence

Another important element in the CUSO-SUCO conflict was the role played by Ottawa. The organization was a rarity among Canadian NGOs in that it often received more than the 50-50 matching grant, see Table XV, and over 90 percent of its Canadian funding from CIDA.247 The yearly contribution did not include development education expenses—which received fewer subsidies.248

246 Thomson, to CUSO-SUCO Board of Directors' meeting, 14 September 1974. From M. Sinclair letter to the CUSO Board of Operations Committee.

247 The host country contribution accounted for the rest of the projects' costs. Smillie, op. cit., p. 265. Also Roxanna Spicer, "CUSO: What Price Unity?" Journalism Honours paper, Carleton, 1975. CUSO Files. Spicer calculated the 1974-5 CIDA contribution as being 93% of CUSO's budget.

TABLE XV: CIDA Subsidies to CUSO-SUCO, 1968-75 (in millions) $

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Cost funded projects</th>
<th>Amount of CIDA Subsidy</th>
<th>% paid by CIDA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968-73</td>
<td>54.586867</td>
<td>21.674760</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>13.354562</td>
<td>7.433000</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>13.305422</td>
<td>7.563320</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76 (partial)</td>
<td>1.217533</td>
<td>585900</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>82.464384</td>
<td>37.256980</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


CUSO-SUCO was generally supportive of CIDA's NGO division, which was referred to as a "masterstroke" and model for other countries by Ian Smillie, a later CUSO Executive Director. Nevertheless, it was a government agency, and inevitably susceptible to political trends which did influence the behaviour of Canadian NGOs. According to the head of SUCO's development education division, Michel Blondin, CIDA was responsible for the CUSO-SUCO controversy:

>CIDA officials associate SUCO with separatism. The problem between SUCO and CUSO began when CIDA stepped in and demanded that we cease our domestic activities. Only then did CUSO begin to think we were a menace to the whole organization.

CUSO did not disagree. To determine the extent Ottawa influenced the conflict, a look at the conditions imposed—and conditions perceived by CUSO and SUCO—of CIDA funding is necessary.

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249 Smillie, op. cit., p. 269.

250 Blondin, quoted in Smillie, op. cit., p. 292. See also p. 192.

251 Smillie, op. cit., pp. 32, 269. See also J. Poole, "Comments on SUCO meeting in Montreal, November 1974. CUSO Files; And CUSO-SUCO Board of Directors, 2 March 1974. CUSO Files.
Ottawa's funding conditions gave little head to the NGO's development approaches. CUSO-SUCO asked for long term contracts based on its criteria of development efficiency (including development education funds); instead, only one year contracts were issued, based on the number of volunteers sent overseas, which added fuel to CUSO-SUCO tensions because SUCO placements were more expensive.\(^{252}\) The guarantee that CIDA would either accept to fund any NGO with matching grants, or refuse totally, was not applied; the year to year budget fluctuated according to CIDA's will. The specific conditions CIDA demanded were seldom clear, but indications were given. Smillie claims that CIDA insisted on CUSO and SUCO's submitting one budget because they did not want a split along 'racial' lines.\(^{253}\) Thomson remembers being warned by a CIDA official to "stay on the development tracks...the traditional ones," or funds would be reduced.\(^{254}\) On other occasions SUCO staff were warned by CIDA officials to reduce their political activities.\(^{255}\) The Constitutional Review Committee referred to the "repeated signals from CIDA" concerning CUSO-SUCO activities,\(^{256}\) but only on three occasions during the year did CIDA put its conditions in writing. The first two letters demanded increased

\(^{252}\) Smillie, op. cit., p. 267. Because SUCO could not meet CIDA's requirements, for whatever reasons, CUSO was forced to decrease its funding to cover SUCO's losses.

\(^{253}\) Ibid., p. 287.

\(^{254}\) Quoted in Smillie, op. cit., p.104. The CIDA worker was B. Marson. Perinbam knew nothing of Marson's warning--of which he disapproved. From Perinbam interview, February 1989.

\(^{255}\) Jacques Fournier, in an interview with R. Spicer. See Spicer, op. cit., p. 10. Also, SUCO Director Yvan Madore, warned by CIDA President Michel Dupuy in Smillie, op. cit., p.269. See also pp. 155, 222.

\(^{256}\) C.M. Williams letter on Constitutional Review Committee progress, 26 June 1974.
accounting of expenditures and warned that "no new initiatives must be undertaken with CIDA funds".\textsuperscript{257}

The third letter was more explicit. On November 15 Lewis Perinbam sent CIDA's reply to the CUSO-SUCO 1974-5 budget proposal. A grant of 7.3 million dollars was approved—if SU CO sent 159 volunteers overseas and CUSO 476. Other conditions were added:

- administrative overhead of the overseas volunteer programme may not exceed 14% of the total CIDA contribution;
- it is understood that donations from private sources, unless they are made for a specific purpose, will be used for the overseas volunteer programme;
- it should be noted that no funds from the present contribution may be used for development education.\textsuperscript{258}

Members of the CUSO-SUCO Finance Committee were "unanimous in their intense dissatisfaction with many of the conditions" in CIDA's reply. The 14% maximum for administrative costs appeared arbitrary. The dictating of private expenditure was "totally unacceptable—what does it mean to be an NGO?" the CUSO-SUCO Board wondered and the total omission of development education funding seriously altered the organization's intended programme.\textsuperscript{259} CUSO-SUCO recognized CIDA's right to refuse funds, but insisted on their right "to disagree, to negotiate the terms of agreement, and to set our own objectives and priorities independent of government

\textsuperscript{257} CIDA letters of 18 June and 2 July presented at CUSO-SUCO Finance Committee meetings of 27 July 1974 (BOARDOC 147) and 14 September 1974 (BOARDOC 176).

\textsuperscript{258} Perinbam to Thomson, CIDA Funding Notice. 15 November 1974. CUSO Files.

\textsuperscript{259} CUSO-SUCO Board of Directors meeting, 16 November 1974. CUSO Files, BOARDOC 203. Also, Finance Committee, same day; and "Comments on Lewis Perinbam’s letter of November 15." CUSO Files, BOARDOC 210.
sanctions.\textsuperscript{260} Perinbam explained that the conditions were not important, not intended as interference, and that CIDA confidence in CUSO-SUCO was clear with the grant of 7.2$ million.\textsuperscript{261}

Regardless of Perinbam's motives, CUSO's perception of CIDA's intentions was clear. Linguistic harmony and minimal development education were required or funding would be reduced. In letters to the Constitutional Review Committee by three CUSO Board of Directors, a major consideration was CIDA's anticipated negative reaction to any possible split.\textsuperscript{262} CUSO members were also convinced that the 1974-75 CIDA budget problems were the result of SUCO's development education policies. Consequently CUSO was in a no win situation concerning its constitutional structure. If SUCO (and its development education policy) stayed with them, CUSO believed it would lose CIDA funds; if SUCO left, CUSO believed CIDA would also cut funding.

SUCO also anticipated CIDA interference and the budget conditions confirmed its fears.\textsuperscript{263} Léger had warned: "We cannot maintain our orientation if we stick to our present financing system."\textsuperscript{264} But SUCO refused to adapt its policies to its perception of CIDA goals.


\textsuperscript{261} Perinbam interview, February 1989. That the conditions on private funding were not important was confirmed by the fact that a redraft was made of the November 15 letter three days later in which no mention of private funds was made. All other conditions remained.

\textsuperscript{262} Williams' letter, June 26, 1974. Sinclair's letter, 26 July 1974. The question asked was: "would CIDA support two separate budgets?" And Don Trivett's letter, 15 October 1974. CUSO Files.

\textsuperscript{263} SUCO Committee meeting, 10 May 1976; also, 14 September 1974. CUSO Files, BOARDOC 176.

\textsuperscript{264} Léger, Executive Director's report to the Francophone Committee, 23 February 1974. CUSO Files.
The Government's reaction is normal and foreseeable, but how should we react? Should we accept that CIDA openly impose on us its own conception of international development? Should we accept that an active and efficient sector of an organization devoted to international solidarity and development be victim of its faithfulness to the objectives of the corporation?\(^{265}\)

Another publication remarked that:

si le SUCO est un organisme privé et qui continue de l’être, il est essentiel pour lui de négocier son budget; si non, c’est accepter d’avance d’être mené par le bout du nez par le gouvernement et d’obéir à ses suggestions.\(^{266}\)

SUCO's determination to challenge its major source of funds led directly to the two crises of the SUCO committee: the one with Léger and the other with CUSO.

CIDA's conflict with CUSO-SUCO was based to a considerable extent on a fundamental difference in development philosophy. CIDA maintained its policy of funding development education projects individually; SUCO argued that innovative approaches were essentiel—and their value was to be determined by the NGOs, not the government. The consequences of the development disagreement included a long, expensive negotiation process between CUSO and SUCO based on unclear hints from CIDA—which refused to negotiate directly. After receiving CIDA's contract, Thomson decided to "delay signing until all this is resolved to the satisfaction of the CUSO-SUCO Board."\(^{267}\) Because of the delays, CUSO-SUCO was forced to borrow over 2$ million.\(^{268}\) Also, a committee was established specifically "to deal with CIDA

\(^{265}\) M. Blondin, "Education in International Solidarity." 19 September 1974. 105 A.

\(^{266}\) SUCO, "Le Comité francophone fait le point de la situation à SUCO", 26 March 1974, p. 4, CUSO Files, BOARDOC 57.


\(^{268}\) Smillie, op. cit., p. 265.
on various policy matters concerning Lewis Perinbam's letter of November 15.  

Smillie affirmed that the "annual negotiations for the government contribution consumed months of planning, preparation and arguments" at CUSO-SUCO. CIDA's views inevitably prevailed, and CUSO-SUCO was forced to adapt its programme—in 1974-5 this included changes in recruitment and placement procedures. Thus a great deal of time, money and energy was expended over the development disagreement.

Different development philosophies were not the only considerations in CIDA's response. Both SUCO and CUSO received the clear impression that domestic political factors were at the root of Ottawa's actions. Consequently, the major portion of the time and energy that CUSO-SUCO devoted to the CIDA budget question was centred around two perceived federal prerequisites. First, development education could not promote Quebec separatism. In a November 1974 press release CUSO and SUCO felt obliged to announce that neither supported the movement. Second, the organization could not divide along linguistic lines. The Siré report recommended that

CUSO-CUSO continue to project a pan-Canadian image which is politically preferable ...to the main supplier of funds.

And another commission agreed that

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269 CUSO-SUCO Board of Directors meeting, 16 November 1974.

270 Smillie, op. cit., p. 103; see also p. 138.


273 Siré, quoted in Jim Holmes letter to CUSO, 16 November 1973. CUSO Files, BOARDOC 204.
It was recognized that on the short term one of the major reasons for staying together was the budgetary question: to save face in front of CIDA, because both sides would be penalized by the separation and would lose some of the power of negotiation.\textsuperscript{274}

CUSO and SUCO both accused Ottawa of being more concerned with domestic Canadian politics than with development.\textsuperscript{275}

**Conclusion**

Since their 1973 separation, OXFAM-Québec and OXFAM-Canada have carried out their own programmes almost totally independently of each other. In contrast, CUSO and SUCO continued their troubled coexistence up to 1980 when a complete separation was agreed to.\textsuperscript{276} In 1984 SUCO came to an end when cabinet refused to grant any further funds to the association.\textsuperscript{277} Clearly, the long-term consequences of linguistic tensions were more devastating to CUSO and SUCO than to the Canadian OXFAM branches.

Certain opportunities were missed because of the time, money and energy each group spent on the separation proceedings. Development thinking was experiencing rapid changes at the time and NGOs were expected to lead the way. Innovation was possible in OXFAM's programmes, but seriously compromised in those of CUSO-SUCO. Development education was identified more with the linguistic struggle than it was with development efficiency. Chances to improve on traditional development plans were also neglected. One CUSO Board member complained about the structural debate:

\textsuperscript{274} CUSO-SUCO Commission of Enquiry 1975, CUSO Files.


\textsuperscript{276} Smillie, *op. cit.*, pp. 112, 305.

\textsuperscript{277} Perinbam interview, February 1989. SUCO has since reemerged.
all this costs a lot of time, effort and money. The really important consequences in a sense are the lost opportunities—in the form of the Board's not being able to deal with more important matters.278

Besides the potential advances that were not realized, the linguistic dispute had more concrete consequences on the OXFAM and CUSO-SUCO programmes. The regular programmes of CUSO and SUCO received much less time and energy during the year and efficiency was thus hurt. As well, the independence of the NGOs was compromised by the interference (real or perceived) from Ottawa in CUSO-SUCO activities. Lewis Perinbam warned that Ottawa's collaboration with NGOs needed to be seen "as an opportunity to forge relationships and not as a threat to the 'status quo' or as a source of disruption."279 Yet CUSO and SUCO were convinced that Ottawa did see their organization as a threat—to the fragile Canadian national unity status quo—which affected their functioning.


279 Perinbam, Commonwealth..., p. 7.
CHAPTER FIVE: Promoting International or Internal Solidarity

The Impact on the Canadian Development Education Programme.

[Greater] information, involvement and public support are essential to a sustained Canadian contribution [and] to the evolution of the domestic and international policies affecting cooperation.


From 1968 to 1976 internal political considerations distorted the international development results of both the NGOs and CIDA’s Francophone African aid division. Both programmes were important; however, during the 1970s the emphasis of international development approaches was clearly on the increased priority given to correcting international economic injustices. Implementing the desired reforms, embodied in the NIEO, required the understanding and support of northern populations. Therefore the goal of informing and educating the Canadian public suddenly became a primary goal of international development organizations. Because Ottawa used every means possible to promote Canadian cultural and linguistic unity, it is not surprising that these internal considerations appeared in Ottawa’s ostensibly internationally oriented development education programme.

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280 LaChance, op. cit., p. 27. Quebec NGOs which identified their principal role as sending volunteers overseas declined from 6 to 4 from the 1960s to the 1970s. In the same period development education NGOs increased from 16 to 32.
A) International and Canadian Theory

1. Why It is necessary

By 1970 it became clear to an increasing number of observers that the North was becoming exceedingly rich at the expense of the South. International commercial and monetary structures—decided by the North for the North and imposed on the South—encouraged this trend. Consequently, international development specialists emphasized the point that a prerequisite for global change was a change in "les attitudes, les actions et les systèmes" of each northern nation. Technical solutions existed to the unjust international distribution of resources; what was absent, according to the Brandt Commission, was a "clear and generalized awareness of the realities and dangers and the ...political will to face up to them and take corrective actions." Before politicians would act, the public had to be informed and mobilized to the point that they would accept, if not demand the necessary fundamental structural changes. A UN report remarked that:

Il est essentiel de mobiliser l’opinion publique dans tous les pays, particulièrement dans les pays développés, afin d’obtenir leur plein adhésion aux buts et objectifs de la stratégie actuelle et à sa mise en œuvre.

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281 Cranford Pratt, "From Pearson to Brandt..." p. 624. In 1975 LDCs were predicted to increase their average GNP per capita of 146$ to 160$ by 1990. In the same period the industrialized countries were expected to increase theirs from 5865$ to 9999$.


283 Brandt, Quoted in Pratt, op. cit., p. 645. See also Brandt Report, pp. 267, 57, 68, 497.

284 Nations Unies, Stratégie pour la 3ième décennie..., p. 2. See also, OECD, Collaboration..., pp. 11, 14; Nations Unies, Stratégie pour la 2ième décennie..., p.30.
The relationship between public pressure and government action, treated in other studies, is complex and beyond the scope of this paper. All that is hoped here is to show that public mobilization towards the goal of implementing an NIEO was a central goal of international theorists.

Ottawa claimed to support this international policy. Trudeau had spoken in 1968 of the problems of the South "who are steadily falling farther and farther behind in their search for a decent standard of living." In 1976 Gérin-Lajoie blamed the situation on the effects of a system of exploitation linked to a power structure principally implanted in industrialized countries but having antennae in the Third World.

To correct the injustices, one of the five major priorities of CIDA for the 1970s was to "awaken the interest and encourage the participation of the Canadian people," without whom the necessary changes to trade, tariff and monetary policies would not be possible. From 1968 to 1976 CIDA Annual Reviews consistently emitted the message that more public understanding and support of international cooperation was essential. Demonstrating to the public that the international economy was unjust was no guarantee that Canadians would demand, or even prefer a more just distribution of ressources, but as Cranford Pratt suggested, it was worth a try:


286 Trudeau, quoted in Carty and Smith, op. cit., p.41.

287 Gérin-Lajoie, "Path we have come," p. 4. He was paraphrasing a 1975 Dag Hammarskjold report. Also, DEA, Strategy..., p. 3.


One should not scorn the significance of what might yet be achieved by increasing the sensitivity and responsibility of the consciousness of the North to worldwide moral values.

2. How it should be implemented

The United Nations' goal of mobilizing all sectors of all countries' populations towards the pursuit of international justice would not be easy to implement. This mobilization could take many forms, and innovative approaches were required. For this the NGOs were recognized as being the most efficient channel and the OECD recommended generous subsidies to NGO development education programmes. Other government initiatives, however, were certainly not ruled out.

Ottawa agreed that all sectors of the Canadian population had to be included in a wide-ranging development education programme. The egotistical mentality of the northern consumer society needed to be replaced by one of international solidarity. Maurice Strong and Jacques Hébert compared the desired mobilization with the Second World War 'total effort.' Clearly, drastic measures were needed. Gérin-Lajoie, in a booklet entitled "No Room for Routine," argued that "CIDA must be imaginative and must not be afraid to innovate and to change radically, if necessary, its perspectives, policies and programmes." This innovation would include subsidies to the NGOs which, independent of the government, would implement their own development education ideas, through workshops, local

290 Pratt, op. cit., p. 625.
292 OECD, Collaboration..., pp. 13, 14.
294 Gérin-Lajoie, No Room for Routine, pp. 5, 17.
meetings, learner centres, films and high school assemblies. Ottawa's other innovative approaches were to include increased CIDA publications, an active debate in parliament and the press, as well as the involvement of unions, business leaders and other segments of Canadian society.

B) Canadian Practice

1. How Ottawa Implemented its development education programme

The actual Canadian practice of the "essential" development education took two principal forms. First were subsidies to NGO development programmes. These subsidies were channeled through a branch of CIDA'S NGO division, created in 1971, named the Public Participation Programme (PPP). The objective of the branch was to

develop a greater awareness among Canadians of international development issues and problems and to stimulate increased development cooperation through the non governmental sector. In doing this it also must ensure that it does not become a political action programme.

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295 CIDA Annual Review 1970-1, p. 62; ACDI et les ONGs, p. 9; Gérin-Lajoie, Le Chemin... p. 16; Perinbam Interview, Feb 1989.


297 CIDA, Programme Summary, NGO Division, 1977-8, p. 4; CIDA, CIDA and the NGOs, pp. 9, 10.
The majority of evaluations of CIDA's PPP branch credit CIDA with being innovative in its development education initiative but, in the words of Gabrielle LaChance, "l'ACDI n'arrive pas à atteindre la population canadienne de façon significative." One reason for the failure was the small amount of money given to the branch. Table XVI shows that on average less than 0.1% of CIDA's budget was allotted to the "essential" "top priority" of the Canadian development programme. The restrained funding was ensured by the policy of matching funds; effectively, the Canadian public was to be solicited to provide funds for its own increased awareness. However, limited funds was only a symptom of the disease: political interference in CIDA's programme.

Behind the PPP refusal to fund political projects—which contradicted many CIDA statements—was the thinly disguised figure of political puppets being directed by the Canadian business lobby. The condition that no funds go to projects "qui traitent de sujets et de problèmes qui relèvent d'autres ministères et organismes du

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gouvernement," such as ITC and DEA, contradicted Gérin-Lajoie's promise to implement:

> a more comprehensive view of development cooperation, (which) will require a CIDA input in many areas of policy which have traditionally been reserved to other departments.\textsuperscript{301}

The condition that no funds go to projects which are incompatible "avec la politique étrangère et le programme d'aide du Canada"\textsuperscript{302} was a contradiction of the whole raison d'être of the PPP–funding innovative, independent new approaches to increase the awareness of Canadians of international injustices...including certain aspects of the Canadian foreign policy. Ottawa went so far as to threaten private campaigns of NGOs with the removal of their right to issue tax exemption receipts if they indulged in any "political activities (designed to) influence the policy-making process of any level of government."\textsuperscript{303} Finally, the federal cabinet's condition that when funding development education, both sides had to be presented or Canadian taxpayers who disagreed with the publicity would be upset\textsuperscript{304} was inconsistent with other government public awareness campaigns; objections from overweight, chain smoking drunk drivers have not moved the government to ensure both sides are heard when they fund their idea of proper behaviour. Nor did Ottawa feel it necessary to provide equal support to both sides during the 1980 Quebec referendum debate.


\textsuperscript{302} CIDA, Intro and Guide, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{303} Richard Gwyn, "Ottawa orders OXFAM..." A Revenue Canada official clarified that: "We are happy to discuss the matter with organizations and advise them how far they can go without jeopardizing their status."

\textsuperscript{304} Lewis Perinbam, Interview, February 1989.
Preoccupation with Canadian bicultural relations was not absent from Ottawa's motives for interfering in the PPP branch. The references to Quebec separatism in certain development education publications undoubtedly alarmed the Trudeau federalists at Ottawa.305

The second major form Ottawa's development education programme took was the use of direct speeches and publications. In CIDA's 1975-6 Annual Review, Gérin-Lajoie announced that

we consider it essential to keep the Canadian public well informed about these shifting realities of the international scene, for the strength and future of our cooperation programme depends on a firm commitment by our entire national community.306

Concretely, to fulfill this need, it was announced that the Annual Review had been doubled in size. The promise to "make available" to the public relevant information was also made,307 but the gap between "mobilizing" public opinion and having information ready in case anyone asked is substantial.

In public statements, cabinet ministers did occasionally mention the topic of international economic justice. However, the message was lost amid domestic concerns. The national unity obsession received much attention and promotion during public addresses in the early part of the period.308 When international development was referred to it was only superficially, and usually from the point of view of its effects on Canada. A notable exception is the last two years of the period

305 See note 226 in Chapter 4. Particularly worrisome for the federalists would have been the fact that four of the major NGOs had made such references.


307 CIDA, Annual Review, 1975-6, p. 5; DEA, Strategy, p. 20.

when international development received more serious attention.\footnote{309} Thus the Canadian development education message transmitted (both through subsidized NGO projects and public government declarations) was too little in quantity and too much oriented towards Canadian considerations.

### Table XVII: Orientation of Canadian Cabinet Statements and Speeches, when referring to International Development, 1968-76

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Quebec in Ext-Affs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(note: the total number of statements and speeches was 239.)

source: DEA, Déclarations et Discours, 1968-76.\footnote{310}

### 2. The Results

Ottawa claimed to be pleased with the results of its efforts. According to CIDA's 1977 report:

A recent major review of the programme indicated that it has succeeded in reaching many Canadians, particularly those living in smaller communities, and in involving them in international development.\footnote{311}

A later report announced that:

\footnote{309} See Table XVII.

\footnote{310} This table is a rough approximation, as several speeches were removed from the copy of Déclarations et Discours used for the table (33 in all of the 239 from the six years.)

\footnote{311} CIDA, Programme Summary, NGO Division, 1977-8. p.4.
le programme a certainement contribué directement à éclairer l'opinion publique et à mieux faire comprendre la signification du développemen\textsuperscript{312}

A look at the House of Commons debates, media articles and public opinion polls will determine the validity of these affirmations.

\textbf{a) Canadian House of Commons Debates}

Because the structural changes CIDA appeared to be recommending in its policy would have profound implications on the world—and Canadian—economy, a serious development education programme oriented in this direction could be expected to draw some questions from parliamentarians. MPs who were supportive, sceptical, or just curious would want to voice their opinions on such an important topic. Conversely, an ineffective programme would be ignored, as would the situation of the South. Table XVIII provides a rough indication of the amount and orientation of questions on development-related issues in parliament.

This Table divides MPs' questions according to an estimation of the principal orientation, or intention of the interogation. For example, certain inquiries were clearly oriented towards a concern for the development of southern countries. William Robinson asked: "quels progrès économiques ont été accomplis dans le cadre du plan Colombo?"\textsuperscript{313} This type of questioning was what the Canadian development education programme hoped to provoke. Such examples were however very rare.\textsuperscript{314}

Even when the recipient's development was the focus of the question, the effects and

\textsuperscript{312} CIDA, \textit{CIDA and the NGOss}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{313} \textit{CHCD}, 3rd session, 27th parliament, 22 December 1971, p. 10700.

\textsuperscript{314} See "recipient" column in Table XVIII.
costs on Canada were rarely absent. An example of this type of question would be David Lewis's inquiry as to the date on which the government expected to fulfill its promise of transferring 1% of Canada's GNP to southern countries.

Table XVIII:
Orientation of Questions in Canadian House of Commons Debates on Canadian Fed.-Prov. Aid Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Donor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: Canadian House of Commons Debates: 1968-76.

More frequent were the "development" questions mostly, or completely, oriented to Canadian concerns—with little or no consideration for the plight of the South. Instead of being mobilized to flood the government with questions about international development, parliamentarians were either ignorant or unconcerned with the situation.

Some examples of the "Donor-Recipient" oriented questions include Alfred Hales's inquiry as to the possibilities for the Canadian programme in Mexico, or more precisely, "qu'est ce que le Canada en retira?" Also, John Diefenbaker's

315 See "Recipient-Donor" column in Table XVIII.
316 See "Donor-Recipient" and "Donor" columns in Table XVIII.
317 Bruneau feels MPs were ignorant of the international situation because of the nature of the Canadian political system. op. cit., pp. 37, 40, 42.
request for information on the number of CIDA interest free loans. The concern of both appears to be for the effect to Canada of the relationship, although a simultaneous interest in the recipient's position is possible. In the "Donor" oriented column even this possible interest is absent. George Whittaker asked if CIDA had loaned Cuba 50 million and "dans l'affirmative, songe-t-il à un programme en particulier afin d'accorder la même aide aux Canadiens?" Ron Huntington wanted to know: "qu'en retire le Canada pour justifier la participation de l'ACDI" in Botswana. Other questions sought information on how much the CIDA President was paid (and whether he had a chauffeur-driven limousine) and how tied aid benefits to Canadians were ensured by the programme. The debate was not on the positive and negative points of the NIEO, nor on the effects on the recipient of current Canadian policies, but on the domestic Canadian impact. Sharp did not try to alter this orientation, as is shown by his effort to reassure one critical MP that "l'aide non liée n'a représenté jusqu'à maintenant qu'une faible proportion de l'ensemble du programme de l'ACDI et elle n'excède sûrement pas 15% du total des déboursés de l'ACDI."

With most international development questions (and government responses) being oriented towards the cost and effects on Canada of the CIDA aid programme, it is not surprising that cultural and linguistic aspects were present. Besides the questions concerning primarily Ottawa-Quebec relations, Michel Houndjahoué


320 CHCD, 1st sess., 30 parl., 7 April 1975, p. 4548.


324 See "Fed. Prov. Relations" column in Table XVIII.
concluded that questions on Canadian federalism dominated also the debate on aid in the early years of the period; specifically, aid to Francophone Africa. In 1975 the national unity orientation had not disappeared from the aid debate; John Reynolds demanded to know when the Latin American division of CIDA was "proclaimed unilingually French?" In fact, French was the working language of the division which provided services in both French and English.

Thus from Table XVIII it can be concluded that the quality of questioning during House of Commons' debates reflected neither a greater awareness of international injustices nor any increased desire to correct them. The almost total absence of such a debate is best illustrated by two 1976 questions on CIDA actions asking if the agency had ever supported projects or loans in foreign countries. The quantity of questions was also far too low to be considered a "mobilization" of MPs. In 1975 and 1976 references to CIDA in Hansard did greatly increase (a fact not adequately reflected in Table XVIII) but this was in reaction to Canadian concerns about waste and mismanagement by the agency—not NIEO issues. The results of Ottawa's development education programme, judging by the quantity and quality of MPs' questioning, was thus not encouraging.

328 Table XVIII shows questions only; the references to CIDA increased from about 30 in 1970-73 to over 300 from 1974-6.
**b) Newspaper Articles**

The quantity and orientation of newspaper articles is another good indication of the results of Ottawa's public education programme. Newspapers provide the primary source of information for a large part of the Canadian public. Any national mobilization would necessarily involve the active and informed participation of the Canadian press. As Gérin-Lajoie remarked:

> Il ne suffit pas d'avoir la matière pour l'information, il faut avoir les media de support pour les diffuser.\(^{329}\)

As with the House of Commons debates, the quantity of articles on international development was well below what was needed for a full mobilization. The 1976-7 CIDA Annual Review pointed out that while 35,000 people were needlessly dying in the South from malnutrition, disease and poverty every day

> the priorities of the rich, who mostly regarded themselves as humane and responsible world citizens, were such that these millions of personal tragedies went virtually unreported in their daily news.\(^{330}\)

Representatives of business, universities, NGOs and school teachers all agreed that newspapers did not adequately inform Canadians on development issues.\(^{331}\) Table XIX confirms the conclusions of another study, that "la pénurie d'articles concernant les relations entre le Canada et le Tiers Monde est assez frappante."\(^{332}\)

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\(^{329}\) In LaChance, *op. cit.*, p. 77.


\(^{331}\) ACDI, *Publications de l'ACDI*. p. 3.

Table XIX: Number of newspaper items by principal subject
(Number in brackets reflects the articles which appeared on page 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Aid, or CIDA</th>
<th>Ottawa-Quebec non aid involvement with Francophone African countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>14 (3)</td>
<td>46 (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>34 (3)</td>
<td>65 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>45 (8)</td>
<td>54 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>31 (2)</td>
<td>59 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>18 (2)</td>
<td>21 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>42 (0)</td>
<td>34 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>29 (2)</td>
<td>25 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>30 (1)</td>
<td>10 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>16 (1)</td>
<td>16 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>259 (22)</td>
<td>323 (99)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: Le Devoir Index, 1968-76.

Because of its nature, the Canadian media were instinctively attracted to controversial stories, or scandals. This explains why the domestic aspects of the Ottawa-Quebec struggle in Francophone Africa received considerably more attention than did the less spectacular development issues. This tendency is confirmed in Table XIX by the proportion of articles from each group which appeared on page one. It should be noted that many aid articles also focussed on the Ottawa-Quebec struggle, but were included under the "Aid or CIDA" column if they made any reference to CIDA aid. Examples include articles described in Le Devoir's index such as "Gérin-Lajoie ne veut pas transposer dans les pays en voie de développement les problèmes linguistiques et culturels du Canada," and "Le Quebec veut participer de plein droit aux programmes et aux decisions de l'ACDI."

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Table XX: Orientation of newspaper items on Aid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Recipient-Donor</th>
<th>Donor-Recipient</th>
<th>Donor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

source: Le Devoir index. 1968-76.

Besides the lack of articles, the media preference for sensationalism disfavoured any campaign to inform the Canadian public on NIEO issues by the orientation of the articles. T. Keenleyside's study observed that even when international development was mentioned in Canadian newspapers, the recent NIEO trends and effects on the recipient received superficial or no attention while the articles focussed on the benefits and costs of Canadian aid to Canadians.\(^{334}\) Table XX confirms this conclusion: only 10% of items on aid or CIDA were concerned exclusively with the situation in southern countries, none of which appeared on the front page.\(^{335}\) The majority of articles, especially during the period 1975-6, were CIDAGATE type exposés of aid waste or mismanagement—most of which were exaggerations or total

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\(^{334}\) Keenleyside et al. op. cit., p. 513. The authors list three other studies with the same conclusion by D. Stairs (1976), W. Suderland (1976) and the Kent Commission (1981).

\(^{335}\) Of the 22 front page articles referred to in Table XIX, the breakdown was as follows: Recip-0, Recip-Don-8, Don-Recip-7, Don-7.
Among the most notable was journalist Morton Shulman's front page fabrication of CIDA activities in Haiti. 337

Many of these donor-oriented items were counterproductive to efficient development education. The rantings of the seldom informed, often racist 'journalists' such as Barbara Amiel, Peter Worthington and others unfortunately found a receptive audience among certain segments of the Canadian population. They misinformed, and as Carty and Smith wrote, fueled public ire with reports of ham slicers sent to Senegal, where religious rules prohibit the consumption of swine flesh, Canadian dairy cattle dead on arrival in India, and grain rotting in Ethiopian warehouses. These media horror stories have often been distortions of fact, easily refuted by agency officials, but still they linger longer in the collective consciousness than subsequent proofs of innocence. 339

All Canadian groups concerned with international development agreed that if CIDA's positive development education programme was ineffective, it must as a minimum respond to unfair negative criticisms in the press. 340 Yet Gérin-Lajoie announced that in such cases "it is more effective, as regards public information, not to try to

336 Carty and Smith, op. cit, p. 6. As C. Morin mentions, the substance of the Quebec-Ottawa international dispute was also lost in superficial media sensationalism. op. cit, pp. 189, 92.

337 Shulman based his CIDA waste story on a front page story from a major Haitian daily paper--this turned out to be an infrequently published 4 page newsletter "which contained none of the quotes attributed to it." Carty and Smith, op. cit, p. 6.

338 Ibid., pp. 6-13.


340 CIDA, CIDA Publications, p. 15.
disclaim it or to make a specific correction since that was probably their goal. He even described such criticism as beneficial, being the "symbol of an awakening." External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen also claimed to be pleased:

CIDA's programmes, and to some extent the whole concept of international development assistance, for the first time drew critical attention from the news media during 1974-5. Such criticism is not only natural, in a time of economic uncertainty, but also rather encouraging; it means that our aid effort is now substantial enough to be perceived as a major area of national interest and that we can expect sustained and increasingly informed public discussion.

Ottawa's claims of success for the results in the press of their development education programme were unconvincing. Despite the limits of Tables XVIII, XIX, XX it appears clear that the type of information CIDA hoped to present to Canadians—in the goal of establishing a more just international distribution of resources—was infrequent and outnumbered by the disinformation of press sensationalism. In the last two years of the period media horror stories dominated aid-related items while in the first two years the Ottawa-Quebec struggle was pervasive. Both cases resulted not from Ottawa's development efforts—but from the lack of such efforts.

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342 MacEachen in CIDA, Annual Review 1974-5, p. 3; Gérin-Lajoie quote from The Longest Journey, p. 11.

343 Only one paper—Le Devoir—was consulted, and only the titles of the articles and the heading in the index were used to categorize each item.
c) Canadian Public Opinion polls

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of Ottawa's public education programme it is necessary to study how the views of Canadians evolved during the period. This task is difficult with the methods used in this chapter—several polls before and after the period. It is made even harder because many factors contribute to public opinion and any changes are not necessarily the result of, or even affected by a government programme. But if public opinion did not evolve at all, then it can be concluded that Ottawa's programme had no significant effect.

The quantity of information received by the Canadian public can be estimated by establishing the knowledge of basic development terms among Canadians. For example, if no one had heard of CIDA it was not likely they knew the details of CIDA's desired development programme. In 1963 76% of Canadians could identify the Colombo plan as a programme of aid to developing countries. Yet in 1980 only 48% of Canadians had heard of CIDA. Even this figure is high, given the fact that 52% claimed to have heard of a bogus government aid agency called ACAO, and when asked to name the Canadian agency in 1988—without prompting—only 10% could identify CIDA.344 It is not surprising that in 1980 in response to the question: "vous êtes bien informé au sujet de ce que fait le Canada pour les pays sous-développés?" two-thirds of Canadians said no.345

344 C. Lemelin et J-C. Marion, Le Canada français et le Tiers-Monde, Ottawa, 1963, p. 26; ACDI, Rapport sur les attitudes des Canadiens face à l'aide étrangère, Ottawa, 1980, p. 54; CIDA, Report to CIDA, Public Attitudes, Ottawa, 1988, p. 32; L. Perinbam explained that almost 80% of news items refer to NGOs, not CIDA, which he argued is fine as long as the message gets through. February 1989 interview.

345 1980 poll, p. 55.
Polls also showed that Canadians supported a humanitarian development programme, but because of the lack of information, the interest of Canadians in and commitment to southern development issues was fragile and susceptible to being swayed. A 1975 poll indicated that only 21% of Canadians felt that "the problems of the underdeveloped countries of the world are their own responsibility" while 72% agreed that "the developed countries must share in this responsibility." And yet of the same sample of Canadians only 61% approved of the idea of development assistance, the weakest support of the four polls. A possible explanation for the relatively low aid support during a period when northern responsibility was acknowledged, is that the 1975 flurry of CIDAGATE attacks harmed the volatile public support of, and believe in the efficiency of, Canadian development assistance.

A serious development education campaign by Ottawa probably would have solidified what appeared to be a public opinion oriented to humanitarianism, behind a programme of international development aimed at southern needs. The majority of Canadians consistently favoured a development assistance programme being used to the exclusive benefit of the South, without consideration for the Canadian economy. However, this support was passive and when not "mobilized" in the early years of the period lessened significantly in the 1975-6 period.

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346 1963 poll, p. 74; 1980 p. 21. The 1963 poll included only Québécois; however the subsequent polls showed a strong resemblance between Quebec and Canadian responses.


348 Ibid.

349 See Table XXI.

Table XXI: Canadian Support for Development Assistance.
Replies to the question: Should Canada continue (or increase) its development assistance efforts?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 351

Conclusion

The results of Ottawa's efforts to mobilize the Canadian population, judging by the House of Commons questions, media reports and opinion polls, was a failure. First, the quantity of development references in parliament and the press were minimal—except for a slight increase in the last two years. Second, the orientation of these minimal references was more often on the Canadian costs and benefits than on southern needs. And third, among these domestic considerations, bicultural and bilingual issues were prevalent—particularly in the early part of the period. These results reflect Ottawa's minimal efforts concerning the programme, in development speeches and PPP subsidies to the NGOs.

The Canadian public was precariously leaning towards humanitarian support of southern development efforts throughout the period. With international economic disorder, and an NIEO being promoted by the United Nations, the opportunity was excellent for Ottawa's development advocates to rally the Canadian population against the business lobby, which preferred the international injustices, and in favour of a more equitable distribution of international resources. Instead, the opportunity was missed; minimal development education and the increase in negative CIDAGATE

stories hardened public opinion. The turning tide from 1973 to 1976, from an uninformed, passively humanitarian Canadian attitude at the height of the NIEO promotion to a misinformed increasingly sceptical public, was a serious consequence of Ottawa’s development education failure.

The promotion of Canadian biculturalism and bilingualism was not alone in obstructing those at CIDA who sought public support for an NIEO. With other northern countries and the determining Canadian business lobby opposing the NIEO, most politicians preferred the politically profitable status quo over justice. However, even on the rare occasions when development education was attempted, French-English relations added an additional complication. Because much of Ottawa’s time, energy and propaganda efforts in the early part of the period had been focussed on the domestic issue of Quebec’s international role, this question appeared in—and often replaced—most development messages. The media and MPs’ questions reflected the national unity obsession and the public consequently heard even less about southern development than it might have. By 1975-6 Ottawa’s ability to implement an effective development education programme became more and more limited, largely due to the predominance of national unity messages in the early years of the programme.
CONCLUSION: Imperfect help or aggravation of the problem?

I sit on a man's back choking him and making him carry me and yet assure myself and others that I am sorry for him and wish to lighten his load by all possible means—except by getting off his back.

- Tolstoy, cited in Carty, Perpetuating Poverty, p. 27.

The Canadian aid programme was designed, Ottawa claimed in public, exclusively to further international development. In private, politicians spoke more freely of their actual intentions for Canadian aid, notably of their goal of promoting national unity. Ottawa believed that the humanitarian goal of advancing international development could be, and was achieved simultaneously with its domestic political objectives. In fact, cultural and linguistic considerations were present—in the federal programme to Francophone Africa, in the NGO programmes and in the development education programme—to such an extent that they could not coexist independently with the optimal development policy; in fact, they replaced that policy.

In the period after 1976 Canada's tensions over bilingualism and biculturalism remained acute, though, paradoxically, with the separatist Parti Québécois in power provincially, the Ottawa-Quebec disputes were less frequent. In the Francophone African programme, several authors have agreed that after 1976 the domestic political objectives became less important while more economic objectives were sought. The NGOs' effectiveness and Ottawa's development education messages were also less affected by national unity concerns. The period 1968 to 1976 thus

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352 See chapter two, notes 92, 98.


354 Michel Houndjahoué, op. cit., p. 107; Mbeko, op. cit. pp. 179, 188, 212.
represented the height of the phenomenon of national unity tensions being expressed in the Canadian aid programme.

Between 1968 and 1976 many new opportunities presented themselves; there had never been a more opportune time for the implementation of innovative development approaches. The United Nations debated and adopted a wideranging integrated approach to encourage a more just international distribution of resources. North-South trade and monetary relations—much larger and more important than the more publicized "aid" relations—were recognized by all as requiring significant and immediate adjustments. The nascent programme of aid to Francophone Africa—which included the most underdeveloped countries in the world—would have been a good place to introduce some genuine Canadian assistance. The NGOs were experiencing a critical stage in their development with the beginning of government funded subsidies. Finally, development education was receiving priority emphasis and indications suggested that the Canadian population would by receptive to such information. The occasion would never be better for the advancement of international development.

Instead, the linguistic and cultural tensions received higher priority. Even more than neglecting the new opportunities to help, and limiting the help in existing programmes, the domestic political emphasis also added to the already enormous problems of international development.

In Ottawa's programme to Francophone Africa the domestic conflict appeared in the form of a flood of rushed, poorly conceived, expensive, cost intensive, visible, urban, infrastructure projects. The political sovereignty and economic fragility of the Francophone African recipients did not receive the consideration they merited. When the Canadian plans went over budget and over time, the recipient was often required to pay more of the bill than the original agreement had specified. A growing debt and the sacrifice of long term development plans were among the consequences to these countries of the Canadian domestic problem.
The NGOs' effectiveness and independence were both affected by the domestic political tensions. The time, resources and energy deflected to confront the cultural and linguistic problems had detrimental effects on the internal functioning of several organizations. Also, NGO independence was limited by implicit federal conditions on government funding.

The impact on Ottawa's development education programme were not as direct, but just as detrimental to international development. The initial predominance of cultural and linguistic concerns in Ottawa's limited development education messages nullified the development impact the programme might have had. In the absence of any positive arguments explaining the desirability of international justice, the Canadian public was more susceptible to the negative reports which criticized the whole idea of development assistance.

In the three aspects of the Canadian aid programme studied, domestic bilingual and bicultural tensions were clearly present. Ottawa's politicians, often against the better judgement of CIDA's development workers, succeeded in using the programme to impede Quebec's activities in Francophone Africa, to prolong artificially the division of the Anglophone-Francophone wings of CUSO, and to hamper separatist messages in development education communications. These goals, however, were not obtained in harmony with international development assistance, but in diametrically opposed discord.

\[355\] See chapter three, note 125. Also, the development theory at the beginning of chapters three, four and five.
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